A FORESEEABLE GENOCIDE

The Role of the French Government in Connection with the Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda

19 April 2021
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PREFACE

This Report is about the role of the French government in connection with the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda, one of the most monstrous atrocities of the 20th century. How the Genocide happened and who is responsible have been the subjects of hundreds of books, judicial proceedings, investigations, and journalistic efforts. And still, questions remain unanswered. Those who seek to evade responsibility have succeeded in hiding, obscuring or distorting the truth.

When a million human beings are slaughtered over a period of one hundred days, and generations continue to suffer more than a quarter century later, there is an imperative to finding the truth. In particular, Rwanda and its people insist on understanding the role of the French government. For too long, they have watched the French government avoid the truth and fail to acknowledge its role and responsibility.

The Rwandan government believes that bringing in an outside law firm, based neither in France nor Rwanda, best helps advance the public’s understanding of the facts. In 2017, the government commissioned this Washington, DC law firm to conduct a detailed inquiry to determine the French government’s role. In furtherance of this mandate, our aim has been to locate and ascertain the facts and circumstances related to the French government’s role, reach conclusions as to its responsibility, and report to the Government of Rwanda. We do so with this Report. The submission of this Report to the government marks the end of the investigation and speaks for itself. We will not be speaking with the media.

The Report is drawn from a range of both primary and secondary documentary sources, including transcripts; reports and studies by governments, non-government organizations and academics; diplomatic cables; documentaries and other videos; contemporaneous news articles; and other such resources. We have met with hundreds of individuals and interviewed more than 250 witnesses in English, French and Kinyarwanda. The Rwandan government has placed no restrictions on our efforts.

The Report is generally structured in chronological order. It begins with an examination of the French government’s early experiences in Rwanda and then focuses on the critical four years when the French government was most involved in Rwandan affairs, starting in October 1990 with the invasion of the RPF, through the Genocide in 1994, and Operation Turquoise later that summer. Importantly, the Report looks beyond the time of the actual Genocide. It examines the French government’s role for the past quarter century and establishes that the Government of France has continuously obstructed justice, concealed documents, and perpetuated false narratives about the Genocide. The coverup continues even to the present.

There are some hopeful signs that this may be changing. In 2019, President Emmanuel Macron ordered the creation of the Research Commission on the French Archives Related to Rwanda and the Genocide Against the Tutsi (“the Duclert Commission”). Several weeks ago, the Commission issued its report and conclusions. In many respects, these findings comport with our own. We commend the effort of the Commission, as it has unearthed new information and
presented the role of the French government in a more candid and honest manner. This new approach represents a departure from previous efforts to obscure the facts. However, our Report parts ways with the Commission in several respects, including:

- **Responsibility**
  It appears that neither the Duclert Commission nor the French government has yet come to a conclusion on the issue of responsibility. The Commission, while speaking of “overwhelming responsibility” and examining such with abstract considerations, including “political,” “institutional,” “intellectual,” “ethical,” “cognitive” and “moral” responsibility, fails to adjudge the actual responsibility of the French government. It fails to state what the French government was responsible for having done. Specifically, it fails to pronounce that the Government of France bears significant responsibility for having enabled a foreseeable genocide. We do so here.

- **Blindness**
  The Commission’s conclusion suggests that the French government was “blind” to the coming Genocide. Not so. Our Report concludes that the Genocide was foreseeable. From its knowledge of massacres of civilians conducted by the government and its allies, to the daily dehumanization of the Tutsi, to the cables and other data arriving from Rwanda, the French government could see that a genocide was coming. The French government was neither blind nor unconscious about the foreseeable genocide.

- **The Coverup**
  The Commission’s conclusion, in the main, does not address the quarter century after the Genocide. Our Report, by contrast, details and examines the cover-up, obstruction and false narratives promulgated by the French government since 1994. The Commission acknowledges the “limits” of its inquiry, in part born of the fact that the Government of France continues to withhold critical documents. This approach by the French government is regrettably consistent with a pattern of 27 years of obstruction.

Our Report was largely completed before the Commission’s work was made public. Nonetheless, we have at points in this Report incorporated facts unearthed by the Commission that aid historical understanding. But we have not attempted to incorporate or answer all of its data or analysis. Neither this Preface nor the Report is an effort to examine and respond to the Duclert Commission. It is enough to say we have regard for the Commission’s effort but suggest each report stands on its own.

Throughout this Report, there is a series of boxes set into the text, which feature the voices of victims who survived the Genocide. They are interspersed in each chapter to remind the reader that no study of the French government’s role can be complete without a continuing awareness of what the Genocide actually was. For those who have not lived it, to simply say the word “genocide” is almost anodyne and cannot convey even the small piece of the horror contained in the testimonies we have gathered. A scientific examination of the duties and failures of governments is important to show how their practices can be improved. But it is inadequate to the task of
determining and judging responsibility. The role of the French government must be examined in
the context of both the events they enabled and the generations irreparably harmed. It can be
disquieting and uncomfortable to confront what actually happened to the Tutsi, but it must be done.
However awkward and unsettling it may be to consider, France’s role can only be examined and
determined with a full awareness of what did occur.

This Report is the culmination of the superb work of the extraordinary professionals and
staff who conducted the investigation. Every page of the Report reflects their considerable skill,
dedication, judgment, decency and intellectual honesty. It has been an honor to share the mission
with such wonderful colleagues—all now dear friends.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge the considerable assistance we received from witnesses
in Rwanda, who themselves are survivors of the Genocide. Discussing what occurred is fraught
with enormous emotions, and this would often be evidenced in our meetings with witnesses who
spoke with deep and painful feelings about events that remain searing.

April 2021
Washington, D.C.

Robert F. Muse
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi in Rwanda stands as one of the darkest and most horrific chapters of the 20th century. In the span of one hundred days, more than one million human beings were killed because of ethnic hatred. Still more suffered grievous injuries and losses, the pain of which lingers to this day.

A. The Investigation

Despite all that has been written about actions taken by the French government in Rwanda before, during, and after the Genocide, critical aspects of the truth remain unknown or unacknowledged. Unsatisfied with such an incomplete record on a central element of Rwanda’s history, the Government of Rwanda engaged this law firm to investigate the role of the French government in connection with the Genocide.

This investigation has included outreach to hundreds of witnesses and document custodians on three continents; interviews with over 250 witnesses in English, French, and Kinyarwanda; collection and analysis of millions of pages of documents, transcripts, and contemporaneous news articles, primarily in the same three languages; and the examination of reports and studies by governments, non-governmental organizations, and academics, as well as books and memoirs by key participants.

The French government, though aware of this investigation, has not been cooperative, perpetuating what by now can only be characterized as an ongoing cover-up of omission, deflection, and distortion. France’s cover-up is also a failure to accept responsibility and a miscarriage of justice. The Government of Rwanda has sent the Government of France multiple requests for documents to establish the facts. The French government acknowledged receipt of the Government of Rwanda’s requests for documents on 20 December 2019, 10 July 2020, and 27 January 2021, and has produced zero documents in response.

Until France opens all of its archives and authorizes all of its government and military officials from the 1990s (and not only those who approve of French actions in Rwanda) to speak publicly and without fear of reprisal about what transpired, the public will not know the full story. Only negative inferences can be drawn from the French government’s recalcitrance.

Nonetheless, much of the story can be known now. The Report that we summarize here details France’s role through an examination of policies, decisions, and events. These details support our conclusion that the French government bears significant responsibility for enabling a foreseeable genocide.
B. Background: Rwandan History and French Policy in Africa Prior to October 1990.

Rwanda is uncommon among the countries of Africa’s Great Lakes region (a term that generally refers to the areas surrounding Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika, and Malawi and often encompasses Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi). Small and without coastline, it was spared outside interference until the late 19th century when Germany first made colonial inroads into the region. Rwanda remained a part of German East Africa until 1916, when, during World War I, the Allies placed it under Belgium’s authority. The Belgians ruled “Rwanda-Urundi” (Rwanda and Burundi) for the next 44 years.

Belgium enforced strict hierarchical divides among otherwise fluid and overlapping quasi-ethnic groups—Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa—as a way of maintaining control in Rwanda. At first, colonial administrators reinforced existing Tutsi elite power structures, working through the Tutsi monarchy, lending military support to Tutsi leaders, and preserving access to economic opportunity for the Tutsi ruling elite. But during the late 1950s, the Tutsi monarchy followed numerous countries in Asia and Africa in pushing for independence from colonial rule. The Belgian response was to champion long-simmering resentment among the Hutu majority and reverse the discrimination, now elevating Hutu over Tutsi and creating a new oppressive state based on the exclusion of Tutsi. This had calamitous results, opening the door to a wave of pogroms that began in 1959 and continued during the 1960s and early 1970s, resulting in the deaths of many thousands of Tutsi and driving more than 300,000 primarily Tutsi Rwandans into exile, mostly to refugee camps in its bordering countries—Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire (today’s Democratic Republic of the Congo).

Meanwhile, as former French colonies declared their independence, the French government sought to preserve its influence on the continent. To that end, France cultivated economic relationships with leaders across Africa, who facilitated the supply of petroleum and other natural resources to France, and who returned a percentage of revenue to France in return for military and economic support. France viewed other wealthy countries, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, as potential rivals to this influence, significantly in resource-rich eastern Zaire, on the western border of Uganda and Rwanda. As old colonialism was dying, the importance of maintaining influence in Africa was not lost on François Mitterrand, who, as France’s minister of justice, wrote in 1957 that “[w]ithout Africa, there will be no history of France in the twenty-first century.”

When Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in 1962, France saw an opportunity. Unlike some of France’s own former colonies in Africa, such as Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville, Rwanda did not have oil or other precious natural resources. What made Rwanda alluring, from France’s perspective, was something else: its distinction as one of only a handful of French-speaking countries on the frontier of English-speaking East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania). In 1963, one French Foreign Ministry official, Bertrand Dufourcq, who would serve as secretary general of the Ministry from 1993 to 1998, asserted that Rwanda, because of “its geographical location,” could “contribute effectively to the development of French influence” in the region. He alluded to a hope that Rwandan emigrants would bring their language and culture with them to the
rest of the region, with the result that, for France, Rwanda would serve as “a significant instrument of cultural penetration in the English speaking neighboring countries.”

To further its interests in the country and the region, the French government supported the militant Hutu nationalist regime led by Grégoire Kayibanda, which took power in Rwanda in 1962 and oversaw the massacres of Tutsi over the following years. The year Kayibanda became president, France signed a “Friendship and Cooperation” agreement with Rwanda. In 1975, two years after Juvénal Habyarimana deposed President Kayibanda in a military coup d'état, the two countries signed a “military cooperation” agreement. This agreement authorized French military personnel (referred to as “cooperants”) to train the Rwandan Gendarmerie (its national police force) but stated that “[u]nder no circumstances” could the French cooperants “be associated with the preparation and execution of war operations.” In 1983, the agreement was amended to remove the ban on French cooperants assisting in war operations. In August 1992, the agreement was further amended to authorize French assistance not only to the Gendarmerie, but to the “Rwandan Armed Forces” (Forces armées rwandaises, or FAR).

Such bilateral military cooperation agreements were a fixture of French relations with its former colonies and other francophone countries. Through these compacts and civil cooperation agreements, France leveraged its relative wealth, as well as its technical and military know-how, to strengthen its alliances in Africa and reap the benefits of those ties. These arrangements were part of a broader French policy established in the early 1960s under French President Charles de Gaulle and known as *françafrique*. Run primarily through the Élysée (the office of the French president), *françafrique* relied on parallel power networks between French politicians and loyal African heads of state. The French government provided these African leaders with financial and military aid in exchange for support of French positions at the United Nations, permission for France to station troops in their countries, preferential trading agreements, and, in some cases, exclusive access for French companies to lucrative African mineral sites.

François Mitterrand came to power in 1981 on a Socialist Party platform pledging an end to France’s military support of corrupt and undemocratic African regimes. “French imperialism in Africa, which doesn’t think twice about resorting to military means (Gabon, Zaire, Sahara, Chad, Central Africa) has run its course,” the platform proclaimed. Such statements buoyed exiled Rwandans. As the Rwandan, mostly Tutsi, refugee population grew, so did their determination to return to their homeland. Some Rwandan refugee activists in Europe petitioned the new French President to support their repatriation efforts, which Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana assiduously resisted. “Rwanda is small,” Habyarimana would say in rejecting proposals for refugee resettlement. “It is like a glass full of water. If one added more, it would spill.” Mitterrand was sympathetic to this view, telling Habyarimana during a 1984 speech in Kigali, “Your constant willingness to maintain good neighborly relations cannot prevent a refugee problem, in your country or on your doorstep . . . . With an already very large population, you now find yourself taking on burdens that should not normally be yours.”

Habyarimana had come to power during a 1973 military coup, capitalizing on the dissatisfaction of northern Rwandans with Kayibanda’s regional sectarianism that favored Rwandans who hailed from Kayibanda’s power base in southern and central Rwanda. Habyarimana and his clique of northern powerbrokers—at the core of which was his wife, Agathe
Kanziga Habyarimana, and her family—responded not only by reportedly murdering Kayibanda and numerous politicians associated with him, but also by consolidating near total power over political and economic life in Rwanda. As a former head of Rwandan state-run media wrote in 1992, “[a]ny decision taken by the party organs goes directly or indirectly through” what became known as the Akazu, meaning “small house,” referring to Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana’s close family circle. “[T]here are very few,” the former Habyarimana confidant continued, “who, these last few years, could have been promoted to and/or kept in an important position without being in thrall to a prominent member of [the Akazu]. An even rarer occurrence was the expression of opinions to which [the Akazu] had not first given its blessing.”

Determined to end this corrupt system and to escape the oppression of refugeehip endured in surrounding countries, Rwandan refugees began organizing in the late 1970s to agitate the Rwandan government for change. But after President Habyarimana’s political party, the Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement, or MRND (the only political party in Rwanda), issued a 1986 statement rejecting the refugees’ call for collective repatriation, Rwandan refugees began planning for the possibility of what they called “the Z Option”—war. In December 1987, they formed a new political action group called the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which was uniquely positioned to plan a military option in parallel to its continuing diplomatic efforts. Many RPF members had escaped the limitations of a life in a refugee camp by spending years fighting a successful guerilla war in Uganda in Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Army (NRA). Well-trained and battle-hardened, the Rwandan NRA soldiers had helped Museveni end Ugandan President Milton Obote’s bloody rule in 1986, and many remained in the NRA, with several reaching its highest levels. Organizing and training in secret, the RPF began to build its own army. “Going home to Rwanda was not possible without military struggle,” recalled Richard Sezibera, who would join the RPF’s army as one of its first medical officers and decades later serve as Rwanda’s foreign minister. “We all listened to the radio. The government told us that Rwanda was not for us—it was full.”

After decades of waiting, planning, and advocating, on Monday, 1 October 1990, several thousand RPF troops crossed the northeast border into Rwanda.

C. Report Summary: The Role of French Officials and the Military in Rwanda from October 1990 to the Present.

1. 1990: The French government responded to the RPF offensive by assisting Habyarimana’s war effort. The French government continued to extend military support despite human rights abuses, anti-Tutsi massacres, and reservations among French officials.

On 2 October 1990, President Habyarimana phoned the Élysée in Paris, to plead for France to help his government repel the RPF’s military offensive. The French official who took his call was not President Mitterrand, but rather the president’s son, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the head of the Élysée’s “Africa Cell,” which largely controlled French policy in Africa. The younger Mitterrand, responding to Habyarimana’s request for help, gave “a bland and reassuring answer” before turning to historian Gérard Prunier, who happened to be in the room at the time, and saying,
“We are going to send him a few boys, old man Habyarimana. We are going to bail him out.” “In any case,” he added, “the whole thing will be over in two or three months.”

As Jean-Christophe Mitterrand may have known, when the war broke out, there were already French military cooperants on the ground in Rwanda, including several who had been working to train key units of the Rwandan Armed Forces—the reconnaissance battalion, the paracommando battalion, and the aviation squadron—that were among the first dispatched to repel the RPF troops.

By 4 October 1990, three days after the war began, these French military cooperants would be joined in Rwanda by 150 French troops to help secure Kigali and its airport. This deployment, followed soon afterward by the arrival of another 150 French soldiers, marked the beginning of Operation Noroit. President Mitterrand tried to assure the French people that the purpose of this operation was to “permit[] the evacuation of the French and of a number of foreigners who placed themselves under our protection.” The Noroit troops, he said, “had no other mission but that one, and once this mission is completed, of course, they will return to France.” This was a lie. Internal communications and recent statements from Mitterrand’s advisors confirm that the mission also had an unofficial purpose: deterring the RPF advance.

To that end, the French intervention was successful. In the skies, Rwandan pilots aboard French-made Gazelle helicopters unleashed rocket attacks that played a decisive role in halting the RPF army’s advance. French instructor-pilots often sat alongside their Rwandan pupils during the early stages of the war. Colonel Laurent Serubuga, the FAR’s deputy chief of staff and a core member of the Akazu, would later tell a visiting French official that the FAR’s French-trained elite units, “backed by France,” deserved the credit for the Rwandan government forces’ “October victory” over the RPF military.

Serubuga welcomed the RPF attack, according to France’s ambassador to Rwanda from 1989 to 1993, Georges Martres. For Serubuga, the attack offered the pretext that government anti-Tutsi hardliners like himself needed to massacre Tutsi. Although Ambassador Martres knew this, the French government nonetheless secretly appointed a special advisor to Serubuga to improve the FAR’s fighting capabilities and to participate in high-level discussions about battlefield tactics.

Massacres of Tutsi civilians were, in fact, already under way on 11 October, the day the French government appointed the advisor to Serubuga. Days after the RPF military began its 1 October 1990 offensive, Rwandan government soldiers and militias began massacring Tutsi civilians in the northeast of the country near the site where the RPF entered Rwanda. These massacres were widely publicized in the Western media. On 10 October 1990, for example, Reuters reported that approximately 400 Rwandan civilians fled to Uganda after Rwandan government troops and Hutu militias attacked peasants accused of supporting the RPF: “Soldiers shot peasants and burned down huts while Hutus hacked women and children with machetes . . . in attacks on at least nine settlements inhabited mainly by the minority Tutsi tribe in northeast Rwanda, the villagers said.” One witness recounted the kind of scene that would become all too familiar four years later, during the Genocide: “One woman died after Hutus hacked off her arms and forced them into her mouth . . . . Her two small children, aged one and five were then
slaughtered.” Another witness said, “The whole place was littered with bodies, it seems more people died than escaped.”

This was not an isolated incident. Government soldiers and militias massacred Tutsi on the other side of Rwanda, too. More than 250 kilometers southwest of where the RPF troops had crossed into Rwanda, in the town of Kibilira, they killed more than 300 mostly Tutsi civilians and burned more than 400 mostly Tutsi homes. The French government knew about these attacks. A 13 October 1990 cable to Paris, signed by Colonel René Galinié, the head of Noroit (who also served as defense attaché to the French embassy and the head of France’s military assistance mission in Rwanda) and transmitted by French Ambassador Martres, reported:

Organized by the MRND, Hutu farmers have intensified their search for suspicious Tutsis in the foothills; massacres are reported in the region of Kibilira, 20 kilometers northwest of Gitarama. As previously indicated, the risk that this conflict will spread seems to be becoming a reality.

Two days later, on 15 October 1990, Ambassador Martres acknowledged that the Tutsi population in Rwanda feared a genocide. “[The Tutsi population] is still counting on a military victory,” Martres wrote in a memo titled “Analysis of the Situation by the Tutsi Population.” “A military victory,” he continued, “even a partial one, would allow them to escape genocide.”

Despite such warnings, on 18 October, an advisor reported to President Mitterrand, “We . . . responded positively to the requests made by the Rwandan authorities for the supply of ammunition and that we have in particular sent rockets for ‘Gazelle’ helicopters. A plane carrying new rockets left this morning for Kigali.”

On 24 October, Col. Galinié issued a more emphatic warning. Rwandans, he wrote would never accept the reestablishment in northeast Rwanda of what he called “the despised regime of the first Tutsi kingdom.” His prediction—chilling, in light of what was to come—was that “this overt or covert reestablishment would lead[,] in all likelihood, to the physical elimination of the Tutsi within the country, 500,000 to 700,000 people, by the Hutu, 7,000,000 individuals.”

Looking back at this period during his 1998 testimony before a French parliamentary mission of inquiry into France’s actions in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994 (Mission d’information parlementaire, or MIP), Ambassador Martres admitted: “The Genocide was foreseeable as early as then [October 1990], even if we couldn’t imagine its magnitude and atrociousness.”

Speaking in 2014 at a conference exploring mistakes made before and during the Genocide, Mitterrand’s closest advisor, Hubert Védrine, acknowledged hearing Mitterrand “say very early, in 1990-1991, that the situation in Rwanda was very dangerous and could only lead to a civil war and massacres.” Védrine added, “I am not saying that he anticipated a genocide in the form that it eventually took, nobody imagined that. But from the very beginning, he had the idea that this was a dangerous situation which could only lead to massacres.”

The day after the 10 October 1990 reports of government-sponsored massacres appeared in the European press, Admiral Jacques Lanxade—then Mitterrand’s top military advisor—
proposed to Mitterrand a partial withdrawal of Noroit forces so that the French government would not “appear too implicated in supporting Rwandan forces should serious acts of violence against the population be brought to light in current operations.” Mitterrand turned him down, and Noroit soldiers would remain in Rwanda even after the Belgian government withdrew its troops over Habyarimana’s human rights abuses (known also to the French government). Mitterrand emphasized in a cabinet meeting on 17 October 1990 that the conflict in Rwanda was an opportunity to fill a vacuum left by Belgium: “We maintain friendly relations with the Government of Rwanda, which has come closer to France after noticing Belgium’s relative indifference towards its former colony.”

By early January 1991, some French officials believed the RPF’s military threat had dwindled sufficiently for France to reduce its military footprint. Mitterrand again rejected Lanxade’s advice to reduce the number of French troops in Rwanda. Emboldened by continued French military support, the Rwandan government resisted diplomatic and political engagement with the RPF. Without political recourse, the RPF resolved to take its case back to the only forum that demanded the Habyarimana regime’s attention: the battlefield.

In late January 1991, the RPF army, having regrouped under the leadership of Paul Kagame, staged an unexpected attack on Ruhengeri, a Habyarimana stronghold in northwestern Rwanda. The evening of the attack, at the Élysée, Mitterrand authorized Noroit to evacuate French and other foreign nationals from the Ruhengeri area. When Admiral Lanxade recommended that France limit itself to retrieving its nationals and leave it to the Rwandans to “try to get the rebels to leave,” Mitterrand balked: “We cannot limit our presence. We are at the edge of the English-speaking front. Uganda cannot allow itself to do just anything and everything. We must tell President Museveni: it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its rule over the [Hutu] majority.” His reply was clarifying. It showed not only that Mitterrand saw a more expansive role for French troops in Rwanda, but that his understanding of Rwandans went no deeper than their ethnic identification. To Mitterrand, Rwanda was a Hutu country, and the RPF, which he oversimplified as a Tutsi movement, could not lead a Hutu country.

The RPF hoped to persuade its Rwandan and French counterparts that “politics is not in the blood; it is in the ideas,” in the words of the RPF’s then-Secretary General Tito Rutaremara. Months before Mitterrand’s late January 1991 remarks, for example, RPF representatives had explained to French embassy staff in Uganda that the “objective of the RPF [was] to liberate the country from the dictatorship of Habyarimana.” The French ambassador to Uganda relayed this information to Paris, along with the RPF’s position that refugee repatriation was “certainly essential, but it cannot conceal all the domestic problems in Rwanda (widespread corruption, embezzlement of international aid, political assassinations, etc.).”

French interests in Rwanda and Africa, however, compelled French officials to disregard this information. Defending Habyarimana was a given: to refuse to help him would have risked losing a reliable ally and alarmed other African despots, who would be left to question France’s commitment to protecting them from threats to their rule. That reaction could threaten the foundations of French influence on the continent.
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How, exactly, to justify intervention to the French people was a more complicated issue. Having proclaimed, only recently, that France would offer military support to African allies only in response to a “foreign menace” (as opposed to “domestic conflicts”), Mitterrand was at risk of criticism for choosing to help Habyarimana repel an army of Rwandan refugees. He preferred, instead, to insinuate that what was happening in Rwanda was not a civil war—that, rather, the RPF was a mere proxy for Uganda and therefore best viewed as a foreign aggressor. Thus, on 24 October 1990, Ambassador Martres advised President Habyarimana to “highlight in the media” the RPF’s military attack as an external aggression by explaining that “France will be in a better position to help Rwanda if it’s clearly demonstrated to the international community that this is not a civil war.”

2. 1991-1992: The French government continued to apply military and diplomatic pressure on the RPF, while knowingly supporting the Rwandan government responsible for the abuse and slaughter of Tutsi.

Days after the RPF’s 23 January 1991 Ruhengeri offensive, local authorities in the region retaliated with organized attacks against the Bagogwe, massacring between 500 and 1,000 members of this pastoral Tutsi subgroup that made its home just above Ruhengeri. But even after word of these attacks by government actors against civilians reached France, they did not register inside the Élysée. Instead, a second RPF attack on Ruhengeri on 2 February 1991 persuaded Admiral Lanxade that the French government should send a supplemental military instruction and training detachment (Détachement d’assistance militaire d’instruction, or DAMI) “to reinforce [French] cooperation and to ‘toughen’ the Rwandan [military] apparatus.” Mitterrand agreed. The DAMI’s subsequent deployment, in March 1991, was meant to be secretive and limited. Originally to end within four months, it would last over two and a half years.

France paired its military support for Habyarimana with diplomatic pressure on the RPF disguised as neutral mediation. Paul Dijoud, a French diplomat who oversaw 1991 negotiations between the RPF and the Rwandan government declared that “the French approach is unbiased and aims only to help bring peace to the Rwandan-Ugandan border.” Yet, throughout negotiations, there was no question where French interests lay. According to an August 1991 memorandum from Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu to President Habyarimana, “Mr. Dijoud wanted to meet me after the departure of the Ugandan delegation to reiterate France’s unconditional support of Rwanda,” adding that the diplomatic talks in Paris had “greatly enlightened us as to France’s determination, which sees itself as a friend and an ally.” Paul Kagame, at the time chairman of High Command of the RPF military, has recounted that, during a September meeting in Paris, Dijoud told him, “We hear you are good fighters, I hear you think you will march to Kigali but even if you are to reach there, you will not find your people. . . . All these relatives of yours, you won’t find them.” Dijoud purported to couple such pressure on the RPF with commensurate pressure on the Habyarimana regime to institute democratic reforms. Habyarimana ended the single-party system in Rwanda but continued to clamp down on dissent and rig the system to keep his party, the MRND, in power. This farce was good enough for the French government, which did not, as Dijoud would later acknowledge, expect Habyarimana to immediately “transform Rwanda into an advanced democracy.”
The depths of Dijoud’s and the Mitterrand government’s commitment to their Rwandan allies would become even more apparent when French officials brushed off the Rwandan government’s participation in a brazen public massacre of Tutsi that would later be referred to as a “dress rehearsal” for the Genocide. The March 1992 massacres in Bugesera, a region just south of Kigali with a large Tutsi community, were sparked by propaganda aired on state-run radio falsely claiming to expose a plot by the RPF and its political allies to murder 22 members of predominately Hutu political parties. The false report achieved its intended effect. From 4 March, the day after broadcast, until 11 March 1992, government-sponsored militias began to resolve what the MRND viewed as the “ethnic problem” and crush the political opposition.

As the killings began, “[t]hey came in a great crowd, shouting like crazy people,” one survivor said, “They killed four of my children and my wife.” Agence France Press and Reuters highlighted the barbarity of the slayings in contemporaneous reports—how the killers had set homes ablaze and burned people alive. In a week, assailants killed nearly 300 and displaced as many as 13,000.

Ambassador Martres knew within days what the state-run radio station had done. “The Rwandan broadcast ignited the fire,” he wrote in a 9 March 1992 cable to Paris. Nonetheless, weeks later, in Paris, French Ministry of Cooperation officials welcomed Ferdinand Nahimana, who, as head of the state broadcasting agency, had authorized the false radio report. Ministry officials made commitments to Nahimana to increase funding for a Rwandan state television station. Two years later, Nahimana would lead RTLM (Radio télévision libre des mille collines), the hate radio station that exhorted militias to hunt down and kill Tutsi during the Genocide.

France’s military assistance also continued unabated. As the Bugesera massacres unfolded, Paul Dijoud, the purportedly neutral mediator of peace talks, circulated a note calling for “[a] reinforcement of French support to the Rwandan army” to help it counter the RPF’s growing “intransigence.” France would, indeed, commit to sending more military equipment to Rwanda during the latter half of 1992. In all, the French government provided almost $2.7 million worth of military equipment to the Rwandan government in 1992, in addition to approving more than $1.5 million in arms sales to Rwanda.

By mid-1992, French journalists began calling out the French government for its continuing support of the murderous regime in Kigali. Jean-François Dupaquier, for example, published a scathing article in June in the French weekly magazine L’Événement du Jeudi titled, “France at the Bedside of African Fascism,” in which he drew parallels between the Rwandan government and the Nazis and the Khmer Rouge. He took the French government to task for using its military advisors to “supervis[e]” a war on behalf of the Rwandan government against the RPF that was “less and less military, and increasingly uncivil.”

On 5 June 1992, the RPF military launched a major offensive in Byumba for the purpose of strengthening the RPF’s bargaining position with Habyarimana. The French government swiftly came to Habyarimana’s aid by deploying an additional 150 Noroit troops and sending new powerful artillery to the FAR. In August 1992, another massacre of Tutsi, this time in the western city of Kibuye, did nothing to deter the continuing French military support.
By October 1992, peace talks, which had proceeded in fits and starts during the war and produced a cease-fire in July 1992, appeared promising for achieving a comprehensive solution to the conflict. But extremists came out strongly against the progress. The newly formed anti-Tutsi extremist party, the Coalition pour la défense de la république (Coalition for the Defense of the Republic, or CDR) organized an 18 October 1992 march protesting the Arusha negotiations and supporting “the presence of French troops and François Miterrand [sic].” Within days of the march, CDR members assassinated two moderate politicians. After negotiators in Arusha, with French and other international observers present, reached a preliminary power-sharing agreement in Arusha on 31 October, Habyarimana took a cue from the CDR and immediately began undermining the peace process, criticizing his own negotiators in two radio addresses in early November 1992 and then, in mid-November, declaring that a cease-fire reached in July was merely a piece of paper. “Peace is not confused with papers,” he declared.

One of the government’s negotiators in Arusha, the notorious anti-Tutsi extremist Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, left the negotiations in Arusha before they were complete and, within months, initiated a Rwandan military program to arm civilian members of the CDR and Habyarimana’s MRND party. Years later, Bagosora would come to be known as the architect of the Genocide.

3. 1993: Ignoring a devastating human rights report exposing the Rwandan government, France reached the pinnacle of its intervention in the war against the RPF.

At the beginning of 1993, a consortium of human rights groups brought government-sponsored ethnic violence in Rwanda into greater focus for the French government and the world at large. The “FIDH Commission” conducted a fact-finding mission in Rwanda between 7 January and 21 January 1993. After interviewing hundreds of Rwandans and excavating mass graves, the investigators concluded that the Rwandan government had “killed or caused to be killed” 2000 Rwandans and that “they [had] been killed and otherwise abused for the sole reason that they [were] Tutsi.” They briefed French officials in Kigali and Paris on their findings. In a 19 January 1993 cable summarizing his briefing, Ambassador Martres noted the “impressive amount of information about the massacres” gathered by the FIDH and suggested the mission’s conclusions would force Habyarimana to answer serious accusations about his role in those massacres. “As for facts,” Martres observed, “the report that the mission will deliver . . . will only add horror to the horror we already know.” The warnings could not have been more dire or more clear. Still, the French government continued and even accelerated its support of the Habyarimana government.

On 21 January 1993, the very day the FIDH mission left Rwanda, the violence that the government had placed on hold for the benefit of FIDH investigators resumed with a vengeance in the north of the country, leaving hundreds more Tutsi dead. In response to the killings, the RPF army resumed hostilities on 8 February 1993, which had been temporarily halted for peace talks. As Paul Kagame explained to the Christian Science Monitor:

This is not the first time they have done this, they killed people in [Bugesera], and Kibilira near Gisenyi and also killed the Bagogwe people in the Gisenyi area. We
thought these killings would die out as we pursued the peace process but they did not. So we could not be indifferent; just stand by and watch.

France’s response came from the spokesperson of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “We are aware of the reasons invoked by the RPF to explain the attack. France does not consider the given reasons [to be] a justification for the resumption of fighting, even if France condemns, in Rwanda as elsewhere, all violations of human rights.”

Mitterrand and his advisors did not let the FIDH findings interfere with their continuing determination to pursue the policy that had prevailed for the previous two and a half years: stopping the RPF remained their priority. With the new RPF advance threatening key Rwandan army positions, on 8 February 1993, General Christian Quesnot, successor to Admiral Lanxade as Mitterrand’s chief military advisor, and Bruno Delaye, successor to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand as the head of the Élysée’s Africa Cell, advised Mitterrand to respond with “delivery of ammunition and equipment” to the Rwandan army and “technical assistance, especially with artillery,” noting also that a French company had been put on alert to supplement the French soldiers already in Rwanda. They made no mention of the ethnic slaughter, let alone any consequence for France’s continuing support for the government that had carried it out. Mitterrand recorded his response to his advisors’ suggestions by hand: “Agreed. Urgent[.]”

The same day, the French government dispatched to Rwanda 121 soldiers, raising the number of Noroit troops to 291 (a number that would grow to 688 by 16 March 1993, in addition to the 142 French troops deployed as trainers and advisors to the Rwandan military). Along with the troops, the French government sent more arms. On 12 February 1993, it delivered fifty 12.7 mm machine guns and 100,000 cartridges for the FAR. Five days later, there was another delivery of 105 mm shells and 68 mm rockets. These shipments were among $1.5 million worth of weapons and military equipment the French government provided free-of-charge to the Rwandan military in 1993, much of it arriving in the weeks following the 8 February 1993 RPF attack in response to the massacres.

When RPF troops moved within 30 kilometers of Kigali, Mitterrand received two military options from his advisors: withdraw French troops or reinforce them. On 19 February 1993, the president’s deputy advisor on African affairs warned that withdrawal “will be interpreted as the failure of our policy in Rwanda. All this will not be without consequences for our relations with other African countries.” With Mitterrand ignoring competing advice from Defense Minister Pierre Joxe, who insisted that “we must strictly limit ourselves to the protection of our nationals,” French special forces flew to Rwanda with a secret mission to assist the Rwandan government forces in its fight against the RPF. Colonel Didier Tauzin, who led the mission, known as Operation Chimère, later wrote in a memoire that, while in Rwanda, he “effectively direct[ed] all Rwandan operations on the entire front.” Tauzin and his men worked closely with Augustin Bizimungu, the FAR Chief of Staff whom the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) would convict for genocide and about whom Tauzin, subsequent to Bizimungu’s conviction, would write, “I have always considered it an honor to have known him and to have fought alongside him.”

Tauzin drew up a counteroffensive against the RPF army, which he would later praise for the “hard time” it gave the rebels, leaving 800 RPF soldiers dead and as many as 2,500 wounded.
in eight days, in Tauzin’s telling. But, much to Tauzin’s regret, Paris pressured him to call off plans to launch a massive effort to push back the RPF army. Later lamenting his decision not to press forward despite his superiors’ disapproval, Tauzin would write, “when the so-called ‘genocide of the Tutsis’ began, I deeply regretted being so disciplined!” His logic, that defeating the RPF would have prevented the Genocide, would be repeated by several high-level French officials. During the Genocide itself, this perspective would drive French decision-makers who viewed stopping the RPF as the key to ending the Genocide.

Tauzin blamed changes in politics in Paris for undermining his mission. And, indeed, changes were afoot. Not only did the French press continue to look skeptically at the French involvement in Rwanda—a 17 February 1993 article in *Le Canard Enchaîné*, for example, was titled, “Mitterrand is hiding an African war from us”—but even French politicians began to join in the criticism, with Gérard Fuchs, the French Socialist Party national secretary, releasing a statement on 28 February 1993 “questioning the decision to send new French troops to Rwanda, when human rights violations by the Habyarimana regime continue[d] to multiply.” With elections approaching, and Mitterrand’s Socialist Party suffering in the polls—and soon to suffer a resounding defeat, ushering in a conservative “cohabitation” (i.e., divided between two parties) government—the French President announced on 3 March 1993 to his closest advisors and cabinet members, “We must be replaced [in Rwanda] by international forces from the UN as soon as possible.” Even so, between March and August, France nearly doubled the number of DAMI advisors in Rwanda, a decision even the 1998 French parliamentary inquiry into France’s actions in Rwanda later criticized.

In August 1993, an historic peace accord, signed in Arusha, Tanzania, would facilitate the departure of most, but not all, French troops from Rwanda. Three years of war came to an end (on paper, at least) on 4 August 1993, when President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe signed a peace agreement establishing a broad-based transitional government predicated on power-sharing and an integration of the Rwandan and RPF armies. But it was a fragile truce dependent on the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) that France and the other Security Council members agreed to establish, albeit at a strength inadequate to meet the challenges to come. Those challenges came principally from extremists uninterested in peace with the RPF, who sought to undermine the Arusha Accords and destabilize the country with anti-Tutsi violence. The hate radio station RTLM, founded in mid-1993, would prove particularly effective at pushing the extremist agenda.

While the French government withdrew the remaining Noroît troops as of 13 December 1993, Col. Bernard Cussac, France’s military attaché in Rwanda since July 1991, dispensed with the pretext that Noroît’s sole mission had been to protect French and other foreign nationals and commended the troops for “present[ing] both a credible deterrent and an effective and decisive know-how that helped stop the fighting.” And France was “not leaving Rwanda,” as Cussac explained. A detachment of roughly two dozen French trainers and advisors would remain beyond UNAMIR’s arrival “to help our Rwandan comrades in the main areas of their military activity.” They included advisors to high-ranking FAR officers, including Chief of Staff Déogratias Nsabimana and the commanders of the reconnaissance and para-commando battalions. This work continued even as evidence emerged, early in 1994, that the FAR was arming and training the
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Interahamwe youth militia in preparation for resumed hostilities against the RPF and a possible slaughter of Tutsi.

Signals of the coming slaughter amplified in mid-January when an informant identifying himself as the Interahamwe’s chief trainer disclosed to UNAMIR that the FAR had transferred weapons and ammunition to the militia with Nsabimana’s consent, and the Interahamwe had conducted trainings for 1,700 militia members at Rwandan army bases. His superiors, the informant said, had issued orders to compile lists of Tutsi who, presumably, would be targeted for extermination. General Roméo Dallaire, the UNAMIR commander, noted this information in an 11 January 1994 cable to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations in New York, and in briefings to French, Belgian, and US diplomats in Kigali. In one of the international community’s most flagrant failures in Rwanda, the UN Secretariat declined Dallaire’s request to raid the suspected weapons caches.

Ten days later, a plane landed in Kigali bearing 1,000 mortar rounds (manufactured by a French company and exported with the French government’s authorization) for delivery from Châteauroux, France to the FAR. Knowing this ammunition had arrived in a nation on the brink, Gen. Dallaire ordered it impounded. “We were all supposed to be moving toward peace, not preparing for war,” Dallaire later wrote.

During the first three months of 1994, the extremists continued to thwart the implementation of the Arusha Accords with violent protests and targeted assassinations intended to obstruct the seating of the broad-based transitional government. Having failed to intercede when it mattered, the UN was left “praying for a miracle,” in the words of an RPF official. Although on 5 April 1994, the Security Council decided to renew UNAMIR’s mandate for an additional four months, as the next two days would reveal, Rwanda’s extremists had other, far more horrific plans for their country.

4. After the Genocide Against the Tutsi began, French officials remained captive to the same inverted thinking that had guided their decisions for the previous three and a half years: the main problem was the RPF—not the genocide the RPF was fighting to end.

On Wednesday, 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana, along with Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira and others, boarded Habyarimana’s private jet, which the French government had gifted him. The passengers had been in Dar es Salaam to complete aspects of the Arusha Agreement that would facilitate the implementation of the broad-based transitional government. At around 8:30 PM, as the plane was set to land in Kigali, there was a powerful explosion over the Kigali airport. The plane had been shot down, killing both presidents and all others on board. “It is going to be terrible,” President Mitterrand exclaimed to Hubert Védrine after learning of the plane crash.

Without evidence, President Mitterrand and his key Élysée advisors immediately blamed the attack on the RPF. French officials would continue to promote this claim for decades, even though cables that have been leaked to the public suggest that France’s own intelligence service, the DGSE, ascribed responsibility to prominent Akazu member Col. Laurent Serubuga, who had
worked with French advisors from 1990 on, and to Col. Théoneste Bagosora, widely reputed to be the architect of the Genocide Against the Tutsi.

The night of the crash, French military coope rants who had remained in Rwanda to train the FAR surveyed the wreckage at the crash site with Major Aloys Ntabakuze, the head of the para-commando unit. Days later, Ntabakuze would oversee para-commandos who massacred Tutsi men, women, and children who had taken shelter at the ETO (École technique officielle) in Kigali (some estimates have the number killed as high as 4,000).

By the morning after the crash, it was clear that preparations for the Genocide were in place. As Jean-Michel Marlaud, the French Ambassador to Rwanda since 1993, was told by Prime Minister-Designate Faustin Twagiramungu, “men of the Presidential Guard were rounding up, kidnapping or assassinating ministers appointed to form the future Government.” Ambassador Marlaud would later recall, “[o]ther murders were committed” as well, “affect[ing] both members of the opposition parties and Tutsis. They were both political and ethnic killings.”

Following the assassination of many of Rwanda’s most prominent moderate politicians—including the gruesome murder of the prime minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana—extremists formed an interim government on 8 April 1994. In the Élysée, General Christian Quesnot expressed satisfaction with the interim government, noting that “the various Rwandan political parties” were represented “in accordance with the proportions provided for in the Arusha agreements.” He neglected to mention, however, that representatives came from the Hutu-power wings of each party. Quesnot’s attention was elsewhere: “Only the RPF refused to participate,” he wrote, singling out France’s antagonist. “[The RPF] broke the cease-fire and began an offensive towards Kigali.”

Beginning in the early morning hours of 9 April 1994, the French government sent troops to evacuate French and other foreign nationals. Known as Operation Amaryllis, the mission increased the number of French eyewitnesses to the scenes of unspeakable horror unfolding across Kigali. A military chaplain embedded with Amaryllis would later describe one such scene:

The driver of one of the commandos charged with the evacuation [from the French school in Kigali] . . . took a road that bypassed the capital from the west, avoiding the most lively axis of the city. Suddenly, a Tutsi woman, chased by a group of Hutu armed with batons and knives, threw herself against the hood of the first vehicle hoping, in her tragic despair, to find refuge there. The driver braked harshly. The two occupants did not move, dazed by the event’s complexity. . . . These few moments of hesitation were enough for the Hutu torturers to understand that the French soldiers would not defend the woman. On the way back, the vehicle’s passengers were able to see her corpse, stomach open, lying on the side of the road. The assassins, with a smile and a friendly wave, kindly acknowledged them.

One of the transport planes that flew this chaplain and his comrades into Kigali reportedly carried with it mortar ammunition for the FAR. (The French government, however, has denied this.) The first plane to evacuate French nationals out of Rwanda also carried, on President Mitterrand’s orders, Habyarimana’s family—including the first lady and Akazu leader, Agathe
Kanziga Habyarimana, about whom Mitterrand would later reportedly exclaim, “She is possessed by the devil, if she could, she would continue to call out for massacres from French radios.”

As wholesale targeted slaughter of Tutsi spread throughout Rwanda, the French government failed to exert meaningful pressure on the FAR or the interim government to stop the killings or the hate media broadcasts exhorting people to murder their neighbors. Senior French officials avoided calling the Genocide by its true name for weeks. In this, they were no worse than the rest of the international community. What did make them worse was, among other things, that French leaders close to President Mitterrand—Gen. Quesnot, Bruno Delaye, and General Jean-Pierre Huchon, head of the Military Cooperation Mission, in particular—continued to portray the RPF, the only force fighting to end the Genocide, as more of a threat to peace and stability in Rwanda than the génocidaires themselves.

French diplomats at the UN defeated even the mildest of efforts by the international community to hold accountable the interim government. French officials pursued a return to peace negotiations and a cease-fire, which would have precluded the RPF from seizing control of the country and forestalled the defeat of the genocidal interim government. For French policy in Rwanda, the overriding issue was not a coming genocide; it was preventing the RPF from establishing what Mitterrand referred to in June 1994 as a “Tutsiland.” That this was Mitterrand’s perspective between October 1990 and December 1993 was misguided and destructive. That it remained French policy during the Genocide is unfathomable.

5. When it eventually redeployed troops to Rwanda through Operation Turquoise, the French government used this humanitarian action to stop the RPF from controlling all of Rwanda.

In mid-May 1994, even after France’s foreign minister, Alain Juppé, referred to events in Rwanda as a “genocide,” Mitterrand insisted that France had no duty to act. “What is this divine decree that made France the soldier of all just causes in the world,” he wondered aloud during an 18 May 1994 meeting with French ministers. However, as May turned into June, several factors prevailed on French officials to seek UN authorization for an intervention. The pressure came in part from French media and the NGO community, which excoriated the French government for its “political responsibility” in the “systematic extermination,” and from francophone African leaders, who argued that France “needed to act if it was going to retain any credibility in the region.” It did not go unnoticed, either, that the RPF forces were finding success on the battlefield. This, to French officials, was a concerning development. Through three and a half years and a genocide, France’s ultimate goal of neutralizing the RPF had not changed: “If we fail to keep our word,” a Foreign Ministry source told a reporter, “our credibility vis-à-vis other African states would be seriously damaged and we might see these states turn toward other support.”

In mid-June 1994, French officials resolved to deploy French troops to Rwanda in Operation Turquoise, a mission with, according to France, no goal other than a humanitarian one to “save lives and stop the massacres.” The UN Security Council approved the resolution drafted by France despite skepticism amongst members about its true motives. Indeed, for Mitterrand, another goal could be achieved. The deployment of French forces would impede the progress of
the RPF army, thereby aiding the FAR. Even Jean-Bernard Mérimée, France’s UN Ambassador, conceded that this was “an inevitable outcome.”

As much as any humanitarian goal, impeding the RPF army was central to President Mitterrand’s motivation: “The Tutsis will establish a military dictatorship to impose themselves permanently,” Mitterrand told French ministers the day Operation Turquoise began and a day after his military advisors warned him that the RPF might take Kigali before French forces arrived. “A dictatorship based on ten percent of the population will govern with new massacres,” he said. Once again viewing the RPF simplistically as an ethnic, rather than a political, movement, Mitterrand continued to oppose the RPF and to reject the possibility of its success.

French troops arrived in Rwanda “armed like aircraft carriers,” but without a clear understanding of the conflict. “Ugandan rebels are invading the country and killing people,” one French commander reportedly explained to a subordinate. Gen. Dallaire found that some French officers “refused to accept the reality of the genocide and the fact that the extremist leaders, the perpetrators and some of their old colleagues were all the same people.” Many troops believed that Tutsi were butchering Hutu rather than the opposite. The truth, when it became gruesomely clear, was shocking. “This is not what we were led to believe,” one French soldier said in late June, after an encounter with Tutsi survivors of a massacre perpetrated by FAR troops and militias.

The ultimate test of France’s intention to save lives arrived at the end of June 1994, in Bisesero, an area in western Rwanda where villagers, acting under the supervision of militia, FAR troops, and gendarmes, had been hunting down and killing Tutsi since April. A French officer, after learning of the danger the Tutsi in Bisesero were facing, promised to return to the region “to get [the survivors] out of there.” His superiors, though, were distracted by other priorities: an upcoming visit by François Léotard, the defense minister, and false intelligence that RPF soldiers were in the area—a deception knowingly dispensed by local authorities taking advantage of the gullibility caused by some French commanders’ pro-regime bias. Three days passed before Turquoise troops, under pressure from Western media, returned to Bisesero. They found the desperate survivors among a sea of corpses. The delay had cost lives.

It was the RPF forces’ advance, rather than genocide, that continued to consume Mitterrand and senior officials’ attention. Over and over again, officials in Paris blamed the RPF for the emerging humanitarian crisis by arguing its troops’ progress was causing Hutu to flee their homes in panic. Delaeye and Quesnot argued that, in addition to augmenting its military presence, France should work through diplomatic channels to persuade the RPF “to stop its westward advance,” even as they conceded that France, because of its history of backing the FAR, was “not in the best position” to press for a cease-fire. “We cannot publicly take the initiative to achieve a cease-fire,” wrote Ambassador Marlaud, who shared the Élysée advisors’ view, “because we would be suspected of attempting to halt the situation under the guise of humanitarian action.”

Col. Didier Tauzin, who, in 1993, had commanded a secret French military operation in Rwanda, during which, by his own account, he had effectively directed all FAR operations on the front against the RPF, was still seething with undisguised hatred for the RPF when he returned to Rwanda in June 1994 with Turquoise. Tauzin hoped that Paris would give his troops the green light “to attack the evil at its root: the RPF!” One Turquoise officer has claimed that France did,
indeed, authorize air strikes against the RPF troops, only to scrap the plan at the last minute. This account is corroborated by a former senior FAR commander who has said that French officers pressed him for intelligence on RPF troop positions for air strikes, and by contemporaneous RPF reports about “intercepted French communications” indicating that French planes planned to bomb RPF military installations.

When the French government assessed, in early July, that the RPF army, which was on the verge of taking Kigali, was likely to keep chasing the FAR to Rwanda’s borders with Zaire, the Mitterrand administration directed Turquoise troops to establish a “Safe Humanitarian Zone” (SHZ), to, as Ambassador Marlaud put it on 1 July 1994, “deter the RPF from going too far.” France, however, informed the UN that the purpose of the SHZ was to shelter civilians fleeing the RPF advance. The French government established the SHZ on 4 July 1994, the same day the RPF liberated Kigali. The SHZ covered much of the territory controlled by the interim government and kept one-fifth of the country off limits to the RPF. (The initial French plan would have “cut the country in two,” effectively preserving half of Rwanda for the génocidaires.) In practice, the SHZ became a safe haven for génocidaires. There, French military neither systematically confiscated their weapons nor detained génocidaires despite evidence of their crimes. Many of the Genocide’s perpetrators, including the interim government’s leaders, used this cover to flee to Zaire. French officers not only allowed them to do so, but made arrangements for their safe passage.

In Zaire, Turquoise officers met with génocidaires and offered guidance on how they could regroup and “reconquer the country.” There is also evidence that French officials secretly funneled weapons to the ex-FAR in Zaire, and, according to a French journalist, a confidential Élysée document confirms that the French government ordered Turquoise officers to rearm the “Hutu who were crossing the border [to Zaire—ed.].” Despite specific requests received on 20 December 2019, 10 July 2020, and 27 January 2021 covering this and other topics, the French government has not released this document or any others that would illuminate these allegations.

The final weeks of Turquoise laid bare its inadequacies as a humanitarian mission. An operation designed to project military strength proved ill-suited to the very different humanitarian crisis that emerged in the Genocide’s wake, as disease and starvation ravaged refugee communities. French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur’s assessment was Orwellian: “Today,” he declared on 20 July, “we can say that Operation ‘Turquoise’ has succeeded.” A month later, French troops finally left Rwanda.

When the last French soldiers finally departed Rwanda on 21 August, they left a land and people destroyed and devastated. As a report written for the OAU later noted:

The consequences of French policy can hardly be overestimated. The escape of génocidaires leaders into Zaire led, almost inevitably, to a new, more complex stage in the Rwandan tragedy, expanding it into a conflict that soon engulfed all of central Africa. That the entire Great Lakes Region would suffer destabilization was both tragic and, to a significant extent, foreseeable.
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The French military’s brief foray achieved little good. Few lives were saved, relative to those lost in the Genocide. And the area further deteriorated, as génocidaires and FAR troops were given the opportunity to fight another day.


On 9 September 1994, when a French news reporter asked President Mitterrand to comment on criticism from intellectuals about France’s role in the Genocide, Mitterrand insisted, “[O]ur responsibility is nil.” Yet, for close to four years, the French government sent guns, money, and soldiers to help defend a repressive regime that barbarically and publicly massacred the Tutsi minority. French troops, officials, and diplomats had witnessed and learned of the commonplace brutalization and dehumanization of the Tutsi: in the media, at roadblocks, in arbitrary detentions, in the torture of arrested persons, and in the massacres. And yet Paris did nothing to change its policy. French leaders sought to maintain influence in East Africa and demonstrate to vital allies throughout the continent that France could be trusted to defend them against military threats to their power. But the cost would rise, precipitously. The effect of the French presence in Rwanda and its conscious indifference to Tutsi suffering was to create a sense of impunity amongst the perpetrators that would grow and find its fullness in the Genocide.

In 2014, as noted above, Hubert Védrine recounted hearing Mitterrand “say very early, in 1990-1991, that the situation in Rwanda was very dangerous and could only lead to a civil war and massacres.” Védrine, however, was quick to add that “nobody imagined” a genocide “in the form that it eventually took.” Likewise, in 1998, Ambassador Martres admitted that the Genocide was foreseeable as early as October 1990, adding the qualification, “even if we couldn’t imagine its magnitude and atrociousness.” The Genocide was, in fact, foreseeable, and French leaders foresaw some horrible ethnic violence, if not in the “magnitude,” “atrociousness,” and “form” that it eventually took. Since their knowledge of these atrocities did not dissuade French officials from continuing their support for the Rwandan government, one can conclude that Mitterrand and his advisors contemplated and accepted some smaller scale, more palatable, ethnic cleansing.

During a 2018 interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade, who, between 1990 and 1994, served first as Mitterrand’s chief military advisor and then as chief of defense staff, the French journalist Laurent Larcher referred to abuses beginning in 1959. “Yes, but,” Lanxade cut in before Larcher could formulate a question, “that’s Africa. All of Africa was like that, at that time. And that’s still largely true today.” During the Genocide, Mitterrand was reportedly more direct, opining, “In such countries [as Rwanda], genocide is not too important.” It seems, for him, violence in Rwanda was a pre-determined and unavoidable state of existence. Jacques Attali, Mitterrand’s close advisor between 1981 and 1991, wrote in 1993 that Mitterrand, while “furiously anti-Hitlerian,” viewed the Holocaust as “only an act of war, not a human monstrosity.” Even in the twilight of his life, just months after the Genocide Against the Tutsi had ended, Mitterrand would not take responsibility for the French government’s role in it, just as he would not apologize for Vichy France’s role in the Holocaust.

In an interview with author François Soudan, President Paul Kagame was asked: “what is your assessment of the role of France in Rwanda from 1990-1993? . . . It appears that France did
not play a strictly negative role.” Kagame’s answer is critical to how the French government must acknowledge and account for its actions in terms of the Genocide Against the Tutsi:

It may not have been a purely negative role, but the real question is, should this actually have been Mitterrand’s responsibility? Was it the role of anybody outside Rwanda, let alone Mitterrand, to influence how things should change in Rwanda? Why should Mitterrand have been in charge of what happened, or furthermore, what was the justification for promoting change according to Mitterrand’s, or France’s conception of this change?

The arrogance of Mitterrand’s neocolonial engagement in Rwanda was to pursue French geopolitical interests with indifference to the consequences for Tutsi in Rwanda.

It is impossible to conclude with certainty what course history would have taken had France pursued a different policy in Rwanda before, during, and after the Genocide. At the very least, French support lengthened the civil war prior to the Genocide by propping up the Habyarimana regime and presenting a credible deterrent to the RPF army. The effect of the French government’s intervention in Rwanda afforded Col. Bagosora and his collaborators additional time in 1993 and early 1994 to plan, and later execute, the Genocide.

While ultimate responsibility for the Genocide, of course, lies with génocidaires like Col. Bagosora, the French government helped build and fortify Rwandan institutions, which, in the hands of those genocidal leaders, became instruments of the Genocide. First and foremost, this included the FAR’s elite corps, amongst them the Presidential Guard, the para-commando unit, and the reconnaissance battalion, which French cooperants had been training for years before they were activated for slaughter during the Genocide. On the first day of the Genocide, members of the Presidential Guard and reconnaissance battalion participated in the assassination of Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the Rwandan prime minister. Later that day, reconnaissance battalion soldiers took part in the murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers who had been guarding the prime minister. On 11 April 1994, para-commandos marched over 1,000 (and as many as 4,000) Tutsi men, women, and children from where they had taken shelter at the ETO to a killing field in Nyanza Hill, where the para-commandos led the massacre.

French officials could not have been surprised at the central role of the Presidential Guard in the killing. In 1992, France planned to “cease [] activities in aid of the Presidential Guard” in response to accusations of its involvement “in destabilizing the opposition” and amid rumors that some of its members belonged to the Interahamwe. But a French instructor working with Presidential Guard in 1992 later recalled that he was simply asked to “step back a little.” Another French instructor subsequently acknowledged his regret for having trained the Presidential Guard, writing, “Of course it’s a shock to think that we trained killers of this sort, and that they used for genocide what we taught them as part of a simple military training!”

As the Presidential Guard, along with other elements of the FAR, the interim government, and the militias, slaughtered Tutsi across Rwanda in April, May, and early June, French officials did nothing to stop them. Instead, they held fast to the perceptions that had guided them for years. To them, the RPF was not the force fighting to end the Genocide, but a destabilizing power whose
belligerence inspired retribution in the form of ethnic massacres. If the RPF would only stop fighting, they believed, the génocidaires would end the carnage. French diplomats at the United Nations watered down resolutions meant to pressure the interim government and pushed for a cessation of hostilities on all sides, as if the concept of sides applied to a genocide. But French officials did not, until mid-May, acknowledge that the horror unfolding in Rwanda was a genocide. To them, it was still a civil war. They would continue the policy they had pursued during the civil war: stop the RPF and pressure the parties to the negotiating table.

When the French government took some responsibility to mount a humanitarian response in the form of Operation Turquoise, it came too late to save many Tutsi. “Too little, too late,” does not begin to capture the extent of this flawed military effort. The most critical of all of Turquoise’s defects is that France—the Habyarimana regime’s most loyal ally and the FAR’s most generous benefactor—was the one to spearhead it. The same officials who conceived of and executed French efforts to stymie RPF designs on regime change between 1990 and the start of the Genocide were still calling the shots in Paris and still viewed the RPF, contemptuously, as Anglophone invaders, Ugandan puppets, a Tutsi minority force incapable of holding power. What followed, in the opening weeks of Operation Turquoise, was a French-led rescue mission that, by design, doubled as a concerted effort to prevent the RPF from overthrowing Rwanda’s interim government. While the French operation, ultimately, did not keep the RPF from achieving its military and political aims, it also did not stop the génocidaires from finding refuge in the French-controlled “safe humanitarian zone,” where they were not arrested, not detained, and not systematically disarmed. This passivity on the part of the French government allowed the génocidaires to abscond to Zaire, where they began plotting to avenge their defeat. In the end, the 60-day mission accomplished little in terms of saving lives and left the area more destabilized than previously.

Yet, France’s role and impact in Rwanda did not end with the disengagement of French troops at the conclusion of Operation Turquoise in August 1994. Quickly, Mitterrand began to frame recent history to demonize the RPF and mischaracterize France’s role as a foiled peacemaker. At the November 1994 Franco-African summit in the French seaside resort town of Biarritz (to which the new Rwandan government was not invited), President Mitterrand, still reluctant to assign blame to the perpetrators, used the term “genocides,” as if the RPF had also carried out a genocide. It did not. The misleading use of the plural would foreshadow the blame-shifting to come and reflected a revisionist history to be repeated and emphasized by many of the génocidaires themselves. French officials would continue to promote a false narrative about France’s conduct both in the Genocide and in the years preceding it.

This revisionist approach continued with France’s 1998 parliamentary information mission on French actions in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994, as leaders of Mitterrand’s Socialist Party pushed back against mounting criticism of France’s role in the Rwandan tragedy. The French government defanged the MIP as a “fact-finding” mission from the start by denying it the power to compel testimony. During the course of the mission’s work, many of its members were content to leave burning questions unanswered, believing, as one MIP rapporteur has said, “that national greatness thrives best in the shadow of secret-défense.” The mission’s December 1998 report, while far from wholly exculpatory, rationalized the Mitterrand administration’s most controversial, and even reprehensible, decisions, and euphemized its moral failings as mere “errors of judgment.”
“France is exonerated,” exclaimed Paul Quilès, one of Mitterrand’s former defense ministers, who had spearheaded the MIP. This conclusion, though, was wholly unmoored from the facts—facts that, in many cases, could be found in the MIP’s own report. The French government, the report itself acknowledged, had spent years arming, training, and even, at one point, effectively commanding the Rwandan military in an effort to protect President Habyarimana and his government, in spite of indications that his government committed and facilitated rampant human rights abuses. Its unwavering support for Habyarimana’s murderous regime disincentivized extremists from accepting a negotiated truce with the RPF and bought them more time to hatch their plans. The message to the extremists was, in short, “that they could get away with just about anything.” But Quilès tried to exculpate French conduct on radio and television to control the message. “It was intentional,” one French reporter remarked, that “everything had been done to ensure that the press did not have time to read the report.”

The years since the Rwandan tragedy have presented myriad opportunities for France to reexamine its links to the extremists who served in Habyarimana’s government, facilitated the massacres, and later established and served in the interim government that presided over the Genocide. The French government, for example, could have refused to permit génocidaires’ entry into French territory after the Genocide. Failing that, it could have deported those (such as the extremist and former first lady Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana) who, in applying for asylum, had made their presence known to French authorities. The French government has not taken those steps, and its refusal to do so has enabled numerous génocidaires to take refuge on French soil. To date, French authorities have brought criminal charges against no more than a handful of the génocidaires living in France.

Cases against accused génocidaires living in France languished for years, neglected and starved of resources, as the accused have gone about their lives without having to face justice. After living in France for years with impunity, Félicien Kabuga, the accused financier of the Genocide, was not arrested until May 2020 near Paris, despite a 1997 ICTR indictment. While French officials had long demonstrated a lack of interest in justice for the victims of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi, Kabuga’s recent arrest, as well as recent activity by French authorities investigating other cases, may signal a reversal of the French government’s historic pattern of non-cooperation as to those who participated in the Genocide.

Recent efforts to promote transparency through the Duclert Commission are also encouraging. Nonetheless, even with a mandate from the French president, the Commission was denied access to some archives, which, in the Commission’s telling, “undermined the comprehensiveness of the Commission’s work.” The Bureau of the National Assembly, for example, “refused to allow [the Commission] to consult the archives of the 1998 Parliamentary Information Mission (MIP).” So too, it appears that the Commission was prevented from viewing documents from the French prime minister’s military cabinet, when archivists responded slowly and in piecemeal fashion to Commission requests. Still other archives were missing or never collected to begin with. President Mitterrand’s military advisors in the État-major particulier (“EMP”)—Lanxade, Quesnot, and Huchon, among them—left few traces of their work. This is unsurprising, because amongst the few EMP directives the Commission found in the archives of the recipients are some that were required to be “destroyed after reading.” No doubt, other relevant and material documentation continues to be withheld by elements within the French government.
The Rwandan government should be rightly skeptical about suggestions of transparency. In the past, French officials have failed to fulfill such promises, refusing public release of documents that would help put to rest lingering questions about the Mitterrand government’s policy and actions in Rwanda. In 2017, as part of an effort announced by French President Hollande, the French government declassified only 83 documents, two of which it made public.

In this investigation, the Government of Rwanda has submitted three detailed requests for documents from the Government of France. Nothing has been produced. The documents concealed by the French government, by and large, do not seem to implicate national security. Rather, concealing them appears to be part of an effort by the French government to protect the reputations of some officials, despite their role in the Genocide Against the Tutsi.

France was not the only country whose government made harmful decisions regarding Rwanda. During its colonial rule, Belgium turned Rwanda’s ethnic distinctions into ethnic divisions. And, between 1990 and 1994, it offered civilian aid and military advisors to Habyarimana. And many countries, notably the United States, delayed recognizing the Genocide for what it was, for fear that doing so would commit them to intervene under international law. However, Belgium and the United States have both apologized for their conduct and acts of omission. France has not. More importantly, France had a special, preeminent status in Rwanda, because of its broad and enduring military commitment in the country.

Despite its unique status and singular role, the French government—rather than accept responsibility—has spent much of the last quarter of a century since the Genocide covering up its failings in Rwanda, refusing to disclose its full complement of government documents, providing safe harbor to numerous Genocide suspects, and too often failing to prosecute or cooperate with others trying to prosecute them. This course of conduct places even the more positive advances, such as the Duclert Commission’s report, in doubt, particularly as the French government continues to withhold documents from the public.

The Genocide remains a visceral, daily reality for most Rwandans. Their ordeals defy language and demonstrate that a genocide has no half-life. It will impair its survivors, and the descendants of those survivors, for generations. That is the ultimate cost of what happened in Rwanda, an awareness of which must condition any assessment of the role of the French.

Throughout this Report, we present the voices of the victims and survivors. These first-person historical accounts are reminders that the role of the French government must be evaluated in the context of the continuing consequences of its actions, and not only with respect to the events that occurred when French officials were present in Rwanda for the four years leading up to the Genocide and during Operation Turquoise. Only in the horrific and grotesque reality of the Genocide can France’s responsibility and culpability be measured. The true history of French conduct in Rwanda matters not least because, as one survivor recounted years after the Genocide, “Even today that sadness does not end. The thought that someone came, raped you, destroyed you and killed your child. . . . It is an extreme strain on my heart that will never end. . . . I only half survived. I am still carrying death in me.” She was one of millions of individuals whose lives were destroyed and devastated as a consequence of a genocide enabled by French officials—officials
serving a country that had been one of the original signatories to the 1949 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Ultimately, this Report cannot be the final word on the French government’s role in Rwanda. That word will arrive after the French government makes public all of its documents and allows all of its officials to speak freely. Releasing this information will set the French government on the road toward a reckoning with history—its own and Rwanda’s. As then-Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo said in 2017, “What happened in the early ‘90s and even before, in the lead-up to the genocide, is something France will have to come to terms with. Rwanda is not going away. We’re not going anywhere.” For the victims and the survivors, the French government should come to terms with history and accept responsibility for enabling the Genocide Against the Tutsi.
A. In October 1990, When War Broke Out on His Country’s Northeastern Border, Rwanda’s President Called on France, a Longtime Ally, to Help His Army Fend Off “the Invaders.” France Obliged.

We are going to send him a few boys, old man Habyarimana. We are going to bail him out.1

– Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, Son of President Mitterrand and Chief Adviser for African Affairs at the Élysée (1986 – 1992)

The fighting that erupted in northeastern Rwanda on 1 October 1990 had been raging for just one day when the country’s long-serving president, Juvénal Habyarimana, placed an urgent call to the Élysée Palace in Paris.2

Habyarimana, then 53 years old and in the seventeenth year of his reign, had spent the week attending meetings and conferences in New York, having been advised by his foreign minister to maintain a public profile so as to “not go unnoticed” by the international media.3 His itinerary to that point had included a 28 September 1990 speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations,4 where French President François Mitterrand, arguably Habyarimana’s most important Western ally, had spoken just a few days earlier.5 Both presidents, in their respective speeches, celebrated the recent triumphs of popular movements in various corners of the world, symbolized by the toppling of the Berlin wall the previous year.6 “In many countries, on all continents, democracy has won out,” Mitterrand crowed in his address. “Borders can no longer contain its radiating strength.”7

It was, in Habyarimana’s case, a crisis on his own country’s border that was now demanding his attention. His trip to the United States had been disrupted on the morning of 1 October 1990, when soldiers of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a political-military movement developed in neighboring countries and abroad,8 marched over the Kagitumba border crossing from southwestern Uganda into northeastern Rwanda, launching a war against the Habyarimana regime.9 RPF leaders were first- and second-generation refugees, amongst hundreds of thousands driven from Rwanda, seeking the right of return to a homeland that, for decades, had refused to permit their reentry.10 Most, but not all, were Tutsi,11 a minority ethnic group whose members were murdered by the thousands in targeted ethnic violence in the years before Habyarimana’s presidency, and who continued to endure systemic discrimination under his rule.12 Habyarimana had long insisted that Rwanda was too crowded to accommodate the refugees’ return, analogizing the country to “a glass full to the brim.”13 The RPF was demanding not only a right of return, but “rule of law” and an end to the Habyarimana regime’s anti-Tutsi discriminatory policies.14 “The aim of the movement is to establish democracy and harmony among the peoples of Rwanda,” one RPF senior military officer told a reporter at the start of the war.15
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The RPF army that crossed the border on 1 October 1990 was led by officers who had cut their teeth fighting under Yoweri Museveni in the uprisings in Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s, and who retained high-ranking positions in Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA) after Museveni became Uganda’s president in 1986. President Museveni was, like President Habyarimana, in New York when the RPF military launched its attack, attending some of the same functions and staying in the same hotel, one floor apart. Museveni would tell interviewers that he learned of the military assault at 5 a.m. in New York on 1 October, when his Ugandan army commander phoned his hotel room to notify him that a number of the NRA’s Rwandan officers had deserted. This was true, according to Paul Kagame, who was the then-deputy chief of the Ugandan military intelligence service and one of the leaders in Rwandan Patriotic Front, and who today is the President of Rwanda. Museveni had received vague information about unspecified planning amongst Rwandan refugees in the NRA. Museveni did his best to “nip it in the bud” by enrolling Rwandan NRA leaders in military training programs around the globe—including Kagame, who was sent to the United States Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (where he was on 1 October 1990). When Museveni learned of the 1 October operation, “he was angry,” Kagame recalls. Museveni said he immediately called Habyarimana, waking him up, to advise him of the “possible danger.”

It was not long before word of the invasion reached officials at France’s embassy in Kigali, the Rwandan capital. Colonel René Galinié, the French defense attaché in Rwanda, sent an alert to Paris on 1 October, reporting that, according to his sources, the rebel force consisted of “at least a hundred men in combat gear equipped with individual weapons, including Kalashnikovs, possibly mortars and recoilless guns.” His cable, which counted the French president’s office and various ministries among its recipients, said the rebels’ “nationality is not currently known – however, Tutsi refugees are strongly suspected.” Galinié reported that the entire Rwandan Armed Forces [FAR] was “on alert,” and that it had begun to conduct aerial reconnaissance, but the order to fire on the enemy had not yet been given, likely on account of President Habyarimana’s absence.

Habyarimana did not, at first, seem overly worried. The Rwandan president stayed in New York for two more days after learning of the attack, opting to proceed with an agenda that included a morning coffee, hosted by US President George H.W. Bush, for roughly two dozen African leaders at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Having just learned of the military conflict at the Rwandan-Ugandan border, dignitaries and foreign affairs professionals at the Waldorf Astoria were surprised to see both Habyarimana and Museveni at the event. Afterward, speaking with a US State Department official, Habyarimana said he had talked to Museveni for an hour, and that Museveni “kept insisting that he knew nothing about the invasion and was not in a position to do anything about it.” Habyarimana did not believe him.

Colonel Galinié, meanwhile, began to receive a clearer picture of events at the border – and more particularly, of how Rwandan military leaders were responding to it. His sources were particularly well placed. Having long provided military assistance to the Habyarimana government, France had a number of military officers stationed in Rwanda, working to modernize its Army and Gendarmerie. These officers reported to Galinié that the FAR’s initial response to the RPF army’s attack had been disorganized, and that Colonel Léonidas Rusatira, a top official in the Rwandan Ministry of Defense, “appeared very concerned.” In a 2 October cable, Galinié
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informed Paris that Rusatira had announced that morning, during a meeting at the Rwandan Ministry of Defense, “that it was possible that the President of the Republic would ask for military assistance from France and Belgium in the form of an armed intervention.”

This was not surprising. Belgium, Rwanda’s former colonizer, had deep ties to the Rwandan government and its military, which only France came close to matching. The French government had been a friend to Habyarimana since the early days of his administration. Among the world’s nations, France was a leading donor of aid to Rwanda, having contributed roughly $4.5 million in 1989. President Mitterrand had, in fact, displayed his generosity yet again only a few months earlier, during Habyarimana’s visit to Paris in April 1990. After welcoming the Rwandan president to the Élysée, where the two presidents talked and dined, Mitterrand agreed to provide roughly $25.5 million to help Rwanda start a national television station. Mitterrand also offered Habyarimana a gift: a new presidential plane, worth $10 million, to replace the plane French President Georges Pompidou had presented to Habyarimana, also as a gift, in 1974. “I believe, without exaggerating, that this gesture testifies to the appreciation and the high esteem that Mr. Mitterrand has of You,” Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu wrote in a memo to Habyarimana shortly after the April 1990 trip to France. (The new plane, a Falcon 50, would take its place in history on 6 April 1994, when it was shot out of the sky, killing Habyarimana and everyone else on board, in an attack that immediately preceded the Genocide.)

Habyarimana did, in fact, solicit France’s military assistance, just as Colonel Rusatira said he might. The French official who took Habyarimana’s call on 2 October 1990 was not President Mitterrand, but rather his son, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the head of the Élysée’s “Africa Cell.” The “Africa Cell” was an organization inside the Élysée with no equivalent for other world regions, reflecting the central place African affairs had long occupied in French foreign policy. Its roots traced back to the early years of Charles de Gaulle’s presidency (Jan. 1959 – Apr. 1969), when the redoubtable Jacques Foccart, de Gaulle’s secretary general for African and Malagasy affairs, established himself as a key powerbroker in francophone Africa. Foccart, whose authority to speak for de Gaulle was unquestioned, set the terms of French foreign policy for decades to come, under which African affairs, “more than any other aspect of France’s external policy, remain[ed] the domaine réservé of the President.” Traditionally, “it is in the office of the President that the most important decisions on African policy are made, and this is a reflection of the fact that African affairs are still considered to affect the heart of French state power.”

Jean-Christophe Mitterrand was a former Africa correspondent for Agence France Presse. He had joined the Africa Cell as deputy advisor in 1982, during his father’s first term as president, but became his father’s top Africa advisor four years later, when the head of the cell resigned amid accusations that he had embezzled public funds. Jean-Christophe was never a kingmaker, as Foccart had been. “He has been manipulated more often than [he has been] manipulative,” one journalist would later say. Many African leaders, though, were more than happy to liaise with him, no doubt finding it useful to have the ear of the president’s son.

French historian Gérard Prunier happened to be with the younger Mitterrand when President Habyarimana phoned in from New York. As Prunier would recall, Habyarimana was seeking affirmations that France would help the Rwandan Armed Forces repel the RPF Army’s
advance. The phone call lasted no more than 10 minutes. Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, responding to Habyarimana’s plea for help, gave “a bland and reassuring answer” before turning to Prunier and saying, “We are going to send him a few boys, old man Habyarimana. We are going to bail him out.” “In any case,” he added, “the whole thing will be over in two or three months.”

**B. France Sought to Retain Its Influence in Africa after World War II, with Mitterrand Playing a Key Role in the Effort.**

Without Africa, there will be no history of France in the twenty-first century.

— François Mitterrand, President of France (1981 – 1995)

If French foreign policy hands like Jean-Christophe Mitterrand thought little of sending “a few boys” to Africa to help an ally in distress, it was because France had done it many times before. Since the late 1950s, France had repeatedly dispatched troops to suppress uprisings in its former colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, signaling, in the words of historian John Chipman, “that when a francophone African leader close to France needed help, France would be willing to use military force to sustain him in power.” The history of interventions in Africa extended into the Mitterrand era, during which time France sent troops to help Chadian President Hissèn Habré fend off Libyan-backed incursions, and also, in 1986, to help Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma quell an internal rebellion. “Indeed,” Chipman wrote, “despite early socialist rhetoric, the government [under President Mitterrand] did much both to sustain and then to improve France’s capacity to bring military power to bear on the African continent.”

The justifications for these interventions varied, of course, but the ambitions behind them remained a constant. “There is no hiatus in France’s African policy before May 1981 and after,” François Mitterrand would say early in his first term, referring to the month he became president of France. “If the method has changed, the objective has remained. It consists in preserving France’s role and interests in Africa.” President Mitterrand presented himself as “the bearer of more than a tradition,” in this regard. France’s history, and his own, compelled France to maintain its influence—in Africa, broadly, and in Rwanda, specifically.

France had emerged from World War II with its borders intact and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, but with its self-image as a global power in tatters. The humiliations of the war years—its 1940 surrender to Nazi Germany and subsequent occupation during the Vichy regime—had battered the nation’s psyche and diminished France’s stature within the international sphere. “[A] sense of fragility remained,” one French scholar would later write. “The status which France inherited in 1945 was unexpected; henceforth it would be necessary to justify itself.” Its colonies, long a source of geopolitical clout, were a vital link to the nation’s past grandeur. At a time when some colonial powers were letting go, France redoubled efforts to keep its prized overseas possessions.

Mitterrand, though still young, was a key participant in those efforts. An early highlight of his rise to power in France’s post-war government was his stint, from 1950 to 1951, as minister of overseas territories, a position that charged him with responsibility for France’s colonies—recently
rebranded as “territories”—in French West and Equatorial Africa. In an era of surging nationalism across the globe, the cost of preserving the old empire had grown exponentially. As one biographer noted:

By the time Mitterrand became Minister of Overseas Territories, the country was bogged down in a full-scale war in Indochina and had suppressed with great brutality uprisings in Algeria in 1945, which left 20,000 dead, and in Madagascar in 1947, where more than 80,000—2 per cent of the population—had died.

Mitterrand, as a young minister in the 1950s, came to recognize that “the old colonialism was dying,” but remained committed to a vision of “Eurafrican France,” in which France’s African colonies would remain associated with France. His argument for this arrangement was that it would not only inure to France’s benefit (“Without Africa,” he once wrote, “there will be no history of France in the twenty-first century.”), but that it would serve Africa’s interests as well. “The African world will not have a center of gravity if it confines itself to its geographical borders,” he penned in a 1953 book. “Bound to France in a political, economic and spiritual entity, it will clear four centuries in a single leap and fulfill its modern role . . . . From the Congo to the Rhine, the third continent will be in balance around France as its center.”

Mitterrand lamented the loss of France’s protectorates in Morocco and Tunisia in 1956—the first breakaways from its African empire—and insisted that France must do what was necessary to keep Algeria, its neighbor across the Mediterranean, under its yoke. “Algeria is part of France. . . . The law applies everywhere [in France], and that law is French law,” he declared, as minister of the interior, in 1954, after freedom fighters there launched a spate of attacks. “All those who try, in one way or another, to create disorder and attempt to secede, will be struck down by every means the law puts at our disposal.” Later, as minister of justice (1956-57), he condoned the arbitrary detention and torture of Algerian rebels. “He already had a well-established reputation for authoritarianism when he took up his post, and he made that felt,” said a French official who worked with him during that era. “This period remains secretive with barely any archives accessible from the functioning of the Ministry of Justice.”

Having declined to ally himself with de Gaulle (sworn in as French president in January 1959), Mitterrand was no longer in the cabinet when the French empire in Africa finally crumbled, with more than a dozen of its African colonies gaining independence between 1958 and 1960. The spirit of nationalism sweeping Africa had gained too much momentum to stop, and the cost of preserving the empire—paid in money and, at times, in blood—had become too high for post-war France to bear. France, though, ensured its political and cultural ties to the continent would survive the rupture. As the American diplomat and author Francis Terry McNamara has written, France devised “an ingenious system of bilateral agreements” with its former African colonies, which largely succeeded in preserving France’s interests in the newly independent nations. The bilateral agreements promised “cooperation”—often in the economic, justice, and diplomatic spheres, but also in matters of defense. (In a few cases, the defense agreements were kept secret.) Other defense agreements were public, but contained “secret clauses for the intervention of French troops, not only in the event of external aggression but also of internal crisis.” For France, the terms of these cooperation agreements were often decidedly favorable; notably, many of the trade
agreements it signed with its former African colonies contained “special provisions” granting France “exclusive access” to certain strategic raw materials, such as oil, natural gas, and lithium. 

Critics derided the system of bilateral agreements as “neocolonialist.” As one scholar observed, the system of cooperation, while nominally “based on reciprocity,” was characterized by relations of inequality. Indeed, there was a supplier and a receiver, the first [i.e., France] providing assistance, making loans, donations, and bringing its development plans to the second. African leaders, though, permitted the system to endure for decades, allowing France to retain its special preferences in trade and investment so long as France continued to provide their governments with aid and, in some cases, security guarantees. “The cost to France is high,” McNamara wrote in 1989, “but the return has been extraordinary. No other middle-sized power in the world enjoys similar status and international influence.”

C. The French Government Forged Relations with Post-Colonial Rwanda in the 1960s, Expanding the Sphere of French Influence into East Africa.

Rwanda had not been a part of France’s colonial empire. Remote and without coastline, Rwanda had been spared outside interference until the late 19th century, when European powers agreed to award control of the territory to Germany. Rwanda remained a part of German East Africa until 1916, when, during World War I, the Allies placed it under Belgium’s authority. The Belgians ruled “Ruanda-Urundi” (today’s Rwanda and Burundi) for the next 44 years.

The Franco-Rwandan relationship began just as the colonial era was ending, in the early 1960s. Indeed, France was a participant in the United Nations negotiation process—between 1960 and 1962—that led to Rwanda’s independence. The French government’s support for decolonization in those negotiations had not been selfless. France, as one scholar has written, saw an opportunity to expand its influence into East Africa, a part of the continent colonized by other European powers, but not France.

Rwanda, at that time, was a new nation confronting extraordinary challenges. Decades under Belgian rule had stunted the development of its economy. Its people had poor access to quality education and were among the world’s most malnourished populations.

It was also a country in the throes of profound societal tumult. The old social order, in which positions of authority were reserved for a privileged few among the country’s Tutsi minority, to the exclusion other Tutsis, the Hutu ethnic majority, and the Twa, had crumbled in the final years of colonial rule. In 1959, after Rwanda’s Belgian-backed monarch unexpectedly announced plans for democratization, the mobilization of newly formed political parties generated what historian Jean-Paul Kimonyo has described as “a confrontational environment bound to explode into violence.” Among the activists at the center of the maelstrom was Grégoire Kayibanda, a former teacher and newspaper editor who had built a following among Hutu peasants by railing against the Tutsi elite. Kayibanda called for the restoration of Rwanda “to its real owners, as this is the country of the Bahutu.” His party, the Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation [Parti du Mouvement et de l’Emancipation Hutu, or “Parmehutu”], declared itself opposed to the “hegemony of the invading Tutsi race.”
Tensions boiled over on 1 November 1959, when members of the youth wing of the Rwandan National Union (UNAR) party, a pro-independence party founded by conservative Tutsi that favored a constitutional monarchy, attacked a Parmehutu leader. Hutu activists falsely claimed that the victim, a Hutu sub-chief, had been killed in the attack, inciting deadly reprisals against Tutsi, which in turn engendered Tutsi counterattacks against Hutu. The violence claimed at least 200 lives and provoked a “massive exodus of Tutsi refugees who could no longer return to their hills.” Belgium declared a state of emergency and deployed a Belgian military commander, Colonel Guy Logiest, to oversee the territory. Logiest believed that continuing to back the Tutsi elites, as Belgium had done for decades, would only enkindle greater frustration among the Hutu peasantry and hasten the movement toward independence. He opted, accordingly, to break ties with the Tutsi authorities and replace them with Parmehutu sympathizers, who used their new power to persecute the Tutsi.

France’s public position in the aftermath of the 1959 rebellion was, as a French diplomat asserted, that it had “no interest in the issue of Ruanda-Urundi.” France did, however, have reasons to support the decolonization and democratization processes, particularly after Rwandans voted in September 1961 to abolish the country’s Tutsi-dominated monarchy and establish a republic, handing control of the Rwandan parliament to Kayibanda’s Parmehutu party. French officials were cheered by Parmehutu’s good fortune and appeared to believe, as others did, that the Hutu were “more inclined to establish relations with France” than the Tutsi. After the 1961 parliamentary elections in Rwanda, France’s delegate to the UN General Assembly declared that the results could “only be favorable to the extension of our cultural and technical influence in this populous region of East Africa.”

France had mixed reasons for seeking a foothold in Rwanda once the latter achieved independence in 1962. Certainly, the relationship promised some economic benefits for France, though these were relatively limited. Unlike some of France’s own former colonies in Africa, such as Gabon and the Republic of the Congo, Rwanda did not have oil or other precious natural resources. What made Rwanda alluring, from France’s perspective, was something else: its distinction as one of only a handful of French-speaking countries on the frontier of Anglophone East Africa.

It has been said that France’s historical resentment of “Anglo-Saxons”—Britain, the United States, and virtually all other English-speaking nations—has at times bordered on a kind of mania. The French historian Gérard Prunier, a scholar on the Great Lakes Region of Africa, has described it as a constant of French political thinking through the centuries—the conviction that English-speaking countries’ political and cultural hegemony poses an existential threat to the French language and the French “way of life.” Prunier called it “Fashoda syndrome,” named for a storied 1898 standoff in the Upper Nile between French and British forces, and diagnosed it as one of the main reasons President Mitterrand so quickly answered Rwanda’s call for intervention in October 1990. The hallmark symptom of the Fashoda syndrome, according to Prunier, was the belief that “the whole world is a cultural, political and economic battlefield between France and the ‘Anglo-Saxons,’” and that “nothing less than the total victory of one of the contending parties will bring an end to the conflict.”
For France in the early 1960s, Rwanda represented a potential “‘bridgehead’ of French-speaking Africa in English-speaking East Africa.” One French Foreign Ministry official at the time asserted that Rwanda, because of “its geographical location,” could “contribute effectively to the development of French influence” in the region. He alluded to a hope that Rwandan emigrants would bring their language and culture with them to the rest of the region, such that, for France, Rwanda would serve as “a significant instrument of cultural penetration in the English-speaking neighboring countries: Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika [now a part of Tanzania—ed.]”

Cooperation served Rwanda’s purposes as much as France’s. Looking for economic and technical assistance wherever he could find it, Kayibanda, now the country’s newly elected president, entered into an October 1962 “agreement of friendship and cooperation” with de Gaulle’s government in Paris that dangled a promise of French assistance in many sectors of the Rwandan economy, a promise that France would soon fulfill.

It took only two months after the signing for French and Rwandan authorities to negotiate, sign, and ratify three new cooperation agreements: one for economic cooperation, one for “cultural and technical cooperation,” and one to help Rwanda establish a national broadcasting agency. Of the three agreements, it was the latter two that, from the French government’s perspective, offered the greatest value. “[O]ur commercial and financial interests [in Rwanda] will never be very important,” the French ambassador to Rwanda wrote in 1964. He suggested that cultural ties, based on their shared (French) language, were, by comparison, the more promising area for cooperation.

D. France Established Relations with the Kayibanda Regime amid a Period of Intensifying Ethnic Strife in Rwanda.

Kayibanda, post-colonial Rwanda’s first president, spoke French well and named it, along with Kinyarwanda, the official language of Rwanda. He was among a cohort of Hutu leaders in the Rwandan independence movement who claimed to embrace “the ideals of the French Revolution,” finding inspiration in the 18th-century French revolutionaries’ toppling of “an aristocratic monarchy.” Kayibanda visited France three times during his nine-year reign (1962-1973), meeting with President de Gaulle on at least two of those occasions. “I do not need to reiterate our unequivocal commitment to cooperate with France in the field of technical cooperation and assistance and in the broader field of international action,” he wrote to the French foreign minister in 1962. The French government reciprocated his interest, steadily expanding its cooperation with Kayibanda’s government over the course of his presidency.

From the beginning, though, it was no secret that Kayibanda was an autocrat and the leader of a party, Parmehutu, with a virulent anti-Tutsi ideology. A UN Trusteeship Council report described his seizure of power in Rwanda as the institution of a “‘racial’ dictatorship.” The report warned, presciently, that “in the transition from one type of oppressive régime to another . . . [e]xtremism is rewarded, and there is a danger that the minority may find itself defenceless in the face of abuses.”
The first few years of the Kayibanda presidency—a period in which France, after signing the 1962 “agreement of friendship and cooperation” with the new Rwandan government, opened its first diplomatic post in Kigali—were marked by killings and insecurity, with thousands of Tutsi houses burned down and tens of thousands of Tutsi, as well as a number of Hutu, seeking refuge in neighboring countries. In December 1963, a force of Rwandan Tutsi exiles attempted to invade from Burundi. After the Rwandan national guard turned them back, Kayibanda “took advantage of the attack in order to unleash anti-Tutsi terror.” His government executed opposition political party leaders and incited Hutu civilians to massacre 10,000 Tutsi with machetes and spears, triggering a massive new displacement of Tutsi. By late 1964, two years into Kayibanda’s presidency, 300,000 Rwandans had sought refuge in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Congo.

The persecution and slaughter of Tutsi in Rwanda was well publicized in Europe, including in France. On 17 January 1964, the French newspaper Le Monde described killings with clubs and corpses thrown in the river. On 6 February 1964, Le Monde quoted British academic Bertrand Russell, who said that the violence against the Tutsi was the most horrible and systemic extermination of a people since the Nazis’ extermination of the Jews.

Such reports, though, did not dim the maintenance or expansion of French relations with Kayibanda’s regime. Among the subjects of interest to both governments was one the two countries had not addressed in the existing cooperation agreements they had signed in the early 1960s—namely, military cooperation. The topic had been a sensitive one, as Rwanda, upon its independence, had turned to Belgium, its former colonial ruler, for help establishing an army. Whatever concerns France may have once had, though, about encroaching on Belgium’s domain seem to have abated a few years later, as, in the mid- and late 1960s, the French military attaché in Kinshasa, Zaire, paid numerous visits to Kigali to “study the possibilities of French action in this field.” The French ambassador in Kigali also raised the subject of possible military cooperation, addressing his inquiries to a young minister, and future president, of Rwanda named Juvénal Habyarimana, then serving as minister of the national guard, police, and security, had shown an interest in “the institutions of French military life,” indicating he wanted to create a French-style gendarmerie out of Rwanda’s senior police officers. He was also interested in buying French military equipment, and did just that. Following his 1966 visit to Paris, the French government sold Rwanda, “on very advantageous terms,” 12 light armored vehicles and two helicopters. The deal presaged an era of Franco-Rwandan military cooperation, which would begin in earnest during the Habyarimana presidency.

Habyarimana had a “close personal friendship” with Kayibanda. As the author Andrew Wallis has recounted, the up-and-coming young minister and his wife, Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, were frequent visitors to Kayibanda’s redbrick house outside of the central Rwandan town of Gitarama, regularly “dropping in to play cards or to enjoy a drink.” The Habyarimanas had no quarrel with Kayibanda’s treatment of the Tutsi. On the contrary, Habyarimana “believed Rwanda was a Hutu country and that Tutsi refugees must never be allowed to return.” The Habyarimanas, though, were northerners, a distinction that was increasingly coming to be seen as a mark for disfavored treatment under Kayibanda’s rule. They watched as the president, a native of central Rwanda, passed over northern Army officers for highly coveted
promotions and reserved key government positions for loyalists from the central and southern parts of the country.\textsuperscript{148}

As northerners’ frustrations with Kayibanda’s rule mounted, the president sought, in Wallis’ phrasing, “to move the debate away from [his administration’s] own failings and back to one area of policy Kayibanda was certain would bring him support—ethnicity.”\textsuperscript{149} When ethnic violence broke out in neighboring Burundi in mid-1972, Kayibanda exploited the tumult for his own political gain.\textsuperscript{150} His government sanctioned discrimination, and even violence, at Rwandan educational institutions, encouraging Hutu university and secondary-school students to lash out at their Tutsi peers for supposedly “taking up far more places than their 14 per cent of the population warranted.”\textsuperscript{151}

Kayibanda’s excesses in the latter phase of his presidency had not passed without notice in the French Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{152} A 1970 telegram from the French ambassador in Kigali remarked that “the regime [had] increased its authoritarian character in the person of Kayibanda.”\textsuperscript{153} The ambassador knew that domestic [i.e., northern] opposition to Kayibanda was stirring and even predicted, in 1966, that “if a coup d’état occurred the author would be the current Minister of the National Guard and the Police,” Juvénal Habyarimana.\textsuperscript{154} His insight proved accurate. On 5 July 1973, Habyarimana, along with ten other officers calling themselves the “high command,” overthrew Kayibanda and “proclaimed Rwanda’s ‘second republic,’” with Habyarimana as its president.\textsuperscript{155}

E. France Deepened Its Diplomatic and Military Ties to Rwanda after the 1973 Coup, as Habyarimana and a Small Group of Primarily Northern Loyalists Steadily Consolidated Control over the Country and Perpetuated Kayibanda-Era Anti-Tutsi Policies.

While Habyarimana, in his first foreign trips as president, sought to deliver messages of goodwill and solidarity to other African leaders, including the dictators in neighboring Zaire and Uganda, his wife headed farther north: to France.\textsuperscript{156}

Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana was the daughter of the prominent owner of a lucrative textile import business in northern Rwanda.\textsuperscript{157} Her family had been far wealthier than the Habyarimanas, who lived across the river in the neighboring commune.\textsuperscript{158} Her father had nevertheless approved her 1963 marriage to Juvénal Habyarimana, whose quick rise up the ranks of the military had earned him considerable power and respect.\textsuperscript{159} Members of Agathe’s large and ambitious extended family saw promise in the young army captain and would later see their faith repaid, as they reaped the spoils of his reign.\textsuperscript{160} The family would form the backbone of the close group of corrupt leaders, commonly referred to as the “Akazu” (a term meaning “small house”), who controlled nearly every major aspect of Rwandan society during much of President Habyarimana’s “Second Republic.”\textsuperscript{161}

Agathe’s trip to Paris in October 1973, just three months after the coup, appears to have produced results. Two months after her visit, President Georges Pompidou made arrangements to present her husband a Caravelle plane, a gift worth roughly 10 million French francs ($2.3 million).\textsuperscript{162} As Rwanda lacked personnel to fly or service the plane, the French government took
the added step of supplying Habyarimana with a pilot, crew, and technicians. (France also paid to build a hangar for the new plane.)

The scholar Olivier Thimonier, who has written of France’s relations with Rwanda during this era, has said the Caravelle “was probably a political gift in response to a request for technical military assistance.” According to Thimonier, the two governments were, by December 1973, preparing to draft a bilateral agreement for “technical military cooperation.” A few months later, when the French secretary of state for foreign affairs visited Kigali, President Habyarimana “solicited France for military aid.”

The Akazu, by this time, had already begun to assert control over Rwandan political and economic life, with many of Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana’s relatives and friends taking positions in her husband’s administration and using the power of those positions for economic gain. Among the first, and most notorious, beneficiaries of the president’s cronyism was Agathe’s older brother Protais Zigiranyirazo, who, at 35, was handed the title of prefect of Kibuye (in the west of the country). One year later, Habyarimana elevated “Mr. Z,” as Zigiranyirazo was widely known, to prefect of Ruhengeri, “the most important—and lucrative—of all the prefectures . . . with its trading routes north into Uganda and Congo, and illicit trade in everything from gorillas to gold, drugs to diamonds.” “Mr. Z” would become one of the most powerful, and most feared, members of the Akazu in the course of Habyarimana’s presidency. As one former Rwandan government official would allege in the early 1990s, “Mr. Z” (also known as “Mr. Zed”) had “leveraged” his familial ties to create a “mafia type” network. This network, which the official dubbed “the Zedist Order,” allegedly controlled and corrupted virtually all commerce in Rwanda.

“Mr. Z” was far from alone in profiting from his familial links to the president. When, for example, Habyarimana named his first cabinet in August 1973, the title of Minister of Youth went to one of Agathe’s cousins: Commander Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita, who in time would become the head of the Rwandan Gendarmerie. Rwagafilita would face allegations, in 1980, that he had pocketed vast sums of money through illegal dealings, with one Rwandan official calling him “barely a step above animal, . . . whose foremost goal is to overtake his equals, then his superiors, and ultimately, to exceed even his wildest ambitions.”

Habyarimana’s inner circle also encompassed a number of northerners who had forged bonds with Habyarimana early in his career. This cohort included Laurent Serubuga, a native of Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana’s hometown, Bushuru, who would soon lead the Army as the deputy chief of staff. Rumors of corruption would follow Serubuga throughout his career, with one Rwandan official, the governor of the national bank, accusing Serubuga of “insatiable greed.” In a 1980 open letter to President Habyarimana, the bank governor described Serubuga as “an enemy of the public good and of individual happiness” who, through corrupt dealings, “brazenly continues to grow a fortune out of nothing.”

Alongside Serubuga was Théoneste Bagosora, another Bushuru native, who would take over command of Camp Kanombe following the assassination of his predecessor (reportedly on Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana’s orders). Bagosora was cold and ruthless by reputation.
International prosecutors would later name him as the mastermind of the Genocide Against the Tutsi.180

It would not take long for the Akazu to show the world how it dealt with enemies. Within a year of the 1973 coup, Habyarimana’s government had arrested and court martialed dozens of government officials, including Kayibanda himself.181 Many were purportedly killed in prison, either by starvation or by being bludgeoned with a hammer,182 at the behest of the Army’s deputy chief of staff, Laurent Serubuga.183 Several were officially sentenced to death, like Kayibanda, only to have their sentences later publicly commuted to life in prison by Habyarimana.184 Nonetheless, Kayibanda died while under house arrest on 15 December 1976.185 Officially, his death was reported as the result of a heart attack, though allegations persist that he was killed at the direction of Habyarimana.186

Habyarimana’s public pronouncements in the early years of his administration were replete with calls for “unity,” and, if many Tutsi residents had harbored some hope after the coup that Habyarimana would be more sympathetic to their circumstances than Kayibanda had been, they were soon disappointed.187 Under Habyarimana the discrimination continued: businesses were ordered to continue identifying Tutsi employees and demanding their resignation, and educational and professional opportunities were denied to Tutsi students in favor of their Hutu counterparts.188

“If there is any strong continuity in the policies of the two regimes,” historian Jean-Paul Kimonyo has written, referring to the Kayibanda and Habyarimana administrations, “it is probably in how they handled the refugee issue.”189 Habyarimana, throughout his reign, would show himself to be unmoved by the refugees’ plight, insisting that Rwanda was overpopulated and did not have enough arable land or natural resources to create employment to sustain a complete return of refugees.190 “You understand that from the numbers there is overpopulation and Rwanda is almost full,” he would later declare, during a 1987 visit to Uganda.191 (He further asserted, during his visit, that “no one [could] accept” the proposition that the “child and the grand-children of a refugee” might also be considered refugees.)192

The regime made its views clear almost immediately after the coup. On 31 July 1973, mere weeks after Habyarimana seized power, his interior minister, Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe,193 met with newly-installed prefects and prescribed how each should dissuade the return of refugees to their regions.194 A few months later, Kanyarengwe extended a Kayibanda-era policy, codified in a 1966 presidential decree, giving regional leaders (i.e., prefects) control over the reintegration of refugees within their territory and legalizing the seizure of land belonging to refugees.195 Kanyarengwe applied the decree to refugees who had fled the 1973 violence, preventing those returning from reclaiming cattle (in addition to confiscated real estate) and expanding the prefect’s control over their movement.196

The government of neighboring Uganda—home to an estimated 70,000 registered refugees at the time (and likely many more who were not registered)—pressed the refugee issue in mid-1974, inviting a Rwandan delegation to Kampala to work out a “definitive solution” to the problem.197 The talks at first seemed headed for success, with the two delegations reaching a preliminary agreement on a plan for the gradual repatriation of refugees.198 The Rwandan government, though, never implemented the repatriation plan, and the available evidence suggests
it never intended to do so.\textsuperscript{199} As Kimonyo, the historian, would later note, an internal memo from the delegation to President Habyarimana revealed its members had all along viewed the refugees’ requests to return as illegitimate and untenable.\textsuperscript{200} The memo referred to the refugees’ return as “a hopeless venture,” stating: “The [Rwandan] people condemned and banished forever the monarchy and all its supporting institutions. It would go against the will of the people to impose on them again the burden of those whom they rejected from their hearts.”\textsuperscript{201}

Kigali subsequently intensified its national initiative to restrict the return of Rwandan refugees. Interior Minister Kanyarengwe demanded that by July 1975 all property formerly owned by refugees not yet taken had to be sold or given away.\textsuperscript{202} In an August 1976 directive, Habyarimana instructed his ministers to “embark on a psychological campaign to persuade Rwandan nationals to remain in their host country.”\textsuperscript{203} He barred the readmission of “vagrants,” which by that time encompassed nearly all Rwandan refugees, who had been systematically stripped of their property.\textsuperscript{204}

Habyarimana ruled as a strongman, abolishing all political parties except for his own, the newly created National Revolutionary Movement for Development (Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement, or MRND).\textsuperscript{205} As president, he modeled himself on Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, promoted an image of himself as the “father of the nation,” and, after 1975, required all Rwandans to wear a small pin displaying a picture of his smiling face.\textsuperscript{206} His military credentials remained a source of strength; in addition to reserving for himself the title of Minister of National Defense, he continued to showcase his Kayibanda-era military rank, major general, alongside his name in official government documents.\textsuperscript{207} As Habyarimana consolidated control over the country, the quality of its small but growing military could be seen as a representation of his own power. He set out, accordingly, to expand Rwanda’s military capabilities—in particular, to continue pursuing efforts to establish a French-style national gendarmerie, a branch of the military that, in accordance with the French model, would serve as a national police force, bearing responsibility for maintaining law and order.\textsuperscript{208} In this endeavor, he found France to be a willing and able ally.\textsuperscript{209}

Habyarimana’s first state visit to Paris, in April 1974, did not go as planned. He had been scheduled to meet President Pompidou at the Élysée on the afternoon of 2 April, but the French president’s staff abruptly canceled the meeting, with rumors circulating that Pompidou had been too ill to attend to his duties.\textsuperscript{210} Pompidou died that night.\textsuperscript{211} In Kigali, the Rwandan government paid its respects, lowering flags to half-mast for three days of mourning.\textsuperscript{212}

Nevertheless, over the next year, the two governments proceeded in finalizing a military technical assistance agreement, laying the foundation for French military cooperation with Habyarimana’s government.\textsuperscript{213} As adopted in July 1975, the agreement authorized French training of the Rwandan Gendarmerie.\textsuperscript{214} The writer Linda Melvern has said that, after adopting the agreement, France supplied the Rwandan Gendarmerie’s equipment, including both vehicles and weaponry, and offered training courses in France for its recruits.\textsuperscript{215}

The 1975 agreement did not authorize France to train the Rwandan Army, and, notably, it precluded French military cooperants from assisting in war operations.\textsuperscript{216} Subsequent amendments in the 1980s and early 1990s would eliminate those restrictions.\textsuperscript{217}
The first French technical assistants—four officers and two non-commissioned officers—arrived in Rwanda in late 1975 and early 1976 to begin training Rwandan Gendarmes. Provisions of French military equipment soon followed. Olivier Thimonier, in his examination of Franco-Rwandan relations during the first two decades of Rwandan independence, detailed those contributions as follows:

- In 1976, France provided roughly 1.3 million French francs’ ($290,000) worth of equipment to the Rwandan Gendarmerie, including 18 armored vehicles, 150 automatic pistols, and 1,000 grenades.
- In 1977, France provided more than 1 million French francs’ ($200,000) worth of equipment, including 12 armored vehicles and 100 automatic guns. Separately, France delivered an Alouette III helicopter, worth 2.2 million French francs ($442,000), as a gift, as French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had promised two years earlier.
- In 1978, aid from the French Military Cooperation Mission held steady at 1 million French francs ($213,000), which covered another 12 armored vehicles, among other items. Separately, but more significantly, the French Ministry of Defense contributed 6.8 million French francs’ ($1.45 million) worth of material aid to the Rwandan Gendarmerie, including 1,000 pistols, 1,000 rifles, 965,600 cartridges, and 500 grenades.
- In 1979, France provided another 16 armored vehicles.

The French government’s willingness to help Rwanda build a gendarmerie in the image of France’s own reflected then-President Giscard d’Estaing’s desire to showcase French military power on the African continent. As one historian wrote: “For Giscard, the display of French military power in Africa was an even more important indicator than it had been for his predecessors of France’s position in the international system.” Giscard significantly boosted French military assistance to African countries in the late 1970s, with an increase in assistance to Rwanda following soon afterward. In 1980, French military aid to Habyarimana’s government soared to 15 million French francs ($3.7 million), an expense covering the costs of a new helicopter, weapons, and ammunition, as well as financing for the construction of an auto repair shop. The sharp increase, and the promise of more helicopters to follow, was notable in and of itself, but even more so because the aid was no longer directed exclusively for the benefit of the Rwandan Gendarmerie. France was now subsidizing the Rwandan Army as well.

Habyarimana showed himself to be a gracious beneficiary of French largesse. In 1977, for example, when President Giscard d’Estaing dispatched French advisers, weapons, and transport aircraft to help Zairean dictator Mobutu repel an invasion in the southern province of Shaba, Habyarimana spoke approvingly of France’s intervention. (Though Zaire, like Rwanda, had been a Belgian colony, France had entered into a military aid agreement with Mobutu’s government in 1974.) Habyarimana further refrained from criticizing French military interventions in the late 1970s in Chad and Mauritania, even as, in Paris, Giscard d’Estaing’s political opponents on both the left and right found common cause in condemning his interventionism. The leader of the Socialist opposition was particularly pointed in his criticisms, accusing Giscard d’Estaing of having turned France into “NATO’s gendarme.” These words
would be turned against that opposition leader—François Mitterrand—a few years later, when, as
president, he, too, found himself advocating for a French military intervention in Africa
(specifically, the 1983 intervention in Chad). 230

F. Mitterrand Overruled Efforts to “Moralize” France’s Africa Policy, Opting Instead to
Placate Autocratic Rulers in Rwanda and Elsewhere.

France has already recognized in you a faithful friend, a Head of State
who knows how to lead his people, a man on whom we can establish a
lasting friendship. 231

– François Mitterrand, President of France, to Juvénal Habyarimana,
President of Rwanda

Among the Rwandans taking refuge outside of their homeland’s borders, there was a small
community of expatriates who had found their way to Europe. These Rwandans, who, perhaps
more than most, were especially attuned to the state of French relations with their home country,
saw reason to cheer the outcome of the 1981 presidential election, as voters rejected President
Giscard d’Estaing’s reelection bid in favor of Mitterrand, the Socialist Party candidate. 232

While Mitterrand himself had a long history as a faithful colonialist, and later
neocolonialist, his political party had pledged in its platform to revisit relations with corrupt
African governments. 233 Specifically, the platform stated:

French imperialism in Africa, which doesn’t think twice about resorting to military
means (Gabon, Zaire, Sahara, Chad, Central Africa) has run its course. The
[current] President [Giscard d’Estaing] . . . has a particular fondness for playing
policeman and for supporting the most backward, if not barbaric, and consistently
most corrupt regimes . . . . All military cooperation agreements must be
renegotiated. They will expressly stipulate that it will be impossible to request and
receive military assistance except in the case of outside attacks against these
states. 234

Mitterrand’s candidacy appealed to Tito Rutaremara, a Rwandan living in France who
would become one of the RPF’s highest-ranking leaders and an intellectual force in the
organization. Rutaremara had been lucky, having earned a scholarship to study in Clermont-
Ferrand, a city west of Lyon. 235 Before that, though, he had lived among the estimated 200,000
Rwandans in exile in Uganda, 236 where, in the late 1960s and again in the early 1980s, many
Rwandan refugees endured persecution under President Milton Obote’s rule. 237 Obote exploited
long-simmering public resentment toward refugees, Rwandans in particular, who competed with
locals for land and employment. 238 Beginning in 1981, young members of Obote’s political party,
the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC), massacred Rwandan refugees “by the hundreds.” 239

The refugee experience was not much different in Zaire. In Kivu, near the Rwandan border,
refugees who arrived after the anti-Tutsi pogroms of the late 1950s and early 1960s were often
“harassed and intimidated, robbed and physically assaulted,” not only by locals, but by Zairean
Persecution continued in the 1970s and 1980s, as did state-sponsored discrimination, including laws barring recently arrived Rwandan refugees from obtaining Zairean citizenship. (Tanzania, to the east of Rwanda, was generally more hospitable toward Rwandan refugees, but even there the government enacted legislation denying refugees criminal due process rights and authorizing the state to confiscate refugees’ vehicles and livestock.)

As was true of many members of the diaspora, Rutaremara was pained by reports of violence and persecution against Rwandan refugees who, unlike him, had remained in Africa. Most alarming of all was the news out of Uganda in October 1982, when the UPC expelled Rwandan refugees—even evicting Rwandans who had taken Ugandan citizenship—killing scores in the process and sending 40,000 fleeing toward Rwanda. Some of the refugees made it over the border. Soon, though, Habyarimana’s government closed the border, trapping thousands of refugees in a narrow strip of borderland between UPC youth militia and Rwandan soldiers. The support provided by the International Red Cross was not enough, and many refugees died from hunger, disease, and suicide.

Those who were fortunate enough to make it to the Rwandan side of the border were directed to crowded refugee camps. One such refugee, a man who later rose to prominence as an officer in the RPF, recalled being ordered to bury the bodies of fellow refugees who had died of cholera or other diseases. The man said that, after entering the camps, the refugees were forced to have their heads shaved so that locals outside of the camps would recognize them as refugees.

Rutaremara, who had become politically active since arriving in France, decided after the 1982 crackdown in Uganda to appeal to the French president to help the refugees. Without political connections or clout, he did what he could, writing letters to Mitterrand and other French politicians pleading for attention to the plight of Rwandan refugees. None responded. Soon, Rutaremara began to lose his optimism about what Mitterrand’s France was willing to do.

Meanwhile, a group of Rwandan refugees in Belgium and France assembled under the name Intego (“goal”) to advocate for the Rwandan refugees in Uganda. Emile Rwamasirabo, an Intego member and a doctor who had fled Rwanda amid the anti-Tutsi violence in 1973, was also hopeful that Mitterrand, after winning the French presidency, would be receptive to a plea from the Rwandan community. Rwamasirabo wrote a letter to Mitterrand asking him to organize a regional meeting through Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, and to use his influence with Habyarimana to advocate for the return of refugees to Rwanda. Rwamasirabo delivered the letter to a local member of the French National Assembly, who appeared moved and pledged to hand-deliver the letter to Mitterrand himself, with whom he said he had good relations.

Several days later, the assemblyman’s office called Rwamasirabo to ask him to come in. Rwamasirabo knew the news was bad from the look on the man’s face while handing over a letter written by the French foreign minister on Mitterrand’s behalf. “Rwanda is a small country which is trying very successfully to overcome poverty,” the letter said, in Rwamasirabo’s recollection. “It is too small to accommodate everybody. I am sorry for you. Try to find and organize your lives in those countries where you live.” The response, which used the same logic as Habyarimana’s
deflections, was dispiriting. “This was the shock of my life,” Rwamasirabo would recall. “I was very naïve.”

There were signs, at first, that Mitterrand’s election would presage a shift in French relations with Africa. His first minister of cooperation, Jean-Pierre Cot, sought, as one writer put it, “to moralize Franco-African relations by breaking with certain bad habits” and “defend[ing] human rights.” Cot also resolved to expand the Ministry’s portfolio beyond the “pré carré”—i.e., francophone Africa—and to begin establishing relations and distributing aid throughout the whole of the developing world. Cot’s initiatives were not well received by those African leaders, such as Gabon’s Omar Bongo, who had long benefitted from France’s attentions. Nor did they sit well with Mitterrand, who considered it foolhardy to chase after new relationships in the Third World at the risk of weakening existing bonds in francophone Africa. Cot resigned under pressure in December 1982, with Mitterrand declaring, a few days later, “I am the one who determines French foreign policy, not my ministers.”

African leaders—some of whom had longstanding friendships with Mitterrand dating to his tenure as minister of overseas territories in the mid-1950s—recognized that France’s Africa policy under Mitterrand ran through the Élysée. Those with connections simply bypassed the Ministry of Cooperation, delivering messages instead “through the Élysée’s back door” to the advisors in Mitterrand’s Africa Cell. With power centralized in the office of the presidency, the Socialist Party’s stated ideals of a more virtuous Africa policy gave way to a more traditional brand of realpolitik. In short order, the Élysée fell back on old habits, offering its support to francophone regimes regardless of moral compromise. As journalist and author Philip Short wrote in his biography of Mitterrand: “Corruption, one-party dictatorship and the murder, imprisonment and torture of political opponents were passed over in silence.”

French military aid to Rwanda, specifically, remained fixed in the early years of Mitterrand’s presidency at 1 million French francs (roughly $220,000) per year. Between 1981 and 1983, the French government gave the Rwandan government a Nord Atlas military transport aircraft. French military aid continued throughout the decade, though “at a ‘more modest’ level.”

Mitterrand’s relationship with President Habyarimana was warm, but business-like. “Stable country, governed for nine years by a liberal soldier who has imprinted a democratic image onto the institutions of his country,” read the introductory note Mitterrand received about Rwanda and Habyarimana before their first meeting, in 1982. In a press conference regarding this meeting, the French president lauded his counterpart: “France has already recognized in you a faithful friend, a Head of State who knows how to lead his people, a man on whom we can establish a lasting friendship.” A few months later, during a brief visit to Kigali, Mitterrand declared after meeting with Habyarimana: “We have forged a friendship. It will last and it will be demonstrated in action, along the historic path that we will now walk together.”

From their earliest conversations, the refugee situation was a major point of discussion between the two presidents. Habyarimana raised the subject during their first meeting in Paris, reportedly noting his concern “about the pressure at his border” and “the vulnerability of his
residence near the [Kigali] airport.” Habyarimana made a point of mentioning his government’s “need to obtain arms.”

Mitterrand sympathized with Habyarimana’s refugee burden. In a 1984 speech, the French president said: “I know, Mr. President, that your constant willingness to maintain good neighborly relations cannot prevent a refugee problem, in your country or on your doorstep . . . . With an already very large population, you now find yourself taking on burdens that should not normally be yours.”

Mitterrand’s view of Africa’s place, generally, in French foreign policy had changed little since his ministerial service in the Fourth Republic, roughly a quarter-century earlier. He continued to believe, in the words of one biographer, that “the raft of French-speaking territories which stretched from Mauritania to Madagascar remained an essential part of France’s claim to greatness.” “Mitterrand’s old dream of an empire ‘from Flanders to the Congo’ was gone,” the biographer, Philip Short, wrote, “but ‘Françafrique,’ the vast domain south of the Sahara in which Paris exercised special rights and responsibilities, lived on.” The French president’s desire to placate African allies and preserve France’s influence on the continent likely fueled his decision, in 1983, to send troops to Chad to help its president, Hissène Habré, quash an offensive by Libyan forces and affiliated Chadian rebels. (Habré would later be sentenced to life in prison for torture, rape, sexual slavery, and the ordering of the killing of 40,000 people.)

General Jean Varret, a French Army Corps veteran who in October 1990 was named head of France’s Military Cooperation Mission, once quipped, in hindsight, that Mitterrand’s Africa policy in the 1980s could be summarized in just a few words: “It’s the struggle against the Americans!” (Varret would be one of only a handful of officials in Mitterrand’s administration to voice misgivings about France’s support for Habyarimana during the war in the early 1990s.) Mitterrand mistrusted the United States’ increased influence after the Cold War and sought to contain it. “Abhorrence is a bit strong, in my opinion,” Varret said. “But there was a wariness of the Anglo-Saxon, the kind that is deft, that double-crosses. [Mitterrand] had perfectly identified this devious policy of sidelining us.”

In the 1980s, Mitterrand was not only opposed to a number of American proposals, including Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, known as “Star Wars,” but also resisted pressure from the United States to join a trade boycott of the Soviet Bloc. “To go to New York in these circumstances would be to recognize America’s imperium,” Mitterrand said during this time. Reflecting once on French-US relations, he commented: “We are members of the Atlantic Alliance . . . . We are friends. But we are a bit like [a] cat and [a] dog in the same house.”

Hubert Védrine, secretary-general of the Élysée and Mitterrand’s top adviser, has disputed assertions that Mitterrand held anti-American views, recalling his boss’s “rather friendly relations with Reagan, exceptional ones with George Bush.” Védrine claimed that anti-Americanism was more of an issue among French military officers—including General Christian Quesnot, Mitterrand’s top military advisor at the time of the war in Rwanda in the 1990s. “Quesnot,” he said, “was very much that way, for example. Very . . . Fashoda, do you understand? Mitterrand wasn’t. He didn’t give much of a damn.”
As the 1990s dawned and the Cold War came to an end, some of Mitterrand’s ministers summoned the courage to challenge him about his “paternalistic” Africa policy, which, in their view, “was becoming an anachronism.” Mitterrand chafed at the criticism, holding firm to the belief, shared by several of his predecessors, that it was more important to maintain “stable relations” with African leaders than to “promot[e] the welfare of their peoples.” When a staffer pushed back, letting Mitterrand know he disagreed with his position, the president fumed: “You too! . . . It’s idiotic!” Ultimately, though, Mitterrand relented. In June 1990, at a Franco-African Summit at La Baule in western France, Mitterrand alluded to a new direction for French policy in Africa, suggesting that, to continue to receive French aid, recipient nations would have to democratize. “[B]y taking the road towards development, you will be committed on the road towards democracy,” he declared in his opening remarks at the Summit. He chose his words so carefully that a casual listener may well have missed their significance. It was only later, in a press conference after the Summit, that he made the policy shift explicit: going forward, he explained, authoritarian African regimes that resist liberalization could expect no more than “lukewarm aid” from France, while “those who take the step with courage” could expect “enthusiastic aid.”

Habyarimana, who had made a point of attending every one of the annual (or nearly annual) Franco-African Summits since 1975, found himself, for once, out of sync with the Élysée. The remarks he prepared for the La Baule Summit were wholly at odds with Mitterrand’s, pressing the contrary—and infinitely more self-serving—argument that, in Africa, economic development must come first, democratization second. “For African countries to be able to continue to advance towards their liberation, towards an ever more real, more authentic participation of all actors in national development, there is . . . one condition that must be met,” he declared. “It is necessary to recognize the need for our countries to have some economic stability.” Habyarimana seems to have intuited, though, that modest reforms—or even mere declarations of an intent to implement reforms—would satisfy France enough to keep the aid to his government flowing. In July 1990, he announced plans to establish a commission to open a “national dialogue” about potential political reforms in Rwanda. Habyarimana personally appointed all of the commission’s members.

The policy Mitterrand announced at La Baule proved, in time, to be little more than window dressing. One French Foreign Ministry official would later observe: “While maintaining the course set by his speech in La Baule, he was not too demanding on the pace of democratization and the quality of elections. His tolerance of electoral rigging even seemed quite high to me.” After La Baule, French aid to African countries transitioning to democracy actually decreased, while debt relief measures aiding authoritarian regimes increased.

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**Marcel Ruhurambuga**

Marcel was born in 1977. He was 16 years old at the time of the Genocide.

Dad was the first to be killed—at the beginning of May. First, they took all of us, saying they were taking us to the district offices at Mukiingi commune—where they used to put people on buses and send them to Kabgayi. But then they
took my Dad and Mum, my young brother, Serubibi Guido, and my sister, Marcelline Mukakimenyi. Somewhere on the way, they let Mum go; and one of the militia helped Serubibi Guido escape through the millet plantation because he knew what would happen to them. The other attackers looked for him, but they never found him. I found out later that they killed Marcelline at Karambo.

So they carried on with only my father. Then Dad was handed over to another gang of killers on Mwendo hill. When he saw the perpetrators with machetes and clubs, he decided to run away. The group that had taken him there acted as if they didn’t want to kill him, but the other group ran after him and grabbed him. He couldn’t run very fast—he was tired, and a lot of people were chasing him. They led him towards Kiryango River, and when they got there, they tied him up—his arms and legs were tied tightly. Then they threw him in the river and drowned him. It was raining heavily, and the flowing water carried him along. His executioners threw stones at his head, saying, “He can swim. He might get out of the water.” So they did that until he died.

About a week after my father’s death, a soldier called Shyaka came. He asked, “How could you kill Nicolas and leave his children? Why didn’t you eliminate them all?” Then the killers added, “Especially that son who goes to school. (I was in secondary school then.) He knows all the Inkotanyis’ secrets. He’s part of them so he must be killed!”

My older brother, Gabriel Burabyo, was hiding at Rusizana’s house. One night, Rusizana gave my brother some beer. Gabriel took it and got drunk. Then Rusizana made him talk loudly. The gang of perpetrators that worked with Shyaka climbed the fence and got inside. The last word I heard Gabriel say was, “Rusizana, why did you betray me? We fed on the same breast, how could you do this to me?” When they were babies, my mother had breastfed Rusizana and Gabriel at the same time, like twins.

Gabriel was about 27. He fought the killers, but they stabbed him. I heard him screaming. It was moonlight, so I followed them quietly to see how they would kill him. I didn’t see clearly, but when we exhumed him and re-buried his remains, I realized they had stoned him to death.

The following day, around three o’clock in the afternoon, I was attacked in my hiding place at Munyawera’s home. Then I hid in a shed, in a cow’s manger and
used manure to cover myself. Maybe someone saw me. I don’t know what happened. I just saw people searching the house and they later came to find me.

There was Shyaka and his brother, a female Interahamwe . . . and many others whose names I didn’t know. They made me get out of the manger and took my clothes off—except for my trousers and shirt. They took me to a place called Kabuga, whipping my legs all the way, and I was subjected to the worst torture you can imagine. They beat me up, spat in my face and forced me to move on my knees and elbows.

... 

They made us sit there and they hit us. They tied our arms behind our backs. Then they took us to Mr. Silas’s ruined house and made us sit there near the septic tank. That’s where they were throwing the people fleeing from Kibuye after they’d been killed.

...

The worst times for me? When they took me to that latrine hole, I thought my life was over. I’d just seen and heard what they did to my brother. All I could think of was what heaven looked like. I wondered why it took them so long to kill me. When the killer snatched a hammer, I thought he was going to smash my head and finish me off. Fortunately—I guess it was by God’s will—he hit my neck instead of my head. That’s how I survived.

When I pass by that pit now, I change a bit and behave differently. I feel strange. It’s as though I lose my humanity. But I don’t have a cruel heart, the heart to kill. I don’t feel like talking to anyone. I just say a prayer, no matter how short. Just a word of thanksgiving to the Lord. But if I see someone related to the militias at that time, I become aggressive. Sometimes I think of doing something horrible, but because it isn’t in my nature, I just get over it.

...

I know there are some people who deny that genocide took place. I would take them to memorial sites like Ntarama, Bisesero, Nyamata and other places like Gikongoro. And I would ask them a single question, “Why do you think those people died? Was it a thunder or floods? Did they commit suicide?”
... 

I know it’s very important to give my testimony so that the whole world, and especially foreigners, will see it. People have to know about the genocide in Rwanda and give it its significance. What I want to be remembered is the massive number of innocent people who were killed. Those people would have been helping the country to develop now. If you forget the genocide, it’s as if if you don’t value human rights.

G. Stateless and Persecuted in the Countries Where They Sought Refuge, Rwandan Refugees Were Told They Could Not Return Home Because There Was No Room. War Ensued.

Habyarimana, to that point, had faced little pressure from Western countries to soften his position on the refugee community’s demands to return to Rwanda. In a 1986 statement, his political party’s central committee issued a statement flatly rejecting the refugees’ call for collective repatriation. The committee maintained that the solution to the refugee problem was to facilitate their integration, by way of naturalization or permanent settlement, in the countries where they lived as refugees. The message was crafted in such a way as to appease the international community, stressing the government’s concern for the refugees’ plight. To the Rwandan diaspora, it was a watershed moment—enshrining in the platform of Rwanda’s only political party that they would not be welcomed home. The Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU), a group formed in 1979 by young Rwandan intellectuals who had grown up in exile, called out the statement as “shameless hypocrisy at its worst,” asserting the government was effectively condemning refugees to “permanent exile, frustration and hardship.”

The young men who founded RANU sought more than the mere return of refugees. The group’s leaders, based in Nairobi and Kampala, articulated a broader goal of bringing about a “political and social transformation” of Rwanda, defined not by ethnic factionalism, but by “national unity” and “true democratic and socialist republicanism.” RANU’s growth was slow, and its strategy of lobbying foreign embassies and international organizations to champion the refugees’ cause gained little traction. At a time when President Habyarimana and his party, the MRND, “still exerted confident control over [Rwanda] and benefitted from broad international support,” RANU and other refugee organizations were all but “powerless,” as Kimonyo put it, “because they only had their appeals to the international community.”

Unable to transform Rwanda, RANU decided to transform itself. In 1986, the year the MRND formally declared its opposition to repatriation, RANU’s leaders threw their support behind a proposal to redefine the group’s mission and attract new members, particularly among younger refugees. Dispensing with the more radical, socialist rhetoric of its earlier years, the group chose, in December 1987, to adopt a minimalist, yet decidedly progressive, political platform that would, it was hoped, appeal to all Rwandans.
stressed, above all, the organization’s desire to unite Rwandans of all ethnicities and endow the country with strong democratic institutions, social services, and security for property and persons. RANU leaders viewed these structural issues as critical. Refugees, they argued, would only face new problems were they to return to a country that refused to treat people equally under the law, that encouraged violence against civilians because of their ethnic background, and that allowed only certain Rwandans to participate in civil society.

The political program became the guiding document of a new organization born out of RANU: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). The RPF was the political wing, and the RPA—the Rwandan Patriotic Army—its military. (Throughout this document, for ease of discussion, we will use RPF to stand for both, unless there is an important distinction to be made between their actions.) The new, two-part structure was a reflection of recent changes in RANU’s membership, no less than of its increasing frustration with the inefficacy of RANU’s campaign to win the support of the international community. An increasing number of RANU’s members in the late 1980s came from the ranks of Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA), the force that, in 1986, toppled the Ugandan government and installed Yoweri Museveni as the country’s new president. The NRA recruits were not the first to advocate for a military solution to the refugee crisis; RANU had previously asserted the right to wage war, if necessary, to achieve its aims. Their presence, though, and their increasing influence within RANU (and later the RPF), helped solidify the turn toward “warfare as the main means of action.” “Going home to Rwanda was not possible without military struggle,” said Richard Sezibera, who would join the RPA as one of its first medical officers. “We all listened to the radio. The government told us that Rwanda was not for us—it was full.”

The RPF’s military leaders were Fred Rwigema, who had risen to become second in command of the Ugandan army, and Paul Kagame, who was deputy chief of the Ugandan military intelligence service. Rwigema and Kagame would use their positions in the Ugandan military to train recruits. Recruitment needed to be clandestine in order to evade Ugandan intelligence, which became increasingly concerned about a Rwandan movement inside Uganda. Kagame’s position in the intelligence service was especially valuable in this regard, providing him with cover to operate in secret and move more freely than most.

The core preparations took place in Uganda, where stealth training occurred within the Ugandan Army under the cover of Ugandan military operations. Occasionally, this required guile and swift coordination. For example, at one point, a Ugandan commandant informed Museveni that the Rwandans in the Ugandan military were training foreigners—Somalis, he said—at a facility west of Kampala, where, in fact, a Rwandan colonel was training Rwandan refugees from Burundi. Museveni instructed Kagame to travel there and detain the Somalis. Kagame tipped off the local NRA commanders (who were fellow RPF members), and “the Somalis” promptly disappeared from camp; when Kagame arrived, he found only Ugandan nationals. Kagame ordered the commandant to write a letter of apology for lying to President Museveni.

The case for regime change, by force or other means, only grew stronger as a series of crises gripped Rwanda at the tail end of the 1980s. The economy had been hard hit, mid-way through the decade, by the collapse of the international market for coffee and tea, the country’s chief exports. A 1989 drought worsened matters, with chronic food shortages in much of the
country causing more than 1,000 people to die of hunger. As unemployment grew, so did violent crime. These crises eroded public support for Habyarimana and the MRND to such an extent that, in 1990, more than one well-connected Rwandan told RPF leaders in Uganda that the regime “was on the verge of collapse and any strong push from outside would complete the process.”

By mid-1990, rumors of an attack from the RPF military were commonplace. France’s new ambassador in Kigali, Georges Martres, had in fact heard the rumors as early as March 1990 and had advised President Mitterrand that Habyarimana would likely highlight his country’s security concerns at the two presidents’ next meeting in Paris that April. Martres seemed to view Habyarimana’s fears as overblown. “[T]he Tutsi emigrant opposition would only constitute a real danger [to Habyarimana] if it were able to provoke an armed strike with support from abroad,” Martres wrote in a March 1990 cable, appearing to suggest he did not view this as likely.

Mitterrand’s advisors knew enough to prepare the French president to expect Habyarimana to present a wide range of requests at their 2 April 1990 meeting, including not only a new presidential plane to replace the one President Pompidou had gifted Habyarimana in the mid-1970s, but an anti-aircraft defense system to protect Kigali. The view in the Élysée was that Rwanda had no need for an anti-aircraft defense system. Mitterrand, as previously noted, chose to grant the request for a new plane (and a crew to fly and maintain it). It was hoped, according to Mitterrand’s staff, that this would appease Habyarimana enough to excuse France’s reluctance to grant some of his other requests—in particular, for “military equipment whose necessity does not seem obvious to us.”

The Rwandan government did not cease to press France for military equipment, including the requested anti-aircraft defense system, after the two presidents’ meeting in April 1990. At the same time, though, other problems, beyond the perceived security threat from Tutsi refugees, were becoming more and more pressing for Habyarimana and his administration. In August, a group of 33 intellectuals issued a highly publicized manifesto demanding political pluralism in Rwanda. It was understood that the drafters of this document were planning to form opposition parties there.

Habyarimana, according to the historian Gérard Prunier, was “jockeying for survival.” From the president’s perspective, a military attack on Rwandan government forces may have appeared to offer an opportunity to galvanize domestic support. As Prunier would later speculate:

In trying to use the external threat to quell the internal one, Habyarimana held a major trump-card—the French fear of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ erosion of their position on the French continent—and it was this which probably made him decide to embark on the risky course of not trying to deflect the invasion through serious negotiation . . . . Habyarimana calculated that Paris would back him in any event, and he was right.
Notes to Chapter I

8 See JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 80 (2016) (“The movement [i.e., the RPF] was made up of Rwandan refugees living in Uganda as well as those scattered in neighboring countries and elsewhere around the world. The RPF demanded the rule of law, the abolition of ethnic and regional discrimination policies, and the right of return for refugees.”).
9 Cable from American Embassy in Kigali to US Secretary of State (2 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Invaders Consolidate Hold on Rwandan Territories; GOR Prepares for Second Offensive”).
10 See Sam Mukalazi, Refugees No More?, AFRICA EVENTS 22 (Nov. 1990); STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS 50 (2008); MIP Tome I 67 (stating that the latest estimates of political refugees from Rwanda by the early 1990s were 600,000 to 700,000 refugees).
14 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 80 (2016).
15 Sam Mukalazi, Refugees No More?, AFRICA EVENTS 22 (Nov. 1990).
17 See Ogenga Otunnu, An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army, in THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE 44 (Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke eds. 1999) (citing NEW VISION, 11 Oct. 1990); Memorandum from the Rwandan Embassy in Kampala (26 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Traduction d’une dépêche d’une journaliste de New Vision: Résumé de l’interview du Président Museveni sur invasion du Rwanda par refugies rwandais de la NRA et quelques éléments Ugandais”). Five a.m. Eastern Daylight Time in New York would have been 1 p.m. in Kampala, Uganda and 12 p.m. in Kigali, Rwanda.
18 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.
19 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame. According to Kagame, RPF leaders were aware that Museveni’s government “had mounted intelligence against us.” “[T]here were a lot of rumors around, some of them true,” Kagame has said. “Increasingly, the government of Uganda was getting jittery about the level of preparations. They were getting suspicious.” STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS 63 (2008). Rwandan intelligence had, in the months before the invasion, received reports about the creation of a “military branch” of the RPF; however, the head of the Ugandan external security service assured his Rwandan counterpart that the Ugandan government was committed to ensuring
that “no refugee will attack Rwanda from Uganda.” See Memorandum from Augustin Nduwayezu to Juvénal Habyarimana (approximately 10 Sept. 1990) (Subject: “sur la réunion tripartite de sécurité Rwanda-Uganda-Zaïre”). President Museveni had his own reputation to protect. As chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), he could expect that an attack emanating from his country would “reflect[]very badly” on him and his government.

WILLIAM PIKE, COMBATANTS: A MEMOIR OF THE BUSH WAR AND THE PRESS IN UGANDA 203 (2019). Museveni, for his own part, has been less than consistent in his responses to questions about his relationship with RPF leaders in the lead-up to the war. In a call with a journalist on the evening of 2 October 1990, the day after the attack, Museveni said, “This took us by surprise. We had been getting intelligence reports which we shared with the Rwanda authorities but they were not confirmed. . . We got some information that people were deserting but what surprised us was the scale and rapidity of the desertions.” WILLIAM PIKE, COMBATANTS: A MEMOIR OF THE BUSH WAR AND THE PRESS IN UGANDA 203 (2019). Years later, Museveni told a documentary film team a different story: “I kept telling Rwigema . . . please we have fought here in Uganda and won. But we fought because we had the support of the population in Rwanda [to] continue to do political work. I will support you because I don’t want you to be defeated and come back here.” INKOTANYI (2017) (documentary directed by Christophe Cotteret) (at approximately 14:40-15:10).

20 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame. President Kagame explained that President Museveni first tapped Fred Rwigema—second in command of the Ugandan army and, surreptitiously, the leader of the RPF’s army—for the training at Fort Leavenworth. When Rwigema claimed personal problems would prevent his attendance, President Museveni decided Kagame would go instead.

21 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame. The officers’ desertions were not without consequence. Soon after learning of the invasion, the NRA contacted Rwigema over radio and informed him that “he and his forces are considered deserters and will be arrested if they attempt to retreat back to Uganda.” The day after the invasion, the NRA had arrested more than 100 Rwandans who had abandoned their NRA units and were caught on the way to join Rwigema.

Cable from Robert Gribbin to US Secretary of State (3 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “NRA General leads Tutsi invasion”). Fourteen NRA roadblocks went up from Kampala to Mbarara to prevent more Rwandans from reaching the border. FRANÇOIS MISSER, VERS UN NOUVEAU RWANDA? [TOWARD A NEW RWANDA?] 21 (1995). To avoid being detected at the roadblocks, Richard Sezibera, a medical doctor, had to travel through Uganda on the floor of a lorry bed, concealed by coffee sacks, along with 14 other Rwandans who did not receive a bathroom break for the 11-hour duration of the ride. Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera.

22 Ogenga Otunnu, An Historical Analysis of the Invasion by the Rwanda Patriotic Army, in THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE 44 (Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke eds. 1999).
Le President Habyarimana commence lundi une visite officielle en France [President Habyarimana begins official visit to France on Monday], AFP, 31 Mar. 1990.

Memorandum from Claude Arnaud to François Mitterrand (30 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “Visite du president du Rwanda (lundi 2 avril)”; see MIP Tome I 21-23 (providing details about French cooperation in Rwanda before the war). France’s support, both moral and financial, mattered greatly to the Habyarimana regime in the years before the war. World coffee prices had collapsed in the mid-1980s, as did prices for tin, which put an end to mining in Rwanda. By the late 1980s, Rwanda was more than ever reliant on foreign aid, even as it was forced to compete for an ever-smaller share of international assistance. See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 84 (1995).

See Memorandum from Casimir Bizimungu to Juvenal Habyarimana (26 May 1990) (Subject: “Rapport de mission consécutif à Vos visites officielle et privée en France du 2 au 9 avril 1990”); Memorandum from Alphonse Mpatswenumugabo to Juvenal Habyarimana (1 Apr. 1990) (Subject: “Programme detaillee de sejour en France du president de la republique Rwandaise”). Monetary figures in this report are provided in French francs and US dollars. As necessary, amounts have been converted to US dollars using the online historical currency converter at https://fxtop.com/en/historical-currency-converter.php. Amounts have not been adjusted for inflation.

See Memorandum from Claude Arnaud to François Mitterrand (30 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “Visite du president du Rwanda (lundi 2 avril)”). Habyarimana had been agitating for a plane to replace his old Caravelle jet aircraft, naming it as his “main request” when he met with Mitterrand in Dakar. Id.; see also Memorandum from Casimir Bizimungu to Juvenal Habyarimana (2 June 1989). Bizimungu attached a draft letter for Habyarimana to send to Mitterrand “as a follow-up to the tête-à-tête you had on 25 May 1989 in Dakar, on the sidelines of the Third Summit of the Francophonie.” Bizimungu drafted the letter to “stress[] the excellence and solidity of the friendly relations maintained by our two peoples, and tactfully leads to the promises made by the French Head of State during the aforementioned meeting, particularly with regard to the replacement of the Impala Caravelle by a new aircraft.”

Memorandum from Casimir Bizimungu to Juvenal Habyarimana (23 May 1990) (Subject: “Votre entretien en tête-à-tête avec le Président François Mitterrand au Palais de l’Élysée le 2 avril 1990”). In his memorandum, Bizimungu continued to flatter Habyarimana, writing: “And, indeed, and [this is] rare, the French President made a point of telling You, during the discussion, that he was aware of the seriousness with which Rwanda manages public affairs and that he personally appreciates You very much as a politician. A statement of this nature from the mouth of Mitterrand testifies unequivocally that he had been briefed on Rwanda and its President and that he had not allowed himself to be intoxicated by the negative literature about our country concocted by certain Ministry of Cooperation officials.”

GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 100-01 n.15 (1995) (“The Africa Unit (Cellule Africaine) is part of the French presidential office which benefits from a high degree of independence where decision-making in Africa is concerned. It is under the direct control of the President himself. Its existence, an oddity in administrative terms, is a reflection of the very peculiar status Africa enjoys in the French political landscape.”). See FRANCIS TERRY MCNAMARA, FRANCE IN BLACK AFRICA 186-94 (1989); Jean-Pierre Bat, Les Diamants (de Bokassa) sont éternels. Pré carré et guerre fraîche: la fabrique de la Françafrique [Diamonds (from Bokassa) Are Forever. Pré Carré and the Guerre Fraîche: The Fabric of Françafrique], in AFRIQUE CONTEMPORAINE 142 (2013).

FRANCIS TERRY McNAMARA, FRANCE IN BLACK AFRICA 188 (1989).

JOHN CHIPMAN, FRENCH POWER IN AFRICA 155 (1989); see JACQUES LANXADE, QUAND LE MONDE A BASCULÉ [WHEN THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN] 159 (2001) (noting that when Admiral Jacques Lanxade, Mitterrand’s chief military advisor at the start of the war in Rwanda in 1990, “was first assigned to the Élysée in 1989, the Africa Cell was the one in charge of [Africa] policy”). The Ministry of Cooperation did not play the significant role it was supposed to: it was a “technical ministry,” as “the African policy was done at the Élysée.” François Garnier, Entretien avec l’Amiral Jacques Lanxade [Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade], in LA NUIT RWANDAISE 81, 92 (Nov. 2015).

JOHN CHIPMAN, FRENCH POWER IN AFRICA 155 (1989).


49 GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 100 (1995). Prunier was in Jean-Christophe Mitterrand’s office that day to offer advice on international affairs. The two men were discussing Sudanese affairs when Habyarimana called. See JEAN-FRANÇOIS DUPAQUIER, POLITIQUES, MILITAIRES ET MERCENAIRES FRANÇAIS [FRENCH POLITICS, SOLDIERS AND MERCENARIES IN RWANDA] 62 (2014).


57 JOHN CHIPMAN, FRENCH POWER IN AFRICA 136 (1989).


59 Philippe Marchesin, Mitterrand l’africain [Mitterrand the African], in POLITIQUE AFRICAINE 5, 9 (June 1995).

60 Daniel Bourmaud, France in Africa Politics and French Foreign Policy, in A JOURNAL OF OPINION 58, 60 (1995).


64 PHILIP SHORT, A TASTE FOR INTRIGUE: THE MULTIPLE LIVES OF FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND 149 (2013). Mitterrand would describe his tenure as the head of this Ministry as “the major experience of his political life, which has determined its evolution.” 1946-1957: Le Plus jeune des ministres de la IVe Republique [1946-1957: The Youngest Minister of the Fifth Republic], INSTITUT FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND (last visited on 24 Nov. 2020).


Chapter I

1959 – September 1990


Emmanuel Berretta, François Mitterrand, un guillotineur en Algérie [François Mitterrand, a Guillotiner in Algeria], Le Point, 4 Nov. 2010. President Emmanuel Macron recently announced that the declassification of secret archives more than 50 years old would be accelerated, a move that will facilitate access to documents related to the Algerian War. Constant Méheut, France Eases Access, a Little, to Its Secrets, N.Y. Times, 9 March 2021.


See Tony Chafer, French African Policy: Towards Change, in African Affairs 44 (Jan. 1992). See also Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa 95 (1989) (explaining that France “wished to avoid at all costs a repetition of the dreadful colonial wars [it] had experienced in Indochina and [was] experiencing in Algeria”).


See Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa 96 (1989); Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism 53 (2008). As discussed in the next section, France signed a series of cooperation agreements with Rwanda in the early 1960s. Those agreements were followed by a technical military assistance agreement in 1975.


Guy Martin, Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations, in Journal of Modern African Studies 10 (Mar. 1995). In 1991, 20 percent of French imports from Africa were agricultural and 45 percent were raw energy and fuel products. France’s heavy reliance on raw materials rather than finished goods deprived erstwhile African manufacturers of opportunities to develop. This imbalance created an unhealthy reliance on France for such goods.


Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa 98 (1989).

Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa 98 (1989).


Chapter I

1959 – September 1990


95 See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 26-27 (1995); JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 21-23 (2016). While the distinctions among Rwanda’s three main identity groups—Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa—long predate the colonial era, the resentments that would come to define ethnic relations in Rwanda in the 20th century were not always so pernicious. As historian Jean-Paul Kimonyo has explained, the three groups were, at one time, a single cultural entity with a common language and religion, living intermingled within the same territory overseen by a single monarch, which at the time was of Tutsi lineage. Relations among the groups could be tense. Id. at 9, 13. However, as Prunier, the French historian, observed, “there is no trace in [Rwanda’s] precolonial history of systematic violence between Tutsi and Hutu as such.” GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 39 (1995). Even with Tutsi holding the principal positions of power, most Tutsi lived under similar conditions as Hutu. See LAURIEN UWIZEYIMANA, OCTOBRE ET NOVEMBRE 1990 LE FRONT PATRIOTIQUE RWANDAIS À L’ASSAUT DU MUTARA [OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 1990, THE RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT] 7 (Sept. 1992); GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 39 (1995) (explaining that average family income was similar between Tutsi and Hutu, but that Twa families, on the other hand, earned roughly a third of the average Tutsi or Hutu family). Rwanda’s German rulers, after first setting foot in Rwanda in the early 1890s, encouraged the monarchy to centralize its authority, thereby simplifying Germany’s control over Rwanda’s complex local governance system and ethnic makeup. Id. at 2, 9, 25. Their justification had an unequivocally racist component. As Kimonyo summarized, “the colonists identified Tutsis as the superior race, born to rule over the Hutu, who in turn were destined to be servants, whereas the Twa were relegated to the less than human.” JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 19 (2016). Belgium, in turn, deepened colonial reliance on the Tutsi elite to exert control. See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 26-27 (1995); JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 33 (2016). Anthropologist and international development scholar Lyndsay McLean Hilker has written, “[T]he history of ethnic identification in Rwanda is complex and contested. While the labels ‘Hutu,’ ‘Tutsi’ and ‘Twa’ existed prior to the colonial period… it is broadly agreed that the differences between these groups were racialised, accentuated and institutionalised under Belgian colonial rule.” LYNDSAY MCLEAN HILKER, THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN DRIVING CONFLICT AND BUILDING PEACE: BACKGROUND PAPER PREPARED FOR UNESCO FOR THE EFA GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2011 4-5 (2010) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). In 1933—nine years before the Nazis required Jews in Belgium to affix yellow stars to their clothing to mark them for future deportation and extermination—Belgium introduced ethnic identity cards to Rwanda. The cards officially and permanently characterized individual Rwandans according to how the Belgians perceived their ethnicity. STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS 26 (2008).

97 See ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 21-22 (2019); JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 29 (2016).
98 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 29 (2016).
99 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 29 (2016).
102 U.N. Trusteeship Council, Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in East Africa, 1960, REPORT ON RUANDA-URUNDI, T/1538, 82 (3 June 1960) (“According to the information received, there are about 200 dead. The actual figure is surely much higher, for the people, when they can, prefer to carry off their dead and bury them silently.”).

103 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 31 (2016).

104 See JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 31 (2016); LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 17 (2nd ed. 2009).

105 LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 17 (2nd ed. 2009).

106 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 31 (2016).

107 UN GAOR, 15th Sess., 1137th mgt., UN Doc. A/C.4/SR.1137, 265 (11 Apr. 1961) (“Mr. Kosciusko-Morizet (France) said that his delegation had no direct or indirect interest in the question of Ruanda-Urundi…. France, which itself followed a policy of decolonization, hoped that a like policy, bringing with it peace, prosperity and reconciliation, would prevail in Ruanda-Urundi.”)


114 GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 105 (1995). The confrontation in Fashoda occurred amid the “scramble for Africa,” in which both countries were vying for control of disputed territories in Africa. Decades after the standoff, the French force’s unconditional withdrawal from Fashoda, in the face of Britain’s vastly larger military expedition, remained a bitter memory, emblematic of “British brutality and injustice.” P. M. H. BELL, FRANCE AND BRITAIN 1900-1940: ENTENTE AND ESTRANGEMENT 3, 9-10 (1996).


Chapter I

1959 – September 1990

124 Baudouin Paternostre de la Maireu, Vie de Kayibanda premier président du Rwanda [Life of Kayibanda, First President of Rwanda], 44, 54, 63, 74-75 (1994).

125 Const. of the Rwandese Republic art. 5 (24 Nov. 1962); Mel McNulty, France’s Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: A Double Discrediting in INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 43 n.10 (1997) (noting that French “has been an official language of Rwanda since independence”).


127 Nicole Even, Archives de Charles de Gaulle, President de la Republique (1959-1969) 104, 148, 340, 408, (2012) (containing entries of President Kayibanda visits in France, including, for example, at 104, “Déjeuner en l’honneur de Grégoire Kayibanda, président du Rwanda, 17 octobre 1962”); see also Olivier Thimonier, La Politique de la France au Rwanda de 1960 à 1981 [France’s Policy in Rwanda: 1960 to 1981] 29, 73 (2001) (Master’s thesis, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne). Kayibanda was quoted as saying, after meeting President de Gaulle in 1962: “I knew of General de Gaulle’s desire to see the countries he led to independence fully enjoy it by helping them develop their natural resources. I can now see that this concern also extends to countries which were not under French guardianship.” MIP Tome I 18-19.


134 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Popular Genocide 34 (2016).

135 Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide 56 (1995); Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Popular Genocide 34-35 (2016); David Rawson, Prelude to Genocide 9 (2018); US Central Intelligence Agency, Current Intelligence Weekly Summary 10 (14 Feb. 1964) (“President Kayibanda . . . threatens to exterminate the 250,000 or so [Tutsi] who remain in Rwanda if the attacks continue.”).


142 Olivier Thimonier, La Politique de la France au Rwanda de 1960 à 1981 [France’s Policy in Rwanda: 1960 to 1981] 74 (2001) (Master’s thesis, Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne). A challenge in understanding what Habyarimana was looking for is that there is not a universally accepted definition or description of “gendarmerie.” Usually, however, when contrasting gendarmerie to a police force, the focus is on the gendarmerie’s military characteristics and reporting structure as opposed to a civilian police force. See DEREK LUTTERBECK, THE PARADOX OF GENDARMERIES: BETWEEN EXPANSION, DEMILITARIZATION AND DISSOLUTION 7 (2013) (SSR Paper 8, Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces).


144 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 46 (2019).

145 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 43-44 (2019).


147 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 18, 28, 44 (2019). Habyarimana hailed from Rambura Parish, outside the northwest town of Gisenyi, which sits atop Lake Kivu on the border with Goma in what was then Zaire. His wife, Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, was from the neighboring commune of Giciye in a region called Bushiru.

148 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 44-46 (2019).

149 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 47-48 (2019).

150 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 44-48 (2019).

151 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 48 (2019); see also JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 38-39 (2016).


155 Juvénal Habyarimana, Message Addressed to the Nation by the High Command of the National Guard (5 July 1973) (read on Radio Rwanda by Commander Théoneste Lizinde) in JAMES K. GASANA, RWANDA: DU PARTI-ETAT À L’ETAT-GARISON 24-25 (2002).


158 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 28 (2019); Belgian Senate Report 143 (1997) (“President Habyarimana was born in the commune of Karago, but he . . . did not come from a [well respected] lineage.”).

159 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 28 (2019).


161 Faustin Twagiramungu (former president of the opposition MDR political party and prime minister of Rwanda from July 1994 to August 1995) has claimed to have coined the term Akazu, meaning “‘small hut,’ which in our tradition comprises members of three nuclear families.” Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Witness Statement of Faustin Twagiramungu 7 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 13 Apr. 2000). The term “Akazu” has generated some small amount of controversy. For example, Christophe Mfizi has objected to its use as underinclusive, since the so-called Akazu included more than just the Habyarimanas’ family members and, instead, extended to close non-familial associates. CHRISTOPHE MFIZI, LE RESEAU ZERO: FOSSOYEUR DE LA DEMOCRATIE ET DE LA REPUBLIQUE AU RWANDA (1975-1994) [THE ZERO NETWORK: GRAVEDIGGER OF DEMOCRACY AND THE REPUBLIC IN RWANDA (1975-1994)] 76 (Mar. 2006). Mfizi opted for the term “Zero Network,” which he introduced
in his 1992 open letter on the corruption surrounding Habyarimana. Letter from Christophe Mfizi to Juvénal Habyarimana (15 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “‘Le Reseau Zero’: Lettre Ouverte a Monsieur le President du Mouvement Republicain National Pour la Democratie et le Developpement (M.R.N.D.)”). This Report uses the term Akazu primarily because it is more commonly used than “Zero Network,” but it is used in the same sense as Mfizi’s Zero Network, that is, to denote “a hard core of people who have methodically pervaded the entire national life at the political, military, financial, agricultural, scientific, scholarly, family and even religious levels.” Letter from Christophe Mfizi to Juvénal Habyarimana (15 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “‘Le Reseau Zero’: Lettre Ouverte a Monsieur le President du Mouvement Republicain National Pour la Democratie et le Developpement (M.R.N.D.)”).


170 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 63 (2019).


173 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 64, 88 (2019).


175 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 53, 87 (2019).

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178 See ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 29, 149-50 (2019); see also LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 62 (2000).

179 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 29-30 (2019).

180 LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 68 (2nd ed. 2009).


183 Memorandum from Théoneste Lizinde to François Mitterrand et al. (8 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwandaise, Rwandais”). Lizinde wrote this a few weeks after being freed during an RPA raid on the Ruhengeri prison where he had been held as a political prisoner for more than 10 years. Lizinde, who was writing to various world leaders claiming to reveal secrets about the Rwandan leaders, wrote that Serubuga had admitted to him that he had ordered the “liquidation” of prisoners.


187 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 46 (2016).

188 See ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 74-75 (2019) (citing interview with Antoine Mugesera in February 2013); Interview by LFM with Emile Rwamasirabo.

189 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 46 (2016).


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1959 – September 1990


193 Kanyarengwe is one of two figures involved in the 1973 coup d’état (the other is Théoneste Lizinde) who by 1980 were accused of denouncing the Habyarimana regime’s “politico-financial ‘shenanigans.’” Kanyarengwe fled to Tanzania, and Lizinde was thrown into prison in Ruhengeri. The RPF and history caught up with both of them: Kanyarengwe was appointed chairman of the RPF in December 1990, and Lizinde was freed from prison by RPF troops in January 1991 and joined their ranks. MONIQUE MAS, PARIS-KIGALI 1990-1994: LUNETTES COLONIALES, POLITIQUES DU SABRE ET ONCTION HUMANITAIRE POUR UN GENOCIDE EN AFRIQUE [PARIS-KIGALI 1990-1994: COLONIAL LENSES, POLITICS OF THE SWORD AND HUMANITARIAN UNCTION FOR A GENOCIDE IN AFRICA] 21, 46 (1999). Kanyarengwe and Lizinde are discussed further in Chapter 3.

194 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 46 (2016).

195 See JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, TRANSFORMING RWANDA: CHALLENGES ON THE ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTION 17 (2019); JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 47-50, 277-78 (2016).

196 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 47-50 (2016).

197 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 48 (2016).

198 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 48 (2016). See, also, e.g., Letter from Juvénal Habyarimana to Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (18 Mar. 1982).

200 See Presentation of President Habyarimana’s Candidature to the “Africa Prize for Leadership 1990” 16 (1 Jan. 1990); ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 53 (2019) (noting Habyarimana’s promotion to Major-General in April 1973); see, also, e.g., Letter from Juvénal Habyarimana to Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (18 Mar. 1982).

208 LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 27-28 (2nd ed. 2009).


211 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 62 (2019).


to another that refers to building skills and abilities aimed at strengthening the capacities of the local population (as opposed to supplying physical infrastructure); OCDE, COOPÉRATION POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT: RAPPORT 2005 [DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION: 2005 REPORT] 121-144 (2006).


216 Special Agreement of Military Assistance, Fr. – Rw., 18 July 1975.

217 See MIP Tome I 29; BRUNO CHARBONNEAU, FRANCE AND THE NEW IMPERIALISM 126-27 (2008). For a discussion of these amendments, see Chapters 3 and 5 of this report.


220 See JOHN CHIPMAN, FRENCH POWER IN AFRICA 130 (1989).

221 JOHN CHIPMAN, FRENCH POWER IN AFRICA 130 (1989).

222 JOHN CHIPMAN, FRENCH POWER IN AFRICA 130 (1989).


226 FRANCIS TERRY McNAMARA, FRANCE IN BLACK AFRICA 150, 167 (1989).


228 see FRANCIS TERRY McNAMARA, FRANCE IN BLACK AFRICA 169 (1989).

229 see FRANCIS TERRY McNAMARA, FRANCE IN BLACK AFRICA 169 (1989).

230 see FRANCIS TERRY McNAMARA, FRANCE IN BLACK AFRICA 169 (1989).

231 François Mitterrand, Speech during the lunch offered by Juvénal Habyarimana in Kigali (7 Oct. 1982).

232 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara; see also RONALD TIERSKY, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND: A VERY FRENCH PRESIDENT 118-20 (2000).

233 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.


235 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.


239 Cable from Yannick Gérard (10 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “La cammunaute rwandaise en ouganda”).
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244 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.


249 See Roger Winter, *Uganda—Creating a Refugee Crisis, in Cultural Survival* (June 1983); Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.

250 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.

251 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.

252 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

253 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

254 Interview by LFM with Emile Rwamasirabo. Intego included Kayitesi Rusera and Immacule Nyirinkwaya, who currently sit on the Rwandan Supreme Court, as well as Jose Kagabo, Kabatsi Bagirishya, Louis Bagirishya, and Ignace Beraho, among others.

255 Interview by LFM with Emile Rwamasirabo.

256 Interview by LFM with Emile Rwamasirabo.

257 Interview by LFM with Emile Rwamasirabo.


264 Philippe Marchesin, Mitterrand l’africain [Mitterrand the African], in Politique Africaine 18 (June 1995).

265 See Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa 200-01 (1989).

266 See Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa 201 (1989).


268 Duclert Commission Report 81.

269 See Duclert Commission Report 81-82; Mémorandum sur la coopération militaire franco-rwandaise 4 (March 1982).


271 Memorandum from Guy Penne to François Mitterrand (11 June 1982) (Subject: “Entretien du President de la Republique avec le President Habyarimana”).

272 François Mitterrand, Speech during the lunch offered by Juvenal Habyarimana in Kigali (7 Oct. 1982).


274 Duclert Commission Report 84.

275 Duclert Commission Report 84.


279 See Francis Terry McNamara, France in Black Africa 206 (1989); Philip Short, A Taste for Intrigue: The Multiple Lives of François Mitterrand 491 (2013) (stating that Mitterrand’s support for Habré was intended “to show France’s African allies that Paris could protect them”).

280 Chad: Former dictator Hissène Habré sentenced to life in prison [Chad: l’ancien dictateur Hissène Habré condamné à la prison à vie], Le Parisien, 30 May 2016.


LAURENT LARCHER, RWANDA: ILS PARLENT [RWANDA: SPEAKING UP] 709 (2019). Védrine, it bears noting, has been said to have held similarly negative views of the United States. He once remarked, during his tenure as Mitterrand’s diplomatic advisor, that when the Americans are after something, “they’re terrifying, they behave like door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesmen,” caring “as little about the effects their actions have on us as we would care about the fallout our policies might have on Luxembourg.” PHILIP SHORT, A TASTE FOR INTRIGUE: THE MULTIPLE LIVES OF FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND 337 (2013).


See François Mitterrand, Opening Speech to the 16th Franco-African Summit in La Baule, France (June 1990).


MIP Tome I 35.

Memorandum from Claude Arnaud to François Mitterrand (30 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “Visite du President du Rwanda (lundi 2 avril)”).


MIP Tome I 36 (“Faced with procrastination by Rwandan authorities and concerned about the stability of states and regional security, France never made the decision to suspend all cooperation, or even to decrease the level of its civil and military aid. Thus, President Juvénal Habyarimana was able to convince himself that ‘France . . . would be behind him regardless of the situation, and he could do anything military and politically’ as Mr. Herman Cohen assessed during his [MIP] hearing.”).


See Tony Chafer, French African Policy: Towards Change, in AFRICAN AFFAIRS 50 (Jan. 1992) (assessing, two years after Mitterrand’s speech, that “[s]o far . . . it seems that little more than lip-service is being paid to the idea” that democratic reforms would be a prerequisite for aid).


JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, RWANDA’S POPULAR GENOCIDE 51-52 (2016).

Note sur l’évolution du problème des réfugiés rwandais, depuis la publication de la position du Comité Central du MRND sur cette question [Note on the evolution of the Rwandan refugee problem since the publication of the position of the MRND Central Committee on this issue] (undated) (summarizing the MRND’s position).


JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, TRANSFORMING RWANDA: CHALLENGES ON THE ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTION 78-80 (2019).
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314 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 79-80 (2019).
315 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 79-80 (2019).
316 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 80-81 (2019).
317 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 82 (2019).
318 RPF, Political Programme (1987); Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 82 (2019).
319 RPF, Political Programme (1987); Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 82 (2019).
320 See RPF, Political Programme (1987).
321 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 82 (2019).
322 See Interview by LFM with Protais Musoni; Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 45 (2019); US Central Intelligence Agency, Uganda Under a Museveni Regime [redacted] (Feb. 1986).
323 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 79-80 (2019).
324 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 81 (2019).
325 Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera.
326 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Transforming Rwanda: Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction 45 (2019).
327 Interview by LFM with Protais Musoni.
328 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
329 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
330 Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemera.
331 Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemera.
332 Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemera.
333 Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemera.
334 Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemera.
336 See Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Popular Genocide 37, 63, 69 (2016); Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism 125 (2008); see also Daleep Singh, Francophone Africa 1905-2005: A Century of Economic and Social Change 97 (2008) (noting that arabica coffee “has been Rwanda’s main export crop since its enforced plantation during the colonial period,” and that tea, the country’s second-most important crop, “accounts for another 24 percent of export income”).
337 Jean-Paul Kimonyo, Rwanda’s Popular Genocide 69 (2016).
342 Cable from Georges Martres (12 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “visite officielle du President Habyarimana à Paris (2, 3 et 4 Avril 1990) – (2/2)”).

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343 See Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “Visite du President du Rwanda (lundi 2 avril)”; Cable from Georges Martres (12 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “visite officielle du President Habyarimana à Paris (2, 3 et 4 Avril 1990) – (2/2)”).

344 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “Visite du President du Rwanda (lundi 2 avril)”).

345 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “Visite du President du Rwanda (lundi 2 avril)”).

346 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 Mar. 1990) (Subject: “Visite du President du Rwanda (lundi 2 avril)”).

347 Memorandum from Casimir Bizimungu to Juvénal Habyarimana (23 May 1990) (Subject: “Votre entretien en tête-à-tête avec le Président François Mitterrand au Palais de l’Élysée le 2 avril 1990”).

348 ANDRÉ GUICHAOUA, REPORT TO THE HAUT COMMISSARIAT DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES RÉFUGIÉS: LE PROBLÈME DES RÉFUGIÉS RWANDAIS ET DES POPULATIONS BANYARWANDA DANS LA RÉGION DES GRANDS LACS AFRICAINS [REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES: THE PROBLEM OF RWANDAN REFUGEES AND BANYARWANDA POPULATIONS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION OF AFRICA] 13 (May 1992) (“In August, a Manifesto signed by 33 intellectuals demanded rapid democratization, and in September the Synthesis Commission was set up to draw up a preliminary draft of the National Political Charter.”).


352 GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 99 (1995); see also JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, TRANSFORMING RWANDA: CHALLENGES ON THE ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTION 77 (2019) (“President Habyarimana was aware of the RPF preparations for an invasion. He counted on French military support and opted for military confrontation as a diversion from the intense domestic opposition that he was facing.”).

A telegram arrived from Paris indicating that President Habyarimana was asking for France’s military intervention: he feared he would be overwhelmed by the RPF forces. Immediately, the [French] President asked me to deploy a company in Rwanda.1


In late September 1990, Charles Kayonga, then a junior officer in Uganda’s National Resistance Army (NRA), received a message from an RPF comrade: “Stay close, don’t go far.”2 Several days later, James Kabarebe, a 2nd lieutenant in the NRA, received one of his own: “Tonight, we move.”3 Until the last days of September, only a handful of people—Fred Rwigema, Paul Kagame, and a few other commanders—knew that the RPF military would cross into Rwanda on 1 October.4

Fred Rwigema led a convoy that departed Kampala on the night of 30 September.5 Five hours later, it reached Mbarara, an hour and a half north of the border crossing with Rwanda at Kagitumba.6 As the convoy approached the border, “there was excitement,” Kayonga recalled.7 “All those who had money were throwing it to people on the road because they would not need Ugandan shilling—there was no return.”8 It was also the first time that the RPF’s army was going to come together as a fighting force on the battlefield.

At the border, around mid-morning on 1 October, a “vanguard” consisting of 30 to 60 RPF troops engaged and scattered a detachment of Rwandan government forces stationed on the Rwandan side.9 The remainder of the convoy crossed into their homeland without resistance—for now.10

The RPF battalions split up, taking different routes to a meeting point six miles into Rwanda. Two battalions took a slightly longer but less-traveled gravel road, pushing past an ambush and capturing weapons and vehicles in the process.11 The two battalions that took the more-traveled direct route to Matimba encountered serious resistance, which claimed a consequential casualty: Fred Rwigema.12 When the battalions converged at Matimba, the meeting point, the commanders13—not wanting to destroy morale—said nothing about Rwigema’s death, but also issued no new orders, as Rwigema’s “death deprived the RPA of a unified command, and units fought on their own.”14 Even to the troops who would not learn of Rwigema’s death until several weeks later, the disorientation was palpable.15
The Rwandan Armed Forces [FAR] ground troops were reinforced by “two French-built Gazelle helicopters equipped with rockets.” A US cable, citing “French pilots,” reported that the Gazelles were “perform[ing] well[,] firing 8 rockets against enemy positions.” A US Defense Intelligence Brief would later note the “considerable effectiveness” of the Gazelle’s rocket attacks on 3 October. By the following morning, the FAR’s helicopters had destroyed, “a column of ten trucks, including two carrying fuel” as well as the RPF army’s “main headquarters” near the Ugandan border, according to a cable from Colonel René Galinié, the defense attaché in the French embassy in Kigali.

Col. Galinié’s cable that day, 3 October, predicted that President Habyarimana would “[i]n all likelihood . . . address the French government today in order to obtain immediate aid in the form of ammunition and equipment, as well as an intervention by French forces.” Mitterrand, then aboard a French frigate in the Persian Gulf, would seem to have received the Rwandan president’s message. As Mitterrand’s chief military advisor, Admiral Jacques Lanxade, later recalled in his memoir, a telegram arrived from Paris on 3 October “indicating that President Habyarimana was asking for France’s military intervention: he feared he would be overwhelmed by the RPF forces.” Mitterrand did not hesitate. “Immediately,” Lanxade wrote, “the [French] President asked me to deploy a company in Rwanda.”

Lanxade has said that French Minister of Defense Jean-Pierre Chevènement—who would soon resign in opposition to France’s participation in the Gulf War—“tried in vain to present some objections” to the planned intervention in Rwanda and cautioned against measures that could be viewed as “neocolonial.” However, Chevènement has said that, although he was also on the frigate that day, the Élysée had not sought his opinion on whether to intervene in Rwanda—a remarkable assertion, considering he was the French government’s defense minister at the time.

Whether over Chevènement’s dissent or not, Lanxade on 4 October delivered the order to the French Army état-major to launch Operation Noroît (“Northwest Wind”), resulting in the immediate deployment of a company of 150 soldiers from the 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment, stationed in the Central African Republic, to Kigali. French officials did not publicly acknowledge that the Noroît deployment was a direct response to Habyarimana’s plea for military assistance. Rather, they insisted—falsely—that Noroît’s sole mission was to protect the French embassy and French nationals in Rwanda. It was an assertion that French officials would repeat for more than three years, until the last Noroît troops were finally withdrawn in December 1993.
B. French Geopolitical Interests in Africa Motivated Mitterrand’s Military Support of the Habyarimana Government. To Justify Pursuing Those Interests, French Officials Sought to Delegitimize the RPF by Casting It As a Foreign Aggressor.

I think that Noroit was absolutely geopolitical.29


France will be in a better position to help Rwanda if it’s clearly demonstrated to the international community that this is not a civil war.30


Mitterrand had his reasons for wanting to defend the Habyarimana regime, of which one, to be sure, was reassuring French allies in Africa. “If France hadn’t responded, it would have lost the confidence of most African countries,” one French official—the minister for cooperation and development at the time of the invasion—later explained to a French parliamentary mission that was examining the French government’s conduct in Rwanda.31 There could be no doubt that other African leaders—close allies of France, in many cases—would be eyeing developments in Rwanda, perhaps fearing that an RPF victory would start a “chain reaction in the region.”32 A demonstration of support for Habyarimana was a way for France to reassure those allies.

There was also the regional picture in East Africa to consider. Mitterrand had no desire to see a reliable ally toppled—most especially by a rebel army formed in English-speaking Uganda.33 According to Admiral Jacques Lanxade, the French president’s chief military advisor, Mitterrand “suspected that [East African destabilization] was secretly led by the Anglo-Americans. And so, to [Mitterrand], we were in a situation in which France had to hold on to its position.”34

Mitterrand was fixated on Uganda in the early days of the war. According to his closest advisor, Élysée Secretary-General Hubert Védrine, Mitterrand “would often talk about ‘the Ugandans’” at meetings in Paris, in October 1990.35 A US cable that month observed, “The Rwandans and the French are both virtually convinced of the complicity of the Ugandan government in the incursion.”36 French cables and internal government memos in October 1990 often referred to the RPF army as the “Ugandan-Tutsi” forces, a phrasing that both painted the government’s opponents, inaccurately, as foreign and defined them, crudely, by their assumed ethnic identity.37

The RPF was never “Ugandan,” even after it convinced Uganda’s President, Yoweri Museveni, to back its cause. Although the RPF incursion into Rwanda on 1 October 1990 had surprised and angered Museveni, he soon came to offer his assistance, gradually increasing his support over time.38 After learning of Fred Rwigema’s death, Paul Kagame raced to the front from the United States Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.39 He found RPF forces in “chaos” and set about reorganizing the army he now led.40 This effort required Museveni’s cooperation to allow his troops to cross back and forth across the border between Rwanda and Uganda and to permit RPF supporters in Uganda to bring food and other supplies to
soldiers at the front.\textsuperscript{41} “Museveni was angry with me,” Kagame recalled.\textsuperscript{42} “He told me that we had done this [operation] without his knowledge and now he was being blamed by the whole world.”\textsuperscript{43} Kagame apologized “for the mess,” but, he implored the Ugandan President, “I need your help.”\textsuperscript{44} Museveni agreed not to interfere with RPF activities but this did not mean he would furnish material support, at least, not at first.\textsuperscript{45}

Kagame returned to Museveni, however, “more than a dozen times” between 1990 and 1994.\textsuperscript{46} “Sometimes we would ask for something, and he would refuse and would say we had caused him problems. I took every insult and said, ‘thank you,’ but can you please help; we need this or that.”\textsuperscript{47} Over time, Museveni agreed to provide weapons and ammunition.\textsuperscript{48} RPF troops had left Uganda on 1 October 1990 with arms taken from the NRA without Museveni’s knowledge or approval, but this did not mean they relied on Ugandan arms exclusively.\textsuperscript{49} RPF soldiers also captured equipment on the battlefield and purchased arms and equipment in other countries that Museveni allowed to be routed through Uganda.\textsuperscript{50} “It was a hybrid,” Kagame explained.\textsuperscript{51} “Partly we relied on ourselves for arms and other things necessary, and then also some supplies from Uganda.”\textsuperscript{52} Sometimes individual NRA commanders approved arms and equipment transfers with clearance from higher authorities, and sometimes without clearance.\textsuperscript{53}

“But for fighting,” Kagame clarified, “we fought our own war.”\textsuperscript{54} By this he meant that the RPF’s army was made up of Rwandan refugees, not only from Uganda, but from Burundi, Zaire, and countries further afield. Between October 1990 and the Genocide, French officials may not have known the extent, nature, and level of RPF support from allies within Uganda, but there was never any compelling reason to doubt that it was the RPF military, and the RPF military alone, that planned the war effort and saw it through. The RPF was what it claimed to be: a movement of Rwandan refugees, resorts to war to force the end of Habyarimana’s autocratic reign. Indeed, the French National Assembly’s 1998 information mission (Mission d’information parlementaire, or MIP), which conducted hearings on France’s involvement in Rwanda and issued a voluminous report on the subject, would later acknowledge: “[I]t appears that the return of the armed refugees of October 1 was in fact an incident in the Rwandan civil war rather than in a two-state conflict.”\textsuperscript{55}

To be sure, French officials knew exactly what the RPF was and why it had resorted to war.\textsuperscript{56} In a 10 October 1990 diplomatic cable, for example, France’s ambassador in Kampala provided historical context for the conflict.\textsuperscript{57} Noting the influx of Tutsi refugees to Uganda fleeing Rwanda since 1959, he explained, “Rwandan refugees . . . believe that their country - they often say their homeland - is Rwanda and not Uganda.”\textsuperscript{58} And, in a cable the next day detailing his deputy’s meeting with RPF representatives, the same ambassador relayed that the RPF’s objective was not merely to secure a right of return for their fellow refugees, but “to liberate the country from the dictatorship of Habyarimana.”\textsuperscript{59} The RPF representatives had explained that, while they were open to participating in international talks, those talks “should not only deal with the question of refugees. [They] should also address all the political problems of today’s Rwanda,” including “widespread corruption, embezzlement of international aid, [and] political assassinations.”\textsuperscript{60} (Notably, the RPF representatives said the RPF would find it acceptable—\textit{at that time}—for France to keep a limited number of troops in Rwanda “for purely humanitarian reasons.” They cautioned, though, that RPF leaders “would not understand” if France—“the homeland of human rights”—retained a large military contingent in the country, “thus allowing Habyarimana to emulate Pinochet by locking up his opponents in a stadium and by ordering summary executions.”\textsuperscript{61})
Yet in spite of everything they knew about the RPF, French officials preferred to conflate the RPF with the country (Uganda) from which the organization’s military leaders had launched their attack. It was only a few months earlier, at the June 1990 Franco-African Summit in La Baule, that Mitterrand had pledged to uphold certain restrictions on French involvement in African conflicts. “I repeat the principle of French policy: every time a foreign menace appears that could undermine your independence, France will be by your side,” he told the assembled African leaders at the summit. But, he said: “[O]ur own role, as a foreign country, even though we are friends, is not to intervene in domestic conflicts. In these cases, France, with the country’s leaders, will ensure the protection of its citizens, its nationals, but does not intend to arbitrate conflicts.” What was critical, he was saying, was whether the threat was external (in which case, French intervention would be permissible) or internal (in which case, it would not be). The 1 October 1990 attack, as Mitterrand would later acknowledge (albeit privately), did not fit neatly into either category: it had been planned abroad, but by Rwandan refugees with grievances against Habyarimana’s anti-Tutsi policies. Publicly acknowledging these complexities, however, could invite only criticism. Mitterrand could more easily justify French intervention on the regime’s behalf—while projecting the appearance of a consistent Africa intervention policy—if the French public perceived the threat as foreign.

Senior Rwandan officials, viewing the support of France and other allies as critical to the regime’s prospects for victory, had similarly strong incentives to mischaracterize the RPF attack as a foreign invasion and were determined to ensure that the West would perceive it as such. On 9 October 1990, just over a week into the war, two advisors warned President Habyarimana that the use of the term “rebel forces” for the RPF was allowing certain international media to portray the conflict as an internal “rebellion” instead of, in their words, an “external aggression.” They alerted Habyarimana to the “terrible danger” such a portrayal presented by threatening to “alienate us from international public opinion.”

The weeks that followed would see a concerted effort by French and Rwandan officials alike to reframe public perceptions of the RPF and the war. Newly uncovered evidence, disclosed in the March 2021 Ducler Commission Report, shows the Élysée played a significant role in this campaign, with Mitterrand’s deputy military advisor, Colonel Jean-Pierre Huchon, emerging as a key operator. Huchon, the Commission found, regularly sent confidential handwritten faxes to Colonel Galinié, the French defense attaché in Kigali, often marking his communications “to be destroyed after reading.” In one such fax, on 24 October 1990, Huchon called on the French embassy to help repair the Rwandan government’s public image by, among other things, persuading the French-speaking media in Rwanda “that this is not a home-grown rebellion, it is foreign aggression.” “Make a real effort to show evidence of the Ugandan origin of the attack,” Huchon urged. Huchon later wrote in a follow-up: “We absolutely need to explain to international opinion that this is indeed an offensive by the Ugandan army (deserters or not) and not a domestic rebellion. Otherwise we will . . . be forced, politically speaking, to align ourselves with the Belgians.” (By this, Huchon presumably meant that France would be compelled to withdraw its troops from Rwanda, as Belgium was preparing to do.)

France’s ambassador in Kigali, Georges Martres, voiced similar concerns in a 24 October 1990 cable, remarking with some frustration that Radio France International, in particular, and
Western media generally, “continue[d] to be manipulated by a Rwandan diaspora dominated by Tutsi.” The same day, in a meeting with Habyarimana, Martres advised the Rwandan president to “highlight in the media” the RPF’s military attack as an external aggression, explaining that “France will be in a better position to help Rwanda if it’s clearly demonstrated to the international community that this is not a civil war.”

Portraying a link between Uganda and the RPF would remain an ongoing concern between French and Rwandan officials in the first months of the war. When, in December 1990, two French officers visited Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the FAR’s military intelligence chief, they reiterated the stronger position Rwanda would enjoy with the international community if it could provide “irrefutable proof” of Uganda’s involvement. Nsengiyumva, a hardliner who would later serve 15 years in prison for his role in the slaughter of civilians at the outset of the Genocide, turned to FAR commanders in Byumba (central Rwanda) and Mutara (northeast Rwanda) with instructions to send captured RPF soldiers to Kigali for interrogation “on the role of the Ugandan government and of its armed forces.”

The Rwandan government proceeded with its planned “media offensive,” an effort to offset what a senior French advisor would later credit as an “obvious advantage” that the RPF held at the start of hostilities. Nsengiyumva recommended that the media offensive involve Ferdinand Nahimana, the newly appointed head of ORINFOR, the Rwandan government’s media and propaganda ministry, whose “dynamism” Nsengiyumva praised. An international tribunal would later convict and sentence Nahimana to life in prison (reduced on appeal to 30 years) for inciting violence during the Genocide through his stewardship of the infamous hate media radio station Radio-Television Milles Collines (RTLM).

C. In Support of Its Desire to Intervene, the French Government Also Mischaracterized the RPF As a Tutsi Movement Intent on Dominating the Hutu Majority, Though the RPF Was a Pluralistic Group with Broad Political Aims.

In 1990, when Kagame planned his invasion of Rwanda from Uganda, we saw it as an excluded minority trying to seize power. It’s not French diplomatic logic to accept these sorts of methods, regardless of their arguments’ merits.


French leaders starting with President Mitterrand also sought to justify French intervention by demonizing the RPF as representatives of an ethnic minority trying to re-establish a Tutsi monarchy over the Hutu majority—a highly inflammatory notion in Rwanda, and a highly erroneous one.

As discussed in Chapter 1 of this Report, the RPF had gone to pains not only to minimize the importance of ethnicity within its ranks, but to promulgate a pluralist platform. Democracy figured prominently in the RPF platform, second in its list of principles only to “Consolidation of National Unity” (meaning the rejection of ethnic politics and divisionism). Democracy for the RPF meant the following:
- “popular democracy where the population is organized in small cells . . . where national affairs will be discussed.”
- a democratically elected national assembly, “free of prejudice by the government or any other political tendency, manipulated or riggings as is now done in Rwanda.”
- a democracy “within the broader context of liberation of our people from all forms of social, economic and political oppression.”

Charles Kayonga, the RPF battalion commander, explained:

The RPF/RPA never saw itself as a Tutsi movement or a Tutsi army. That mindset was the biggest problem in Rwanda, which is why the RPF was focused on principles of unity and togetherness. In refugee camps, there were Hutu who had fled in the 1950’s, and when the RPF started, there were Hutu who joined. The RPF did not identify people based on ethnicity. The RPF went out of its way to recruit people from different walks of life. There were Hutu in the RPF, and there were Hutus in the RPA [the RPF’s army].

RPF representatives, as noted above, had explained much of this to staff at the French embassy in Kampala, in mid-October 1990. An “open letter” that same month from the Rwandan community in Switzerland, addressed to Mitterrand and other world leaders, said much the same:

We would like to point out that the Rwandan Patriotic Front, which is fighting the bloodthirsty regime in Kigali, has no objective other than the restoration of human rights and democracy in Rwanda. It aims only to establish political pluralism [that] excludes any reference to ethnic and regional character, which are the pillars of the Habyarimana system.

Western news outlets depicted the RPF in similar terms. French officials, though, seemed uninterested in exploring, even with skepticism, the possibility that the RPF meant what it said.

President Mitterrand mischaracterized the conflict using reductive ethnic terms that rationalized his desire to reassure African partners by supporting Habyarimana: in his false logic, the RPF represented the minority Tutsi; Habyarimana represented the majority Hutu; all Rwandans would vote according to their ethnicity; the minority Tutsi, who were in pursuit of full political control, could not offer stable democratic rule over the Hutu; and, therefore, France should support Habyarimana against the RPF. As Ambassador Martres would recall in a 2014 interview with the French newspaper L’Indépendant: “In 1990, when Kagame planned his invasion of Rwanda from Uganda, we saw it as an excluded minority trying to seize power. It’s not French diplomatic logic to accept these sorts of methods, regardless of their arguments’ merits.”

The Habyarimana regime encouraged the effort. Védrine would recall in 2014, “On the government side, they kept on telling us that they represented the immense majority, so why should there be a political compromise with a small minority?” On 10 October 1990, Le Monde reported on the Rwandan foreign minister’s claim that the RPF had included in its ranks “a Hutu opponent, Pasteur Bizimungu” only “to show that it was not an ethnic party,” not because it stood for
pluralism. The foreign minister went on to accuse the RPF of “wanting to establish a feudal-like ‘minority-rule’ regime.” Le Monde remarked skeptically that the minister “could not have alluded more clearly to the Tutsi monarchy, which reigned until 1959, the year of the Hutu revolt,” but President Mitterrand internalized the idea that the RPF was after Tutsi political domination, when remarking at a 17 October 1990 meeting with French ministers that “there is no value to a revolt by a small Tutsi minority that prevails over the majority of the Hutu population.” Mitterrand would cling to this rationale for years, even repeating it as his primary motivation for sending troops to Rwanda during the Genocide in Operation Turquoise.

Freddy Mutanguha

Freddy was 18 years old at the time of the Genocide. He lived with his parents and four sisters in Kibuye.

My strongest memory of the Genocide, the one that hurts me most, is the night of 13 April 1994. That was the day they came to kill my family. I was away from the house, in hiding, but Mum came to find me. She knew I was very hungry because by then nobody could cook any food. There was practically nothing left in the house. By then people had been bribing the hungry Interahamwe with food—to let them live a few days longer. At home the only thing we had left was beans. Mum knew I didn’t like beans and so she brought me some vegetables and passion fruit. She told me, “I couldn’t find anything for you to eat . . . The people I told you about—the ones who don’t like us—took everything away from me. I don’t even have anything to give my child.” Then she added, “Try and eat this, it will be OK. Be strong.” Today, passion fruit still reminds me of that last meal my Mum gave me.

I also remember that before she was killed, Mum told me I had to be strong. She said that if my sister and I survived, I had to be a man. Those are the two things still on my heart to this day.

I was there when the perpetrators came to kill my family. They came saying, “We’re tired, we’ll take these two fat kids [Freddy and his sister] later.” So they took the younger ones; my sister Rosette and I were left behind. We saw them being taken with our own eyes, and they were killed not far away. We couldn’t see it happening, but we could hear them screaming . . . . They took Mum far away to kill her. Later at night, I went with another boy to find her body. We rushed there and buried her. We simply covered her with soil. So I saw my Mum’s body, but not the
rest of the family. I just heard my sisters being killed. I didn’t see my father killed—people told me about it later.

I know some of the killers very well. One of them wanted to rape my sister, but he didn’t succeed. I know the people who took them away. They were our neighbours, among them a man called Benoit who had been our neighbour for years and owned a shop nearby. He was Mum’s friend, and he even used to lend her money for me to go to school. They got on very well. He was one of the leaders of the group that took them. And there was another young man called Kanani—Mum had been his teacher in primary school. Some people inside the compound tried to fight off the killers, but it was Kanani who held on to Mum when they took her out of the house. Later, he let go of Mum’s hand, and she ran away. But they found her again, and she was beaten to death with clubs.

... 

It’s hard to describe how I felt during the Genocide. I was so afraid. I used to imagine a machete cutting my neck all the time—or my neck on the ground. All the time I was hiding in the roof of someone’s house, my heart was full of fear. They sometimes used to let me sit near the fire because I was freezing in the cold. I used to hide behind a big sieve (used for sorghum) so that whoever was making the fire couldn’t see me. I was so afraid and lost all hope of survival. But then I reached a point where I wasn’t scared any more. I was no longer afraid of death. Death or life, it meant nothing anymore.

Sometimes my sister and I would walk along the road. We walked a lot but we weren’t afraid of passing the roadblocks. There was only once we were frightened. That was in a place called Mwendo in Kibuye. They took us up to the roadblock and asked us if we were Tutsis. We told them we weren’t, but they looked at us and said we must be Tutsis because of our soft hair. They told us to stop lying to them. They asked me to dig my own grave and I refused. They said the burgomaster would judge our case and took us to the commune. We ended up spending a night in a cell because the burgomaster was drunk. But I wasn’t afraid. I had lost my fear after my parents were murdered and after all the terrible things I had experienced. Only my sister Rosette and I survived.
D. French Cooperants Had Been Training the Rwandan Army Units That Stopped the RPF’s Military Progress at the Start of the War and the French Government Sent More Troops Immediately Thereafter.

[T]hese units, backed by France, gave Rwanda the October victory.96

– Laurent Serubuga, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army

The “small force of armed helicopters” whose “rocket attacks against rebel concentrations”97 helped stop the RPF’s army at Gabiro was reinforcing the Rwandan Army’s para-commando battalion, one of three elite FAR units that had been receiving French training and support prior to the war.98 The other two elite FAR units were an aviation squadron (escadrille de l’aviation)99 and the reconnaissance (“recce”) battalion.100 Both deployed against the RPF troops in the first days of the war.101

On 1 October 1990, there were 17 French military cooperants training the Rwandan military under the auspices of the French Military Assistance Mission (MAM).102 For instance, five French soldiers trained the aviation squadron’s flight engineers and ground mechanics, and shared their expertise in the Nord 2501, a military transport aircraft.103 The FAR needed a lot of training. “[T]he chief challenges encountered this year,” a French officer had written in a January 1990 report, “result from a lack of motivation and taking care, from a lack of interest, from secretiveness and from Rwandan soldiers’ outsized pride, and the economic crisis is making their behavior even worse.”104

The outbreak of war did little to disrupt the MAM cooperants’ efforts to professionalize Rwanda’s military. A report by Col. Galinié, the French defense attaché in Rwanda, explained that even after he ordered the cooperants to temporarily withdraw from the Rwandan military camps where some of them had been living, French cooperation with the FAR “never ceased.”105 If anything, he said, the withdrawal only strengthened France’s assistance, as French cooperants devoted themselves to gathering intelligence.106 This, Galinié wrote, “allowed us to advise the [Rwandan] officers in a discreet manner without ill-intentioned observers being able to claim that we were participating in military actions.”107

Galinié delivered much of this advice personally. According to the Duclert Commission Report, Galinié was “[the] de facto military and political advisor to the Rwandan President,” with whom he met four times in October 1990, “and was also the main contact for the Rwandan Minister of Defense and the various staffs.”108 In addition to advising Habyarimana, Galinié provided both advice and, as he put it, “encouragement” to FAR operational commanders.109 He did this while, at the same time, pressing French military and Ministry of Cooperation officials to supply the FAR with needed ammunition.110

Other French military cooperants maintained contacts with their Rwandan colleagues throughout the opening weeks of the war, even after France temporarily called its officers back to the embassy to help prepare plans to evacuate French nationals.111 During this time, armed helicopters from the FAR’s aviation squadron, which continued to receive advice from French
military cooperants, made six “shooting passes” per day over enemy positions—a “very high rate,” in the estimation of one French officer who worked with the unit. The helicopters fired 640 rockets in the three weeks after the invasion.

In his MIP testimony, the head of the French Military Cooperation Mission, General Jean Varret, confirmed that there were times, during the early phase of the war, when French instructor-pilots were on board the Gazelle helicopters alongside their Rwandan pupils. French officials have maintained that the French instructors “were not at the controls of the helicopter to fire”—they were onboard only “to provide training in flying and shooting.”

Efforts to improve the reconnaissance battalion and para-commando battalion continued as well, to considerable effect on the war effort. The impact was such that, in December 1990, Col. Laurent Serubuga, the FAR deputy chief of staff, declared to the head of the French Military Cooperation Mission that “these units, backed by France, gave Rwanda the October victory.” Serubuga’s plea for French support of these units to continue was successful. In fact, in the three and a half years leading up to the Genocide, the French government expanded its support.

The 4 October launch of Operation Noroît, in which approximately 150 French troops from a French base in the Central African Republic landed in Kigali, joining the French advisers already in Rwanda, was followed the next day by the arrival of approximately 500 Belgian paratroopers. Both Belgium and France characterized their missions as the protection of their nationals in Rwanda. As Admiral Lanxade wrote in a 2001 memoir, however, “This increase in our forces was also a clear signal sent to the RPF and, indirectly, to Uganda.” In other words, these troops also served as a deterrent of the RPF military advance.

Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko sent an entire battalion plus his personal protection force, the French-trained and well-equipped Division Speciale Presidentielle (“DSP”), which helped drive the RPF troops from Gabiro. Reports placed the number of Zairean forces in Rwanda variously at 1,000, 1,200, and 1,500, some of which reportedly participated in “wantonly killing, looting, and raping,” including a massacre of 200 civilians in Gabiro. Habyarimana soon asked Zaire to remove its troops from Rwanda.

France’s involvement had other consequences. When, for example, French and Belgian soldiers secured the Kigali airport, ostensibly to facilitate the evacuation of their nationals, their actions doubled as a favor to the Rwandan government; as the RPF’s James Kabarebe explained, the decision “freed up the FAR to go to the front. The French action said, ‘we are securing Kigali for you; you can go to the front.’” Col. Galinié—France’s military attaché, the head of the Military Assistance Mission to Rwanda, and the commander of Noroît—confirmed as much in an 11 October telegram: “If the French and Belgian forces had not relieved [the FAR] by taking over missions and terrain (protecting the airport and the roads leading to it) and if the Zairean forces had not participated directly in the conflict, they would have, at best, shuttered themselves in Kigali in conditions and with a less-than-effective plan.”
E. In the Early Months of the Conflict, the Élysée Extended Military Support to the Habyarimana Regime Despite Human Rights Abuses, Anti-Tutsi Massacres, and Reservations among French Officials.

Of course, we fear it could get worse and turn into an ethnic disaster.130


Shortly after the 1 October RPF military attack, the international press began to report that the Rwandan government was sponsoring massacres of civilians. On 10 October 1990, Reuters reported that approximately 400 Rwandan civilians fled to Uganda after Rwandan troops and anti-Tutsi militias attacked peasants accused of supporting the RPF outside the northeast Rwandan town of Nyakatale in the Mutara region near the border with Uganda: “Soldiers shot peasants and burned down huts while Hutus hacked women and children with machetes Monday in attacks on at least nine settlements inhabited mainly by the minority Tutsi tribe in northeast Rwanda, the villagers said.”131 One witness recounted the kind of scene that would become all too familiar four years later: “One woman died after Hutus hacked off her arms and forced them into her mouth…. Her two small children, aged one and five were then slaughtered.”132 Another witness said, “The whole place was littered with bodies, it seems more people died than escaped.”133 The fleeing villagers said that hundreds of villagers had been killed.134

Around the same time, other massacres took place around Nyagatare, also in the Mutara region. As one surviving farmer said, “They began shooting our cattle, then they ordered us outside. We thought we were going to be released, but they formed us in a line and then began shooting people.”135 The farmer “displayed festering gunshot wounds on his leg and back,” Reuters reported at the time. “He said he had fallen behind a bush where he remained for three days, too scared to move.”136

The violence was not limited to the northeastern border region. On the other side of the country, in and around Kibilira, roughly 175 miles southwest of where the RPF troops had attacked, local authorities directed the massacre of more than 300 mostly Tutsi civilians, and the burning of more than 400 mostly Tutsi homes.137

Kigali issued feeble denials. Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu said the murdered civilians were actually rebels in civilian clothing “because ‘that’s their guerilla tactics.’”138 A public report issued in March 1993 by an independent consortium of human rights groups led by the Paris-based Federation Internationale des Droits de L’Homme (International Federation of Human Rights) (“FIDH”), would set the historical record straight:

According to [a FAR] officer…and verified by testimony of displaced persons in camps in the region of Ngarama and others who had fled to Kigali, several companies of the Rwandan army were ordered to clear the zone between Nyagatare and Kagitumba [both in the northeast] of all humans and animals. The massacre was carried out on October 8, 1990 by helicopters and soldiers on the ground. . . . Between 500 and 1,000 persons were killed. The Rwandan Red Cross buried the dead.139
The FIDH also concluded that beginning on 10 October, local Rwandan officials led massacres in Kibilira and Satinsyi in western Rwanda, killing over 300 (mainly Tutsi), burning over 400 homes, and destroying and pillaging “nearly all the farm animals, food reserves and household furnishings” in 48 hours, confirming the broad outlines of the contemporaneous Reuters report.140

French officials knew about the violence, and, what is more, they knew that President Habyarimana’s party, the MRND, had, in some cases at least, played a role in it. A 13 October 1990 cable by Col. Galinié reported: “Organized by the MRND, Hutu farmers have intensified their search for suspicious Tutsis in the foothills; massacres are reported in the region of Kibilira, 20 kilometers northwest of Gitarama. As previously indicated, the risk that this conflict will spread seems to be becoming a reality.”141

Ambassador Martres was equally aware of the massacres and mass arrests.142 Martres, who had been on vacation when the war began,143 returning to Kigali on 5 October, was on good terms with Habyarimana and was a regular lunch guest at the president’s home.144 The two men were close enough, in fact, that members of the diplomatic corps liked to joke that Martres acted less like France’s ambassador to Rwanda than like Habyarimana’s ambassador to France.145 “Without questioning the diplomatic talents of my colleague,” Belgian Ambassador Johan Swinnen would later say, “I found it somewhat shameful, a bit humiliating and even dangerous for Martres to be the object of the perception that he was a tool of the other country.”146

On 7 October, Martres told Reuters that the situation outside the capital was very confused, and conceded that “there had been what he termed slip-ups because the troops were nervous. ‘Of course, we fear it could get worse and turn into an ethnic disaster,’ [Martres] said.”147 By 15 October 1990, Martres acknowledged that the Tutsi population in Rwanda feared a genocide. “[The Tutsi population] is still counting on a military victory,” Martres wrote in a memo titled “analysis of the situation by the Tutsi population.” “A military victory,” he continued, “even a partial one, would allow them to escape genocide.”148 Martres did not dismiss the possibility of genocide. Indeed, he would later tell the French Parliamentary Information Mission (MIP) that as early as October 1990, it was possible to see the calamity ahead:

The genocide was foreseeable as early as then [October 1990], even if we couldn’t imagine its magnitude and atrociousness. Some Hutus had in fact had the audacity to refer to it. Colonel Laurent Serubuga, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Rwandan army, was pleased with the RPF attack, which would serve to justify the massacre of Tutsis.149

The massacres took place in rural areas, where they were harder to see for the media and the international community. In Kigali itself, late in the night of 4 October, the Rwandan government staged a fake attack, supposedly by RPF troops, on the capital, and used it as a pretext to arrest “several thousand people as suspected rebels or sympathizers;” many were tortured.150 While most were Tutsi or Habyarimana’s political opponents,151 the regime’s indiscriminate sweep even took in Ambassador Martres’ driver Jean Rwabahizi, who had worked at the embassy for more than two decades. Rwabahizi was arrested ostensibly for being out after curfew. He said he was first taken to Kanombe Military Camp and beaten so severely that when the responsible
officers transferred him to Nyamirambo stadium with numerous other arrestees, the authorities there did not want to accept Rwabahizi because they did not take “corpses.”

Ambassador Martres’ wife was ultimately able to get him released. To this day, Rwabahizi does not know how she learned of his arrest. According to Rwabahizi, he told Ambassador Martres what happened to him and also about the plight of the abuse of others who were held at Nyamirambo stadium. It took Rwabahizi two months to recover from his injuries and return to driving Ambassador Martres.

The mass arrests made news in Europe. On 9 October 1990, Le Monde reported that the Rwandan government’s “hunt for arms and rebels in the working-class Nyamirambo neighborhood is reportedly brutal. In the stadium next door, the army has rounded up several hundred ‘suspects.’” Within days, Le Monde revised its estimate of the number arrested from “a few hundred” to 3,000, as did publications in the United States. A 12 October cable signed by Col. Galinié and sent by Ambassador Martres put the number at 10,000, noting also that “the interrogations are violent,” and “people are held for several days without food or drink.”

On 8 October, Belgian Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens spoke to Rwandan Ambassador to Belgium Francois Ngarukiyintwali about the arrests. On 10 October, the Quai d’Orsay issued a statement declaring its hope that the Rwandan government would avoid “excess” and called on local authorities to “engage in dialogue.” Belgium’s ambassador to Rwanda, Johan Swinnen, was far more forceful, personally urging President Juvénal Habyarimana “to respect the rights of people detained in an anti-rebel mopping up operation.”

A formal demarche from Swinnen to the Habarumwire government on 11 October laid out the full range of Belgium’s concerns, decrying the reported massacres, other human rights abuses, and Rwanda’s denial of Red Cross access to detainees.

Habyarimana eventually released many of the detainees, and Martres would later claim credit by attributing the decision to apply “international pressure, mainly that of France because of its significant military presence. Therefore, it was with the sole purpose of avoiding the worst outbursts of violence that French military presence was maintained [in Rwanda].”

Lost in Martres’ attempt to assign credit to the French government for Habyarimana’s concessions was the hard truth that France was backing the Rwandan government despite French officials’ knowledge of the Habyarimana’s regime’s “worst excesses.” The warnings would only grow louder. A 19 October 1990 cable by Col. Galinié cautioned that “hardliners of the current regime” might encourage Rwandans to commit more “serious abuses against the inland Tutsi populations” if the RPF succeeded in seizing more territory. Galinié assessed that Rwanda’s Hutu majority was primed to fear that an RPF military victory would mark a return to Tutsi rule. Rwandans, he argued in a 24 October note, would never accept the reestablishment in northeast Rwanda of what he called “the despised regime of the first Tutsi kingdom.”

His prediction—chilling, in light of what was come—was that “this overt or covert reestablishment would lead: in all likelihood, to the physical elimination of the Tutsi within the country, 500,000 to 700,000 people, by the Hutu, 7,000,000 individuals.”
F. As Belgium Withdrew, the French Government Increased Its Support.

Belgium has its conscience, and we have ours.170


On 11 October, Col. Galinié delivered a grimly blunt assessment of the FAR’s capabilities: “[T]he Rwandan army is unable to handle the situation.”171 According to the MIP, Galinié “recommend[ed] that France send advisers on the ground in the northeast in the combat zone and in Kigali” to, in Galiné’s words, “educate, organize and motivate a troop that had languished for thirty years and that had forgotten the basic rules of combat.”172 This recommendation would become reality in March 1991, when France sent a detachment of 30 officers to instruct Rwandan troops in Ruhengeri, in the northwest. Those troops would supplement the high-level reinforcement France sent in fall 1990: the appointment of a special advisor to Col. Serubuga to “improve [the Rwandan] army’s operational abilities in order to get it quickly capable of opposing the increasing number of raids by RPF troops.”173

The man selected for this assignment, Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Canovas, was, in the words of French authors Gabriel Périès and David Servenay, “un homme de terrain”—roughly, a man with hands-on experience in the field.174 He came from the 1st Marine Infantry Paratrooper Regiment,175 an arm of the French Army Special Forces Command, where, according to Jean-François Dupaquier, a French investigative journalist who served as an expert at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), Canovas had a “brilliant career” as a paratrooper.176 Dupaquier wrote darkly of Canov as, describing him as “a specialist in total warfare and in disinformation as a weapon of war,”177 while Périès and Servenay have described Canovas as an experienced soldier who could offer Rwanda the benefit of “French know-how in defense matters.”178

Officially, Canovas served under Galinié both as deputy defense attaché and as deputy of operations for the Military Assistance Mission.179 It appears, though, that Canovas operated outside of the usual reporting channels, with the Duclert Commission deducing that his mission was likely “closely managed” by President Mitterrand’s staff at the Élysée.180

Canovas testified before the MIP in 1998. While that testimony has not been made public, the MIP report itself stated that Canovas insisted his mission was “official and avowed”—just one component of France’s emergency response “in the context of a major crisis, which the Rwandan Armed Forces—few in number and largely inexperienced—had trouble handling.”181

Canovas’ presence at Col. Serubuga’s side during the first nine months of the war, from October 1990 to June 1991, was never publicized. (In his 2004 book on France’s role in Rwanda, the journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupéry quoted an unnamed French officer as saying that Canovas’ charge was to advise the Rwandan command on the sly.182) The secrecy suggests that French officials were concerned about the controversy it might create, in both France and Rwanda, as would happen in February 1992, when opposition political parties decried reports that Lieutenant Colonel Gilles Chollet, the head of the detachment sent in March 1991, was advising both President Habyarimana and Col. Serubuga on military operations.183 The Quai d’Orsay denied...
those reports,\textsuperscript{184} and it never mentioned that Canovas had been advising Serubuga long before Chollet.

From the beginning, Canovas enjoyed what the historian Daniela Kroslak would describe as “privileged access to information about troop deployment and other military activities of the FAR.”\textsuperscript{185} The MIP report reflects that at his hearing, Canovas acknowledged his role in helping the FAR develop a defense plan for the city of Kigali, as well as plans to strengthen the FAR’s fighting capabilities “in the border regions facing the greatest threat,” including Gisenyi and Ruhengeri in the northwest, Byumba in the center, and the Mutara Lake region in the northeast.\textsuperscript{186} The MIP offers no further specifics on the advice he provided. Documents show, however, that he had a voice in high-level strategic military discussions.\textsuperscript{187} Canovas spoke freely in meetings with FAR leaders, such as a 2 November 1990 meeting with Col. Serubuga, during which Canovas recommended having Rwandan reconnaissance planes fly at low enough altitude to evade enemy fire and also “to create enemy panic.”\textsuperscript{188}

Other French officers had their own opportunities to advise the FAR. Beginning in late October 1990, Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie leaders began holding daily, or near-daily, briefings for French and Belgian military officers in Kigali.\textsuperscript{189} Typically, two Noroit officers and a French advisor to the para-commando battalion attended.\textsuperscript{190} The mid-afternoon briefings invariably began with an overview of the security situation in the country, followed by a review of the latest skirmishes in the combat zone, and finally a question-and-answer session, during which the Rwandan military leaders shared highly sensitive information—for instance, intelligence gleaned from the FAR’s aerial reconnaissance missions.\textsuperscript{191} Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the FAR’s chief of military intelligence, would continue for a time to provide briefings to the Noroit officers after Belgium withdrew its troops from the country on 1 November.\textsuperscript{192}

The MIP suggested that France did not at first envision keeping Canovas in Rwanda for more than a few weeks.\textsuperscript{193} President Habyarimana hoped otherwise, telling French officials in November 1990 that Canovas and Galinié had “played a decisive role as advisers that were effective and had the ear of Rwandan military authorities of all ranks.”\textsuperscript{194} In December 1990, during a visit to Rwanda by General Jean Varret, the head of the Military Cooperation Mission in Paris, Habyarimana, Serubuga, and Colonel Léonidas Rusatira (the Secretary General of the Defense Ministry) all pleaded with Varret to extend Canovas’ tour (as well as the tours of French advisers working with the aviation squadron and para-commando battalion).\textsuperscript{195} Varret obliged, assuring Habyarimana that France would extend Canovas’ term for six months, until June 1991.\textsuperscript{196}

French support for the FAR extended beyond strategic advice to material support. On 8 October, Admiral Lanxade reported to President Mitterrand that France had sent munitions to Habyarimana in the “first days of the crisis” and recommended adding a small shipment of helicopter rockets, which President Mitterrand authorized in a handwritten note.\textsuperscript{197} (Belgium provided two planeloads of munitions to resupply the Rwandan Army.\textsuperscript{198}) The following week, on 16 October, Lanxade’s deputy, Colonel Huchon, warned Mitterrand that President Habyarimana remained in a “very difficult” situation:
The Hutu peasantry, even though it has an 85% majority in Rwanda, will not be able to single-handedly oppose an offensive by Tutsi forces, whose supply of arms and ammunition appears to be abnormally sustained. President Habyarimana’s future depends more and more on the diplomatic and material aid that we can give him.199

Rwandan officials persisted in “asking France for direct military intervention and for help with their ammunition and weapons supply,” as Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the head of the Africa Cell at the Élysée, reported to President Mitterrand on 16 October.200 Dismissing the possibility of intervening directly, the president’s son proposed two options: (1) “minimum deliveries [to] allow the army to maintain a status quo on the ground[,]” such as “heavy equipment—helicopters, light armored vehicles, AML [a type of light armored vehicle],” or (2) “a reliable logistics flow [that would] allow Habyarimana to score decisive military points in order to negotiate from a comfortable position.”201 He noted the latter option would “allow France to forcefully demand respect for human rights and a speedy move towards democracy once calm has returned.”202 He concluded by pointing out the urgency of decision: “A plane must leave for Kigali Wednesday morning [17 October]. Depending on the decision, it will be almost empty . . . or full, which will allow regular [that is, Rwandan—ed.] troops to resume the offensive or at least to contain one.”203 While it is unclear whether the plane left empty or full, an 18 October memo by an advisor reported to President Mitterrand, “We . . . responded positively to the requests made by the Rwandan authorities for the supply of ammunition and that we have in particular sent rockets for ‘Gazelle’ helicopters. A plane carrying new rockets left this morning for Kigali.”204

In total, during October 1990, the French Ministry of Cooperation granted to Rwanda in the form of direct aid (i.e. for free): 130,000 9mm cartridges for sidearms, 2,040 20mm shells, 2,000 60mm mortar shells, and 100 68mm rockets, for use on Gazelle helicopters.205 In addition, during 1990, France sold 3.3 million French francs (about $600,000) in equipment from its own military stocks to the Rwandan government, likely consisting primarily of 90mm explosive artillery shell rounds, 120mm explosive mortar shells, spare parts for Alouette II helicopters, as well as nonlethal supplies.206 In the course of 1990, the French government also authorized 191 million French francs (about $34.7 million) in arms sales by French companies to Rwanda.207

At least one French official, President Mitterrand’s top military advisor, Admiral Lanxade, questioned whether France should reduce its support for Habyarimana in light of the allegations of the regime’s human rights abuses. Lanxade was “very close” to Mitterrand.208 The two had met in 1987, when Mitterrand visited a French aircraft carrier under Lanxade’s authority as the head of French naval operations in the Indian Ocean.209 According to Lanxade’s memoir, it was a meeting of like minds: “From the outset, with Mitterrand, we were on the same page on international affairs. . . . He must have said to himself: ‘Here is a soldier with whom we can talk about strategy.’”210 On 11 October 1990, Lanxade recommended that France partially withdraw its forces so as “not to appear too implicated in supporting Rwandan forces should serious acts of violence against the population be brought to light in current operations.”211 Mitterrand, apparently, did not share his concern. The admiral’s recommendation for a partial withdrawal went unheeded, causing no discernible change in France’s policy in Rwanda.
Belgium, by contrast, was reconsidering its commitment. According to the Belgian Senate’s Commission of Parliamentary Inquiry Concerning Events in Rwanda, Belgium decided to withdraw its forces in response to broad domestic opposition to “news of arrests of many people from the opposition and on the militarization of the Rwandan regime.” The Belgian Senate urged the government, as an alternative, to focus on helping Rwanda achieve “democratization and a negotiated peace.”

Rwandan officials hoped that some other Western country—the United States, perhaps—would come in to fill the void left by Belgium. But France was also willing to take on an additional load. In a 29 October meeting, Col. Serubuga asked Col. Galinié, Lt. Col. Canovas, and other French officers for help in assessing the needs of the FAR’s most elite units in light of the Belgian troops’ upcoming departure, then just a few days away. (Belgian military advisors remained even after Belgian troops departed.) Serubuga’s Rwandan colleagues rattled off a list of supplies France might provide, including 400 rockets and 1,000 cannon shells for the aviation squadron and radio equipment for the transmission company. Galinié signaled his agreement and said he would forward the requests for approval.

President Mitterrand welcomed the opportunity to spotlight France’s support for Habyarimana. “We maintain friendly relations with the Government of Rwanda, which has come closer to France after noticing Belgium’s relative indifference towards its former colony,” he reportedly said on 17 October, according to notes from a meeting he held with French ministers. Ambassador Martres, meanwhile, accused Belgium of more than mere indifference. “On a diplomatic level,” he wrote in a 24 October cable to Paris, “the rush of the Belgian side to give away Rwanda as it did the Congo in 1960, and for analogous domestic political reasons, poses a grave threat to the future of the Rwandan people.” On 29 July 1991, as France’s involvement in Rwanda continued to increase, Martres would tell a Rwandan newspaper: “Belgium has its conscience, and we have ours.”
Notes to Chapter II

2 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
3 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
4 Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemera.
5 Interview by LFM with Eric Murokore; Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
6 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
7 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
8 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
9 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe; Interview by LFM with Eric Murokore. According to Gen. Murokore, an accurate count of RPF soldiers on 1 October 1990 is difficult. Prior to that day, he said, these troops had never been together as a singular force. Some Rwandans who had been in the NRA were delayed in making it to the front—those who were on leave when the call came to mobilize, those who got the information late, or those who were delayed because of the roadblocks set up by the NRA soldiers. It took some of the Rwandan NRA soldiers one or two months to get to the border. There were also Rwandan exiles from all over central and east Africa who were making their way to the front, not only from Uganda, but from 30 years of living in exile in Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, and Kenya. See also Memorandum from Celestin Rwagafilita (2 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Compte rendu de la réunion d’EM Gd N tenue en date du 01 Octobre 1990 de 1145 A 1220 B”) (placing the RPF initial attack at 10:00 a.m.).
10 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
11 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
12 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe; interview by LFM with Eric Murokore.
13 RPF officers were addressed as “commander.” Interview by LFM with Eric Murokore.
14 JEAN-PAUL KIMONYO, TRANSFORMING RWANDA: CHALLENGES ON THE ROAD TO RECONSTRUCTION 85 (2019).
15 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga; Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemera.
16 Cable from American Embassy in Kigali to US Secretary of State (2 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Invaders consolidate hold on Rwandan territories: GOR prepares for second offensive”) (reporting on a meeting with French, Belgian, and German military attachés).
17 Cable from American Embassy in Kigali to US Secretary of State (2 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Invaders consolidate hold on Rwandan territories: GOR prepares for second offensive”).
27 MIP Tome I 129-30.
See Press Conference by François Mitterrand, Conférence de presse de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, notamment sur les récents événements au Liban, le conflit dans le Golfe et la proposition d’une conférence internationale pour régler les conflits au Proche et Moyen-Orient, Paris [Press Conference by Mr. François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, Notably on the Recent Events in Lebanon, the Conflict in the Golf and the Proposition of an International Conference to Resolve the Conflicts in the Middle East, Paris] (15 Oct. 1990); Cable from American Embassy in Paris to US Secretary of State (4 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Rwanda: France Will Send Ammunition”).


Cable from Georges Martres to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand et al. (25 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entreave avec le Président Habyarimana”).

31 MIP Audition of Jacques Pelletier, Tome III, Vol. 2, 88 (quoting Jacques Pelletier Audition summary) (Pelletier’s testimony, like all witnesses heard by the MIP, is a summary and not a verbatim transcript); see also THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE: RWANDA 1990-1994, Annotated Transcript 1-64 (2 June 2014). While discussing Mitterrand’s reasons for military opposition to the RPF, his advisor Hubert Védrine recalled hearing the President “talk frequently about France’s commitment to stability and security in Africa, from Senegal to Djibouti.”


34 François Graner, Entretien avec l’amiral Jacques Lanxade [Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade], in LA NUIT RWANDAISE 100 (2016).

Védrine was a mainstay of Mitterrand’s 14-year presidency, beginning with his tenure as Mitterrand’s personal diplomatic counsel from 1981 to 1986. He went on to serve as Élysée spokesman (1988 – 1991) and as secretary general to the president (1991 – 1995). See Biographie, HUBERT VÉDRINE, https://www.hubertvedrine.net/biographie/ (last visited 17 Nov. 2020). Although the powers of the secretary general have never been legally defined and have varied greatly between presidencies, Védrine received and reviewed all incoming information for Mitterrand, selecting, prioritizing, and following up on requests by adding handwritten comments characterizing and highlighting information for the president. See Jacques Morel & Georges Kapler, Hubert Védrine, gardien de l’Inavouable [Hubert Védrine, Guardian of the Unmentionable], in LA NUIT RWANDAISE 2-3 (2008); see generally Xavier Magnon, L’organisation particulière du secrétariat général de l’Élysée et du cabinet du Premier ministre: considérations générales et regard particulier sur l’organisation actuelle [The Special Organization of the General Secretariat of the Élysée Palace and the Prime Minister’s Office: General Considerations and a Special Look into the Current Organization], TOULOUSE CAPITOLE PUBLICATIONS (2015).

Védrine has acknowledged having had some influence on President Mitterrand’s decision-making through one-on-one discussions of various foreign-policy issues. He has long claimed, though, that he did not play any role in decision-making over Africa, and Rwanda more specifically, citing his comparative lack of expertise on Africa matters, the existence of the Africa Cell within the Élysée, and the dominant part the president’s top military advisor would play in Africa matters. See LAURENT LARCHER, RWANDA: ILS PARLENT [RWANDA: SPEAKING UP] 718, 763-64 (2019). Since the end of the Rwanda conflict, Védrine has been one of the most vocal defenders of Mitterrand’s legacy (and of his Rwanda policy), as the director, since 2003, of the late president’s archive in the Institut François Mitterrand. See Hubert Védrine – Président de l’Institut François Mitterrand, INSTITUT FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND (last visited 24 Feb. 2021).
October 1990

36 Cable from American Embassy Paris to US Secretary of State (19 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Rwanda: October 18 Meeting of Presidents Mitterrand and Habyarimana”).


38 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.


40 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

41 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

42 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

43 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

44 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

45 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

46 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

47 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

48 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

49 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

50 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

51 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

52 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

53 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

54 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

55 MIP Tome I 126. For a detailed discussion of the MIP and its shortcomings, see the Epilogue.

56 See, e.g., Cable from Yannick Gérard (10 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “La communauté rwandaise en ouganda”) (identifying the insurgents as “Rwandan refugees” who “believe that their country—they often say their homeland—is Rwanda and not Uganda”); Cable from Yannick Gérard (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entretien avec des représentants du front patriotique rwandais”) (“The objective of the RPF is to liberate the country from the dictatorship of Habyarimana.”).

57 Cable from Yannick Gérard (10 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “La communauté rwandaise en ouganda”).

58 Cable from Yannick Gérard (10 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “La communauté rwandaise en ouganda”).

59 Cable from Yannick Gérard (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entretien avec des représentants du front patriotique rwandais”).

60 Cable from Yannick Gérard (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entretien avec des représentants du front patriotique rwandais”).

61 Cable from Yannick Gérard (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entretien avec des représentants du front patriotique rwandais”).

62 See, e.g., Notes of Meeting at the Élysée (23 Jan. 1991) (“Uganda cannot allow itself to do just anything and everything. We must tell President Museveni: it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its rule over the [Hutu] majority . . . . ”); Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (asserting that the RPF army benefitted from “Uganda’s military support”); Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 July 1992) (referring to a “Ugandan-RPF offensive”).
63 See François Mitterrand, Opening Speech to the 16th Franco-African Summit in La Baule, France (June 1990).
64 See François Mitterrand, Opening Speech to the 16th Franco-African Summit in La Baule, France (June 1990).
65 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993). Mitterrand remarked that, ordinarily, France would not intervene in a conflict “unless there is a foreign aggression, and not in cases of tribal conflict,” but that “in this case, it’s an amalgamation [of the two] because of the Tutsi problem.”
66 Memorandum from Boniface Ngulinzira and Juvenal Habimana to Juvenal Habyarimana (9 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Mobilisation de la presse internationale”).
67 Memorandum from Boniface Ngulinzira and Juvenal Habimana to Juvenal Habyarimana (9 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Mobilisation de la presse internationale”).
68 Duclert Commission Report 74, 752. A note on one fax said, “To be destroyed after reading like all my handwritten messages.” Id. at 75.
69 Duclert Commission Report 752 (quoting SHD, versement tardif n°1. Avec une mention « Personnel – Confidentiel »).
70 Duclert Commission Report 752 (quoting SHD, versement tardif n°1. Avec une mention « Personnel – Confidentiel »).
71 Duclert Commission Report 75 (quoting SHD, versement tardif numéro 1, Fax du général Huichon au colonel Galinié, sans date).
72 Cable from Georges Martres (24 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).
73 Cable from Georges Martres to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand et al. (25 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entrevue avec le Président Habyarimana”).
74 Cable from Georges Martres to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand et al. (25 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entrevue avec le Président Habyarimana”).
75 Memorandum from Anatole Nsengiyumva (15 Dec. 1990) (Subject: “Exploitation d’un rapport”). The day before, Nsengiyumva received a letter from one of the French officer’s primary points of contact in the Rwandan army: the commander of the para-commando battalion, Commandant Aloys Ntabakuze. Ntabakuze’s 14 December 1990 letter gave rise to Nsengiyumva’s argument that Rwandan officials “must exploit the fact that the aggression against our country is supported by Museveni’s Uganda and Kaddafi’s Libya,” as “[c]ertain countries could be sensitive to this and resolutely come to our aid, or at least put pressure on Museveni so that he puts an end to this deliberate and unjustified aggression.” Nsengiyumva praised Ntabakuze: “If only all of the unit [commanders], if not all of the officers, could be animated by the same spirit,” he wrote in his 15 December letter to Habyarimana. Prosecutor v. Aloys Ntabakuze, Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A, Appeal Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 8 Nov. 2012). Ntabakuze is presently serving a 35-year sentence following his convictions for genocide, extermination, and crimes against humanity, among other offenses.
77 Memorandum from Anatole Nsengiyumva (15 Dec. 1990) (Subject: “Exploitation d’un rapport”).
78 MIP Tome I 138-39.
79 Memorandum from Anatole Nsengiyumva (15 Dec. 1990) (Subject: “Exploitation d’un rapport”).
82 RPF, POLITICAL PROGRAMME (1987).
83 RPF, POLITICAL PROGRAMME (1987); see also Cable to US Defense Intelligence Agency et al. (18 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “[Redacted] Rwanda Patriotic Front Political Program”) (including the RPF’s Political Programme as an enclosure).

84 RPF, POLITICAL PROGRAMME (1987); see also Cable to US Defense Intelligence Agency et al. (18 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “[Redacted] Rwanda Patriotic Front Political Program”) (including the RPF’s Political Programme as an enclosure).

85 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

86 Cable from Yannick Gérard (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entretien avec des représentants du front patriotique rwandais”).

87 Letter from Pierre Karemera to François Mitterrand et al. (10 Oct. 1990) (on behalf of the Communauté rwandaise de Suisse).

88 See, e.g., Belgium and France Send Troops to Rwanda as Army Holds Rebels, REUTERS, 4 Oct. 1990 (“In Kampala, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) said it was behind the attack to oust Habyarimana but denied that it was an ethnically-based organization. ‘It is neither a Hutu-Tutsi conflict, nor a refugee problem. We are opposing a system which is under a small clique that is undemocratic, corrupt and abuses human rights,’ an RPF spokesman said.”); Aidan Hartley, Rwandan Rebellion Draws Exiles Back Home from Uganda, REUTERS, 9 Oct. 1990 (reporting that the rebels’ “aims, they say, are to topple the government of President Juvenal Habyarimana, end government corruption and repression, institute democracy, and solve the refugee problem created when thousands fled tribal massacres three decades ago”).


94 Restricted Council meeting notes (22 June 1994) (“If this country were to come under the domination of the Tutsi, a small ethnic minority based in Uganda where some favor the creation of a ‘Tutsiland’ encompassing not only that country but also Rwanda and Burundi, it is certain that the democratization process will be interrupted.”); see also Notes of Meeting at the Élysée (23 Jan. 1991) (quoting Mitterrand as declaring, “[w]e must tell President Museveni: it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its rule over the Hutu majority”).


100 Memorandum from Celestin Rwagafilita (2 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Compte rendu de la réunion d’EM Gd N tenue en date du 01 Octobre 1990 de 1145 A 1220 B”).


Duclert Commission Report 63.


MIP Audition of Jean Varret, Tome III, Vol. 1, 8 (“President Paul Quilès asked whether the instructors were at the controls of the helicopter to fire. General Jean Varret said that although the training missions were extended in the field in October 1990, our technical assistants did not carry out firing operations because the Rwandan soldiers were at the controls.”).

MIP Tome I 169-70.


Redistribution politique dans le conflit rwandais [Political Redistribution in the Rwandan Conflict], AFP, 15 Oct. 1990; US Defense Intelligence Brief (24 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “War in Rwanda: Troubling Implications for the Region”); Cable from American Embassy in Kigali to US Secretary of State (5 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Invasions of Rwanda: Update of October 5: SITREP 10”) (“Foreign military assets on hand: as of 1300 hrs., approximately 300 French forces, 150 French legionnaires, are on the ground. The French also say 400 Zairian troops . . . are in Kigali . . . . The first plane load of what will total 5 to 600 Belgium paratroopers landed this morning. French and Belgian forces protect the airport which continues to function. Belgian forces have also as their mission and the protection of access road to the airport. According to the Belgian ambassador Furnueu, they would be prepared to assist evacuation of Belgians and other foreign national should it become necessary.”).

See, e.g., US Department of State, Rwanda: Tutsi Exiles Challenge Rwandan Stability (12 Oct. 1990) (“Paris and Brussels have insisted, however, that their forces are in Rwanda solely to evacuate and protect French and Belgian
nationals and will not intervene in the fighting.”). See also US Department of State, Africa Trends (25 Oct. 1990) (France’s agenda was “to protect its nationals and assist Belgian troops in securing Kigali airport.”).


125 Frances Kerry, Kigali Reported Quiet, Belgium and France Send in More Planes, REUTERS, 7 Oct. 1990 (“A senior French official, who asked not to be named, said there were now about 1,000 troops from Zaire in the country.”); Cable to US Defense Intelligence Agency (Oct. 11, 1990) (Subject: “IIR [redacted]/Tutsi Patriotic Rwandan Front in Zaire Produces Leaflet Explaining Reasons Behind the Rwandan Invasion”); Aidan Hartley, Rebels Say 1,500 Zairean Troops in Rwanda, Belgians Involved, REUTERS, 12 Oct. 1990; US Department of State, Rwanda: Tutsi Exiles Challenge Rwandan Stability (12 Oct. 1990) (estimating the number at 1200).

126 Cable to US Defense Intelligence Agency (Oct. 11, 1990) (Subject: “IIR [redacted]/Tutsi Patriotic Rwandan Front in Zaire Produces Leaflet Explaining Reasons Behind the Rwandan Invasion”); Zaire’s Troops Loot in Rwanda, 100 Killed, Newspaper Says, Reuters, 18 Oct. 1990 (“At least 100 Zairean troops sent to Rwanda to help quell a rebellion have been killed and others have disgraced themselves by raping and robbing Rwandans, a Zairean newspaper said on Thursday.”).

127 Habyarimana gave the implausible explanation that the Zairean forces had been withdrawn to “allow fresh [Rwandan] troops to take their place.” Nicholas Doughty, Belgium Says Troops Will Stay in Rwanda Until Ceasefire, REUTERS, 20 Oct. 1990. A 13 October 1990 cable from Ambassador Martres, however, reported:

The behavior of Zairian troops is a subject of concern for the Rwandan population and for settlements of expatriates. In fact, traders, automobile drivers, and simple pedestrians are held for ransom daily at the Zairian control posts. Certain reports indicate numerous lootings (in particular in Gabiro, where the hotel was entirely stripped bare). Rapes have also been reported. Conscious of the significance of these abuses, the country’s highest authorities have decided to take measures within 24 hours (information provided at the A.D. by Colonel Rusatira), among which the most probable is the withdrawal of the Zairians from urban zones.

Cable from Georges Martres (13 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation générale le 13 octobre 1990 à 12 heures locales”).

128 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe; Cable from Leonard Spearman to US Secretary of State (8 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “SITREP 13: Zairians Mobilize in Mutara, Rwandans Lose Observation Plane, French Arrange Convoy for Expats from Gisenyi and Ruhengeri”) (“Airport access road and Kigali airport remain well defended by French and Belgian troops.”); see also MIP Tome I 129 (noting the ostensible purpose of controlling the airport).

129 MIP Tome I 137 (The quoted diplomatic telegram from René Galinié is excerpted in the MIP report, but the full document was not made public.) Col. Galinié of the French Gendarmerie had been on the ground in Rwanda since August 1988, serving as the Defense Attaché and Head of the Military Assistance Mission in Rwanda (August 1988-July 1991) and as Commanding Officer, Operation Noroit (October 1990-July 1991, except November 1990). See MIP Tome II, Annex 1.1.

130 Frances Kerry, Kigali Reported Quiet, Belgium and France Send in More Planes, REUTERS, 7 Oct. 1990.

131 Aidan Hartley, Fleeing Peasants Report Massacres by Rwandan Army, REUTERS, 10 Oct. 1990; see also Cable from John Burroughs to US Secretary of State (19 Oct. 1990) (confirming press reports that the number of civilians, mostly Tutsi but some Hutu, seeking refuge in Kizinga, Uganda, had swelled to over 2200, and noting that the refugees recounted stories of “indiscriminate killings by GOR and Zairois troops and civilian vigilantes”).


Chapter II

October 1990


137 Cable from SRS Ngororero to SCR (19 Nov. 1990) (regarding Kibilira massacres, 352 civilians killed, including 345 Tutsi and seven Hutus, 45 Tutsi injured, and 423 homes burned in Kibilira; and 20 Tutsi killed and eight injured in nearby Satinsyi commune); *see also* Francis Kerry, *Priests Say 335 killed in Rwanda Ethnic Clashes*, Reuters, 18 Oct. 1990. The government reported only 50 killings, but a local priest said that “335 people had died in the Kibilira sub-district of Ngorolero, most of them Tutsis.”


140 FIDH Report 13 (1993). The FIDH report did not identify the ethnicity of those killed, however, several contemporaneous reports establish that those massacred were mainly Tutsi. *See* Cable from SRS Ngororero to SCR (19 Nov. 1990); *see also* Francis Kerry, *Priests Say 335 killed in Rwanda Ethnic Clashes*, Reuters, 18 Oct. 1990.

141 Cable from Georges Martres (13 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation générale le 13 octobre 1990 à 12 heures locales”).

142 MIP Audition of Georges Martres, Tome III, Vol. 1, 118.

143 Duclert Commission Report 41.


147 Kigali Reported Quiet, Belgium and France Send in More Planes, Reuters, 7 Oct. 1990.

148 Cable from Georges Martres (15 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Analyse de la situation par la population d’origine Tutsi”).

149 MIP Audition of Georges Martres, Tome III, Vol. 1, 119. In its report, the MIP interpreted Martres’ remarks as indicating that a genocide was “foreseeable starting in October 1993.” MIP Tome I 297 (emphasis added). This can only have been a misunderstanding of Martres’ testimony, or perhaps a typo. Martres’ tenure as ambassador to Rwanda ended in April 1993. *See* MIP Audition of Georges Martres, Tome III, Vol. 1, 121. He would have little reason to comment on circumstances in Rwanda in October 1993, several months after his departure from the country. Indeed, the context of his remarks leaves little doubt that he was referring to October 1990.

150 MIP Tome I 127; US Defense Intelligence Brief (24 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “War in Rwanda: Troubling Implications for the Region”).

151 MIP Tome I 127; *see also* Interview by LFM with Jean Rwabahizi.

152 Interview by LFM with Jean Rwabahizi.

153 Interview by LFM with Jean Rwabahizi.

154 Interview by LFM with Jean Rwabahizi.
Interview by LFM with Jean Rwabahizi.

Interview by LFM with Jean Rwabahizi.


Cable from Georges Martres (12 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Analyse de la Situation Politique”).

Belgium Concerned at Human Rights in Rwandan Rebel Clampdown, Reuters, 8 Oct. 1990; see also Bettina Gaus, *Rwanda Civil War: Concern Over Fate of Detainees*, UPI, 10 Oct. 1990 (“A Belgian Foreign Ministry Spokesman said Foreign Minister Mark Eyskens had twice expressed concern to Rwanda over reports of possible human rights violations and had received assurances that no such violations were taking place.”).


See Duclert Commission Report 76, 343-44.


MIP Tome I 137.

MIP Tome I 137-38.

MIP Tome I 138.


179 See MIP Tome I 137-38; Memorandum from Jean Varret to the French Ministry of Cooperation and Development (27 May 1992) (Subject: “Compte rendu de mission au Rwanda et au Burundi”) (enclosing document titled “Principales actions de la MMC au profit des FAR depuis octobre 1990”).


181 MIP Tome I 138. The MIP has not made Canovas’ testimony public.


184 Pas de fonctions de conseiller auprès du président rwandais pour le chef de la mission d’assistance militaire française [No Advisory Functions to the Rwandan President for the Head of the French Military Assistance Mission], AFP, 28 Feb. 1992.


186 MIP Tome I 138.


188 Meeting Notes (2 Nov. 1990) (signed Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza).


190 See Meeting Notes (16 Oct. 1990) (signed Augustin Balihenda); Meeting Notes (31 Oct. 1990) (signed Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza); Meeting Notes (6 Nov. 1990) (signed Grégoire Rutakamize); Meeting Notes (7 Nov. 1990) (signed Pierre Célestin Kabatsi); Meeting Notes (8 Nov. 1990) (signed Xavier F. Nzuwomeneye); Meeting Notes (9 Nov. 1990) (signed Xavier Nzuwomeneye). Lieutenant Colonel Patrice Caille and Captain Pedro Rodriguez were the Noroît officers, and Captain Christian Refalo the para-commando advisor.

191 See Meeting Notes (29 Oct. 1990) (signed Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza); Meeting Notes (6 Nov. 1990) (signed Grégoire Rutakamize); Meeting Notes (8 Nov. 1990) (signed Xavier F. Nzuwomeneye).

192 See Meeting Notes (2 Nov. 1990) (signed Jean-Bosco Ruhorahoza); Meeting Notes (6 Nov. 1990) (signed Grégoire Rutakamize); Meeting Notes (7 Nov. 1990) (signed Pierre Célestin Kabatsi); Meeting Notes (8 Nov. 1990) (signed Xavier F. Nzuwomeneye); Meeting Notes (9 Nov. 1990) (signed Xavier F. Nzuwomeneye).

193 MIP Tome I 139. The MIP explains that, because of his effectiveness, Canovas’ tour was extended to the end of November 1990.

194 Memorandum from Léonidas Rusatira (17 Nov. 1990) (Subject: “Note d’appréciation de l’Assistance Militaire française au Rwanda”).


197 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (8 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).
Cable from American Embassy in Kigali to US Secretary of State (2 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Invaders Consolidate Hold on Rwandan Territories: GOR Prepares for Second Offensive”). The cable states that “Belgium has pledged assistance in the form of munitions which should arrive in the next 24 hours.” US Defense Intelligence Brief (24 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “War in Rwanda: Troubling Implications for the Region”) (“By 4 October the rebel attack had bogged down in the northeast, and the Rwandan government pulled its para-commando and one infantry battalion, now low on munitions, back to the capital of Kigali. In addition, the FAR was bolstered by the arrival of two plane loads of Belgian munitions.”).

Duclert Commission Report 51 (quoting AN/PR-EMP, AG/5(4)/12456, Note from Colonel Huchon to the President of the Republic under cover of the Secretary General, 16 October 1990. Rwanda. Update on the situation).

Memorandum from Jean-Christophe Mitterrand to François Mitterrand (16 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Jean-Christophe Mitterrand to François Mitterrand (16 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

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Memorandum from Jean-Christophe Mitterrand to François Mitterrand (16 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).


Memorandum from French Ministry of Cooperation (22 Sept. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aide logistique – historique”); Memorandum from Jean Varret to the French Ministry of Cooperation and Development (27 May 1992) (Subject: “Compte rendu de mission au Rwanda et au Burundi”) (enclosing document titled “Principales actions de la MMC au profit des FAR depuis octobre 1990”) (noting that direct aid, which had been set at 4 MF “for many years, reached 8.34 MF in 1991” and that “[t]he effort made is continued in the current financial year”).

MIP Tome I 180-81.

MIP Tome I 179.

François Graner, *Entretien avec l’amiral Jacques Lanxade* [Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade], in *LA NUIT RWANDAISE* 100 (2016). Mitterrand named Lanxade his chief military advisor in 1989. The president would later elevate him to chief of defense staff.

François Graner, *Entretien avec l’amiral Jacques Lanxade* [Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade], in *LA NUIT RWANDAISE* 100 (2016).

François Graner, *Entretien avec l’amiral Jacques Lanxade* [Interview with Admiral Jacques Lanxade], in *LA NUIT RWANDAISE* 100 (2016).

Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Rwanda – Situation”).


Memorandum from Anatole Nsengiyumva (15 Dec. 1990) (Subject: “Exploitation d’un rapport”).


Belgian Senate Report 698 (1997) (citing Audition of Colonel Vincent, Head of the Coopération Technique Militaire (CTM) in Rwanda). Colonel Vincent stated, “[I]n October 1990, the war broke out and relations chilled. Belgian technical and military cooperation was relegated to a figurative role.” The Belgian Report continued, saying that “Colonel Vincent even [went] so far as to specify that the officers and non-commissioned officers were doing ‘little or nothing’ and that they hoped that ‘the peace process would break the situation’s deadlock.’ In light of all of the above, the [Belgian] commission question[ed] the appropriateness of maintaining the CTM.”


A. Noroit Troops Remained to Deter the RPF Military, Despite Mitterrand’s Claims That French Troops Were in Rwanda Solely to Evacuate French Citizens.

The presence of our troops, even reduced, no longer only appears as a guarantee of security for the expatriate population, but also as an indirect reassuring factor for the entire country. Many believe that [Noroît’s] presence reassures Rwandans as much as foreigners. The Noroit operation thus increasingly tends to be placed in a new light.1


When the troops of Operation Noroit touched down in Kigali on 4 October 1990, there were an estimated 750 French nationals in Rwanda.2 By 12 October, Noroit had evacuated 313 of them,3 presumably all those who wished to leave, as the French government’s evacuation order was not mandatory.4 But the Noroit troops showed no sign of leaving.

At a 15 October press conference, a journalist pressed President Mitterrand for an explanation: “All the French nationals who were in danger [in Rwanda] have been evacuated. What still justifies today the mission of the French troops on the ground?”5 Mitterrand answered without answering: “France sent two companies that permitted the evacuation of the French and of a number of foreigners who placed themselves under our protection. . . . These troops had no other mission but that one, and once this mission is completed, of course, they will return to France.”6

As noted in Chapter 2, Admiral Lanxade had already, by that point, recommended that President Mitterrand withdraw one of the two Noroit companies, expressing concern in an 11 October memorandum that allegations of “serious acts of violence against the population,” at the hands of the regime that France was supporting, might surface in the media.7 His recommendation was not heeded. Both Noroit companies stayed in Rwanda. By 20 October, the operation’s 314 soldiers and tactical staff exceeded the estimated number of French nationals remaining in the country.8

Pleas from President Habyarimana, who “called President Mitterrand every week asking him especially not to, above all, withdraw French forces,”9 found a sympathetic ear. After Mitterrand and Habyarimana spoke on 18 October, Habyarimana followed up with a letter of gratitude: “I was pleased with your reassurances regarding the friendship and support that France grants and will continue to grant Rwanda.”10 A week after he met with Mitterrand, Habyarimana lobbied Ambassador Martres, who reported that Habyarimana’s “main concern” at the meeting was to know what France would do after the Belgians departed.11 “President Mitterrand . . . promised me he would not abandon Rwanda,”12 Habyarimana told Martres. The ambassador wrote, “[I] confirmed to him that we were doing everything in our power to help him,” referring
in particular to a delivery of artillery shells and spare parts for armored vehicles to the Rwandan Army.\textsuperscript{13}

The RPF took France to task for continuing to intervene on behalf of a regime that had committed “massacres and unbearable cruelty,” asserting in a 6 November press release:

The Rwandan Patriotic Front is entitled to ask the French authorities not to play a double game. . . . Why do the declared defenders of “human rights,” the “free world” and “democracy” feel the need to trample on all of these values [just] to lend a strong hand to a dictatorial, racist and bloodthirsty regime?\textsuperscript{14}

Admiral Lanxade continued, in late October 1990, to recommend a phased withdrawal of the Noroît contingent.\textsuperscript{15} Other French officials made similar recommendations. On 30 October, a researcher at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ analysis center (the Centre d’analyse et de prévision, or CAP) argued that France’s policy of backing the current Rwandan authorities was unsustainable, as it would, among other things, “support the arrests, executions and massacres that the government of Juvenal Habyarimana will carry out in order to break not only the Rwandan Patriotic Front but also its potential sociological base (the Tutsi minority) and Hutu opposition.”\textsuperscript{16} Predicting more trouble ahead if French forces remain, the researcher recommended that Noroît be withdrawn “as soon as circumstances allow.”\textsuperscript{17}

Soon afterward, on 9 November, Colonel Jean-Claude Thomann, who briefly took over command of Noroît forces from Col. René Galinié, from mid-October into December 1990, advocated a phased withdrawal of the entire Noroît force over the following month.\textsuperscript{18} Thomann’s assessment was that the FAR, despite some “tactical blunders,” was in a position of strength.\textsuperscript{19} “Unless there is a new development or a major element that has escaped analysis . . . we can assume that there is no longer a large-scale military threat,” he wrote.\textsuperscript{20}

The French government proceeded with a partial withdrawal in November 1990, repatriating half of its forces.\textsuperscript{21} Preparations were soon under way to withdraw the rest of the contingent,\textsuperscript{22} though not without some pushback. Ambassador Martres, who was well aware of the Rwandan government’s human rights abuses,\textsuperscript{23} wrote to Paris at the end of November, “The presence of our troops, even reduced, no longer only appears as a guarantee of security for the expatriate population, but also as an indirect reassuring factor for the entire country.”\textsuperscript{24} He added, “Many believe that this presence reassures Rwandans as much as foreigners. The Noroît operation thus increasingly tends to be placed in a new light.”\textsuperscript{25}

In the end, events outside Rwanda caused France to withdraw some Noroît troops—namely, France’s armed forces were stretched thin due to its military involvement in the Persian Gulf, where France was part of a coalition challenging Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait.\textsuperscript{26} Once he learned of the intended withdrawal, Habyarimana did not mince words, calling it an “abandonment.”\textsuperscript{27} It is unclear whether Habyarimana’s objection was the impetus, but on 15 December, only one of the two Noroît companies withdrew, on orders from France’s highest office: “By decision of President of the Republic François Mitterrand,” the second company would remain in Rwanda “beyond the term originally planned.”\textsuperscript{28}
B. Early Warnings by a Senior French Official That Rwandan Leaders Had Genocidal Aims Did Not Alter French Policy and May Have Caused the Élysée to Marginalize the French Official.

My reports and diplomatic telegrams were for nearly three months unambiguous: I stressed the risks of a massacre of the Tutsis. I became aware, gradually, that my messages embarrassed a military “lobby” for whom the enemy to be fought was the Tutsis’ RPF.29


While Habyarimana fretted about a possible “abandonment,” he could take comfort in knowing that one Noroit company still remained, and that a smaller contingent of French troops—the Military Assistance Mission (MAM) officers advising the Rwandan Gendarmerie (i.e., the national police) and several elite FAR units—had actually taken on additional duties since the start of the war. A French captain named Christian Refalo was now working not only with the para-commando battalion, but the reconnaissance battalion as well,30 retraining the latter on the use of MILAN anti-tank guided missiles.31 In December 1990, Refalo and a French colleague worked with FAR officials to create an intelligence unit within the para-commando battalion.32 Refalo vowed to “do everything they could, unconditionally to ensure thorough and effective training.”33 This intelligence unit would soon function as a “front line observer of RPF movements into Rwandan territory” and would direct mortar fire on enemy troops.34 (Soldiers in both the reconnaissance and para-commando battalions would go on to commit atrocities in the early days of the Genocide.35)

The network of French military assistance missions in Africa (including the mission in Kigali) was under new leadership that fall. General Jean Varret, a veteran of multiple military operations in Africa, had volunteered to take over as head of the Military Cooperation Mission (MCM)—the office within the Ministry of Cooperation that supervised France’s military partnerships with its African allies—just as the war in Rwanda was starting, in October 1990.36 Two months later, in mid-December 1990, Varret paid a visit to Kigali to inspect the French assistance mission there.37

Newsstands in the Rwandan capital that month bore startling evidence of the anti-Tutsi animus that had been increasingly pervading local public discourse since the war began. The December 1990 issue of Kangura, a bimonthly newspaper whose name, in Kinyarwanda, meant “Wake Them Up,” featured a noxious and soon-to-be-notorious manifesto under the heading, “Ten Commandments of the Bahutu.”38 Published in French, the “Ten Commandments” admonished Hutu, on threat of being “deemed a traitor,” to avoid consorting with Tutsi women; to know that “all Tutsis are dishonest in their business dealings” and “are only seeking ethnic supremacy”; and to reserve Armed Forces membership, and dominance in politics and education, for Hutu. This “ideology must be taught to Hutus at all levels,” the commandments concluded. “Hutus must cease having any pity for the Tutsi.”39
Founded in May 1990, Kangura was privately run—it was the brainchild of journalist Hassan Ngeze (later convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, or ICTR, for, among other things, inciting the Genocide through Kangura)—but it also benefited from close ties to some of the Habyarimana era’s most powerful state officials. Its early backers were rumored to include Augustin Nduwayezu, the “charming but deadly” former chief of Rwanda’s national intelligence services. Though ICTR prosecutors were unable, ultimately, to conclusively establish that the government had bankrolled Kangura, they presented evidence “suggesting that financial support for Kangura came from the government, and more specifically from” one of Nduwayezu’s successors as chief of the intelligence services, Col. Anatole Nsengiyumva, as well as Robert Kajuga, the president of the Interahamwe, and Joseph Nzirorera, the minister for public works and trade and the executive secretary of the MRND. (Habyarimana called Nzirorera—who was notoriously corrupt, a lavish spender, and often drunk in public—his “rogue minister.”) All three of those men would go on to play a central role in the Genocide.

The publication of the “Ten Commandments” caught Ambassador Martres’ attention. A few weeks after the Kangura issue appeared on newsstands, the ambassador wrote a letter to the French foreign minister in which he “feebly denounce[d] the ‘excessive nature [of these] ‘ten commandments,’ none of which leaves room for dialogue with the opposing clan, in any area whatsoever.” Martres noted in a separate report that the article’s “racist language, reminiscent of the worst anathemas of Nazi anti-Semitism, is finding an increasingly sympathetic audience” in Rwanda, particularly among the ranks of the Rwandan army, where, he said, it received “almost unanimous approval.”

The depravity within the upper ranks of the Rwandan military would reveal itself during General Varret’s December 1990 visit to Kigali. Among the Rwandan government officials Varret met during his brief stay, one was shockingly blunt: Colonel Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita, the deputy chief of staff of the Gendarmerie (the national police) and a cousin of Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, the president’s wife and a central figure in the Akazu. First, Rwagafilita asked Varret for heavy weapons. Varret demurred, “[T]he Gendarmerie’s mission is to maintain order within the country and . . . this type of weaponry is reserved for the Army.”

Rwagafilita then asked if he could speak to Varret in private. When they were one-on-one, Rwagafilita said:

We’re between soldiers and I will speak to you more clearly than in diplomatic terms. The Gendarmerie needs these weapons because it will participate in solving our problem with the Tutsis: they are very few, we will liquidate them and that will go very quickly.

It is striking that a Rwandan military official felt secure enough in his sense of French backing to confide such inflammatory intentions to his French counterpart. Varret was horrified by Rwagafilita’s statement and relayed it the next day in a meeting with President Habyarimana at which Ambassador Martres and Col. Galinié, the French defense attaché, were also present. On hearing what Rwagafilita had said, Habyarimana grew angry and promised to dismiss him. But Rwagafilita remained in his job.
It was not only Rwagafilita who caused Varret concern. As Varret wrote in a 2018 memoir, “Colonel Serubuga, whom I met at each of my missions in his country, was more diplomatic in his remarks, but I could read between the lines that genocide was one of the solutions being considered.” Varret’s unease was confirmed by strong local intelligence from Col. René Galinié, who, in Varret’s words, “used the [investigative] methods of the Gendarmerie,” that is, of a good policeman. “To be well informed,” Varret told a French journalist, “[Galinié] had interlocutors everywhere, including members of religious communities,” which offered particularly reliable insight into what people were really thinking. Varret explained that Galinié “told [him,] in essence, ‘There is a danger… in Rwanda, of politico-ethnic violence and massacres. And this time, the risk is very high.’ We both quickly used the phrase ‘danger of genocide.’”

Galinié told the MIP that he had warned of the threat of ethnic violence as early as January 1990. And more than one of his cables, which Ambassador Martres co-signed, reflect as much. In his memoir, Varret elaborated on the alarm he sounded:

My reports and diplomatic telegrams were for nearly three months unambiguous: I stressed the risks of a massacre of the Tutsis. I became aware, gradually, that my messages embarrassed a military “lobby” for whom the enemy to be fought was the Tutsis’ RPF.

As the French journalist Jean-François Dupaquier has noted, “successive French governments and presidents since 1990 have so far refused to declassify two notes written by [Varret]: one sent on 14 December 1990, the day after Varret met with Rwagafilita, and another on 17 December, following the conclusion of his trip.”

Varret also recalled having raised his concerns about Rwanda in meetings to discuss French military-cooperation missions that brought together representatives of the chief of staff of French Armed Forces, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the President’s special chief of staff (the top military adviser in the Elysée—Admiral Jacques Lanxade, and then, in mid-1991, after Lanxade was named chief of defense staff, General Christian Quesnot). When Rwanda came up, Varret says, the others present regularly urged Varret to “send more cooperants, more money.” In response, Varret recalled, “I stalled every time. . . . [E]very time I said no!” Varret tried to limit France’s military entanglement; for instance, he kept French judicial police training of Rwandan gendarmes to a minimum. Varret told his colleagues that he opposed French support because he feared it would lead to massacres. As a result, he says that he became “a nuisance for some people.” In 1993, Varret was dismissed from his position and replaced by an anti-RPF hardliner, Gen. Jean-Pierre Huchon.
Chapter III

November 1990 – June 1991

C. After the Habyarimana Regime Retaliated against an RPF Military Attack by Massacring Tutsi Civilians, French Officials Increased French Military Support for the Regime.

We are at the edge of the English-speaking front. Uganda cannot allow itself to do just anything and everything. We must tell President Museveni: it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its rule over the [Hutu] majority.65


By January 1991, French officials believed the RPF’s threat had dwindled sufficiently for the French government to reduce its military footprint. On 2 January 1991, the chief of staff of the French army, General Maurice Schmitt, recommended the withdrawal of the one remaining Noroît company.66 Admiral Lanxade, Mitterrand’s top military adviser, was of the same mind. In a 2 January note to the president, Lanxade acknowledged “President Habyarimana’s concerns,” but noted that the “situation is calm in the interior.”67 As reassurance, he added that France could “maintain a company on a twelve-hour alert in Bangui [in the Central African Republic, where France kept troops poised for rapid reaction to conflicts in Africa].”68 President Mitterrand rejected the recommendation. “Yes,” he wrote by hand, “but I would favorably consider delaying the departure of the company stationed in Kigali. At least for one month.”69

Emboldened by continuing French military support, the Rwandan government resisted diplomatic and political engagement with the RPF. For example, when Rwandan government officials met with regional leaders at a conference held in Zaire to discuss how to address the Rwandan refugee problem, the RPF was denied a seat at the table at the request of President Habyarimana.70 Without political recourse, the RPF resolved to take its case back to the only forum that demanded the regime’s attention: the battlefield. In the preceding several months, the RPF military had evolved from a fledgling force whose commanders were disoriented by Fred Rwigema’s death71 to a disciplined guerrilla army under the leadership of Paul Kagame,72 who had spent years in the NRA and the RPF Military with Rwigema.73 On 23 January, RPF troops attacked Ruhengeri, a government stronghold and one of the key cities in President Habyarimana’s region of influence.74 As Kagame would explain to author Steven Kinzer, the RPF intended the Ruhengeri offensive to free political prisoners, seize FAR weapons, and

to bring to the world and the government news of our continued existence, not only our existence but also that we had the capability carry out such a significant raid on the forces of Rwanda. . . . And of course, that would also result in some significant establishment of ourselves in that particular area, a totally new sector, and that would help us in fighting the war.”75

France knew of the RPF’s attack on Ruhengeri the day it happened.76 President Mitterrand immediately authorized French action to protect expatriates,77 and over the next 24 hours Noroît troops evacuated 185 people from Ruhengeri to Kigali.78 Admiral Lanxade again tried to keep France’s military operations limited by proposing that France leave it to the Rwandan government to “try to get the rebels to leave,” while France would focus, instead, on “getting our nationals
He failed to convince President Mitterrand, who proceeded to neatly summarize France’s interest in the Rwandan conflict, as he perceived it:

We cannot limit our presence.

We are at the edge of the English-speaking front. Uganda cannot allow itself to do just anything and everything. We must tell President Museveni: it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority wants to impose its rule over the [Hutu] majority.  

Habyarimana promptly used the Ruhengeri attack to pressure the French government to return a second Noroit company to Kigali. Mitterrand withheld his assent to redeploy a second company but, in a 30 January letter to President Habyarimana, committed to maintaining the one company that remained in Rwanda “provisionally, and for a length of time bound to the situation’s development.” Mitterrand used the opportunity to push Habyarimana for reforms, specifying that French troops would remain “during this period while the policy of openness you announced is being put into place, and while the conference on the refugees is being prepared for.”

Habyarimana was proving, though, that his “policy of openness” was no more than a façade. On 25 January, two days after the RPF attack on Ruhengeri, his regime resorted to the same retaliatory tactic it had deployed in October: slaughter of Tutsi civilians. Local authorities in the Ruhengeri region organized attacks against the Bagogwe, a pastoral Tutsi subgroup that made its home in the area. In the three weeks that followed, “five hundred to a thousand people belonging to the Bagogwe ethnic group . . . were massacred by the [FAR] and Hutu civilians.” Government representatives, from the bourgmestre (mayor) of a local commune to Army soldiers, directed and committed the atrocities.

Béatrice Nikuze

Béatrice was born in 1967. She lived in Kucikiro.

Then people started having meetings, but peasants like us didn’t know that they were dangerous. We never thought anything bad would come out of the Hutus or the Tutsis. Although I’d seen some of the Hutu’s deeds in the 1970’s, by then I’d forgotten everything. I couldn’t differentiate between the Hutus and the Tutsis because they used to be very sociable and intermarry. Later on, I knew all about the political parties, and some parties joined together and started fighting against others. It was all very confusing, especially for the peasants.

. . .

We’d been there [in Kicukiro—ed.] for two months when President Habyarimana died in the plane crash [on 6 April 1994—ed.]. After his death, a priest called Patrice told us to go to ETO school [Ecole Technique Officielle]. When we got
there, a group of people—including Mr. John from Nyakabanda—came and took my husband, seemingly to collect some property he had left at home. Nevertheless, I knew they were going to kill him because these were the people who had hunted him in the past. Later, a lady called Bibi came crying to me and said, “Your husband Masabo was murdered along with a boy called Ndohera. John killed them.”

We remained at ETO under the protection of United Nations forces, but after a short time the police came and told the UN soldiers there was no need for them to continue guarding us. The police said they would ensure our safety themselves. The UN forces packed up and left us at the mercy of the mob.

As soon as they left, the policemen took us to Sonatubes [Société Nationale des Tubes, a factory and the surrounding area] where we stayed a short time. A man called Rusatira came and said, “Take the garbage to Nyanza” [where there was a waste tip on the outskirts of Kigali]. By ‘garbage,’ he meant us. Many people started showing their identity cards claiming that they were Hutus, and the police started sorting out the Hutus and letting them go. The rest of us were taken to Nyanza.

When we were taken to Sonatubes, my brothers and some other boys had been kept behind at the parish. Whilst we were in the factory, my older brother came running and told me that the rest of them had all been killed. They had hacked him as well, but he was still able to run away although he was bleeding. The others had been thrown into a pit.

So we were taken to Nyanza. I was still with my Mum then, but my husband had already been taken. There were so many people going to Nyanza. On the way there, we were stopped at Kicukiro centre because there was a traffic jam. In front, there were military tanks surrounded by Interahamwe . . . with machetes and clubs. Some of them suggested we should be killed there at the centre, but it was later agreed that we would be taken to Nyanza for execution. In fact, many people were killed on the way; others were kidnapped and taken to an unknown destination.

When we reached Nyanza, they gathered us in one place and started throwing grenades at us. After many people had been killed and others injured, their leader said there was no need to waste their ammunition. He said machetes and clubs would easily execute us because we were wounded and very weak.

But before killing us, they first sorted out the young, energetic boys and men, and killed them right away. Then, instead of killing us in small groups, they finally decided to do it all at once. They started hacking us. But around 2:30 in the
afternoon, they got tired. They had taken us there at around eight or nine in the morning. That was when I managed to crawl towards a nearby bush with my child. My mother hadn’t been injured, but she had passed out when Nyiramutangwa was killed on top of her.

I crawled slowly and finally reached the bush, although I had already been hacked on the head and back. But after the Interahamwe had killed all people on the field, they surrounded the bush, looking for those who were in hiding. They shouted, “Come out and join the others.” Then we were put on the field with the corpses, and they started killing. People were screaming in agony; babies being hacked to death; young women being raped and murdered . . . I remember Oliva who was murdered so maliciously. She was raped first, then tortured to death. It was a horrible scene. And Cécile, who was accused of going to visit the RPF. A soldier called John told Cécile, “I’ll kill you myself.” And he did horrible things to her. I could hear her crying for help from where I was.

After reports of ethnic violence in the area, on 4 February, President Habyarimana, without acknowledging the massacres, let alone his government’s role in them, disingenuously announced in a speech before the Rwandan parliament that he would not tolerate ethnic killings. US cables noted the violence and the President’s speech. Although the French government has not made public any documents reflecting contemporaneous knowledge of the Bagogwe massacres, given Col. Galinié’s intelligence network, it is difficult to believe that the United States, but not France, would have known of them at the time. (If they did not know contemporaneously, French officials knew by the summer, when media reports, primarily out of Belgium, insinuated that the Habyarimana government and the Rwandan Armed Forces were accomplices to the killings. French military support would proceed unaffected by these accounts.)

The RPF military staged a follow-up attack on Ruhengeri on 2 February, effectively snuffing out any remaining illusions that the FAR were headed for a quick victory. After that, Admiral Lanxade changed his position on continuing the French military presence in Rwanda and conceded in a note to President Mitterrand that removing the final Noroit company was “hardly conceivable.” Instead, Lanxade recommended replacing the company with 30 fresh military trainers who would travel to the Ruhengeri-Gisenyi area to “toughen” the Rwandan military apparatus. Lanxade also recommended that French combat aircraft fly in a “visible” way over “sensitive Rwandan regions.” With a handwritten “yes,” Mitterrand approved.
D. Mitterrand Escalated French Military Support by Sending Military Trainers to Ruhengeri and, against Counsel from His Military Advisors, by Keeping the Last Noroît Company in Kigali.

These decisions would provide some assistance to President Habyarimana and would remove any ambiguity towards President Museveni. However, they carry the risk of being interpreted by the Rwandan authorities as unconditional support for their policy.98


France acted quickly on Lanxade’s recommendation to send a new detachment of military advisors (the French acronym is DAMI, short for Détachement d’assistance militaire d’instruction or Military Instruction Assistance Detachment, in English), who arrived in Rwanda on 22 March 1991.99 One stated reason for this deployment was the security of French nationals in the Ruhengeri area. Many of those French nationals who had been evacuated to Kigali after the RPF Army’s attacks occupied key positions in non-governmental organizations and other civil society groups, and French officials viewed their presence in the Ruhengeri area as “vital for getting the country’s economy back on track.”100 If France did not want them to abandon their development missions in the area,101 as Admiral Lanxade wrote President Mitterrand in early February, the deployment of the DAMI unit to train the FAR units at the front could make a difference for security. (Noroît troops were based in Kigali and ventured into the war zone only—or at least, primarily—for evacuation operations.)

But as with Noroît, the concern for French expatriates was hardly the only motivation. As the MIP reported, the decision was related to France’s refusal to accede to President Habyarimana’s “constantly asking for France’s direct military engagement.”102 As an alternative, a 1 February 1991 memo from the Directorate for African Affairs in the French Foreign Ministry “indicated that France could help [Habyarimana] deal with any threat in the northern area of the country by sending a detachment of fifteen men of the 1st RPIMA [a French special forces unit] to Ruhengeri on a cooperation mission to train the Rwandan battalion stationed in this city.”103

Lanxade, however, was concerned that deploying the DAMI while keeping the remaining Noroît company in place could be “interpreted by the Rwandan authorities as unconditional support for their policy.”104 He urged Mitterrand to advise Habyarimana that France was extending this support “in order to facilitate [Habyarimana’s] policy of openness towards the internal opposition and [his] attention to the refugee issue.”105 Lanxade, like several other French officials, suggested that to end the conflict, it was necessary both to strengthen the Habyarimana regime and resolve the refugee crisis.106 Lanxade did not consider the imperative of reforming the governing system that had produced the refugee issue in the first place.

It is easy to understand why the idea of sending the DAMI appealed to French policymakers: secrecy and efficiency. The DAMI had a smaller footprint than Operation Noroît (30 vs. 160 troops, respectively),107 and, unlike the Noroît troops, which were generally confined to the capital,108 the DAMI would work directly with FAR troops nearer the combat zone, advising
high-ranking officers on tactical matters, helping battalion commanders reorganize their units, and training soldiers to use heavy weapons and explosives.109 (A “proposed directive” from General Schmitt, the chief of staff of France’s army, called for DAMI officers to also “provide information on the local situation [in Ruhengeri], limited to the passive collection of information.”110)

One potential complication, as Ambassador Martres conceded to the MIP, was that, much like Noroit, the DAMI deployment “lacked a legal basis.”111 The 1975 military assistance agreement between France and Rwanda had authorized France to provide military assistance as “necessary for the organization and the training of the Rwandan Gendarmerie.”112 The agreement had not authorized assistance to Rwanda’s army, and though the French government had quickly proceeded, regardless, to provide technical assistance to the entire Rwandan Armed Forces,113 it had, on at least one occasion in the early 1980s, declined the Rwandan authorities’ entreaties to legitimate this practice through a formal amendment.114 This state of affairs left both Noroit and the DAMI on shaky ground, as a legal matter (a lapse that French officials would not attempt to rectify until mid-1992, after a cease-fire agreement between the Rwandan government and the RPF threatened to force France to withdraw its forces).115

For all these reasons, the rollout of the DAMI Panda, as it was known, was purposefully low-key. French officials had no intention of announcing it publicly116 and alerted Habyarimana of the deployment less than a week before the DAMI arrived in Kigali.117 Martres was directed to ask Habyarimana to show the same discretion.118

On 29 March 1991, the day after the DAMI arrived outside Ruhengeri, the Rwandan government and the RPF reached a cease-fire in N’Sele, Zaire.119 The cease-fire was a milestone for two reasons other than the cessation of hostilities: 1) Rwanda agreed to the withdrawal of foreign troops (with the exception of military cooperants such as the ones who were present in Rwanda when the conflict began) as soon as a neutral military observer group was in place,120 and 2) Rwanda conferred an unprecedented level of recognition on the RPF. None of the declarations or communiqués that had emerged from previous summits had even mentioned the RPF by name. Here, though, was a document on official Republic of Zaire letterhead bearing the RPF’s name and, further down, the signature of Paul Kagame, right alongside that of Habyarimana’s Foreign Minister Bizimungu.121 To RPF leaders, it was as though the Rwandan government had conceded that it was at war with fellow Rwandans rather than with Uganda.122

While the N’Sele cease-fire would fall apart “almost immediately,”123 Col. Galinié, who as head of the Military Assistance Mission (MAM) in Kigali had supervisory authority over the detachment,124 nonetheless urged Paris to confine the DAMI to a four-month deployment and to end Operation Noroit.125 In a 4 April report, Galinié relayed his concern that maintaining the increase in French military assistance beyond the pre-October 1990 level would empower opponents of reform in Habyarimana’s regime, in particular the deputy chief of staff of the Gendarmerie, Col. Pierre-Celestin Rwagafilita (who had shocked Gen. Varret with his plan to liquidate Tutsi126) and the deputy chief of staff of the Army, Col. Laurent Serubuga.127 “It is important, in this very unstable context,” Galinié wrote, “to evaluate our presence, especially with the État-Major of the Rwandan Army, [the institution] where a good number of conservative officers are grouped around Serubuga.”128 Galinié advocated a phased withdrawal in which the
Noroît troops would leave first, followed by the DAMI in July 1991, allowing France to “gradually return to the type of cooperation” it had provided Rwanda before the war.129

Galinié’s advice would be ignored. Both the DAMI and Noroît troops would remain in Rwanda for two and a half more years, and the position of the senior FAR opponents of reform—as Galinié foresaw—would strengthen.

In the meantime, DAMI personnel took a central role in the reinvention and guidance of an often-ineffective military force. A massive wartime recruitment drive—the FAR now outnumbered the RPF Army 10-1, according to estimates130—had bloated the FAR’s ranks with, in the words of one author, “[a] vast pool of unemployed, uneducated young men [who] were easily attracted to a job that gave them regular pay, clothing, food and two bottles of beer a day.”131 Once enlisted, they received barely any training.132 Some committed war crimes.133 In one especially egregious case, French technical advisers working with the Rwandan Gendarmerie learned that a recruit had killed three civilians with his service weapon and disappeared.134

The DAMI’s assessment of its first trainees—the FAR battalion based in Gitarama, in central Rwanda—was bleak.135 Lieutenant Colonel Gilles Chollet, the DAMI commander, reported that the officers “are not very good, nor very motivated, and above all do not lead by example.”136 The soldiers were no better. Many did not know how to use their weapons and, in fact, were too afraid of hurting themselves to be effective in close combat.137 They also disregarded safety instructions during training exercises, nearly shooting three French instructors.138 Col. Galinié, summarizing the findings in Lt. Col. Chollet’s report, described the general level of the troops in that unit as “poor in all areas and at all levels.”139

French advisors were pivotal to FAR offensives in the spring of 1991. That April, Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas, the French officer advising the senior leadership of the FAR, and Captain Christian Refalo, a MAM officer advising the FAR’s para-commando battalion, accompanied Major Ephrem Rwabalinda, the FAR’s chief of operations, on a trip to Ruhengeri.140 (Rwabalinda would meet with Gen. Jean-Pierre Huchon, Gen. Varret’s replacement as the head of France’s Military Cooperation Mission with African allies, in Paris during the Genocide.141) The FAR, at this point, had reportedly surrounded RPF military elements in the mountains that form the border between northwestern Rwanda, Zaire, and Uganda.142 Rwabalinda’s field commanders told him that the para-commando battalion would have to take up the mission, as FAR units closer to the zone had been “traumatized” by past RPF Army’s ambushes.143 Rwabalinda urged Canovas and Refalo to be on hand for the operation’s launch the next day.144 Whether or not they appeared, one former FAR captain told French writers Benoît Collombat and David Servenay that in 1991 he received training from DAMI soldiers that was “coupled with an ‘advice’ component, directly on the front line” in the volcanos region (meaning the same area where Rwabalinda carried out his mission) to instruct the FAR on troop placement: “This company, put yourself here rather than there.”145 Such tactical advice had the potential to boost FAR performance and morale enormously, offering yet another example of the ways in which France became a co-belligerent. The offensive proved successful, with news outlets reporting that government forces drove the rebels “back into Uganda” after several hours of fighting.146
By late April, Admiral Lanxade reported to President Mitterrand, “The situation is calm throughout the country except at the northwest border, where the zone near Uganda remains subjected to harassment from Ugandan-Tutsi rebels.” Lanxade credited French “technical assistance in training the Rwandan forces,” which he claimed was “starting to yield noticeable results,” in particular near Ruhengeri, where, he said, it was “difficult to foresee another rebel raid.” He also considered Kigali to be “out of danger,” and advised that “the maintenance of the French [Noroît] company is no longer militarily justified. This maintenance could even appear contrary to the provisions of the ceasefire, which stipulate the withdrawal of foreign troops.”

Presidential adviser Gilles Vidal, briefing Mitterrand in advance of a 23 April 1991 meeting with President Habyarimana in Paris, made a similar point, noting that Noroît would have to withdraw as soon as a neutral group of military observers was in place to monitor the ceasefire. The neutral observer group was still not operational, but Vidal suggested that Mitterrand could prepare Habyarimana for Noroît’s withdrawal.

Mitterrand, it seems, did not deliver this message to Habyarimana at their meeting in Paris. A summary drafted by Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu contains no direct reference to a Noroît withdrawal. (It does mention, without elaboration, that Mitterrand wanted to know from Habyarimana to which ethnic group Ugandan President Museveni and Zaire’s Mobutu belonged.) Instead, Mitterrand pledged to provide additional support to the Rwandan military, acceding to virtually all of the requests Rwandan Army officials had put forward in a meeting the previous week with Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Canovas, the French adviser to the Rwandan Army état-major (general staff). Most notably, the French president assured Habyarimana he would make the DAMI “permanent.” He also promised that France would continue to provide an adviser to the Army état-major even after Canovas’ tour concluded.

The Noroît troops did not leave Rwanda, as Col. Galinié and Admiral Lanxade had advised. In a 20 June 1991 note to President Mitterrand, General Christian Quesnot—who replaced Lanxade as Mitterrand’s top military adviser in April, praised the DAMI, which, he said, was providing French nationals with “much sought-after security,” and recommended keeping it in Rwanda “for some time to come.” But General Quesnot’s view of Operation Noroît was similar to his predecessor’s. With the odds of a successful RPF military offensive in the capital looking increasingly remote, “the permanent presence of the French company in Kigali is no longer militarily justified,” he wrote. This was not only his view, he said, but the view of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the president’s Africa advisors. President Mitterrand’s position, however, remained the same. “No,” he wrote. “Do not withdraw our troops yet. Discuss this with me.”

A month later, when Ambassador Martres was asked whether the continued presence of Operation Noroît troops was in violation of the N’Sele agreement, Martres did not cite ongoing hostilities or difficulties in standing up the neutral military observer group as the reason French troops were still in Rwanda. Rather, the ambassador said, “We did not sign the N’Sele Agreement, and we cannot, therefore, go against it.” Martres may have been correct in a narrow literal sense, but in terms of policy and ethics, the comment reflected a disregard for a peace agreement reached by the conflict’s actual parties.
Notes to Chapter III

1 MIP Tome I 135.
2 Duclert Commission Report 49 (quoting AN/PR-EMP, AG/5(4)/12456. Note from Admiral Lanxade to the President of the Republic, 2 October 1990. Rwanda - Offensives by foreign armed forces; but see MIP Tome I 132-33 (indicating that French troops evacuated 313 French nationals between 5 and 12 October 1990, leaving 290 French nationals in Rwanda).
3 MIP Tome I 133.
4 Envoi d’un deuxième détachement militaire français au Rwanda [Dispatch of a Second French Military Detachment to Rwanda], AFP, 5 Oct. 1990 (“The spokesperson, Mr. Daniel Bernard, specified that no evacuation order of French citizens had been given but that everything was done to allow the departure of those who wished it.”).
5 See Press Conference, François Mitterrand, Conférence de presse de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, notamment sur les récents événements au Liban, le conflit dans le Golfe et la proposition d’une conférence internationale pour régler les conflits au Proche et Moyen-Orient, Paris [Press Conference by Mr. François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, Notably on the Recent Events in Lebanon, the Conflict in the Gulf and the Proposition of an International Conference to Resolve the Conflicts in the Middle East, Paris] (15 Oct. 1990).
6 See Press Conference, François Mitterrand, Conférence de presse de M. François Mitterrand, Président de la République, notamment sur les récents événements au Liban, le conflit dans le Golfe et la proposition d’une conférence internationale pour régler les conflits au Proche et Moyen-Orient, Paris [Press Conference by Mr. François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, Notably on the Recent Events in Lebanon, the Conflict in the Gulf and the Proposition of an International Conference to Resolve the Conflicts in the Middle East, Paris] (15 Oct. 1990).
7 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Rwanda – Situation”).
8 See MIP Tome I 130, 133. The mission included the two companies of the 8th RPIMa, consisting of 137 soldiers each, in addition to 40 tactical staff charged with facilitating the transmission of the commander’s orders.
10 Letter from Juvénal Habyarimana to François Mitterrand (22 Oct. 1990); see also Memorandum from Claude Arnaud to François Mitterrand (18 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Habyarimana Jeudi 18 Octobre 1990 à 18H30”). This memorandum by presidential advisor Claude Arnaud ends, “P.S.: One of our two companies could be withdrawn after the acceptance of the cease-fire by both parties. The other would be withdrawn once the situation is stabilized.”
11 Cable from Georges Martres to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand et al. (25 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entrevue avec le Président Habyarimana”).
12 Cable from Georges Martres to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand et al. (25 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entrevue avec le Président Habyarimana”).
13 Cable from Georges Martres to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand et al. (25 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Entrevue avec le Président Habyarimana”).
15 See Duclert Commission Report 102.
16 Duclert Commission Report 104-05 (quoting ADIPLO 3711TOPO/239, Note by Jean-François Bayart, Centre d’analyse et de prévision, 26 Oct. 1990, « Le détonateur rwandais »).
17 Duclert Commission Report 104-05 (quoting ADIPLO 3711TOPO/239, Note by Jean-François Bayart, Centre d’analyse et de prévision, 26 Oct. 1990, « Le détonateur rwandais »).
18 Duclert Commission Report 72.
Duclert Commission Report 72 (quoting GR 1997 Z 1813 21, Msg n°78/DEF/CEMA/CAB/910 of 13 November
1990). By the time he wrote this cable, Col. Thomann had been in Rwanda long enough to recognize the risk of a
major “inter-ethnic conflagration.” Id. at 782 (quoting GR 1997 Z 1813 21, Fax for EMA-Armées Paris, 9 Nov. 1990.
“Orientations pour le devenir de Noroît”). He warned: “[T]he population is strongly encouraged to be ‘vigilant’ in
order to counter the rebellion and detect suspects. This vigilance is demonstrated in fairly aggressive reflexes in the
villages (roadblocks, local controls) which can degenerate into settling of scores under the guise of security, the main
victims being of course the minority Tutsis or the Hutus who are allegedly affiliated with them. It would probably not
take much to spark things off.” Id.

See Duclert Commission Report 74, 833-34.

MIP Audition of Ambassador Georges Martres, Tome III, Vol. 1 140-41; see also Chapter 2, supra (referencing
Ambassador Martres’ acknowledgement to the MIP that he was aware of Rwandan government’s “worst excesses”
and that the Genocide was foreseeable as of October 1990).

MIP Tome I 134-35.


MIP Tome I 135.

MIP Tome I 135.


Meeting Notes (30 Oct. 1990) (signed Jean-Bosco Ruhorahaza); Memorandum from the Rwandan Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to the French Embassy in Rwanda (23 Nov. 1990).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (9 Apr. 1990) (Subject: “French Deploy 30 Military Trainers in
Ruhengeri”).

See Augustin Ndindiliyimana et al. v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-56-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶¶ 248-50 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 11 Feb. 2014) (linking reconnaissance battalion soldiers to the killing of UN peacekeepers on
7 April 1994); Aloys Ntabakuze v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41A-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶¶ 165, 189, 218 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 8 May 2012) (holding that an international tribunal did not err in finding that soldiers in the
para-commando battalion killed Tutsi civilians in Kabeza, Nyanza, and the Remera area during the first week of the
Genocide).

Décret du 15 octobre 1990 portant admission par anticipation dans la 2e section, conférant les rang et appellation
de général de corps d’armée et affectation d’officiers généraux de l’armée de terre [Decree of 15 October 1990
granting early admission to the 2nd section, conferring the rank and designation of lieutenant general and assignment
of general officers of the army] (15 Oct. 1990); MIP Audition of Jean Varret, Tome III, Vol. 1, 2-3. With regard to his
appointment as head of the MCM, Varret explained that in the event of a crisis, he had to reconcile the directives of
his superior, the minister of cooperation, and that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the
Africa Cell of the Élysée. He recognized that the volume of interlocutors posed a challenge.


See Marcel Kabanda, Kangura: The Triumph of Propaganda Refined, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE
79 (Allan Thompson ed. 2007); Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco Bayaragwiza, Hassan Ngeze, Case
issue also included a full-page picture of François Mitterrand above the inscription, “His Excellence Mr. François
Mitterrand, President of the Republic of France. A true friend of Rwanda,” KANGURA 20 (Dec. 1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Chapter III
November 1990 – June 1991


41 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 155 (2019); see also US Information Service, Media Situation in Rwanda (17 July 1992) (noting that the sponsor of Kangura was “[r]umored to be Mr. Augustin Nduwayezu, ex-Secretary General of Service Central des Renseignements”).


43 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 210, 260 (2019).


47 JEAN VARRET, GÉNÉRAL, J’EN AI PRIS POUR MON GRADE [MY WAR STORIES] 156 (2018). In April 2019, “speaking out for the first time on camera” about this, Varret added, “Whether [Rwagafilita] meant the RPF or the whole Tutsi ethnic group I don’t know, but very often the Tutsi were assimilated with the RPF as being the enemy.” Rwanda, Story of a Genocide Foretold, FRANCE 24, 5 Apr. 2019.

48 JEAN VARRET, GÉNÉRAL, J’EN AI PRIS POUR MON GRADE [MY WAR STORIES] 156 (2018); see also Cable from Georges Martres (14 Dec. 1990) (Subject: “Rencontre du President Habyarimana avec le Général Varret”). Martres’ cable does not reflect Varret relaying his concern about Rwagafilita’s comments, nor do any of the documents the French government has thus far declassified and made public on its involvement in Rwanda.


55 MIP Audition of René Galinié, Tome III, Vol. 1, 10 (“[Galinié] stated that he had already mentioned in January 1990, in his defense attaché’s report, this risk of physical elimination and massacres, which he was all the more aware of since, as soon as he arrived in the country on 23 August 1988, he had been brought by helicopter to the border and
had been personally very disturbed by seeing for himself the massacres perpetrated in Burundi. This episode had given him a clear understanding of a daily reality marked by violence.

56 Cable from Georges Martres (12 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Extrait du message de l’attaché de défense à Kigali, 12 octobre 1990, analyse de la situation politique”) (warning that “this conflict will deteriorate into an ethnic war” (emphasis omitted)); Cable from Georges Martres (13 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Situation générale le 13 octobre 1990 à 12 heures locales”) ("[M]assacres are reported in the region of Kibilira, 20 kilometers northwest of Gitarama. The risk of generalization of this confrontation, already reported, seems to be becoming concrete.").


58 Genocide des Tutsi du Rwanda: “un lobby militaire a l’oeuvre a l’Élysée” [Genocide of the Tutsi: “A Military Lobby at Work at the Elysée”], AFRIKARABIA, 5 Nov. 2018 (interview by Jean-François Dupaquier with Jean Varret). Dupaquier explained that even if these documents are someday declassified by the French government, that does not meant they will be made public: “Effectively declassification does not necessarily mean opening to the public. They could corroborate the alerts you’re talking about. Between one thousand and two thousand French diplomatic or military documents, some classified as confidential or Defense secret are precisely known over the period 1990-1994, including part of the ‘Mitterrand archives.’ It is surprising to note that after December 1990, in the French documents revealed, there is only rarely any mention of the risk of genocide of the Tutsis.”


61 LAURENT LARCHER, RWANDA: ILS PARLENT [RWANDA: SPEAKING Up] 521 (2019); but see Report from Jean Varret, Compte rendu de mission au Rwanda et au Burundi (27 May 1992). In this report, Varret states, “Military assistance to RWANDA, under its ‘PERSONNEL’ and ‘DIRECT AID IN MATERIAL’ components, has almost tripled since the start of the conflict on October 1, 1990. Indeed, its annual cost in 1991 reached 28.35 MF [$5.15M] against 11.5 MF [$2.09M], on average, in previous years.”

62 In his MIP hearing, Varret said that he only sent two gendarmes for the judicial police training. MIP Audition of Jean Varret, Tome III, Vol. 1, 7. However, a November 1992 report by his deputy, Col. Philippe Capodanno, indicates that four gendarmes were sent. Report from Philippe Capodanno, Rapport du Colonel Capodanno sur sa Mission au Rwanda 7 (10 Nov. 1992).


(“– And in this dozen or so meetings where you spoke of Rwanda, you said: there is going be a massacre.

. . .

– I don’t know if I said it, this is no verbatim. But I am well aware that I stalled every time that they said: we need to send more guys, more weapons, every time, I said no!

– And did you say why?

– Of course. But I don’t remember going on a diatribe about the risk of genocide. I was reluctant to respond to requests for reinforcing the Hutu Army. I remember the mood, and the mood was, it was Varret who was reluctant.

”)


67 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (2 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).

68 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (2 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).

69 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (2 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).

70 Press Release, RPF (19 Jan. 1991) (listing the representatives from Zaire, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, the OAU, the UNHCR, and Rwanda who participated in the conference on refugees; noting that no representatives from the RPF were included). A Rwandan Government representative at the conference noted in a report to President Habyarimana about the conference that the RPF sought political recognition as a precondition for cease-fire and expressed the
difficulty of marginalizing the RPF while opening Rwandan politics to opposition parties. See Memorandum from Joseph Nsengiyumva to Juvenal Habyarimana (23 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Conférence régionale sur le problème des réfugiés rwandais”). The same government representative revealed his true feelings in the same report: “Wherever Tutsis are, they consider themselves superior to other races, they monopolize the best command positions to the detriment of nationals and provoke rejection. It will obviously not be easy to dislodge them without international condemnation or even war. In other words, the return of refugees will not have put an end to our suffering.” See Memorandum from Casimir Bizimungu to Juvenal Habyarimana 1 (23 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Conférence Régionale sur les Réfugiés, niveaux Experts et Ministériel”) (“It should be recognized, however, that it is thanks to your approaches to President Mobutu that the representatives of the Rwandan Patriotic Front were not invited to the meeting.”).

71 Interview by LFM with Joseph Karemtara; see also Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga; Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.

72 Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera.

73 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.

74 Liberation Diary: The Attack on Ruhengeri and Release of Political and Other Prisoners, THE NEW TIMES, 27 Aug. 2015. See also Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake; Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.

75 STEPHEN KINZER, A THOUSAND HILLS 87-88 (2008).

76 Cable from Georges Martres (23 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

77 Meeting Notes (23 Jan. 1991) (“[Mitterrand]: We are authorized to intervene to liberate them.”).

78 Cable from Georges Martres (24 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).


81 Cable from Georges Martres (24 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “Entrevue avec le President Habyarimana”).


88 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “War or peace in Rwanda”).


90 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Jan. 1991) (Subject: “War or peace in Rwanda”); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (6 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Habyarimana Accuses Uganda of Complicity in RPF Attack, Calls for an End to Ethnic Violence”).


92 Agnes Gorissen, Le Front patriotique rwandais accuse: des Tutsis massacrés par Kigali? [The Rwandan Patriotic Front Accuses: Tutsis Massacred by Kigali?], LE SOIR, 14 Aug. 1991 (“Between 500 and 1,000 people were allegedly killed by armed winged militias, formed by local authorities at the request of the region’s military command and local politicians in retaliation for the 22 January attack on the town of Ruhengeri by the RPF.”); L’Ambassadeur rwandais en Belgique reconnait le massacre de civils Tutsi [The Rwandan Ambassador in Belgium Acknowledges the Massacre of Tutsi Civilians], AFP, 14 Aug. 1991; Natacha David, Massacre de Tutsis occulté au Rwanda? [Occult Massacre of Tutsis in Rwanda?], LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 16 Aug. 1991; Version de l’ambassadeur du Rwanda [The Rwandan Ambassador’s Version], LE SOIR, 16 Aug. 1991; Rwanda eerbiedigt bestand [Rwanda Respects the Truce], DE

93 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”) (reporting a “new Ugandan-Tutsi offensive attempted on 2 February to conquer the city of Ruhengeri” that was repelled by FAR counterattacks and stating the planned 15 February withdrawal of the Noroît company in Kigali was “difficult to envision”).

94 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

95 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

96 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

97 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

98 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

99 MIP Tome I 152.


101 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

102 MIP Tome I 144. The memorandum was quoted in the MIP Report but not made public by the MIP. See also Cable from Jean-Paul Taix (15 Mar. 1991) (Subject: “Mise en place d’un détachement d’assistance militaire et d’instruction (DAMI) au Rwanda”) (directing Martres to notify Habyarimana that the decision to deploy the DAMI was a response to Habyarimana’s and the Rwandan foreign minister’s pleas for assistance).

103 MIP Tome I 144; Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).

104 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

105 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

106 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (3 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nouvelle offensive ougando-tutsie”).

107 MIP Tome I 147; Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point of situation”).


109 MIP Tome I 146-47. Directive 3146 of 20 March 1991 is referred to in the MIP Report, but the document is not made public by MIP.


111 MIP Tome I 29. Martres “noticed in 1992 that the military cooperation intended for the Rwandan Army lacked a legal basis since the agreement effective at that time only mentioned cooperation with the Gendarmerie.”

112 Special Agreement of Military Assistance, Fr.-Rw, 18 July 1975 (emphasis added). A 1983 amendment removed a provision that expressly prohibited French cooperants from participating “in the preparation and execution of war operations, of maintenance or reestablishment of order or the law.” Id.; see also Signed letter from François Breton to the Rwandan minister of foreign affairs (27 Apr. 1983) (“I have the honor of informing you that the proposals made
in your letter meet the approval of the government of the French Republic and constitute an agreement between our two governments as of today’s date.”


114 President Habyarimana pressed the French government in 1983 to agree to expand the agreement to authorize cooperation with the armed forces more broadly. France did not agree to the change. See Memorandum from Léonidas Rusatira (22 Nov. 1983) (Subject: “Accord particulier d’Assistance Militaire entre le Rwanda et la France”).

115 See MIP Tome I 29; Memorandum from François Nicoulaud to Roland Dumas (6 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “Application de l’accord de cessez-le-feu au Rwanda”).

116 Cable from Jean-Paul Taix (15 Mar. 1991) (Subject: “Mise en place d’un détachement d’assistance militaire et d’instruction (DAMI) au Rwanda”).

117 MIP Tome I 152.

118 Cable from Jean-Paul Taix (15 Mar. 1991) (Subject: “Mise en place d’un détachement d’assistance militaire et d’instruction (DAMI) au Rwanda”).


120 The N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement, Rw. – RPF, 29 Mar. 1991. The neutral military observer group became operational later in the spring of 1991. See Cable from Georges Martres (21 May 1991) (Subject: “Situation Militaire et Renseignements Divers”). Led by General Hashim M’Bita, the group proved satisfactory to no one. RPF leaders accused the Rwandan government of impeding the group’s work, see, e.g., Press Release, RPF (5 Aug. 1991) (signed Shaban Ruta), while the government complained that the group had a pro-RPF bias, see Memorandum from Casimir Bizimungu to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Aug. 1991) (Subject: “Recontre tripartite à Paris: France-Rwanda-Uganda”). Foreign Minister Bizimungu would argue, in August 1991, that the group’s continued ineffectiveness was among the reasons why France should not withdraw the remaining Noroit troops. See id.


122 Interview by LFM with Protais Musoni.


124 The DAMI was ostensibly under the authority of the Ministry of Cooperation, which provided its funding. See MIP Audition of Jean Varret, Tome III, Vol. 1, 217. A 19 February 1991 planning document specified that the DAMI would be “separate from Operation Noroit” and would take orders from the head of the MAM, an agency within the Ministry of Cooperation. See Meeting Notes (19 Feb. 1991) (Subject: “PV de réunion DAO Rwanda du 18 février 1991). As a practical matter, though, the line that purported to separate Noroit from the DAMI was not all that stark. One reason this was so was that the chains of command for both entities shared a common link: Col. Galinié—who, as head of the MAM, had supervisory authority over the DAMI, and, as a seasoned military officer, held command over Noroit. See MIP Audition of René Galinié, Tome III, Vol. 1, 227. The line would become even blurrier with time, as the Ministry of Defense gradually usurped operational control of the DAMI from the Ministry of Cooperation. See Jacques Isnard, La France a mené une opération secrète, avant 1994, auprès des Forces armées rwandaises [France Led a Secret Operation, Before 1994, with the Rwandan Armed Forces], LE MONDE, 21 May 1998.


127 Report from René Galinié, Compte Rendu Semestriel de Fonctionnement (4 Apr. 1991). In an 18 November 1990 cable, Col. Galinié wrote, “Thus, the FAR whose cohesion is more asserted today than ever, thanks to the ties created by the offenses carried out against the adversary, see their political and popular influence considerably increased, to the point that their leaders like Colonel Serubuga appear threatening.” MIP Tome I 139. It is unclear what Galinié meant by his comments that “leaders like Colonel Serubuga appear threatening” without more context—although the MIP included excerpts from the cable in its report, it did not make the full cable public.


The MIP states that, by January 1991, the FAR had doubled in size to 20,000. MIP, Tome I 138. In contrast, Prunier estimates that the FAR had swelled to 15,000 by mid-1991. GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 113 (1995). Prunier also estimates that, by early 1991, the RPF consisted of approximately 5,000. *Id.* at 117.

ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 250 (2019).


Memorandum from Ruelle to Rwandan Gendarmerie (6 May 1991) (Subject: “Visite du groupement de Butare”).

Memorandum from Ruelle to Rwandan Gendarmerie (6 May 1991) (Subject: “Visite du groupement de Butare”).


*See, e.g.*, Memorandum from Ephrem Rwabalinda to Augustin Bizimana (16 May 1994) (Subject: “Rapport de mission”). This meeting is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 9 of this Report.


Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (22 Apr. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Point de situation”).

Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (22 Apr. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Point de situation”).

Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (22 Apr. 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda. Point de situation”).

Memorandum from Gilles Vidal to François Mitterrand (22 Apr. 1991) (Subject: “Entretien avec M. Juvenal Habyarimana, Président de la République du Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Gilles Vidal to François Mitterrand (22 Apr. 1991) (Subject: “Entretien avec M. Juvenal Habyarimana, Président de la République du Rwanda”).


Chapter III

November 1990 – June 1991

159 Décret du 8 avril 1991 portant élévation dans la 1re section, promotion et nomination dans la 1re section et dans la 2e section et affectation d’officiers généraux (10 Apr. 1991).
160 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).
161 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).
162 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).
163 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1991) (Subject: “Rwanda – Point de situation”).
CHAPTER IV
July – December 1991

A. The French Government Claimed Neutrality at the Negotiating Table As It Worked to Keep Habyarimana in Power and Attempted to Intimidate RPF Representatives into Surrendering Their Demands.

The French approach is unbiased and aims only to help bring peace to the Rwandan-Ugandan border.  


On military matters, the authorities in Kigali should know that they can continue to count on the support of France. . . . As for the diplomatic support of France, … President Habyarimana knows that we have persistently acted as his country’s advocate, in international bodies and with its immediate neighbors.  

– Gilles Vidal, Presidential Advisor to President Mitterrand, Élysée Africa Advisor (1989 – 1993)

France kept up its assistance to the Rwandan Armed Forces throughout the latter half of 1991. When the new school year started in the fall, the DAMI Panda instructors decamped from the University of Nyakinama campus, their home since March 1991, and took up residence a few miles away at Camp Mukamira, where they would share space with a FAR unit.  

Looking back on the DAMI’s first six months in Rwanda, Colonel Bernard Cussac—who in July 1991 had taken over for Col. René Galinié as the French defense attaché, head of the Military Assistance Mission (MAM), and commander of Operation Noroît—did not hesitate to assign it a measure of credit for the FAR’s battlefield successes (without pinpointing any successes in particular). “The partners readily acknowledge this and would like the MAM to intervene more and more widely and massively,” he wrote in October 1991. Not long afterward, the DAMI spent a month helping the FAR select a team of elite snipers and trained them to join the battalions fighting in Ruhengeri, Byumba, and Mutara.

There was no mistaking where France stood: in mid-to-late 1991, and throughout the war, France was a partisan, working to improve the FAR’s fighting capabilities and to deter the RPF military’s advance. And yet, at the same time that French military cooperants were training the FAR, and French Noroít troops were working to deter the RPF Army, France was representing itself as a neutral mediator of the conflict. Between August 1991 and January 1992, France mediated three sets of talks meant to resolve the Rwandan civil war. Paul Dijoud, the new Director of African Affairs at the French Foreign Ministry, was France’s chief “mediator” at the summits. Opening the August 1991 plenary meeting in the presence of the three delegations, Dijoud declared that “the French approach is unbiased and aims only to help bring peace to the Rwandan-Ugandan
border.”11 If President Mitterrand’s military support for the Rwandan government were not enough to discredit this claim, Dijoud made sure to tell the participants—which included only the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, and not the RPF—that French officials had met separately with the RPF and tried to impress upon them that France’s “military presence in Rwanda prohibit[ed] [an RPF] military victory.”12 “It has been made clear to [the RPF],” Dijoud continued, according to Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu’s report to President Habyarimana summarizing the August talks, “that [the RPF’s] military adventure is doomed to failure. . . . That is why France has asked them to follow the path of democracy and national reconciliation.”13

But Dijoud did not expect the RPF to gain any more from the democratic process than from the battlefield, since—as dictated by the narrow, essentialist logic so many French officials had adopted, from President Mitterrand down—the RPF represented only the Tutsi minority, and Tutsi voters would always be overwhelmed at the polls. “France [had] made [the RPF] understand,” Bizimungu continued in his report, “that they cannot, of course, win the elections since they constitute a small minority.”14

“For [Dijoud], Africans were the most unintelligent human beings,” senior RPF official Protais Musoni recalled.15 “This perspective was typical of France at the time. For the French, it was not about political ideas, but ethnicity. It is true that, historically, the resistance started with refugees, who happened to be mostly Tutsi. But the RPF [welcomed] Hutu.”16 Indeed, as RPF soldiers sat around campfires in Virunga listening to Radio Rwanda—and later RTLM—mischaracterize the RPF as a “Tutsi” organization and the RPA as a “Tutsi” army, they would ask themselves, “What am I? What are you?”17 “The RPA had people who didn’t know if they were Tutsi, Hutu, or Tw,” in the words of Richard Sezibera, then an RPF medical officer. “It was genuinely difficult to grasp how a political movement could be built around tribalism or ethnicity.”18 The main identity these soldiers had in common was that they were Rwandans.

But where the RPF envisioned an ethnically integrated Rwanda, French officials were committed to the status quo. Dijoud had made clear that France wanted Habyarimana to triumph over both the RPF and the political opposition that had been forming since the previous year, when Habyarimana, spurred by Mitterrand’s speech at La Baule, put into motion political reforms meant to transition Rwanda away from single party rule by his party, the MRND.19 “Mr. Dijoud,” Casimir Bizimungu recounted to Habyarimana, “insisted on the need to anticipate the events in order for you to be the real pilot of the democratic process in Rwanda. You should not let yourself be overtaken by the opposition parties.”20

Dijoud and Bizimungu also discussed ways to rationalize the presence of French troops in Rwanda—which both Habyarimana and Mitterrand wanted “to remain on the spot”21—in case of a cease-fire requiring foreign troops to withdraw. They could, for example, bestow “military cooperator” status on all French soldiers in Rwanda, including the Noroit forces that comprised the majority of French troops in Rwanda.22 As Bizimungu summed up, “Mr. Dijoud wanted to meet me after the departure of the Ugandan delegation to reiterate France’s unconditional support of Rwanda,” adding that the diplomatic talks in Paris had “greatly enlightened us as to France’s determination, which sees itself as a friend and an ally.”23 And he believed Dijoud’s sincerity, understanding the geopolitics behind French support:
The Paris meeting finally convinced me of France’s sympathy for us. This sympathy, which is not linked to any economic, financial or other interest, could perhaps be explained by France’s concern to protect the French-speaking area stretching from Senegal to Rwanda and Burundi to other countries of French-speaking Central Africa. Although we are not a former colony of France, we have belonged . . . to its sphere of influence.24

Soon after the August 1991 summit, Paul Kagame, the RPF’s military commander, traveled to Paris to meet with Dijoud.25 Dijoud’s objective, as he reported at the time, was similar to those he had claimed to have expressed in his meetings with the RPF in early August: to “demonstrate that we are the friends of all Rwandans without exception,” to “involve [Kagame] in our reconciliatory approach” by showing him the downsides of a military solution, and to “dissipate any potential misunderstanding about the mandate of French soldiers currently stationed in Rwanda.”26 What actually transpired, however, made clear that France was “reconciliatory” toward only one side of the Rwandan conflict.

After his meeting with Kagame, Dijoud reported to Ambassador Martres that he was happy with the outcome, describing Kagame as “pleased” to have been received at the Ministry. Due to Kagame’s “feeling that the French policy in Rwanda had been, until [then], characterized by a certain imbalance,” Dijoud wrote that Kagame “welcomed this opportunity to give us a different perspective on the Rwandan crisis.”27 According to Dijoud, Kagame declared himself favorable to any French initiative to facilitate a negotiated resolution to the conflict.28

Kagame had a very different recollection:

[Dijoud] insisted we must stop fighting. I took time and explained that there’s a reason why the fighting was happening, which we needed to address . . . . There was a back and forth. . . . It was a heated discussion but before we finished the meeting, he got upset. And by the answers I was giving, he perceived me as an arrogant person and someone not treating with importance what he was instructing me to do. “We hear you are good fighters, I hear you think you will march to Kigali but even if you are to reach there, you will not find your people.” He repeated and clarified, “All these relatives of yours, you won’t find them.”29

Other members of the RPF delegation confirmed Kagame’s account.30 Dijoud’s comment has a familiar ring: For the duration of the conflict, French officials would refer to ethnic massacres conducted and condoned by the Habyarimana regime as regrettable, but perhaps understandable retaliations by a citizenry affronted by the RPF’s attack.

But this was the lesser part of the ordeal Paul Kagame would go on to experience during his visit to Paris. Early one morning during Kagame’s visit,31 plainclothes police roused him, along with members of his delegation, from their beds in the Hilton Hotel, on Avenue Suffren, in the shadow of the Eiffel Tower.32 According to Kagame, “They had guns pointed at me and were shouting, “get up! get up!”33 Kagame explained that they were in Paris by official invitation and named his host, but the officers accused the RPF representatives of being a “group of terrorists,” placed Kagame and an RPF representative named Emmanuel Ndahiro under arrest, and took them
to a prison located, according to one account, at the headquarters for the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the French domestic intelligence unit responsible for counterterrorism and counterespionage. Dijoud later testified to the MIP that the RPF delegation had been spotted with suitcases full of cash and arrested without advance warning of the Quai d’Orsay. The police kept the RPF delegates behind bars until around 8 o’clock in the evening, when they were freed without explanation or apology. Neither Dijoud nor Jean-Christophe Mitterrand ever discussed the incident with Kagame. When asked by *Le Figaro* if perhaps his French hosts had not been informed, Kagame responded, “They were informed.”


The current regime in Rwanda has firmly laid the country on the path to democracy.


As has been demonstrated, there is no democratic process in Rwanda. The regime which is at the moment assassinating even innocent civilians in Bigogwe, Kibilira, etc. . . . cannot claim to be democratic.

— RPF

Paul Dijoud would describe the next set of negotiations, which took place at the Quai d’Orsay in Paris, between 23 and 25 October 1991, as “three days of tempestuous and brutal debates” with both sides “hating and manipulating one another.” He did not reflect on how he may have contributed to that outcome. Dijoud announced during the proceedings that he considered France “a disinterested friend.” The RPF, which now had a seat at the negotiating table, heard something else in his opening statement, which began by pressuring the RPF to accept a junior role:

A movement like the RPF can carry on negotiations with the state, but remember that you are not on an equal footing, since the Rwandan government exists, it is legal; recognized internationally and carries out all the responsibilities of a State. You are not a State.

Using the same neo-colonial electoral logic he had in August—*i.e*., because Rwandans would only vote their ethnicity, the RPF had little clout—Dijoud reiterated that the RPF had no place in an interim government because “your resolutions would never be adopted.”

For the RPF, Dijoud had “simply restated the Rwandan government’s point of view.” The RPF delegation sought to respond to Dijoud’s remarks, but “he refused, saying he already knew the RPF’s point of view[,]” and that he did not appreciate having his objectivity questioned.
During the talks, Dijoud had made clear that his faith was with Habyarimana. “The current regime in Rwanda has firmly laid the country on the path to democracy!” Dijoud reportedly told the participants. He then admonished the RPF to appreciate the regime’s magnanimity in dealing with the RPF at all.

The RPF urged Dijoud to recognize that “democracy” in Habyarimana’s Rwanda was a thin veneer laid over an authoritarian ethno-state. Dijoud’s position was representative of the French government’s: Habyarimana’s superficial democratization was enough, both because something more substantive would threaten his hold on power, and because French officials expected no more in this African nation. When asked in 2018 by French journalist Laurent Larcher if he believed that Mitterrand was truly committed to promoting democracy in Africa, Admiral Lanxade replied: “Absolutely. He knew Africa very well, and he knew very well the limits of what we could and could not do.” When asked to clarify these limits, Lanxade answered uncomfortably: “What I mean to say is that he knew very well. . . . You can’t change things all of a sudden. You can’t promote democratic leaders. . . . In Africa, it is still not possible today. . . . You have to look at . . . the lesser of two evils.”

Mitterrand’s neocolonial approach to democracy—requiring only so much as he thought, paternally, a lesser developed African nation could offer—translated into a push for multipartyism alone, without the mechanisms necessary to ensure a free and fair society (such as free and fair elections, free speech, and respect for human rights). For the RPF, any authorization of nominal political competition without a consideration of the structural ills of the Habyarimana regime—the inequality and disrespect for human rights that had produced the refugee crisis—was window dressing. In a submission to the March 1991 Conference on Human Rights in Africa, the RPF had pointed out the hypocrisy of claiming democratic progress while ethnic demonization continued on state media:

As anyone who listens to Radio Rwanda will know, incitement to ethnic hatred has gathered pace since the civil war. . . . The state radio and most of the country’s media continue to lead the population into believing that the RPF is either a Uganda force or [Tutsi] coming to reclaim the land and the position they lost.51

The document went on to describe the consequences of the radio’s incitement, which would continue to play a tragically effective role all the way through the Genocide: “Hundreds have been murdered,” including teachers and students. “It is clear to the least casual observer,” the document summed up, “that these so-called changes have been no more than a misguided attempt to pull the wool over the International Community’s eyes.”

Indeed, Habyarimana’s reforms often coincided with President Mitterrand’s authorizations of Rwandan requests for military support. For instance, Lt. Col. Gilbert Canovas, the French advisor to the FAR’s general staff, held an 18 April 1991 meeting with the FAR’s representatives, which included Col. Laurent Serubuga (the anti-Tutsi extremist who headed the Army). During that meeting, the FAR representatives submitted a series of requests: (a) two helicopters, requiring the training of six pilots for two years, (b) the permanent presence of the DAMI, and (c) personnel and material for the supervision of a battalion of para-commandos. Three days later, on 21 April 1991, President Habyarimana announced the deadline for opposition parties to “register,” a
precondition for official party recognition.\textsuperscript{56} A few days after that, when the Rwandan and French presidents met in Paris, President Mitterrand agreed to most of the requests that the FAR representatives had drawn up during their 18 April meeting with Canovas.\textsuperscript{57} In a press conference following the meeting, Habyarimana confirmed that “multipartyism would be instituted in Rwanda.”\textsuperscript{58} (He also claimed that he had made no requests of Mitterrand for material assistance.\textsuperscript{59})

“If [Habyarimana] didn’t do a certain number of things, we [would have] left” Rwanda, as Admiral Jacques Lanxade told the French journalist Laurent Larcher in 2019.\textsuperscript{60} In speaking of “lessons that… we gave to Habyarimana,”\textsuperscript{61} Lanxade did not reflect on how sincerely one could have expected Habyarimana to hew to those lessons, if he was “learning” them only because he feared losing military support.

The MRND soon showed that it had no intention of forfeiting its monopoly on power.\textsuperscript{62} At local meetings, bourgmestres and prefects threatened residents to support the MRND. The MRND had other advantages it could exploit. It enjoyed unique access to state-run Radio Rwanda, the country’s most wide-reaching and influential medium, and exemption from the restrictions on freedom of movement that prevailed in the country (most Rwandans were required to obtain written authorization to travel from one commune to another), ostensibly for security reasons in view of the war.\textsuperscript{63} In the opposition’s estimation, the MRND was playing a “rigged game” to ensure its victory in any elections.\textsuperscript{64}

US diplomatic correspondence shared the RPF’s and the opposition’s concerns, with the US ambassador to Rwanda, Robert Flaten, writing frankly to the US State Department’s director of Central African affairs, Robert Pringle, in August 1991: “While we are trying to promote democracy as an answer to both the domestic ethnic problem and the RPF violence, those close to the President appear to be promoting a Hutu supremacy game.”\textsuperscript{65} Flaten named some of the extremists “close to the President,” including Col. Laurent Serubuga and Col. Elie Sagatwa, Habyarimana’s personal secretary, relative of Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana,\textsuperscript{66} and Serubuga’s equal in corruption and abuse of power.

Flaten referred to “[t]he almost daily exposure of the evils of Serubuga, Sagatwa, and others in the tight little circle.”\textsuperscript{67} Habyarimana was caught between his extremist inner circle and pressure to make peace with the RPF and democratize:

[T]he President talks a good game of democracy[,] and many take him seriously. . . . Under normal circumstances I would say that the [democratic process] is essentially irreversible, that the cost of reversing it would be too high for any politician to pay. But these are not normal circumstances, and it is because of that that the opposition fears that the government is manipulating the continuation of the war in order to have an excuse to stomp on the opposition if it looks like a real threat to the President and [his] family. . . . The problem is that the things that he must do internally in order to have a chance of negotiating the end of the war, are being undercut by his loyal followers with a Hutu supremacy vision. And he either can’t or won’t bring them under control.\textsuperscript{68}
While French officials, several of whom had voiced internal concerns about Rwandan extremism and how continued French aid could enable it (see discussion in Chapter 3), were undoubtedly aware of this dynamic, they did not precondition French military support on a rejection of extremism. “It was clear that the French were solidly on the side of the Rwandans and their Hutu dictator, Habyarimana,” Pringle would tell an oral-history project in 2015.69 “They saw the invading Tutsi rebels, coming out of Uganda and speaking English, as a threat to their French-language hegemony.”70

Now, at the October 1991 negotiations, the RPF once again invoked the reality of state-sponsored killings in Rwanda: “As has been demonstrated, there is no democratic process in Rwanda. The regime which is at the moment assassinating even innocent civilians in Bigogwe, Kibilira, etc. . . cannot claim to be democratic.”71 The RPF military would “not lay down its arms for two main reasons”: the MRND government would not lay down its arms, and the “RPF [was] fighting for political change in Rwanda, namely that social injustices cease. . . . [I]t is well known that being suspected of being an RPF sympathizer is reason enough to be arrested or killed. This is the excuse given out . . . for the killings in Kibilira and those of Bagogwe.”72

The Rwandan government responded that “the raids and the killings belonged to the past,” and that “today democracy has changed everything.”73 One did not have to wait long for evidence of the contrary.

At 6:30 a.m. on 25 October,74 the last day of the proceedings, in the outskirts of Kigali, a Rwandan soldier and three accomplices carrying hand grenades entered the home of David Gatera, whose brother Justin Mugenzi headed the Liberal Party (PL),75 a party that the MRND regularly singled out for opprobrium and attacks because of the PL’s large Tutsi following. The soldier shot Gatera point-blank and fled with the others.76 In reporting the murder to Paris in a cable also signed by Ambassador Martres, Col. Cussac—the new French defense attaché, MAM chief, and commander of Operation Noroît— relayed the official explanation of the Rwandan authorities (“personal vengeance”) without commenting on the likelihood that this was an act of government retaliation against its political opponents.77 (Cussac and Martres did find it relevant to point out that the opposition might exploit the murder.78) Many put no stock in this explanation. As a Rwandan human-rights organization reported, “Many observers saw in this assassination . . . a concrete expression of intimidation attempts of well-known opposition parties.”79

On 27 October 1991, Jacques Bihozagara, one of the RPF representatives at the recent Paris talks, wrote a letter to Paul Dijoud bringing the murder to his attention as “an illustration of the Rwandan government’s present practices.”80 Dijoud’s deputy, Catherine Boivineau, however, assured Rwanda’s ambassador to France that “France knew the true version of the facts,” likely meaning that France accepted the official explanation that the murder had been motivated by personal vengeance.81 Nonetheless, Boivineau told the ambassador that France “considered this assassination to be troublesome.”82

Gatera’s murder was not an isolated incident. The following week, the RPF sent Dijoud another letter naming 18 people, ten of whom had been tortured and eight of whom had been reported missing after arrest, all between 20 and 30 October 1991 in the Bugesera region, in the south.83 Details of these killings would reach the world in 1993, with the “Report of the
International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since October 1, 1990” (“FIDH Report”) (The FIDH Report set the total number of victims at 28, exceeding the eighteen victims that the RPF had named a year and a half earlier in its letter to Dijoud.):

In October 1991, Burgomaster of Kanzenze [a settlement in the Bugesera region, about a half-hour’s drive south of Kigali] Fidele Rwambuka ordered the arrests of a number of Tutsi youths, who were accused of planning to join the RPF and of having recruited others for that purpose. Twenty-eight were seized over a period of two weeks, and, after a brief detention at the communal offices, they were transferred to the Gako military camp, where they were all severely beaten. Eight were killed or disappeared.84

We have uncovered no evidence that Dijoud replied to the RPF, or that the French government urged Habyarimana to address these allegations. Exactly five months after the RPF’s letter to Dijoud, anti-Tutsi massacres in Bugesera, facilitated by the same Bourgmestre Rwambuka, would kill nearly 300 by gruesome means.85

The RPF was not alone in sounding the alarm. In November 1991, frustrated by the slow pace of political change, the main opposition parties—the MDR (the restored Hutu party of the center and south, with both moderate and extremist elements), the PL (Liberal Party; center-right, urban, business-oriented), and the PSD (Social Democratic Party; center-left, middle-class professionals)—petitioned Habyarimana with a long list of areas in urgent need of reform.86 Prominent among them, according to Col. Cussac, who summed up the letter’s contents for Paris, was “a major overhaul of the administrative apparatus currently controlled by a single party and the militancy of whose public officials forbids the organization of free and democratic elections.”87

The letter condemned “the monopolization of the National Radio by the . . . MRND for use in propaganda” and “the persecution of members of parties other than MRND.”88 It went on:

- The regional authorities “behave as propagandists for MRND and hamper the campaigning activities of other parties . . . [,]” for example, by “preventing the local population from attending the meetings organised by the opposition parties . . . .”89

- “The militants of the . . . MRND with the support of the local administrative authorities, carry out acts of intimidation and practice physical violence on members of the opposition.”90

- “On 20th October 1991 . . . a band of MRND militants . . . attacked some MDR members who were returning from a meeting. About ten members of them were wounded, one of whom had his hand chopped off.”91

- “. . . [T]he explosion of new political parties. . . has completely upset the Rwandese political scene to a point whereby the former single party no longer boasts the highest number of members in the country.”92
“... [T]he [o]fficial image of the country, as represented by the current regime, no longer corresponds to the true picture of Rwanda which [is] today turning toward the opposition parties.”93

The petition’s summation was blunt: “[T]he country is running a serious risk of falling apart.”94 It concluded by re-iterating the coalition’s earlier calls for a national conference, the organized repatriation of refugees, liberalization of the press, a “complete reshuffle” of administrative and diplomatic bodies, and the reorganization of the security services.95

Ernestine Mudahogora96

Ernestine was born in Bugesera, in Ntarama district. She was the only one in her family of seven who survived. She was 18 at the time of the Genocide.

In Nyamata, things were getting worse as the days went by. There were horrible shootings and killings in the church. The survivors fled back to where they had come from. All the Tutsis in Nyamata and other areas had been killed. That was when they started attacking the remaining areas.

My uncles and aunts were living across the valley, so they came and lived in the neighbouring houses. Sometimes it was OK for one or two days, then things got bad again. One day, after about two weeks, the Interahamwe . . . had killed all the people in Nyamata—all those in Kayumba forest and everyone in the church. They had killed everywhere else, and the next place was my home village. I remember some people saying, “The attackers have come through the coffee plantation.” That was just below our home and I wondered what was going to happen. I couldn’t imagine what killings were like. I thought they were impossible. People were screaming, “They’ve come.” And then they fled through the forest to Ntarama church. Those who could still defend themselves with bows and spears fought off the attackers, but they started to lose courage when they saw about ten or twenty of their number being killed. They started to scatter. The strong fighters fled towards Gitarama and Kabwayi; a few helpless people were left behind.

My brother was among those who managed to flee. He came home and told us, “We can’t defend ourselves; they’ve killed most of us. They’ve killed the strongest men we had. We should all find our own way now.” “Where are you going?” I asked him. He told me, “We’re going to look for a safer place to take refuge.” “Won’t you be killed there?” I asked. “I don’t know,” he replied. “But
goodbye for now. If I survive, we shall meet again.” Those were the last words we heard from him, as he walked away and left us.

...  

We ran away and reached a small forest just below our home. We heard the perpetrators amongst the cattle we had left behind. They hacked the cattle and then killed the elderly people who had stayed in their homes. We hid in a bush near our house because the attackers were coming close.

Then we ran to the sector offices at Ntarama church. Even as we were running, we could hear some Interahamwe behind us saying, “They went through here. There they are.” Others came into the bushes searching for us, but luckily they found property—suitcases, bags and so on—that people had hidden there. We heard them saying, “Hey! I’ve found some treasures here.” So while they concentrated on what they had found, we fled. That’s how we managed to survive that day. We ran to Ntarama church.

...  

Just after we left [from Ntarama church], they threw grenades at Ntarama church. They killed almost everybody—there are just a few handicapped survivors. Anyway, we continued and went to the school. It was the only safe hiding place then for those who had managed to survive Nyamata or the other massacres throughout Bugesera. We spent the nights in the school and during the day we would loiter in the swamps. We never slept in the swamps because the Interahamwe went home around four o’clock. Then we could go back to the school.

...  

It was 15 April 1994. They came in many buses. They had come to kill us. The buses came straight to the school building where we were hiding. The attackers killed many people and only a few were left. We were near the swamp at the time and that’s where they found us. Some old people committed suicide. They said they had survived the machetes of 1959, and the machetes of 1994 would not kill them. They dived into the water and were carried away.

I ran away and hid in the bush near the swamp. The Interahamwe immediately ran after me. It hadn’t rained that day. It was around midday, and the sun was shining brightly. That’s when the Interahamwe came and killed many
people—including my cousin who was slightly older than me. Later I discovered that they had hacked me. I didn’t know when it happened, but I guess it was around midday. I touched myself and saw blood. I wondered if it was possible that they had cut me, and I was still alive. I always used to imagine how one day they would bring a machete and hack me. I didn’t know how I would react. I wasn’t sure then whether I should hide in a sorghum plantation, but I just kept on running.

At some point, I penetrated another area of bush where the perpetrators found me and started hacking me again. I collapsed. I finally managed to leave that place around six o’clock in the evening when the killers left to go home. Perhaps it was the wind that brought me back to consciousness. I heard people moving around and started calling. But maybe those people thought I was with the perpetrators. Instead of coming close to see, they ran away. And then someone came and said, “Oh no, Mudahogora has been hacked. Look how badly she’s hurt!”

You can imagine what I looked like, considering the scars I have now. I looked like a dead body with blood all over my face. I heard someone say, “She’s taking her last breath; there’s no life in her.” I was with my sister’s three-year-old boy; we had hidden together in the bush. When I opened my eyes, I saw him seated beside me; he wasn’t hurt at all then. He died later. I was the only one left with him, but I couldn’t help him get food and later he developed anemia and died. He was sitting there with his eyes wide open just beside me. By chance, a kind woman who lived nearby came and carried him away on her back.

I was left alone there; everyone had gone. No one bothered to carry me away from there. I tried both my legs and found I had a little strength left in them even though I was injured. I knew that when the wounds are still fresh, it’s still possible to move around. The risk was that I might suddenly fall over because of losing too much blood. So I tried walking, and I managed it. The pain hadn’t started by then, so I started running after the people. I didn’t want to be left in the Bush alone.

Everybody was running, and I was left behind. I remember that when the Interahamwe came back and found you still alive, they had to finish you off. I survived that day. I pulled myself up to the school buildings, but by then all my brothers had fled to Gitarama. I was left with my sister, the second eldest in our family; the rest had been killed, including my third brother. There were still some survivors at the school. They had seen that the killing had become very intense and
In advance of the fourth biennial summit of Francophone states at Chaillot Palace, in Paris, on 19-21 November 1991, Jean Carbonare, the President of the French Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and Democracy in Rwanda, made an impassioned plea directly to President Mitterrand to stop supporting a regime that committed the abuses itemized by the RPF and the opposition:

Numerous testimonies from international organizations . . . have . . . reported serious and multiple violations of human rights in Rwanda (arbitrary arrests, massacres of civilians and disappearances, torture, prolonged preventive detention under inhumane conditions, trials and convictions without any legal procedure, racist propaganda [, etc.]).

These violations increased considerably with the start of the civil war. . . . Since that date, France is present militarily in Rwanda, officially to protect our nationals. Several testimonies have brought to light the active participation of French military . . . particularly with regard to the control of strategic points and the interrogation of prisoners.97

In the name of the human rights with which France has always wanted to identify itself, in the name of the democracy to which you yourself have called countries at . . . La Baule . . . our committee can only reiterate its indignation—its shame—and vigorously protest against France’s political and military support to a dictatorship with no respect for human beings or their rights. Withdrawing French troops in Rwanda would be, in our view[,] a first step in bringing our values in line with our actions.

In a 14 November 1991 memo to President Mitterrand meant to prepare him for a meeting with President Habyarimana on the sidelines of the summit, Dijoud’s deputy Catherine Boivineau mentioned none of these concerns. Her focus was on the “many important developments” in Rwandan democratization that President Habyarimana had steered since he last met with President Habyarimana.98 She noted that Habyarimana would expect Mitterrand to reassure him that “Kigali authorities could continue to count on French [military] support.”99

It is unclear whether the two presidents met during the Chaillot summit. At the summit itself, President Habyarimana gave a speech touting his country’s so-called democratic progress.100 Its main obstacle, he said in a speech to the assembled, was “partisans nostalgic for the monarchy in the interior [meaning Tutsi in Rwanda—ed.] with aid from their allies on the exterior [meaning Uganda—ed.]” intent on “smothering this nascent democracy.”101
The signals of uncritical support sent by France had consequences, namely that Habyarimana’s administration felt emboldened to resist the opposition’s demands. When, on 30 December 1991, the MRND Justice Minister Sylvester Nsanzimana, who had been appointed prime minister by Habyarimana in October, was finally sworn in after two and a half months of stalled negotiations to form a coalition, he named a cabinet that included only one non-MRND official. Otherwise, the MRND continued to dominate, with the top ministries in the same hands that they had been in February. The opposition was livid. An opposition march in Kigali on 8 January 1992 drew 50,000, with thousands more marching in the center and south of the country. Another march was planned for a week later but was stifled by the authorities.

Despite Habaryimana’s political violence and repressive tactics, France’s principal mediator did not change his approach. Paul Dijoud began a second round of negotiations between the RPF and the Rwandan government, on 14 and 15 January 1992, in Paris, by lecturing the Rwandans: “The difference between dictatorship and democracy is that the first is based on force while the second is based on consensus. . . . It is democracy that will solve your problems.” Then Dijoud advised both parties to “preserve the established order” and “gradually learn to govern together.” After suggesting once more that the RPF represented Ugandan interests, Dijoud insisted that the Noroit troops were part of the military cooperation between France and Rwanda—an inaccurate spin developed in conjunction with the Rwandan delegation to the August negotiations—and therefore not subject to the March 1991 N’Sele cease-fire agreement’s requirement that foreign troops depart Rwanda. Then he reiterated that the main problem was refugees rather than the wholesale rot of the Habyarimana regime. None of the arguments the RPF had repeatedly made in response to these points had found an interested audience in Dijoud, and none of Dijoud’s arguments inspired confidence in the RPF that France was serious about modifying either its approach to peace talks or the authoritarian system in Rwanda.

According to the Rwandan government’s delegate, on 20 January 1992, Paul Dijoud left the negotiations displeased and “disheartened by the RPF’s delaying tactics and its negativistic and unconstructive attitude.” Dijoud seems to not have countenanced that the intransigence might be France’s, and that its effect would be to encourage Habyarimana to make merely superficial reforms. France did not expect more. Paul Dijoud had said it himself: it was not the goal to “transform Rwanda into an advanced democracy.” President Habyarimana was the “lesser evil,” and that was good enough.
Notes to Chapter IV

2 Note from Gilles Vidal, Chargé de mission for African and Malagasy Affairs at the Élysée, to President François Mitterrand 6 (22 Apr. 1991).
3 Memorandum from Jean Varret (20 Sept. 1991) (Subject: “Nouvelle implantation du DAMI”).
5 MIP Tome II, Annex 1.1 (“Liste des Personnalités Entendues par la Mission d’Information”).
10 Dijoud took over the position in March 1991. See Paul Dijoud, POLITIQUEMANIA; MIP Audition of Paul Dijoud, Tome III, Vol. 1, 146.
15 Interview by LFM with Protais Musoni.
16 Interview by LFM with Protais Musoni; see also Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake; Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.
17 Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera; see also Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.
18 Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera; see also Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake; Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.
19 RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION NATIONALE DE SYNTHÈSE SUR LES REFORMES POLITIQUES AU RWANDA [REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SYNTHESIS COMMISSION ON POLITICAL REFORMS IN RWANDA] 8-9 (Mar. 1991); see also Frances Kerry, Rwanda Sets Date for Multi-Party Politics, REUTERS, 22 Apr. 1991 (“Rwandan embassy officials in Nairobi said on Monday that parties have been allowed to organise themselves since last November, but until now have not been registered.”).
22 The term “cooperant” applied to the AMTs serving under the French Ministry of Cooperation. At the time of this meeting in the summer of 1991, there were less than 50 cooperants in Rwanda. See MIP Tome I 151 (Évolution des effectifs de l’assistance militaire technique française au Rwanda de 1990 a 1994 [Evolution of French Military Technical Assistance to Rwanda from 1990 to 1994]). Bestowing the status of “military cooperant” to the hundreds of French soldiers who cycled through Rwanda as DAMI or in the Noroit operation would have been well over a tenfold increase in the number of military cooperants.


26 Cable from Paul Dijoud (27 Sept. 1991) (Subject: “Visite à Paris du Major Kagame”).

27 Cable from Paul Dijoud (27 Sept. 1991) (Subject: “Visite à Paris du Major Kagame”). The recipient is not explicitly mentioned. It can be inferred from Dijoud’s request that the recipient met with Rwandan Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu, while the French Embassy in Kampala met with representatives of the other side.

28 Cable from Paul Dijoud (27 Sept. 1991) (Subject: “Visite à Paris du Major Kagame”).

29 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

30 Mucyo Report Section 8.2 (2008); see also Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Dar Es Salaam (10 July 1992) (Subject: “Preliminary ceasefire talks with the RPF”) (reporting on a meeting between RPF, US, French, and Belgian officials during which the RPF delegation recounted being “particularly bothered” by what they perceived as a clear statement by Dijoud during the September 1991 meeting that French troops were in Rwanda to protect the regime).

31 Renaud Girard, Quand la France jetait Kagamé en prison . . . [When France Threw Kagame into Prison . . . ], LE FIGARO, 23 Nov. 1997; Mucyo Report Section 8.2 (2008). The Mucyo Report, however, said that the arrest preceded the meeting.

32 Renaud Girard, Quand la France jetait Kagamé en prison . . . [When France Threw Kagame into Prison . . . ], LE FIGARO, 23 Nov. 1997. The author of this article placed the timing of Kagame’s arrest in January 1992, which may then have been adopted by the Mucyo Report as fact. See Mucyo Report Section 8.2 (2008). However, Kagame told the reporter that this was his first trip to Paris, and it is known that he was in Paris in September 1991. In addition, evidence suggests that the delegation to the January 1992 talks in Paris with Paul Dijoud did not include Paul Kagame. See Memorandum from Claver Kanyarushoki to Juvénal Habyarimana (20 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “Pourparlers avec le FPR”) (naming the delegates to the January 1992 talks and stating that Kagame was not at the talks).


34 Renaud Girard, Quand la France jetait Kagamé en prison . . . [When France Threw Kagame into Prison . . . ], LE FIGARO, 23 Nov. 1997; Mucyo Report Section 8.2 (2008). The Mucyo report states that only Kagame and Emmanuel Ndahiro were arrested and detained in prison.


37 Renaud Girard, Quand la France jetait Kagamé en prison . . . [When France threw Kagame into Prison . . . ], LE FIGARO, 23 Nov. 1997; Mucyo Report Section 8.2 (2008). The Mucyo report states that the French delegation apologized, but it does not cite a source for that statement.

38 Renaud Girard, Quand la France jetait Kagamé en prison . . . [When France threw Kagame into Prison . . . ], LE FIGARO, 23 Nov. 1997.


Chapter IV

41 MIP Audition of Paul Dijoud, Tome III, Vol. 1, 146.


48 Report from Pasteur Bizimungu, Negotiations between the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandese Government (GR) under the auspices of the French Government (France) from 23rd to 25th October 1991 8 (25 Oct. 1991). “What had just been dubbed a democratic process,” the RPF delegation warned, “was the very denial of democracy. There is just one person who calls the shots—today just as in 1973—Mr. Habyarimana. He authorized the amendments of the Constitution, the formation of parties, etc. . . . He installed in reality a democracy made to measure.”


51 RPF, A CONTRIBUTION BY THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) TO THE CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA IN MARCH 1991 (Mar. 1991).

52 RPF, A CONTRIBUTION BY THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) TO THE CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA IN MARCH 1991 (Mar. 1991).


56 Frances Kerry, Rwanda Sets Date for Multi-Party Politics, REUTERS, 22 Apr. 1991.


62 Memorandum to Juvénal Habyarimana (13 June 1991) (Subject: “Note à Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République Rwandaise”).

64 Memorandum to Juvénal Habyarimana (13 June 1991) (Subject: “Note à Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République Rwandaise”) (summarizing the criticism levied by opposition parties).

65 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (9 Aug. 1991).

66 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 54 (2019).

67 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (9 Aug. 1991).

68 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (9 Aug. 1991).


83 Letter from RPF to Paul Dijoud (4 Nov. 1991); see also Letter from Jacques Bihozagara to Paul Dijoud (16 Dec. 1991) (Subject: “Répression de la presse libre au Rwanda”). The 16 December 1991 letter informed Dijoud of the arrest of three journalists and the harassment of two others by Rwandan soldiers, forcing the reporters to flee. Bihozagara noted that Reporters Without Borders had confirmed these events and stated, “The Rwandan Patriotic Front would like to draw your attention to the anti-democratic and anti-constitutional behavior of the Kigali regime, which does nothing but hinder the process of a genuine democratic change to which the Rwandan people aspire.”

85 MIP Audition of Edwige Avice, Tome III, Vol. 2, 47.
86 Cable from Georges Martres (15 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Lettre adressée au Président de la République Rwandaise par les partis d’opposition”).
87 Cable from Georges Martres (15 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Lettre adressée au Président de la République Rwandaise par les partis d’opposition”). The letter also called for the following:
   - the redress of injustices and the restoration of respect for human rights and public Freedoms…
   - introduction of a deposit to limit pre-trial detention . . .
   - a tax reform abolishing ‘extra-legal collections by the municipal authorities’ . . .
   - a national and sovereign conference… to ‘turn the page of this part of history . . . , to analyze without . . . spirit of revenge the cause of the important events and to do somehow (his) self-criticism.’
   - the return of refugees.
88 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
89 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
90 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
91 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
92 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
93 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
94 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
95 Letter from Faustin Twagiramungu et al. to Juvénal Habyarimana (19 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Petition to His Excellency the President of the Republic by the M.D.R, P.L., and P.S.D. Political Parties to Protest Against the Serious Attempts to Oppose the Process of Democratization Currently Taking Place in Rwanda”).
96 This account is taken from WENDY WHITWORTH, WE SURVIVED: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 74 – 80 (2006).
97 Letter from Jean Carbonare to François Mitterrand (16 Nov. 1991).
98 Memorandum from Catherine Boivineau (14 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Entretien du Président de la République avec le President Habyarimana en marge du Sommet de Chaillot (19-21 novembre 1991)”).
99 Memorandum from Catherine Boivineau (14 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Entretien du Président de la République avec le President Habyarimana en marge du Sommet de Chaillot (19-21 novembre 1991)”).
100 Juvénal Habyarimana, Speech at the Francophone Summit at Chaillot, France (20 Nov. 1991).
102 Memorandum from Catherine Boivineau (14 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Entretien du Président de la République avec le President Habyarimana en marge du Sommet de Chaillot (19-21 novembre 1991)”).


106 Memorandum from Claver Kanyarushoki to Juvénal Habyarimana (20 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “Pourparlers avec le FPR”).


113 Interview by LFM with Protais Musoni; Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

114 Memorandum from Claver Kanyarushoki to Juvénal Habyarimana (20 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “Pourparlers avec le FPR”).

115 MIP Audition of Paul Dijoud, Tome III, Vol. 1, 368.

A. French Officials Watched As Akazu-Backed Militias Perpetuated Rwanda’s Ethnic Divisions.

Before 6 April 1994, political parties in concert with the Rwanda Armed Forces organized and began the military training of the youth wings of the MRND and CDR political parties (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, respectively) with the intent to use them in the massacres that ensued.¹


On 22 January 1992, Col. Bernard Cussac, France’s defense attaché in Rwanda, sent a cable to Paris, signed by French Ambassador George Martres.² In it, Cussac reported that “after the most recent massacres of civilians,” the Rwandan minister of the interior “decided to arm the population of the border area.”³ Nearly 400 arms, mainly French MAS-36 military rifles, would be distributed in the Ruhengeri, Byumba, and Mutara regions near Rwanda’s border with Uganda.⁴ FAR personnel would recommend the civilians who would make up these armed groups—termed “self-defense militias,” in Cussac’s report—and local leaders would designate which militia members would carry the weapons.⁵ The rifles would be “distributed in the evening and returned in the morning,” a rate of “one weapon per three people.”⁶

Col. Cussac showed concern. He contacted Colonel Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita, the chief of staff of the Gendarmerie and one of the corrupt, unaccountable authorities who made up the Akazu, to “emphasiz[e] that this mission… should have been incumbent upon the Gendarmerie” and not the FAR.⁷ Unsurprisingly, Rwagafilita demurred: “If he agreed,” Cussac wrote, he “hid behind the argument of insufficient numbers of personnel and their lack of training.”⁸

Col. Cussac wrote in his cable, “Will the weapons only be used against the R.P.F.? Aren’t they in danger of being used to execute personal, ethnic, or political vengeances?”⁹ He also questioned whether “the local leaders who will designate the weapon bearers, and who all come from the administration set up by the M.R.N.D. (the former single party),” would distribute the weapons primarily to “members of this party.”¹⁰

Cussac’s concerns were well placed. With the war now stretching into its second year, there were growing indications that hardliners in the Rwandan government were waging an effort to militarize civil society and stoke ethnic hatred. It was not just the arming of civilian “self-defense militias” in the north. As French officials would discover,¹¹ major political parties, including Habyarimana’s party, the MRND, had begun, in the second half of 1991, to create their own youth militias.¹² The Akazu and accomplice figures, in and outside government, were pivotal in the development of the MRND’s militia, known as the Interahamwe, which would play a primary role in the mounting anti-Tutsi violence of the years to come.
As lead patron of the Habyarimana regime, the French government had ample opportunity to discredit and disenfranchise the extremists behind these initiatives. It never did. There has been no evidence that any senior French officials did anything to forestall the distribution of arms to civilians or to pressure the government or political parties to disband the militias. Rather, as will soon be discussed in greater detail, first-hand accounts indicate that, as the MRND and Akazu professionalized the Interahamwe into a paramilitary organization trained by the FAR, French military personnel participated in the training.13

The Interahamwe (meaning “those who come together,” in Kinyarwanda14) was among the youth militias that sprang into being in the months after Rwanda’s June 1991 constitutional amendments, which formalized Rwanda’s transition from single-party rule to (nominal) multipartyism.15 As the historian and human rights activist Alison Des Forges would later write, the newly created parties instituted the militias “to provide security at their meetings and, in some areas, to attack members of rival parties.”16 James Gasana, the MRND defense minister from April 1992 to July 1993, who analyzed the Interahamwe for the 1998 French parliamentary inquiry into the Genocide (MIP), said the MRND’s aims for the Interahamwe were both to counter aggression from the youth militias of rival parties, such as the Inkuba, the militia of the Democratic Republican Movement party (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain, or MDR), and to frustrate opposition parties—for example, by blocking roads to keep opposition party members from gathering in Kigali.17

According to Des Forges, the Interahamwe’s function evolved over time, becoming, in 1992, “a real paramilitary force, trained and sometimes armed by the [Rwandan] military.”18 Anastase Gasana (no relation to James Gasana), a former member of the MRND who left to join the MDR, wrote in a May 1992 analysis of the Interahamwe that, in addition to “carry[ing] out criminal and terrorist acts against opposition political parties,”19 its mission was:

- To carry out criminal acts, commit crimes and assassinations in order to terrorize the people and divert them from their democratic ideal by making them helpless and confused;
- To create a general and widespread sense of insecurity in the country in order to psychologically prepare the Rwandan public opinion for the acts of murder planned for the future;
- To cut bridges, sever the roots of the nascent democratic ideas;
- To unconditionally protect the MRND regime.20

As 1992 progressed, the Interahamwe would murder its opponents and “create[] a climate of terror by looting and destroying the homes of adherents of other parties,”21 according to a report released by a consortium of human rights groups in early 1993.

The Interahamwe benefited from the support of the Akazu,22 who not only financed the militia but played a role in recruiting its members.23 In his May 1992 analysis, Anastase Gasana wrote that some of the militia’s earliest recruiters, who selected civilians to join its ranks,24 included President Habyarimana’s notorious brother-in-law Protas Zigiranyirazo, as well as such other prominent figures as MRND Secretary General Mathieu Ngorumpatse and the head of the state broadcasting agency, Ferdinand Nahimana.25 Gasana cited several other Akazu members and
high-ranking regime officials—including Habyarimana’s private secretary, Colonel Elie Sagatwa; Colonel Laurent Serubuga, the deputy chief of staff of the FAR; Lieutenant Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, Rwanda’s head of military intelligence; and Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, who would serve as director of the Cabinet for the Ministry of Defense from June 1992 to July 1994 and would go on to play a leading role in orchestrating the Genocide.26 By May 1992, Gasana said, Interahamwe members included former soldiers and gendarmes, plainclothes Presidential Guard members, and members of the Service Central de Renseignements (SCR), the Rwandan intelligence service.27

The rise of the Interahamwe coincided with the formation of another powerful force for anti-Tutsi extremism. Formed by Hutu hardliners in early 1992,28 the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (la Coalition pour la Défense de la République, or CDR) sought, as Des Forges would later put it, to “rally all Hutu in a common front against the Tutsi.”29 At the CDR’s inaugural meeting, the party’s most influential figure, Jean Bosco Barayagwiza—a Rwandan Foreign Ministry official who, as it happens, had participated in the negotiations with the RPF in Paris in October 1991—argued that the Tutsi had created political parties to address their grievances, so it was only right for the Hutu to do likewise.30 The extremist newspaper Kangura (discussed in Chapter 3) would soon devote an issue to celebrating the CDR’s formation, calling on its readers to join the party.31 “The island is none other than the CDR,” Kangura proclaimed in the May 1992 issue, equating the CDR party to a refuge of safety. “So now grab your oars, Hutus.”32 Kangura went on to denigrate the Tutsi, “who,” it said, “has a desiccated heart where the Nazi worm nibbles in tranquility.”33

The CDR had its own youth militia: the Impuzamugambi (Kinyarwanda for “those with a single purpose”).34 The Impuzamugambi’s purpose almost always aligned with the Interahamwe’s. As Jean Kambanda, the prime minister of the genocidal interim Rwandan government (8 April to 17 July 1994),35 would admit in 1998 upon pleading guilty to genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and other crimes: “Before 6 April 1994, political parties in concert with the Rwanda Armed Forces organized and began the military training of the youth wings of the MRND and CDR political parties (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi, respectively) with the intent to use them in the massacres that ensued.”36 The two militias would become all but indistinguishable during the Genocide.37
B. French Officials Reacted to Rwandan State-Led Terrorism against Tutsi Civilians and Political Opponents in Bugesera by Refusing to Protect Victims and Increasing Support to the Perpetrators.

MONIQUE MAS (RFI Journalist): French troops are present in Rwanda, and you yourself, I met you recently, had put forward the humanitarian argument to justify the presence of these French troops. How is it that they do not intervene, how is it that this massacre can unfold before the eyes of France?

GEORGES MARTRES (French Ambassador to Rwanda (1989 – 1993)): Indeed, French troops are present in Rwanda. . . . Their mission has not changed for over a year. It is the protection of French nationals. To assign them another objective, to make them perform a humanitarian task for the benefit of the entire Rwandan population, and in particular with regard to the events that are taking place at this time, they would have to receive further instructions, which they do not have for the moment.38

On 3 March 1992, a warning came over the airwaves of Radio Rwanda, the national radio station of the Rwandan government. “There are reports of foreign terrorists recruited to destabilize the country,” Jean-Baptiste Bamwanga, the announcer, declared, citing a missive from a “committee of sympathizers of nonviolence.”39 This “committee” claimed to have discovered a letter detailing a joint plot by the RPF and its political allies in the Parti Libéral to murder 22 prominent Hutus.40 “These murders would call for revenge on both sides,” Bamwanga announced ominously. “We ask everyone to remain vigilant.”41

In case the intended message was not clear, the station’s announcers read out an explanatory editorial that carried the headline, “Rwandan aggressors are reported to be prepared to engage in acts of terrorism and destabilization,” and opined, “We cannot as a public press remain inactive. We need to inform you of the information in our possession. You will then be able to adopt the necessary attitudes to annihilate these Machiavellian plans of the enemy.”42

The letter that included details of this alleged assassination plot was a fake.43 Lower-level Radio Rwanda editorial employees, fearing the public was being tricked, had urged Ferdinand Nahimana—the head of Rwanda’s government broadcasting agency,44 and, as such, the editorial director of the station—not to run it.45 Nahimana ignored them.46 He later admitted—while on trial for inciting genocide as the principal force behind Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), the hate radio station created in 1993 in the face of a coming peace agreement that exhorted its listeners to eliminate the Tutsi during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda—that he had made no effort to establish the provenance of the letter.47 Radio Rwanda broadcast inflammatory reports about the letter four more times over the next two days.48

The broadcasts instigated terrible violence in Bugesera, a region stretching from south of Kigali to the Burundi border. When the broadcasts aired, the Bugesera region was already ripe for upheaval, on account of its history and ethnic makeup. Following anti-Tutsi violence during the transition to majority rule after independence from Belgium in 1962, the Rwandan government, in
conjunction with Belgian officials, had forced Tutsi from their homes around the country to the arid, less desirable land in Bugesera. Government planners had begun laying the groundwork for the massacres there as early as October 1991, when Fidèle Rwambuka, the bourgmestre (mayor) of Kanzenze, a Bugesera settlement a half-hour’s drive south of Kigali, ordered the arrest of 28 Tutsi youths he claimed were planning to steal across the Burundi border to join the RPF, which was then steadily gaining territory after having crossed into Rwanda a year before. During the ensuing months, Rwandan government officials engaged in repeated extra-legal provocations in response to the appearance of a majority-Tutsi Rwandan political party, the Parti Liberal, in the region. (On 12 February 1992, the MDR warned its members that the Interahamwe had seriously injured three people in the Remera neighborhood of Kigali, while carrying swords and wearing ropes around their waists. Two weeks later, the MDR updated that notice, notifying its members that the Interahamwe was now armed with grenades.) Bourgmestre Rwambuka—who, in May 1992, would be named among a number of Rwandan government officials on a list of “MRND regime hardliners” affiliated with the Interahamwe—did not temper his words. On 1 March 1992, two days before the fateful radio broadcasts, Rwambuka or one of his supporters issued a pamphlet that called for violence against local Tutsi in the strongest terms since tensions had started rising the previous fall: “THEY MUST NOT ESCAPE US!”

The riots began on 4 March 1992, less than 24 hours after the first broadcast on Radio Rwanda. “They came in a great crowd, shouting like crazy people,” a survivor said, “They killed four of my children and my wife.” “They threw my wife’s body into the latrine. It was a man from the north who is my friend who told me that. He was among the attackers.”

The assailants moved systematically from one neighborhood to the next, another witness reported. “They said they were supposed to kill the Tutsi,” she said. One old man said attackers had burned both of his houses, that he had been so badly struck on the ears that he could no longer hear, and that he had been nearly blinded by a beating that also left him with a massive scar on his chest from a spear wound. His child only managed to survive with the help of a Hutu neighbor to whom he had loaned a field for cultivation.

In a week, there were nearly 300 killings and as many as 13,000 displaced persons. The killings would come to be seen as a milestone in the lead-up to the Genocide: the first time Habyarimana’s allies and authorities used the Interahamwe to slaughter Tutsi. “The militia knew how to take the lead, making it possible for government officials to play a less public part in the slaughter,” a 1999 Human Rights Watch report would observe. This gruesome collaboration would become a regular feature of ethnic killings that followed. Indeed, Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, an officer in the RPF’s Army at the time, has called the Bugesera massacres “a test run for the Genocide.” (Others have described them, similarly, as a “dress rehearsal” for the Genocide.)

The French ambassador, Georges Martres, knew within days of the inciting broadcasts what the government-run radio station had done. “The Rwandan broadcast ignited the fire,” he wrote in a 9 March 1992 cable, “when it broadcast this letter with no critical analysis and leaving
no doubt about its authenticity and the soundness of its allegations.” Martres spoke with Rwandan Minister of the Interior Faustin Munyazesa on 7 March 1992 about the station’s actions, shortly after reports of the slaughter first reached the community of Western diplomats in Kigali. “The minister,” he wrote afterward, “did not hide his embarrassment concerning this act of misinformation by the official services.” In an interview on RFI two days later, Martres would call the manner in which the fateful letter was broadcast “unfortunate.”

Minister Munyazesa assured Martres on 7 March 1992 that the situation was “under control.” News reports in the Western press on 8 March suggested otherwise. AFP and Reuters highlighted the barbarity of the slayings—how the killers had set homes ablaze and burned people alive. Rwandan security forces, they said, had responded too slowly to stop the killing and, in some cases, had encouraged those fleeing the violence to return home.

Clashes, he noted, continued throughout the day on 8 March, leading more and more local Tutsi—women and children, mostly—to seek shelter at the Catholic parish in Nyamata, home of the Belgian White Fathers.

Labeling the killings in Bugesera a “pogrom,” a French cable on 9 March appeared to recognize both that the massacres were organized, and that the victims were targeted because of their ethnicity. The cable asserted, unequivocally, that local authorities—namely, the sub-prefect and the bourgmestre—borne responsibility for inciting the massacres.

RFI reporter Monique Mas put Martres on the spot in a 9 March 1992 interview, asking him why the Noroit forces in Kigali, just an hour’s drive from Nyamata at that time, had done nothing to stop the bloodshed. “How is it that this massacre can unfold before the eyes of France?” she asked. Martres insisted that the Noroit troops had one and only one mission: “the protection of French nationals.” “To assign them another objective, to make them perform a humanitarian task for the benefit of the entire Rwandan population . . . , they would have to receive further instructions, which they do not have for the moment,” he said.

One French military cooperant would later claim, more than a decade after his service in Rwanda, that he took it upon himself to go to Bugesera to verify if the reports coming out of the region were true. Lieutenant Colonel Michel Robardey, who, since October 1990, had been working to reorganize Rwanda’s Gendarmerie (i.e., national police), said he and his wife drove out from Kigali to Bugesera on 8 March, “as soon as he had heard the news of this ethnic violence on the radio.” As the author Pierre Péan recounted in a 2005 book, Robardey—after passing, with difficulty, through FAR-manned roadblocks—arrived to find that “everything was burning.” An Italian missionary told Robardey she had been making calls all day, pleading to anyone and everyone “to do something to stop the violence.” Robardey, according to Péan’s book, promised her he would come back. He returned to Kigali, where he briefed the French ambassador and defense attaché on what he had seen.

A French cable indicates that, on 10 March 1992, France’s embassy in Kigali sent two diplomats to scout out the situation in Bugesera. In Ngenda, where the violence uprooted as many as 1,500 locals, among the poorest in Rwanda, the burnt remains of the villagers’ homes were still smoking. Parish priests had counted 10 dead over the preceding two days. The priests, one of
whom was French, told the diplomats that “the Parti Libéral maintains an anti-French propaganda that is starting to spread among the refugees: [that] France supports the Habyarimana regime held responsible for the massacres and the passiveness of the French Army allows these massacres to continue.” In a cable the next day, the French embassy requested that the Quai d’Orsay consider sending an aid package—however small—of food, medicine, and blankets for the Ngoroi soldiers to distribute. “In these conditions,” wrote “W.B.” (likely William Bunel, an embassy counselor to Martres) in this cable, “a humanitarian gesture, even if symbolic, toward displaced persons would certainly be well perceived.” The French embassy wanted, first and foremost, to burnish France’s image. Helping refugees was a secondary concern. (A few days after this cable, Rwandan authorities issued an appeal for foreign donations in response to several ongoing crises, including the displacement of Bugesera residents. According to a US Department of State cable, France promptly pledged to donate “90 tons of flour mixed with powdered milk” to Bugesera, a contribution valued at 3.3 million Rwandan francs, or roughly $23,000)

Martres’ Belgian counterpart, Ambassador Johan Swinnen, was by all appearances far more alarmed by the massacres in Bugesera. Swinnen spoke to Col. Serubuga, the Rwandan Army chief of staff, no less than four times on the evening of 6 March, urging him to send soldiers to stop the carnage. (To that point, he wrote, Rwandan gendarmes in Nyamata had done nothing other than steer fleeing Tutsi back to their homes, effectively driving them back “into the arms of raging Hutus.”) Swinnen personally raced down to Nyamata on 7 March, counting corpses along the roadside as he traveled to meet with refugees. Most of the dead he saw were old men who had been unable to flee. He saw, as well, the bodies of two women and a child who looked to be about eight years old. Swinnen guessed there were probably dozens more out there, scattered in the hills. It was a full three days before two members of the French diplomatic staff travelled to the northeast to investigate the situation.

Swinnen kept up a furious pace over next 24 hours, beginning with a call he placed to the Rwandan prime minister, and concluding with a meeting with Justin Mugenzi, the president of the Parti Liberal, who characterized the violence as an “obvious destabilization scenario” cooked up in Kigali and executed by Interahamwe youths affiliated with the MRND. In between those discussions, Swinnen convened an emergency meeting of Western diplomats (including Ambassador Martres), who, at Swinnen’s urging, agreed to sign onto a joint demarche prodding the Rwandan government to take necessary measures to stop the slaughter. The demarche, which also counted representatives from the US, Canadian, German, and Swiss embassies among its signatories, further demanded “an impartial investigation to determine who is responsible for the outbreak of violence” and called on the national radio and other media to “exercise moderation and avoid the use of language which could be considered to incite violence.” It closed with what the US ambassador characterized as a “hint” that further inaction “could jeopardize the future of cooperative programs.” Similarly, a Belgian Foreign Ministry official, meeting with the Rwandan ambassador in Brussels, suggested that if conditions in Rwanda continued to worsen, Belgium would have no choice but to “freeze foreign relations” with Rwanda.

Swinnen, Martres, and the other Western embassy officials delivered the demarche to President Habyarimana on 11 March 1992. The Rwandan president offered rote assurances during the nearly two-hour meeting by insisting he “understood how grave the problem is” and vowing “to do everything possible to bring peace to the country.” He also promised to “punish
those found responsible for stimulating the violence.”

There was a sense, though, that Habyarimana was not as distressed about the goings-on in Bugesera as his guests felt he ought to have been. When, for example, the diplomats pressed him to “discipline” Radio Rwanda for its role in the killings, he defended the station by claiming “not to understand the nefarious intent” behind the inciting broadcasts, US Ambassador Robert Flaten wrote in a cable. The president went on to say that he had heard that Parti Liberal President Mugenzi, during a rally a few days before the broadcasts, had called for the assassination of the local bourgmestre. The Rwandan interior minister, who was present for the 11 March meeting with the diplomats, gently “corrected” the president, explaining that Mugenzi’s words had been misconstrued.

French diplomats in Kigali were inclined to credit Habyarimana’s claims that his government was operating in good faith; an 11 March cable informed Paris that Rwandan authorities wanted to regain control in Bugesera, but that local government officials were simply “overwhelmed.” The embassy’s own reporting, though, had already established that elements of Habyarimana’s government had been complicit in the killings, and the regime’s responsibility was, if anything, only becoming clearer. A 13 March report by France’s military intelligence agency, the DRM, suggested the decision to air the inflammatory radio broadcasts might have been politically motivated, the goal being, in all likelihood, to delay the formation of a new coalition government, in which opposition parties would wield greater power. The DRM reasoned that, in pursuing this aim, Radio Rwanda had probably not acted alone: “If the government authorities seem embarrassed by the role of the national radio, the broadcasting of the notice can only have been authorized by one of them.”

Others in the Western diplomatic community soon began to receive reports affirming the Rwandan government’s complicity in the massacres. One such report came from Prime Minister Sylvestre Nsanzimana, who told US Ambassador Flaten in a 13 March meeting that he was “convinced that people close to the President were responsible for helping to incite the violence” in Bugesera. Swinnen, the Belgian ambassador, had other sources. On 12 March, the day after the meeting with Habyarimana, Ambassador Swinnen alerted officials in Brussels that he had received a note from Jean Birara, director of Rwandex (a company responsible for the sale of Rwandan coffee), and former governor of the National Bank of Rwanda who had sounded the alarm about the Akazu in an open letter in 1979. Birara’s note alleged that Habyarimana had put together a team of eight high-ranking Rwandan military officers or members of his inner circle to “organize terror and massacres in the country.” The team purportedly included two powerful members of the Akazu: the president’s brother-in-law, Protais Zigiranyirazo; and his personal secretary, a relative by marriage, Elie Sagatwa. The other members were as follows: Captain Pascal Simbikangwa of the Central Intelligence Service; François Karera, sub-prefect of Kigali (whose son had married a niece of Zigiranyirazo); Commandant Jean Pierre Karangwa, the head of intelligence in the Ministry of National Defense; Captain Justin Gacinya, head of the communal police in Kigali; Lieutenant-Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, the head of intelligence in the Army état-major; and Lieutenant-Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho, prefect of Kigali.

Swinnen received an all-but-identical list from a second source, one he described as “reliable,” a few weeks later. These men, Swinnen wrote in a cable marked, “very important,” were said to be “members of [a] secret état-major charged with the extermination of Tutsi in Rwanda in order to definitively resolve . . . the ethnic problem in Rwanda and to crush the internal
Hutu opposition.132 The “group [was] directly linked to the President of the Republic, who often preside[d] over the group either at the Office of the President or at the headquarters of the MRND political party.”133 The source also asserted that two government entities played a role in the Bugesera massacres: the Interahamwe militia and “commando recruited from among the pupils” of the training academy of the Gendarmerie.134 (Reports would emerge later in the course of the war that the perpetrators of the massacre in Bugesera had included soldiers from the Presidential Guard,135 the arm of the military responsible for protecting the president and his family, guarding certain government buildings, and providing escorts for VIPs.136 This, as it happens, was a part of the military France knew well, as French military cooperants had been laboring to improve the Presidential Guard’s capabilities since mid-1991.137)

Whether the US and Belgian embassies shared what they were hearing with their French colleagues, or whether the same sources also approached the French, is unclear. In any event, the French government’s commitment to supporting Habyarimana and the FAR remained unshaken. Indeed, the killings in Bugesera were still ongoing when, on 10 March 1992, Paul Dijoud, the Quai d’Orsay’s director of African affairs, wrote a note expounding on the “[n]eed to reaffirm and clarify French policy” in Rwanda.138 The note began by calling for “[a] reinforcement of French support to the Rwandan Army” to help it counter the RPF’s growing “intransigence.”139 “It would,” he wrote, “be useful, in particular, to give the Rwandan Army the ability to operate at night.”140 Thus, a self-proclaimed neutral French diplomat requested specific military equipment for one side of the conflict. Less than two months later, the French electronics and defense contractor, Thomson-CSF, fulfilled its contract (signed in September 1991) with the Government of Rwanda delivering “equipment for encrypted communications . . . hundreds of transceivers . . . and four high-security digital telephone sets.”141 The French government also committed to sending another 1.7 million French francs’ ($304,898) worth of military equipment in the back half of 1992, including an Alouette II helicopter engine, radar units, paratrooper equipment, and three Peugeot sedans.142

The increased assistance to the FAR would, Dijoud wrote, be “discreet but significant.”143 In exchange, France would expect the administration in Kigali “to encourage . . . all Rwandan political parties to support the efforts of President Habyarimana to broaden his government and find a prime minister in agreement with the opposition.”144

Dijoud’s note made no mention of Bugesera,145 though the violence, at that point, had been going on for close to a week.146 That day, as it happens, the news services reported that Italian missionary Antonia Locatelli—the same missionary Lt. Col. Robardey, the French cooperant working with the Rwandan Gendarmerie, has said he encountered during his visit to Bugesera on 8 March—had been shot dead overnight at a mission near Nyamata.147 Locatelli, a resident of the area for more than two decades, had given interviews to RFI contradicting Rwandan authorities’ claims that the killings in Bugesera were unplanned—that they represented nothing other than the convulsions of angry locals.148 Locatelli asserted in these interviews that the killers were strangers to the area who arrived by government vehicles intending to commit political crimes.149 Locatelli’s killer was a Rwandan gendarme.150 A “diplomatic source” told AFP that she “was shot at close range, making it unlikely it was a mistake.”151
Monique Mas, in her 9 March 1992 interview with Ambassador Martres, asked whether France’s attitude would change after the slaughter in Bugesera. Martres’ answer was elliptical. There was still hope, he said, that Rwanda would soon have a transitional government, and France, among other Western countries, “intends to continue its pressure on the Rwandan government” to see that process through. “So,” Mas said, “pressure on the Rwandan government, but also support to the Rwandan Army?” Martres repeated. He continued, “I already explained to you how we conceived it. Support to the Rwandan Army is technical support, a support of trainers and instructors, as we bring to other armies of Africa.” With killings of Tutsi orchestrated by government and government-affiliated forces continuing in Bugesera, Martres defended his country’s decision to continue supporting the military—to finance it, to train its soldiers, to supply them with gear and weapons—as perfectly routine. Would France reconsider its support for the Rwandan military? The short answer was no.

Bugesera would be, in every way except one, a turning point in the 18-month conflict in Rwanda. Despite everything it indicated—about government sponsorship of ethnic violence; the deployment and effectiveness of state media in particular to incite this violence; the rise of Hutu extremism; and the patterns that the contest between reform and backlash in Rwanda would now take—it would do nothing to alter French support for the Habyarimana regime. Despite comprehensive understanding of what transpired in Bugesera, France would not press the Habyarimana regime for explanation, let alone suppression of extremists within its ranks, and in fact would send more weapons, money, and advisors than it had in the past.

Immaculée Songa

Immaculée was born on December 3, 1954. She was 39 at the time of the invasion.

After the invasion in October 1990, and for several years, the presence of the French soldiers grew, and they were in a position to witness the constant discrimination and harassment taking place. During this time, the radio was constantly filled with anti-Tutsi hatred. It would speak about the Ten Commandments of the Hutus and demonize Tutsi.

I lived in Gikondo, on the road which goes from Kigali City to Kanombe, where the airport is. From my home, I observed trucks full of militia members who were singing about Hutu power and killing Tutsi. I learned they were going to a place called Gako in Bugesera because I had a member of the Interahamwe at my office, a business called Office des Cafés. He would tell us what the Interahamwe were going to do, including saying that “We are killing you tomorrow! We have guns! We will kill you tomorrow!”

Roadblocks were used throughout the country to check identification. I saw French soldiers at roadblocks supporting militias as they checked IDs. The
roadblocks were a problem for the Tutsi. We would learn that people were beaten at them. I recall seeing my friend Claudine after she was beaten at a roadblock as she was on her way to work passing through Nyamirambo.

The practice of putting Tutsis in prison and denying them basic rights became more frequent after the RPF invasion, as Hutus then became more hostile towards Tutsis. Many people were put in prison and many died there. Everyday life for all Tutsis became more difficult, as we were viewed as second-class citizens. People would be telling us “move Tutsi, go get out of here.” On the radio, Tutsis were called “snakes,” “cockroaches,” and other such words that would say Tutsis were sub-human. Such messages were heard on the radio and were constantly being played to spread hatred.

The night of the plane crash, we were told that the President had died, and that the military was saying no Tutsis would survive. My husband and I went to hide in a neighbor’s house, stowing away in the kitchen storage area when militia members would come searching. The militia members went away twice after receiving bribes. I knew we would not survive a third time, so we decided to leave.

We had placed our children with Hutu friends in the Southern Province for fear of violence. Our two daughters were killed with those friends in Gisenyi. The last time we saw our daughters was when they were in hiding at our friends’ house. Our Hutu friends kept them because the adults all agreed that it would be worse for our children to be seized at a roadblock and killed in front of me and my husband.

My husband and I went to Butare with my one-year-old son and stayed with other families in a friend’s house. When militia members attacked the house for the third time, my husband and I were put in a line in a forest with the other families from the house. As they started killing my friends, the soldiers were coming up to us to make sure we didn’t escape. One soldier approached me, I gave him the money I had with me and told him we had money in the house. He pushed me aside, and I saw him going to the other people as I moved backward into the forest. I heard the militia members killing everyone and saying they needed tools to get rid of the bodies. A heavy rain made them leave the forest along with the people at the closest roadblock. I had survived there with my son, but my husband was killed with all the families we were with. Afterwards, I went from house to house and survived in Sahera, Butare with my son.
After Operation Turquoise began, I was still in a village near Butare. A militia member in front of the house where I was hiding stated proudly that he had killed many and was counting the Tutsi remaining in that village. The man of the house I was staying in was a member of the Interahamwe, and he would bring news. A neighbor told me that I was going to be killed next. So, I went to hide in the bushes with another girl from the house. I would hide there during the night while the neighbor woman kept my one-year-old, then return to the house during the day.

The neighbor woman eventually helped me get a Hutu identity card because our brothers were good friends before mine was killed on April 7th. Meanwhile, the RPF was making its way towards Butare, making Hutu militia members flee the surrounding villages and head for Burundi. The militias used this as an opportunity to kill any Tutsi who were flushed out of hiding. The other Tutsi girl and I moved to another house where the lady of the house was Tutsi. Hutu extremists returned to the village to kill any remaining Tutsis and were coming into the house where I was, when we heard heavy gunfire nearby. The extremists left in a hurry. We were in total despair, until the RPF Inkotanyi found us in that house and rescued us.

I believe that we survived for a reason. It is to remind the world that genocide must never happen again. It is to tell the truth about the Genocide Against the Tutsi.

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C. Despite Ferdinand Nahimana’s Pivotal Role in the Bugesera Massacres, French Officials Welcomed Him and Pledged Additional Aid to the Government-Run Media That Had Incited the Violence.

Martres’ reporting about the Bugesera massacres had been unequivocal in one critical respect: it was, he wrote, the government-run national radio that had “ignited the fire” with its broadcasts of the alleged plot to murder prominent Hutu. The man responsible for those broadcasts—and, more pointedly, for the thinly veiled calls to murder in response to reports of a conspiracy he almost certainly knew to be false—was Ferdinand Nahimana.

Nahimana, who would later receive a lengthy prison sentence for inciting genocide and other genocide-related crimes, was the director of l’Office Rwandais d’Information (ORINFOR), the government broadcasting arm and Radio Rwanda’s parent agency. He owed the position to President Habyarimana, who had personally selected him for the directorship in late 1990. It was a powerful perch, as radio was a leading source of information for Rwandans, and Radio Rwanda was then the only station in the country.
It is difficult to overstate the influence of the state-run radio in early 1990s Rwanda. In a country more than half of whose people could not read,\textsuperscript{162} the radio had unequaled reach. “Inexpensive radios are assembled locally and available everywhere,” the US State Department reported in 1992.\textsuperscript{163} MRND, the ruling party—and the only party until political reforms began in 1991\textsuperscript{164}—subsidized radio production, sold discounted radios, and gave radios away.\textsuperscript{165}

The French government had been supporting Radio Rwanda since 1962, a year after the station began broadcasting,\textsuperscript{166} by providing technical and professional training for the station’s staff, as well as experts and advice through France’s Radio Cooperation Office.\textsuperscript{167} This aid constituted one of the earliest forms of French governmental support for the Government of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{168} It helped make Radio Rwanda the most authoritative and widespread source of information in Rwanda, even as the MRND leaned on the station to pump out what a January 1992 US State Department report would describe as “self[s]-serving propaganda.”\textsuperscript{169}

Nahimana had begun his career not in broadcasting, but in academia, earning his doctorate in history at Paris Diderot University.\textsuperscript{170} His dissertation, entitled, “From Lineages to Kingdoms and from Kingdoms to Chiefdoms,” had argued that the Tutsi were not native to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{171} The imprimatur it had received from Paris Diderot, one of the leading academic institutions in France, had turned him into a revered intellectual at home.

Nahimana “was someone who was ready to do everything in order to be rich or to get appointments,” recalled Christophe Mfizi, head of ORINFOR from 1976 to 1990, who had taught Nahimana at the National University of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{172} According to Mfizi, Nahimana, as a young academic, ingratiated himself with Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana’s fearsome brother, Protais Zigiranyirazo, the Akazu power-broker.\textsuperscript{173} Zigiranyirazo, according to Mfizi, became an important patron for Nahimana, who, in turn, showed his fealty by faithfully promoting what Mfizi termed the “politique zédienne”—the systematized corruption that served primarily to funnel money to Zigiranyirazo and his close associates in the Akazu (or “Network Zero,” as Mfizi called it).\textsuperscript{174} Mfizi said it was Zigiranyirazo and his cronies who, in 1990, encouraged President Habyarimana to tap Nahimana to replace Mfizi as director of ORINFOR, where Nahimana proceeded to stoke ethnic tensions.\textsuperscript{175}

It was Nahimana’s decision, on 3 March 1992, to broadcast the false allegations that the Parti Libéral was an arm of the RPF and was planning to assassinate prominent Hutus.\textsuperscript{176} His employees suspected that the letter giving rise to those allegations was false and urged him not to air reports about it, let alone refer to it in such inflammatory language.\textsuperscript{177} Nahimana went ahead with the broadcasts anyway.

By the time of Nahimana’s visit to Paris later in March 1992, Nahimana’s responsibility for the violence in Bugesera had, to some extent, become public knowledge. On 10 March 1992, a group of five Rwandan human rights groups issued a statement condemning the national radio and demanding that authorities dismiss Nahimana “for his obvious complicity in the fascist and partisan media campaign that triggered the violence at Bugesera.”\textsuperscript{178} The MDR echoed this demand in an 11 March press release.\textsuperscript{179} Whether French officials were aware of these statements is unclear. What is certain is that they knew, as Ambassador Martres had reported, that Radio
Rwanda’s broadcasts sparked the violence, and that Nahimana was the director of the agency responsible for Radio Rwanda.

Nahimana nevertheless appears to have encountered no resistance during his March 1992 visit to France. In fact, the opposite occurred. After returning to Rwanda, Nahimana wrote to President Habyarimana that he had met with a French Ministry of Cooperation official, who had “reaffirmed that France is always ready to help us set up a national television. To this end, a Rwandan television dossier will be submitted for approval to the [French Ministry of Cooperation’s] Assistance and Cooperation Fund . . . which will meet at the beginning of June 1992.”

France made good on its offer, in the end. In December 1992, a Rwandan government delegation once again met with Ministry of Cooperation officials, who told the delegation that France was ready to step up its support in the form of close to 1.2 million French francs, approximately $225,000 at the time.

“It is not a surprise to me that Nahimana went to France in March 1992 even though French officials knew that he was behind the massacres in Bugesera,” Mfizi said. “The French Ambassador to Rwanda, Mr. Martres, seemed very close to extremists; once, in 1992, Martres received a delegation of CDR members in the embassy. I wrote him a letter saying I was shocked by that visit.”


Following the Bugesera massacres, the opposition parties and Western diplomats, led by Belgian Ambassador Swinnen, argued it was more necessary than ever for President Habyarimana to relax the MRND’s grip on power and install a true “coalition government.” They had a hard time persuading Habyarimana. He maintained that the current cabinet was sufficiently pluralistic, even though the MRND controlled 15 seats, and the opposition held only two seats. The pressure, though, ultimately proved too much for Habyarimana. On 2 April 1992, he agreed to replace MRND Prime Minister Nsanzimana with the opposition parties’ preferred candidate, Dismas Nsengiyaremye of the MDR. The ensuing cabinet reshuffle in mid-April left the president’s party with just nine out of 19 cabinet seats.

The ministers of this new coalition government lost no time pursuing some long-sought reforms. For example, Education Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate affiliated with the MDR, did away with the “policy of equilibrium” that had allowed the government to consider a candidate’s ethnicity and regional origin in awarding educational opportunities, and replaced it with an exam. Soon, too, new préfets (regional governors) drawn from the opposition supplanted the MRND faithful who had abused their power.

Pluralism, though, brought neither peace nor stability. On the contrary, the weeks after the April 1992 cabinet reshuffle saw a marked uptick in violence—in Kigali especially, but not exclusively. On 25 April, for example, a bomb exploded in front of a newspaper counter at the bus station in the center of Kigali, seriously injuring six people, two of whom had to have their
legs amputated.\textsuperscript{193} On 1 May, a landmine blew up a van outside of a crowded shopping center in Ruhango, reportedly killing 17 people and wounding 13 more.\textsuperscript{194} A few days later, a bomb blew apart a restaurant in a Butare hotel, tearing off the roof and injuring 30 people.\textsuperscript{195}

Uwilingiyimana, the new education minister and a member of the MDR party, would herself become a victim of the country’s deteriorating security situation on 7 May 1992, when, not long after sundown, a band of roughly two dozen thugs stormed into her house in Kigali.\textsuperscript{196} The men, armed with machetes and grenades, forced her to hand over whatever cash she had, then clubbed her in the head.\textsuperscript{197} After just a few minutes, they ran off with the money, some clothes they snatched from her wardrobe, and an assortment of blankets and bedsheets.\textsuperscript{198}

Uwilingiyimana would suffer far worse before the war’s end. Two years later, in April 1994, just hours after President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down, a group of Rwandan Presidential Guard soldiers would track down and murder her and her husband, cementing her legacy as one of the first casualties of the Genocide.\textsuperscript{199} Though, of course, she could not have known in May 1992 what was to come, she understood immediately that the perpetrators behind the armed robbery at her Kigali home had targeted her for political reasons.\textsuperscript{200} “Unless my memory is not good, I think that so far we have never seen such an attack on an individual from the MRND party,” she remarked to a reporter after the attack.\textsuperscript{201} In the interview, she recalled that the neighbors who rushed over to the house just after the mob left had wanted to know why none of the gendarmes who had been patrolling the neighborhood that night had come to her aid.\textsuperscript{202}

There was general agreement that many of the attacks in the interior of the country, outside of the combat zone, in mid-1992 constituted a form of terrorism, but little agreement as to who bore responsibility for them. The RPF blamed the Interahamwe\textsuperscript{203} while, according to the Belgian paper \textit{Le Soir}, the Rwandan people felt the Army was to blame:

The Rwandan Army has indeed gone from 5,000 fairly professional soldiers to 35,000 hastily trained men, attracted by the pay and the prospect of receiving weapons. Already today, these makeshift soldiers represent, like their Zairian counterparts, a great source of insecurity: The population blames them for the attacks, acts of terrorism and banditry that have multiplied in recent weeks.\textsuperscript{204}

French officials, perhaps unsurprisingly, attributed the surge in violence, in large part, to the RPF and its sympathizers.\textsuperscript{205} A confidential French defense memo indicated that the FAR had shared with French officers a number of messages it had purportedly intercepted from the RPF, which, according to the memo, confirmed suspicions that “the RPF has used terrorist methods for several months at the expense of civilian populations neighboring the combat zone in the north of the country.”\textsuperscript{206} To the French officers’ apparent surprise, though, the messages also indicated that Rwandans on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum—anti-Tutsi extremists with the newly formed Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) party—were using those same methods in a parallel campaign to “destabilize” the Habyarimana government, which, in the CDR’s view, had become too sympathetic to Tutsi.\textsuperscript{207} In one message, the RPF supposedly called off a plan to stir up ethnic tensions in a girls’ school in Gisenyi after learning that CDR members had already concocted an identical scheme involving the same school.\textsuperscript{208} “[O]nce again,” the French memo concluded, “we run into the feeling—incomprehensible to our Western sensibilities—that there is
collusion, or at the very least a coincidence of interests, between the inner circle surrounding the
president, the ‘Akazu,’ and those from Uganda who have sworn to achieve [the regime’s] undoing.”

When General Varret, the head of the French Military Cooperation Mission, met with
Rwandan authorities in Kigali in May 1992, he spoke of the country’s deepening instability as if
it were a problem the Habyarimana administration was making a good-faith effort to mitigate, as
opposed to a crisis the regime was actively making worse. Varret, according to a Rwandan
Defense Ministry memo, spoke approvingly of the government’s transition toward multi-party
democracy: “He added that it is this reason that justifies their support for our country. He also
added that France will not let us down in these difficult times that our country is going through.”

Col. Rene Galinié, who accompanied Varret on the trip, offered congratulations of his own
while chatting with a Defense Ministry official at a cocktail hour reception at the Méridien hotel
on 9 May. Galinié, who, less than a year earlier, had been France’s defense attaché in Kigali,
said Rwanda was lucky—it was the first country in the region to “succeed” at multiparty
democracy. As such, he said, it could count on European countries and international
organizations to offer “a lot of help.” This assistance, though, would not be unconditional, he
warned: “[I]f certain persons manage to torpedo this democracy, as is happening in Togo [where
forces loyal to the sitting dictator were undermining democratic transition—ed.] the French will
leave.”

The French government, however, would remain committed to supporting the Rwandan
military all through the turbulent season that followed Varret’s visit. Notably, the DAMI Panda,
which, as of May 1992, had trained nine of the Rwandan Army’s 29 active battalions, saw its
ranks increased from 30 to 45 officers. In the months ahead, the DAMI officers would train
many of the FAR platoons leading the charge at the front, prompting one Rwandan military official
to write: “For the time being, the DAMI remains of paramount importance to us as long as the war
persists in our country.”

Extremists, meanwhile, including those with connections to the Rwandan government,
continued to showcase their opposition to peace and democracy. Between May 28 and May 30,
members of the MRND and Interahamwe massed in front of the Prime Minister’s Office in
Kigali. Their protest, led by Interahamwe president Robert Kajuga, was meant to condemn
alleged attacks against the Interahamwe by members of the Parti Libéral, one of the opposition
parties. In a speech, Kajuga warned that the MRND would have to “use all means possible to
defend themselves,” if its complaints were ignored. A slew of MRND ministers seconded his
remarks and rained calumny on the opposition. A subsequent MRND press release called for
the dissolution of the PL and the arrest of its leader, Justin Mugenzi.

The MRND/Interahamwe protest may have had another target: a new round of peace talks
taking place at that same moment in Brussels between the RPF and representatives from three
opposition political parties (MDR, PL, PSD) who were not formally representing the Rwandan
government. The late May 1992 talks in Brussels may have represented a unique opportunity for
peace in Rwanda because, as a Belgian newspaper observed, they enabled the warring parties to
make concessions without losing face: the RPF could argue that it was making concessions to the
opposition, not the Habyarimana regime, and the Habyarimana regime could protect itself by claiming the inverse, namely that it did not bear responsibility for the concessions from its side. According to MDR Chairman Faustin Twagiramungu, the two sides at the talks shared the goal of removing the “dictator.”

“[P]eace without humiliation, where there would be no winners or losers,” was how the delegation from the opposition parties put it. According to MDR Chairman Faustin Twagiramungu, the two sides at the talks shared the goal of removing the “dictator,” but they differed on the means of achieving that goal, with PL Chairman Mugenzi speaking for the delegation in saying that it “condemn[s] the use of violence.”

Habyarimana was later reported to have condemned the talks in Brussels and “those who fell into the enemy’s trap” by agreeing to them. Meanwhile, the Interahamwe, who were on the streets of Kigali protesting the new multiparty government, attacked Charles Karemera, a high-ranking PSD member, provoking clashes between the Interahamwe and supporters of the former opposition parties, leaving seven dead and 20 injured.

Elements of the Rwandan Army rioted, too, attacking civilians and pillaging stores in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, and elsewhere. The chaos ultimately left about 30 people dead. News reports indicated the riots began after MDR Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye announced that “peace [was] to come,” and so was the demobilization of many FAR members. However, Le Soir, the Belgian newspaper, noted there was speculation that some unspecified party (presumably, Habyarimana’s supporters in the military) had orchestrated the violence to delegitimize the coalition government and its negotiations with the RPF.


Whatever the nature and scale of this attack, which the post has not been able to evaluate yet, it appears to me in any event necessary to reinforce the Noroit detachment.


Amid the tumult, the RPF launched a major offensive—its largest since the January 1991 attack on Ruhengeri. In the early morning of 5 June 1992, RPF forces pushed into Byumba province, briefly taking Byumba town, the logistical base for government forces in the area, located approximately 19 miles from the border and only 25 miles north of Kigali along a main road. The goal, as RPF army officers have since explained, was not to capture Byumba, but to attack it and retreat—which, in fact, is what the RPF forces did. “We had moved into a phase of a propaganda war, and the objective was not to seize territory,” Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, then an intelligence officer in the RPF’s Army, has said. “We were trying to seize equipment and break morale, which would help create leverage for the RPF at the negotiations table.”

The attack highlighted how the two sides’ fortunes had changed since the start of the conflict. While the RPF military had increased its numbers and had a solidified leadership and chain of command, the FAR was showing signs of stress. The FAR had tried and failed several times in April 1992 to reconquer sections of Mutara where the RPF was firmly ensconced. Rwandan authorities had been quick to blame these failures on a lack of firepower and claimed to
need more mortars. Colonel Cussac, though, said the FAR lacked courage and drive. He also said its commanders were employing the wrong tactics and ignoring the advice of their French military cooperants.

In Cussac’s view, the FAR at that moment—and its elite para-commando battalion, in particular—was worn out. The para-commando battalion had been deployed in virtually every major battle since the start of the war—“too often,” in Cussac’s opinion. As of May 1992, he noted, no more than 120 of the battalion’s 500 soldiers were fit and available for combat. “The rest,” he wrote, “are sick or . . . absent.” (Ambassador Martres would later describe the FAR, more generally, as “increasingly demoralized,” and he would even go so far as to question whether Rwandan soldiers might pose a greater threat to the security of French expatriates than the RPF did.)

Almost as soon as the RPF launched its 5 June offensive in Byumba, President Habyarimana called Ambassador Martres to report the attack and to request that France send “a second company . . . immediately to Kigali to cover the town and the airport.” Martres was apparently of the opinion that France should send more troops regardless of the situation, writing a cable to Paris that “[w]hatever the nature and scale of this attack, which the post has not been able to evaluate yet, it appears to me in any event necessary to reinforce the Noroit detachment.” Martres’ suggestion had immediate effect: France deployed a second Noroit company of 150 troops to Rwanda in the evening of 5 June/morning of 6 June, increasing the Noroit presence once more to two companies. (As a reminder, France had withdrawn one of the two Noroit companies in December 1990 because it was needed in the Persian Gulf.)

By the time French troops arrived in Byumba town on the afternoon of 6 June, the RPF forces had already withdrawn. In a 7 June cable to Paris, Martres appeared to question whether Habyarimana had misled him:

As with the taking of Ruhengeri in January 1991, that of Byumba showed . . . exaggerations more or less calculated to raise the concern and support of Western countries [that are] friends of Rwanda. There was no massive attack by the Ugandan Army, as President Habyarimana had told me . . . nor a massive invasion as the Minister of Defense had suggested.

The Byumba offensive precipitated a major shake-up in the Rwandan armed forces. Among the officers axed on 9 June, just four days after the offensive, were the heads of the Army and national Gendarmerie, both Akazu members and notorious anti-Tutsi hardliners: Col. Laurent Serubuga, who had succeeded Habyarimana as head of the Army in December 1991, and who, Martres would tell the MIP, had welcomed the RPF military offensive in 1990 because it provided a pretext for carrying out anti-Tutsi violence; and Col. Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita, the chief of staff of the Gendarmerie, who had alarmed Jean Varret with his talk of “liquidat[ing]” the Tutsi in December 1990. (Also significant, Théoneste Bagosora, who would go on to become one of the primary architects of the Genocide, was pulled from his role as head of Camp Kanombe and assigned to a position as the Cabinet director in the Ministry of Defense, essentially the second in command in the department.) Martres and Cussac, in a cable to Paris, noted that the official reason for the replacement of Serubuga and Rwagafilita was a forced retirement on account of
age, although other observers would claim that Habyarimana had dismissed the officers for incompetence or because they could not be trusted.

US Ambassador Robert Flaten was pleased with the reorganization: “This was a very important step,” he wrote in a cable the day after the announcement. As long as I have been here I have heard the names of Rwagafilita, Serubuga and [Elie] Sagatwa [President Habyarimana’s private secretary—ed.] as the eminence grises behind all of the evils of this Habyarimana administration. The removal of two of them will prove to many Rwandans that this government of transition is now functioning. Flaten had high hopes for Rwagafilita’s successor, Col. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, who, he said, was “well respected in and out of the armed forces, and generally considered to not have used his positions of power to enrich himself.” He was less sure about Serubuga’s replacement, Col. Deogratias Nsabimana. The FAR’s new chief of staff, Flaten wrote, was known to be “effective and [have] earned the respect of his soldiers,” but also “known as a man who gives no quarter, believed to have tortured prisoners to death and instituted summary executions on the battlefield.”

Indeed, Nsabimana would prove before long that he was no reformer. In September 1992, he ordered Rwandan Army commanders to circulate among their troops an explosive document—one that defined the FAR’s “main enemy” not as the RPF military, but as “the Tutsi.”

F. Despite Press Criticism Aimed at French Military Engagement in Rwanda, Following the Byumba Offensive, French Leaders Provided New Weaponry and Training to the FAR and, by Several Accounts, Engaged Directly in the Fight.

[A] commanding officer cannot avoid responsibility because he did not shoot a bullet. There is training, there is preparation, mentoring, advising people—the actual battle is the last aspect.

– Charles Kayonga, RPF Battalion Commander

Publicly, throughout 1992, France continued to claim its troops were in Rwanda for humanitarian purposes and for the security of expatriates. A spokesperson for the Quai d’Orsay said that France’s sole goal was “to help the country [Rwanda] move towards democracy.” The RPF presented a different take in a 9 June 1992 press release, “The French Military Guarantor of the MRND Regime,” that began, “The humanitarian justification for the French military presence in Rwanda has increasingly proven to be a decoy.” Two days later, in an article in the French paper Libération, reporter Stephen Smith offered reasons to believe the RPF was right. Smith observed that the recent deployment of additional French troops had taken place in the “utmost secrecy.” He also reported on several ammunition deliveries to Rwanda from Châteauroux airport in central France, and he added that the French military had proven willing to “deduct” ammunition from its own stock when French arms supplier Thomson-Brandt could not fill an order for Rwanda.

Smith was not the only French journalist to criticize France’s intervention in Rwanda. In the last week of June 1992, Jean-François Dupaquier published a scathing article in the French weekly magazine L’Événement du Jeudi titled, “France at the Bedside of African Fascism.”
Dupaquier’s article ticked off the history and resurgence in Rwanda of anti-Tutsi repression and slaughter: “extermination of some two hundred and fifty thousand Tutsi between 1960 and 1973, pushing half a million others to the roads of exile”; the renewal of widespread killings in a “Cambodian-style scenario”; the racist rants in Kangura, reminiscent of Nazi newspapers, that appealed to “Hutu fanatics of the ‘final solution’”; the failure of Habyarimana (referred to as a good friend of President Mitterrand and his son) to “punish the fanatical groups who have sworn to bring about the total extermination of the 14% of Tutsi ‘remaining’”; government use of torture during interrogations; and the role of Radio Rwanda in inciting the massacres in Bugesera. On this last point, Dupaquier reported that French soldiers protected Radio Rwanda, and that ORINFOR director Ferdinand Nahimana had not explained or apologized for the radio’s role in provoking the Bugesera violence.

Dupaquier then turned his analysis to French support of the regime:

Most astonishing is the role of the French military in Rwanda. . . . François Mitterrand wants above all to prevent the fall of his old friend, Juvénal Habyarimana . . . . [T]he French intervention corps of about two hundred men has thus gone from having a “humanitarian” role to that of a second Presidential Guard. The French soldiers have been instructed to show themselves as much as possible in the streets of Kigali and to police the high places of power: the presidency, the airport, [and] the French embassy.

Among the allegations that made their way into both Dupaquier’s and Smith’s reports was one—previously the subject of some conjecture in Rwanda—that a French officer had secretly been leading the FAR’s war against the RPF Army. A substantially similar claim had arisen in February 1992, when press outlets obtained from the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs a letter purportedly informing French embassy officials that Lieutenant-Colonel Gilles Chollet, then the commander of DAMI Panda, had been named a military adviser to both President Habyarimana and Col. Serubuga, the then-chief of staff of the Rwandan Army. Rwandan opposition political parties pounced on the letter, with the People’s Union Party calling Chollet the new “strong man of the regime,” and the MDR wailing in a press release: “It’s serious. . . . Very serious! . . . Today our troops are under the command of a Frenchman.” An editorial in Kangura, a prominent opposition newspaper, drew parallels to Rwanda’s colonial past—save that this time, the colonial power exercising control over Rwanda was France, rather than Belgium.

The Quai d’Orsay had promptly denied the reports of Chollet’s advisory position, without ever mentioning that another French officer, Colonel Gilbert Canovas, had served as an advisor to senior leaders of the FAR for the first nine months of the war. (The MIP would later echo the Quai d’Orsay’s denial: Chollet, it wrote, “had never, unlike Colonel Gilbert Canovas, been instructed to act in an advisory role to the Rwandan Head of State or to the chief of staff to the Rwandan Army.”) It would not be long, though, before the French government did, in fact, assign an officer to advise the FAR chief of staff. A new deputy defense attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin, took on this role in mid-April 1992. Maurin’s orders were to advise Colonel Serubuga, then the top official in the Rwandan army, “on everything concerning the conduct of operations,” as well as on “the preparation and training of the Rwandan armed
forces."²⁸⁶ A draft letter of assignment instructed him to approach his task with “great discretion.”²⁸⁷

Smith, in his June 1992 article in Libération, wrote that Lt. Col. Maurin was no mere advisor—rather, he wrote, Maurin now “decides, de facto, on the Rwandan Army’s war strategies.”²⁸⁸ Similarly, Dupaquier asked, “How far can the involvement of the French Army in Rwanda go? Very far, if we observe that Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Jacques Maurin, officially deputy to the military attaché, is in reality the head of the état-major of the Rwandan Army, in charge of supervising a war [that is] less and less military, and increasingly uncivil.”²⁸⁹

General Varret, the head of the French Military Cooperation Mission, had opposed Maurin’s appointment. “Do we need to get more involved in this conflict when our military presence is already misunderstood and misinterpreted?” Varret wrote in an April 1992 note. Varret thought not. His note argued it was inadvisable “to assign a military cooperant to an army commanded by a chief of staff [i.e., Colonel Serubuga] whose methods we cannot endorse.”²⁹⁰

While, officially, Maurin’s role consisted of “discreetly advising the Chief of Staff of the FAR on everything concerning the conduct of operations, but also the preparation and training of the Rwandan armed forces (FAR),” the full scope of Lt. Col. Maurin’s work with the FAR, in practice, remains unclear.²⁹¹ (Maurin’s testimony to the MIP is unavailable to the public.) The French government, in any event, paid no heed to Smith’s and Dupaquier’s criticisms. The French government’s response to the Byumba offensive was to fortify its military assistance to the FAR, which was then trying to push back the RPF forces that continued to hold much of the area north of Byumba.²⁹² According to ex-FAR officer and current Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) Brigadier General Evariste Murenzi, “it was after the RPF assault on Byumba in June 1992, when they [the RPF] showed their military superiority over the Rwandan Armed Forces, that the French became resolutely engaged.”²⁹³ France promptly integrated the DAMI and Noroît forces into a single unit under the authority of a commander of operations, Colonel Jacques Rosier, who would lead French efforts to help the FAR counter the RPF military’s Byumba offensive.²⁹⁴

Col. Rosier was a decorated officer—a 1985 recipient of the Legion of Honor, France’s highest order of merit—with decades of military experience, much of it in Africa.²⁹⁵ He had, in that time, participated in several military interventions on the continent, including in Chad, where from 1969 to 1972 France helped Chadian dictator François Tombalbaye fend off an insurgency.²⁹⁶ Rosier later led a detachment in the Central African Republic during a controversial 1979 French intervention that led to the ouster of the country’s self-proclaimed emperor, Jean-Bedel Bokassa.²⁹⁷ Described years later as “legend in the French Army,”²⁹⁸ Rosier would go on to play a significant role in Rwanda, including as a French special forces commander during Operation Turquoise,²⁹⁹ the ostensibly “humanitarian” operation France launched more than two months into the Genocide.

Between 11 and 16 June 1992, Col. Rosier and Col. Dominique Delort conducted a French military mission to evaluate the FAR’s capabilities.³⁰⁰ (Delort, like Rosier, had served in Chad against the insurgency there.)³⁰¹ According to an interview given by Col. Rosier, “[i]t emerged, above all, from this mission that the FAR did not have sufficient firepower to stop the RPA offensives, sufficient reserves of maneuver to counter-attack in the various sectors and a management team that was equal to the situation.”³⁰² To address the first of these issues, Col.
Cussac, the French military attaché, informed the new head of the FAR, Déogratias Nsabimana, on 20 June 1992 that the French would deliver five 105 mm cannons, along with 2,400 shells, to Kigali on 24 June (with another 300 shells authorized to be delivered). The RPF soldiers would nickname these powerful new weapons “dimba hasi” (Kinyarwanda for “earth shaker”).

Cussac told Nsabimana that France intended to train FAR soldiers on the 105 mm howitzer “in the Byumba region so as to deal with real targets on the field.” It appears, though, that French officials soon had second thoughts about this plan. On 22 June, the FAR was informed that the decision to allow the French to train them in the combat zone was “amended by a message from Paris, which prohibits the use of these 105 mm cannons in the combat zone for the time being.” Displeased, Col. Nsabimana asked Defense Minister Gasana to intervene with the French, “so that training can take place in the combat zone where . . . [it] will positively impact the morale of our men.” Nsabimana was clear about his intentions, explaining to French officers on 25 June that he wanted to put the battery to use soon, “within the context of the current fighting in the BYUMBA OPS sector.”

Colonels Rosier and Delort promptly returned to Rwanda, where, as Rosier would later say, their top priority “was to set up in the shortest possible time a battery of 105s given by France and operated by the FAR.” To help him accomplish this objective, France sent 28 artillery specialists from the 35th Artillery Parachute Regiment to train Rwandan troops to use the new weapons, some of the time at an “artillery school” at Kanombe Camp.

The pressure to expedite the cannons’ deployment on the battlefield spurred Col. Delort to propose a new concept—what he termed “semi-direct” aid to the FAR. Acknowledging that it would take some time before FAR soldiers would be ready to fire the new weapons, Delort wrote to Paris on 26 June: “In a restricted circle, we are studying the possibility of semi-direct actions, i.e. FR/RW [French/Rwandan] battery, with the FR personnel being the least visible but present.” The Duclert Commission discussed documents indicating that such “semi-direct actions” did, in fact, occur in the weeks that followed.

Rosiier has said that, on 8 July 1992, “doubled by the French cadres, the Rwandan battery carried out its first firing in the Byumba sector. We were only at the shooting-exercise stage, but the level was progressing rapidly because every day the battery was in one of the three operational sectors.” He said the French cooperants—who, at one point, would set up a second battery of 122 mm howitzers provided by Egypt—continued to train the Rwandan troops in the field until 1 August 1992, by which time the Rwandan soldiers were “completely autonomous.”

The 105 mm cannons—weapons never used before by the Rwandan Army—surprised and alarmed RPF troops, who soon had to contend with new types of injuries, in addition to the psychological impact of realizing that the FAR had new and substantial reinforcement. “The deployment of the 105 mm guns had a demoralizing effect because they were much bigger than what we had,” Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, then an intelligence officer in the RPF’s Army, said. “They were fired from long range, they pinned us down in the trenches. You didn’t know when you were going to get out.” Charles Kayonga (who was a commander in the RPF’s Army in 1992) said he knew it was French soldiers directing the use of these weapons because communication equipment captured by RPF forces revealed French soldiers expressing
disappointment that the FAR was not taking advantage of the French artillery support. “Ils sont faible [they are weak],” the French were saying over the radio, comprehensible to the RPF troops thanks to its Francophone soldiers who had joined from exile in Burundi and Congo.318

The dimba hasi made a similar impression on James Kabarebe, then the commander of the 101st battalion based in Mukarange (about 15 kilometers north of Byumba). According to his account, a few weeks after the start of fighting in Byumba, RPF troops learned that the French had returned to the field with enough 105 mm artillery ammunition to bomb them all day and night for two or three weeks.319 “The noise alone from the 105 mm was terrible,” he said.320 The FAR opened fire on the 105 mm around 6 a.m., and at around 4 p.m. French soldiers could be heard over the radio commanding the FAR to “avance [advance].”321 But because RPF forces had dug trenches, its forces were not incapacitated by the shelling.322 When the FAR advanced their attack on foot, the RPF soldiers waited until the FAR troops were about 20 meters away from their trenches to defend their positions.323 The French could be heard on the radio calling the FAR “cowards,” “useless,” saying they would not win this war if they could not defeat the RPF troops after such heavy shelling.324

One French officer who served in Rwanda that summer has since written that, while French troops managed throughout the war to avoid direct combat with the RPF, “we were hitting them copiously with 105 mm shells (and even 122 mm [shells] from Egypt).”325 A number of ex-FAR soldiers have attested that it was French soldiers who manned the 105 mm cannons at Byumba.326 In contrast, former French ambassador to Rwanda George Martres testified in front of the French Senate that “French forces of the Noroît detachment had not taken part in any engagement,” and further that “[o]ur technical assistants have not taken part in combat in the sense that they have not directly fought.”327 Whether or not French troops were firing the cannons, they trained and advised the FAR soldiers operating the artillery in the field. As Kayonga observed recently, a “commanding officer cannot avoid responsibility because he did not shoot a bullet. There is training, there is preparation, mentoring, advising people—the actual battle is the last aspect.”328

There were no contemporaneous news reports in France on this intervention. It did not even appear in a 14 July 1992 article in Libération written by Stephen Smith, who one month earlier, in a separate article, had revealed the 5 June Noroît deployment (see discussion above). Apparently unaware that France had supplied the 105 mm howitzers to Rwanda, Smith nevertheless wrote in his 14 July piece, “Officially, the purpose of French military presence is only ‘the protection and security of foreigners.’ However, the constant support of Paris, since the beginning of the Rwandan civil war, makes the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana seem like a ‘protectorate’ of the Élysée.”329
G. Following a July 1992 Ceasefire Agreement, French Authorities Supplied More Weapons to the FAR and Took Measures to Ensure the DAMI “Panda” Advisors Would Not Be Forced to Leave Rwanda.

In keeping with your orders, the Army chief of staff continues its logistical aid in order to avoid a brutal destabilization of the Rwandan Army.330


With talks between the RPF and the Rwandan government set to commence in Arusha, Tanzania in July 1992, President Mitterrand’s top military advisor, General Christian Quesnot, warned the president that “the RPF will probably try to reach a maximal territorial guarantee before” the negotiations.331 Quesnot, by this time, had been advising Mitterrand on Rwanda matters for a little more than a year. Where, once, in June 1991, he had advised Mitterrand to withdraw Noroit troops, Quesnot had begun, in time, to favor more aggressive action in support of the Rwandan government, and his antipathy toward the RPF was becoming more and more evident.332

Quesnot was a leading voice in the Élysée’s internal debates over Rwanda policy. According to Françoise Carle, an aide to Mitterrand who worked at the Élysée during the Rwanda conflict to archive the French president’s files,333 Quesnot was more involved in Rwanda than either Mitterrand or his chief advisor, Élysée Secretary-General Hubert Védrine.334 Quesnot’s outspokenness had defined him as far back as the 1970s, when, as a relatively junior army commander, he had been part of a group of reformers who openly criticized senior officers for focusing on personal advancement while under-investing in the Army.335 (This made it necessary for Quesnot to rely on political figures for future career advancement.336) Quesnot would later distinguish himself for his ingenuity and daring,337 as well as his readiness to work outside the lines. Reflecting, years later, on his service in anti-terrorism operations in Chad and Lebanon in the late 1970s and early 1980s, he acknowledged: “I defended French interests . . . using methods that morality condemns, but efficiency recommends.”338

Quesnot’s recommendation to Mitterrand on 1 July 1992, while the FAR was still reeling from the surprise attack in Byumba, was to offer “temporary operational assistance of a few advisers to the staffs as well as to the units recently equipped with the new equipment”—subject “to the utmost discretion and with the prior agreement, on a case by case basis, of the [French] état-major des Armées.”339 He noted that existing directives “exclude[d] all direct French participation in the confrontations,” but questioned whether Mitterrand might reconsider that position in light of recent events: “The previous strict directives could also be confirmed, but then there would be no guarantee that the Rwandan forces, though experienced, would hold under RPF pressure until 10 July [when peace talks were due to start in Arusha—ed.]. Could you let me know your decision?”340

At the top of Quesnot’s 1 July 1992 note, Mitterrand replied in handwriting: “I saw Mr. Joxe [Minister of Defense].”341 What Mitterrand decided or communicated to the minister of defense is unknown, but the lack of public information on this topic would be in keeping with the “utmost discretion” advised by Quesnot.
The FAR, in any case, did manage to hold its ground until representatives from the two sides met for talks later that month in Arusha. Those talks culminated on 12 July 1992 with the adoption of a cease-fire agreement, which called for the two sides to stop fighting one week later, on 19 July, and to recommit themselves to the terms of an earlier cease-fire agreement they had signed in March 1991 in N’Sele, Zaire. In so doing, the government and the RPF promised, once again, to suspend the delivery of “supplies of ammunition and . . . weaponry to the field.” They further agreed, as they had at N’Sele, that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) would deploy observers to Rwanda to monitor the cease-fire, and that this deployment would trigger “the withdrawal of all foreign troops . . . except for Military Officers serving in Rwanda under bilateral Cooperation Agreements.” The agreement did not mention France by name, but the implications for French troops were clear: if, as envisioned, the OAU were to dispatch observers to Rwanda, only a small number of French military cooperants—essentially, the 20 or so advisors and technical assistants working with Rwandan armed forces through the French Military Assistance Mission (MAM)—would be permitted to stay. Other French troops, including the Noroit detachment and DAMI Panda advisors, would be expected to leave.

Quesnot wrote to Mitterrand that he saw the 12 July 1992 cease-fire agreement as no more than a delaying tactic by “Ugandan-RPF forces . . . to reinforce and develop their offensive.” He conceded that even “French aid cannot reverse the balance of power between the powerful Ugandan Army and what remains of the Rwandan army after 21 months of fighting. Only an exceptional and rapid diplomatic pressure on the Ugandan president Museveni would be likely to stop the ongoing offensive against Rwanda.”

Quesnot doubted Museveni’s commitment to the peace process. “[G]iven the psychological profile of the Ugandan president,” Quesnot wrote, “it’s feared that . . . perceiving the rise in international hostility against his operation, he may be tempted to abruptly accelerate his offensive in order to outpace the peace process expected in Arusha.” As a result, Quesnot concluded, “In keeping with your orders, the Army chief of staff continues its logistical aid in order to avoid a brutal destabilization of the Rwandan Army.”

France’s policy during this period may have been best summarized by a Rwandan Gendarmerie officer, who, after sitting through a September 1992 meeting between a French Army intelligence officer, was put in mind of a Latin adage: “Si vis pacem, para bellum”—if you want peace, prepare for war. The French intelligence officer, speaking for himself, if not necessarily for the whole of the French government, said he had no doubt of the Rwandan government’s commitment to the peace process, “but he castigated the maximalist position of the RPF delegation during the Arusha negotiations.” What France wanted, the Gendarmerie officer’s memo suggested, was to help the FAR mount enough of a defense on the battlefield to convince RPF leaders to pin their hopes on the Arusha process, and to settle for less than they were currently demanding: “At the moment when the Inkotanyi realize that our Army has regained its power and fury, the Negotiations will succeed.”

The French government did not let the July 1992 cease-fire agreement imperil its support for the Rwandan military. Though the agreement had expressly precluded the delivery of “supplies of ammunition and . . . weaponry to the field,” France continued to ship weapons to the FAR. On 6 August 1992, a French Defense Ministry official sent the French Foreign Ministry a note
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seeking guidance on what to do about a planned transfer of “2,000 shells of 105 mm and 20 machine guns of 12.7 mm, with 32,400 cartridges.” One week later, the Defense Ministry—with the blessing of the Foreign Ministry—authorized the military to transfer those munitions. According to the MIP, the French government provided 23.4 million French francs (roughly $4.3 million) in weapons and ammunition to Rwanda in 1992. Of this, substantially more than half was provided free of charge. These figures represented a substantial increase from 1990 and 1991. In addition, the French government authorized arms sales by French companies to the Rwandan government.

Rwandan authorities, meanwhile, proved determined to find a work-around for another of the July 1992 cease-fire agreement’s provisions: the one requiring the withdrawal of foreign troops upon the deployment of an OAU observer force to monitor the cease-fire. The agreement, as Rwandan officials were well aware, had made an exception for “military cooperants” who “are in Rwanda as a result of bilateral Cooperation Agreements,” which promised to shield a limited number of French military personnel—specifically, the roughly 20 MAM advisors and technical assistants whose presence in Rwanda was authorized under the 1975 Franco-Rwandan Military Technical Assistance Agreement (MTAA). These cooperants would be allowed to stay. It was understood, though, that the exception did not cover the Noroît detachment and the DAMI “Panda” advisors, because the MTAA—which, strictly speaking, authorized French assistance only to the Rwandan Gendarmerie—did not apply to them.

The Rwandan authorities’ solution to this problem was to ask the French government to amend the MTAA. France agreed. On 26 August 1992, the two countries amended the MTAA to authorize French assistance not only to the Gendarmerie, but to the “Rwandan Armed Forces,” more broadly. The amendment was made with DAMI “Panda” particularly in mind, with a French Ministry of Cooperation official explaining: “The uncertainty weighing on the evolution of the Rwandan situation inclines the Army general staff to consider the continued presence of the DAMI as desirable and could justify granting them the status of military cooperant in order to make it legally possible.” Though the official plainly saw the value in reclassifying the DAMI advisors as technical cooperants so they could remain in Rwanda consistent with the MTAA, he cautioned that this should be done in a way that would “not appear to observers as a maneuver intended to maintain, at all costs, a total French military presence that they will not fail to note as significant.”

H. French Officers Worked Alongside Rwandan Gendarmes at the Kigali-Based Criminal Investigations Center, Despite Allegations That Gendarmes Abused Prisoners There.

In July 1992, France sent four technical advisers to help Rwandan gendarmes conduct criminal investigations at the Centre de recherche criminelle et de documentation (Center for Criminal Research and Documentation, or CRCD), in Kigali. Their arrival had been in the works since May 1992, when General Varret, the head of the French Military Cooperation Mission, agreed to support a plan to help Gendarmerie leaders combat the growing threat of terrorism in Rwanda.

Controversy had stalked the center that summer, as Amnesty International aired allegations that gendarmes had beaten and tortured prisoners at the center, then known as the Fichier Central
Letter writers, spurred on by the organization’s report, urged Rwandan political leaders to stop the abusive treatment of prisoners at the “notorious” facility. One letter told the story of two detainees, both Tutsi, who “were subjected to severe beatings while in Gendarmerie custody in an effort to force them into making false statements meant to incriminate themselves and others.”

The allegations, broadly speaking, were true, according to Liberata Mukagasana, a seasoned judicial police officer who managed to survive the Genocide by keeping her head down in Gendarmerie barracks in Kigali. Mukagasana said that, after the war started in October 1990, the Fichier Central became the scene of many interrogations of suspected “accomplices,” a term that usually just meant the person was Tutsi, or perhaps a journalist from an opposition newspaper. Rwandan gendarmes, Mukagasana said, would tie the person’s hands behind his back and lash his chest with an electric cable. Some were tortured to death.

It was the French, she said, who first proposed changing the center’s name, a bit of public relations legerdemain after the torture allegations became public. Some French officials had pressured the Habyarimana regime to reform its treatment of prisoners. French defense attaché Col. René Galinié, for example, before his departure from Rwanda in June 1991, had urged President Habyarimana to stop the summary execution of prisoners. According to Mukagasana, however, the approach taken by cooperants in the CRCD was more laissez-faire. The French officers knew the Rwandan gendarmes were torturing suspects, but they did not tell the gendarmes to stop it—just to do it somewhere else, when the French advisers were not around to see it.

Gerard Nshimyumuremyi

Gerard was born December 28, 1967. Beginning in 1990, he was a resident of the Kicukiro Commune.

After the invasion, I became increasingly aware of anti-Tutsi racism. It was always there but became much worse. Beginning in primary school, students were asked to identify themselves as Tutsi or Hutu. For high school entrance exams, Tutsi were “not supposed to pass,” and even those possessing high marks were often not allowed to progress. The identification card had both ethnicity and region of birth, and those cards were to be displayed any time one sought official services. Soldiers at roadblocks would also ask for these identification cards. And if you were Tutsi you would have problems, mostly at roadblocks.

From 1990 to 1994, every day you could hear and see the hatred. The French were aware, they could watch people be mistreated at roadblocks, hear the messages on the hate radio about Tutsi being cockroaches and snakes.
I recall seeing French soldiers at roadblocks on my way back into Kigali from Nyanza, now the Southern Province. They had distinctive hats, uniforms, and tricolor badges, and the Rwandan soldiers at the roadblocks spoke French to them. The roadblocks were a fixture of life, dispersed roughly every 20 miles and were mobile, sometimes being a piece of wood, or string, or even a horse. The typical procedure was to have everyone leave the bus, line up single file, and present their IDs. It seemed I had to stop at roadblocks every day from 1992-1993. Not all the roadblocks had French people present, but they were often at the main entrances to Kigali.

Besides being at the roadblocks, the French assisted the Rwandan police. At the end of 1992, I was brought in for questioning after a car bombing at my workplace, PetroRwanda. I was the Transportation Officer at the time, and my coworkers had told the gendarmes to start with me. They suspected I was an RPF collaborator because I was a Tutsi. The gendarmes were accompanied by French officers who were in uniform and speaking French, though I do not know if they were French Gendarmerie officers or soldiers. They took me to the Gendarmerie’s criminology department. I believe that the French officers were there to lend their expertise with police work, as they did in my case. They seemed to be permanently assigned there since they had a desk filled with paperwork. It was clear that the Rwandan gendarmes had a lot of confidence because of the French presence working with them and supporting what they did.

The French could also see the growing presence of the Interahamwe. The Interahamwe were all over Kigali, when you were driving or walking, every day. They could stop you and take your car with impunity. They were harassing, hurting people, and doing all the bad things you could imagine. They would have been visible to the French because they were visible to everyone.

You could tell who was with the Interahamwe because they had their uniforms and weapons. They would have been visible to the French because they were visible to everyone, and present throughout the country. The French were supporting the Habyarimana government even while the Interahamwe were threatening and hurting civilians like me.

I was at home asleep when the plane was shot down. The next day, the Interahamwe started trying to break through the gate to my house. I thought it was my last day. I took my infant son out of the back door and handed him over the fence to my neighbor because I did not want him to die with me. I eventually
escaped, but most of my family were killed by machetes – my mom, my brother, my grandparents.

One day, when I was hiding, the Interahamwe came to find me. At the house where I was, they had chickens. An Interahamwe took one of the chickens, cut it on the neck, and showed me the blood on the blade to show me how sharp the machete was and what it would do to me. Then, they said “let’s go.” Two of them went in front of me with machetes and the one behind had the grenade. As we left, they said to me, “You think you’re hiding? Everyone knows where you are.” They were escorting me to kill me elsewhere. As we walked, I saw people lying dead and naked everywhere on the streets, hacked apart. Eventually, as we were walking, one of them convinced the others to take my car and leave me. That was how they would do it: in the beginning, they would take stuff and then a few days later they would come to kill you. I managed to stay in hiding and ultimately, I was able to reach the RPF. I then lived in a refugee camp in Byumba for two months.

Even today [February 2021] as I drive by some places, I can still see those bodies in my mind, lying hacked apart and in heaps. Other people who do not know the story cannot see them, but they are still clear to me.

The DAMI officers’ presence at the CRCD was a source of comfort for some Rwandan opposition party members, who assumed that, left to its own devices, the regime would corrupt and exploit investigations for political gain. François Nsanzuwera, a prosecutor in Kigali in the early 1990s—and later an Appeals Counsel in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR’s) Office of the Prosecutor—said he worked on cases with the French cooperants in CRCD, and they were “judicious” and did “their job well.” Mukagasana, though, said the French officers delayed or undermined some investigations to protect France’s partners in the Rwandan government. One tactic, she recounted, was for the French officers to question witnesses themselves, then have a young Rwandan gendarme sign the witness statements; the questioning would be quick and perfunctory, but if anyone questioned why the investigation had not been more thorough, the officers could always point a finger at the young gendarme. Documents drafted by the cooperants themselves while serving in Rwanda might resolve questions about their activities. The Government of Rwanda requested such documents from the Government of France in connection with this investigation but received no response.

The CRCD kept lists of the many “accomplices” it arrested. Before the DAMI’s arrival, the list was little more than a scroll of names. According to Mukagasana, the French officers professionalized the operation, advising the gendarmes to collect and compile far more, from fingerprints to addresses to photos. It does not appear that anyone stopped to consider how such a list of people, most of them Tutsi, might, in the wrong hands, be put to grievous misuse.
Mukagasana, who worked in the same office space as the French technical advisors, said that one French officer in particular was unmoved by the suffering many Rwandans had endured during the war. When, for instance, a colleague remarked, with sadness, on a report that 10 Tutsi had been slaughtered in Gisenyi, the French officer was unfazed. “Rwandans kill each other,” he said. “That’s what they do.”


Mukagasana has suggested that her French colleagues engaged in activities even more nefarious than hamstringing criminal investigations. According to her, on Sundays during 1992 and 1993, three of the four French advisors stationed in the CRCD (one of the four always stayed behind in the office) would climb into a Rwandan military land rover to drive from Kigali in the direction of Mutara, the eastern province that was home to both the Akagera nature reserve, with its lions and elephants, and the FAR military camp at Gabiro, where French soldiers trained the FAR, and where the FAR trained Interahamwe between 1992 and 1994. Not coincidentally, on Sundays a white minibus full of Interahamwe leaders traveled in the same direction. According to Mukagasana, her colleagues told her the French soldiers and the Interahamwe were both headed to Mutara with the same mission: to oversee militia training.

The French gendarmes always returned the day they left, and they would later show off safari pictures—week after week, for months, similar pictures of animals. When asked why they went to see the same animals every weekend, the French advisors provided “nonsense” explanations, according to Mukagasana. She recalled that a Rwandan gendarme colleague once refused to provide the French advisors with fuel for their trip to Mutara, presumably to undermine what he perceived to be an ill-advised mission; he soon found himself transferred out of the CRCD.

If Mukagasana’s French colleagues were headed to Mutara, their destination was likely in or near the Gabiro military camp, where numerous witnesses—Rwandan, French, and other nationalities—have testified that French soldiers trained not only FAR soldiers, but also recruits for civilian militias. For example, a Rwandan Army private testified confidentially under the initials “DA” at the ICTR’s Military II trial that toward the end of 1992 he observed French soldiers training Interahamwe in survival techniques near Gabiro. Similarly, Emmanuel Mwumvaneza, a communal councilor in Muvumba commune, witnessed a 1992 meeting between the bourgmestre of Muvumba (Onesphore Rwabukombe, who in 2015 would be sentenced by a German court to life in prison for his role in the Genocide) and four French soldiers with black berets dressed in uniforms similar to the FAR. Three of the four French soldiers had their faces coated in what looked like shoe polish or coal, and the one without a darkened face appeared to be their commander, who went by the name Captain Jacques. After the meeting, the bourgmestre informed Mwumvaneza and the other councilors that French and Rwandan soldiers were to train select civilians in self-defense, and it was up to the councilors to provide civilians to train. Mwumvaneza gathered a group of sixteen, himself included, who boarded buses to Gabiro, where they spent about a month in tents just outside the camp and received firearms training in a valley roughly five kilometers from the camp. According to Mwumvaneza, French soldiers occasionally supervised the trainings delivered by FAR soldiers, with the French supervisors...
drawing circles on paper targets and inspecting the targets to see if the trainees were hitting their marks.397

Paul Rwarakabije, the Rwandan operational commander of the Gendarmerie, explained that militia training took place outside the camps, including Gabiro, to conceal it from rank-and-file FAR soldiers, some of whom were moderate and would have objected to civilian training.398 Only certain soldiers, presumably those known to hold reliably extremist views, were trusted enough to train militia.399 Rwarakabije emphasized that as operational commander of the Gendarmerie, he received written reports every day about operational units, including from gendarmes stationed in Mutara at Ngarama, who had access to Gabiro camp.400 It was, he said, “his job to know what was going on,” and in 1992 and 1993, he received reports of French soldiers participating in militia trainings.401

Consistent with the testimonies of Rwarakabije and Mwumvaneza, human rights researchers Howard Adelman and Astrid Suhrke have cited interviews with diplomats serving in Kigali during this period who reported seeing French officers with Interahamwe.402 Also consistent is an account from Thierry Prunnaud, who in 1992 was a GIGN, a so-called “super-cop,” in Rwanda with the French Military Assistance Mission training members of the Presidential Guard.403 In a 2012 book recounting his experiences in Rwanda, Prunnaud recalled passing a group of French soldiers training one hundred armed Rwandan civilians as he and another GIGN accompanied two other officers (and one officer’s wife) on a drive to Akagera for a weekend trip.404 “There, in Akagera,” the game park which, Prunnaud explained, had been closed to the public to use as a FAR training ground, “the trainers were French soldiers. They must have belonged to the 1st RPIMa or the Legion, which were the only units present in Rwanda at that time.”405

French academic Gérard Prunier speculated before the MIP that the French military had trained militia “without having realized—through stupidity and naivety.”406 But Prunnaud dismissed this hypothesis:

In my opinion, it was neither an error nor a careless mistake. No soldier in the world can mistake a beginner for a man who is already trained and toughened! When you put a rifle in someone’s hands, you can see right away if he knows how to take the rifle apart and put it back together, and then support it. So you necessarily know whether you’re training a civilian or perfecting a soldier. And it’s not the same thing.407

Another French witness, Sylvain Germain, an accountant at the French Cultural Center in Kigali from 1987 to 1994, was at a café bordering a street near work when, around 8 p.m., he saw a group of young Interahamwe disembark from a bush taxi excitedly discussing two weeks of training in a French Army camp.408 Germain did not date the account or say where the training may have occurred, but accounts of French soldiers training militias have included sites and timeframes beyond Gabiro in 1992. For example, Paul Rwarakabije, the Gendarmerie operational commander, has said that he received reports from Gendarmerie stationed in Gisenyi about training of militias in nearby Bigogwe camp, in 1992 and 1993.409 Other witnesses have described militia training closer to Kigali.410
Did French officials know the purpose of the militia they reportedly trained? Col. Cussac’s expression of concern in January 1992 over a program to arm “self-defense militias” in northern Rwanda (as described above) suggests that French officials were well aware of the dangers posed by armed civilians—and that was before militias had massacred Tutsi in Bugesera in March 1992. Paul Rwarakabije summed up his view on the French government’s understanding of the purpose behind training militias: “The French knew everything. From 1993, they had their people in the Presidency, in the Army, in the Gendarmerie. I can confirm that they knew what was going on. The French will deny it now, but they knew.”

French officials have vehemently denied training militias. The MIP dismissed the allegation as “never seriously supported to date,” offering the equivocal denial by Col. Jean-Jacques Maurin that “never, during the état-major meetings he had attended, had there been a reference to the equipping of militias” (leaving the possibility that the trainings took place but were not discussed at état-major meetings). The allegations of French training of militias, however—particularly at Gabiro—cannot be ignored. The French government can and should clarify the matter by disclosing any documents and testimony that would shed light on the truth.

**J. The Rwandan Government Recognized the Value of French Support in 1992 and Made Every Effort to Ensure It Continued.**

Throughout 1992, President Habyarimana and other Rwandan officials made sure to thank their French patrons for their support. “[F]irst and foremost, I would like to reiterate my feelings of deep gratitude for the steady support my country receives from France, invaluable support to tell the truth, which the Rwandan people truly appreciate,” President Habyarimana wrote to President Mitterrand on 21 April 1992, before asking the French President for his continued support as well as an opportunity to meet in person.

To show its appreciation, the Rwandan government regularly bestowed honors and awards on the Noroit and DAMI soldiers who served in Rwanda. For example, on 23 August 1992, Rwandan Defense Minister James Gasana wrote President Habyarimana to recommend Col. Rosier for decoration as an Officer of the National Order of the Thousand Hills—the highest honor—for “personally supervis[ing] and lead[ing] on the ground the action of a 105-mm artillery battery which put a stop to the enemy’s advance in the operational sectors of Byumba, Ruhengeri and Mutara.” While the highest decorations were reserved for military leaders like Col. Rosier, nearly every French soldier received an honor.

French officials could plainly see, as Ambassador Martres put it in a 15 October 1992 cable, that the Rwandan government “strongly desired” the “continuation and reinforcement” of French military cooperation “at all levels.” Rwandan authorities wanted Martres to stay in Rwanda, too. In a 5 December 1992 letter to President Mitterrand, President Habyarimana expressed his “deep appreciation” for Martres’ “outstanding services” and requested that France extend Martres’ term as ambassador. Habyarimana elaborated:

Indeed, through his effective action, and his vast knowledge of the Rwandan problem and complexity, and in view of the extremely unstable times that my
country is going through, Mr. Martres should be able to continue his functions for some time to come, for the greater good of Rwanda. Any change in this regard, occurring at this difficult time, could only be a source of instability and endanger the precarious balance of political dialogue in my country.420

Thereafter, Mitterrand extended Martres’ term for three more months.421

Defense Minister Gasana, a moderate MRND member, found it intolerable that any Rwandan would call for the withdrawal of French troops from Rwanda, “[s]eeing how military cooperation with France has been of vital importance during this war, and considering how we still need [France’s] help after the war.”422 To “demoraliz[e] these co-operants and clamor[] for their departure,” he wrote in a 17 December 1992 letter to Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye, of the MDR, would be to “follow[] the example of the Inkotanyi” and “would constitute an attack on the Security of the State.”423

But perhaps the most eye-opening thank-you to France in 1992 came from CDR co-founder Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, who, in the summer, sent President Mitterrand a letter, featuring 700 signatures by Rwandan citizens, thanking France for its military and political support.424 Bruno Delaye, who had recently replaced Mitterrand’s son, Jean-Christophe, as head of the Élysée’s Africa Cell,425 wrote back to Barayagwiza: “The President has asked me to send you his thanks.”426 The reply letter was dated 1 September 1992—just days after the Kibuye massacres (discussed below). When asked years later by the French Parliamentary Mission (the MIP) about Delaye’s response to Barayagwiza, Hubert Védrine—who, as Élysée secretary-general, headed Mitterrand’s team of advisors—replied that “France was in contact with everyone between 1990 and 1994, whether it was President Habyarimana, opposition parties, the RPF, or the Ugandans,” and said all such communications “should not be interpreted as support but as pressure to obtain an agreement for a ceasefire from each of the parties.”427 Barayagwiza would later be found guilty of genocide by the ICTR and sentenced to 32 years in prison.428

K. While Halting Progress toward Peace Produced Violent Extremist Reactions, French Officials Discounted the Backlash and Continued to Shore Up a Government Beholden to Extremists.

An imminent and meticulously prepared plan for systematic physical extermination, mainly targeting the Tutsi population, is in the process of being implemented.429

– 25 residents of Kibuye

By August 1992, RPF High Command Chairman Paul Kagame could see two rival camps emerging in Kigali: those with a sincere desire to solve the country’s problems, and “those who wished to sabotage” the coalition government’s ongoing peace talks with the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania.430 The latter camp seemed to be growing stronger and wreaking havoc. On 4 August 1992, the CDR’s youth militia staged a violent demonstration in Kigali, blocking roads and forcing people out of their vehicles, both to protest the jailing of some CDR members and to condemn the coalition government, led by Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye, for pursuing “peace with the
rebels.” At least two civilians and possibly two gendarmes lay dead by the time order was restored.

The violence did not stop the peace negotiations in Arusha, where several highly contentious issues were still on the table, including the balance of power in the “broad-based transitional government,” which the two sides had agreed to form once peace was achieved. That issue, and the equally thorny problem of integrating the two sides’ militaries, would take many months to resolve. The negotiators did, however, succeed, with the help of Tanzanian facilitators, in approving an 18 August 1992 “Protocol of Agreement . . . On the Rule of Law,” which affirmed the parties’ commitments to principles of national unity, democracy, pluralism, and human rights. Ratification of these principles was a top priority for the RPF, according to RPF Vice President Protais Musoni, who had reaffirmed recently that the RPF sought to have the rule of law, including the protection of human rights, respected in Rwanda. He also said that power sharing and the creation of a cabinet whose decisions would not be overruled by the president remained primary objectives for the RPF in these 1992 talks. The August 1992 protocol recognized the return of refugees as an “inalienable right” and reaffirmed a commitment to establishing a coalition government, with a new round of talks slated to follow in September 1992.

Extremists responded with additional violence, this time renewing the now familiar tactic of murdering Tutsi civilians. Between 20 and 25 August 1992, extremists in the prefecture of Kibuye, located on Rwanda’s western border with Zaire, attacked Tutsi families, killing several people, burning scores of homes, destroying coffee fields and banana farms, and displacing hundreds, if not thousands, of people. The RPF and opposition parties blamed Habyarimana’s party, the MRND, for the violence. Speaking to Radio France International on 23 August, not long after the violence in Kibuye started, Rwandan Minister of Public Works and Energy Felicien Gatabazi—who also served as the secretary general of the Social Democrats (“PSD”)—accused elements closely associated with President Habyarimana and the MRND of orchestrating the violence in order to undermine peace talks with the RPF.

On 18 September 1992, a group of 25 Kibuye residents sent a letter to foreign diplomats in Rwanda alleging that Akazu members and high-level government officials had directed the Interahamwe to commit the massacres in Kibuye. The letter warned that “[a]n imminent and meticulously prepared plan for systematic physical extermination, mainly targeting the Tutsi population, is in the process of being implemented.” (Belgian Ambassador Swinnen would forward the letter to Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Claes on 13 October 1992. The letter was addressed to the Apostolic Nuncio, ambassadors, and heads of diplomatic, cooperative, and advisory missions in Rwanda, presumably including French Ambassador Georges Martres. Likely, Martres or someone on his staff received it.)

When Habyarimana’s cabinet director, Enoch Ruhigira, met with US Ambassador Robert Flaten on 29 August 1992, Ruhigira argued the violence in Kibuye cast doubt on the peace process. According to Flaten, Ruhigira, “unsettled by the communal violence in his own prefecture (Kibuye),” did not believe that the Rwandan government would be in any position to negotiate a power-sharing agreement “generous” to the RPF. Ruhigira said the MRND and CDR
would not accept a power-sharing agreement that favored the RPF, and he predicted that even if they were to do so, civil violence would follow.447

Allegations would soon surface that various Rwandan soldiers had participated in the massacres in Kibuye and elsewhere, and that gendarmes who had responded to the violence committed “barbaric acts against the population.”448 On 30 August, Col. Ndindiliyimana, the head of the Gendarmerie, brought his French advisor, Lt. Col. Alain Damy, along with him on a trip to Kibuye, where the two spoke with local authorities.449 The local officials claimed the violence had actually stemmed from a disagreement between two local families, one Hutu and the other Tutsi.450 They insisted that the accusations of Gendarmerie misconduct were false.451 Ndindiliyimana concluded: “[O]ne shouldn’t always rely on the rumors spread by certain people about the conflicts in Kibuye.”452

Apart from the allegations against government officials, the 18 September 1992 letter from Kibuye residents alleged that Presidential Guard members had been among the participants in the Kibuye massacres.453 The Presidential Guard—one of the many beneficiaries of French technical assistance during the war—was officially a part of the Gendarmerie. Lt. Col. Damy, the French officer assigned to advise Ndindiliyimana, would note that the Presidential Guard occupied a unique space in the Rwandan military and was, for obvious reasons, close to the President and his family.454 (Damy called it “a kind of Praetorian Guard,” a reference to the elite force charged with protecting the Roman emperor.)

Damy took note of the criticism the Presidential Guard had generated in the year since France assigned officers to reorganize and train it.455 After rattling off two of those criticisms—first, that northern Rwandans were overrepresented in its ranks, and, second, that it had sometimes performed missions outside of its jurisdiction—he alluded, obliquely, to “certain underground actions aimed at destabilizing certain opposition political parties.”456 There was talk among human rights groups and opposition parties that the MRND’s Interahamwe militia counted some Presidential Guard soldiers among its members.457 A US Department of State cable described this allegation as “credible,” though unproven.458

The French government’s response to the allegations involving the Presidential Guard in 1992 was neither swift nor decisive. According to the MIP, Col. Cussac told President Habyarimana that France would start withdrawing its technical assistance to the Presidential Guard in August 1992.460 The assistance, though, was still ongoing that fall, when Colonel Philippe Capodanno was sent to Rwanda to evaluate French military cooperation there.461 Capodanno wrote in a November 1992 report that France was planning to withdraw its DAMI of two non-commissioned officers from the Presidential Guard and assign new duties to Major Denis Roux, the French officer who had been serving as the Guard’s technical advisor.462 “That is to say, to cease our activities in aid of the Presidential Guard,” Capodanno wrote.463 Even then, though, the severance was less than total. Roux—though he received an additional title, that of advisor to the mobile Gendarmerie—retained the title of technical adviser to the head of the Presidential Guard through at least May 1993,464 and continued to work with the Guard through his departure from Rwanda in August 1993.465
Roux’s recollection, as recounted in a 2014 book, was that his instructions in the summer of 1992, as the allegations against the Presidential Guard were surfacing, were simply to “step back a little.”466 “From then on, I intervened more as an advisor than as a trainer-instructor with the Presidential Guard,” he said.467 His primary responsibility for the remainder of his time in Rwanda was to train the mobile Gendarmerie to respond to rising social unrest in the country.468 “They were taught how to respect the rules, how to handle weapons, individual and collective actions in policing, crowd management,” he recalled.469

One French officer who worked with the Presidential Guard in 1992 has since admitted to having regrets about his service in Rwanda. The officer, Thierry Prungnaud, had, upon his arrival in January 1992, participated in an effort help the Rwandan Gendarmerie stand up a new elite tactical unit known as the security-and-intervention group (Groupe de sécurité et d’intervention de la Garde Présidentielle, or GSIGP).470 The GSIGP was created in the image of the French National Gendarmerie’s Security and Intervention Group, a conglomeration of elite gendarme units specializing in hostage crises, para-commando operations, and presidential security.471 According to Prungnaud, France selected about 30 Rwandan military members to serve in the new unit, whose primary task would be to ensure the security of the Rwandan president and his entourage.472 In the course of their training, the Rwandan recruits learned to shoot with precision, to respond to hostage situations, to conduct reconnaissance, and to perform anti-terrorist actions.473

Prungnaud has said he later learned that his trainees—some of them, at least—were among the perpetrators of the Genocide.474 “I think some of these guys were part of the notorious death squads that executed many opponents of the regime, Hutu and Tutsi alike,” he said. “Of course, it’s a shock to think that we trained killers of this sort, and that they used for genocide what we taught them as part of a simple military training!”475

L. In Late 1992, General Quesnot’s Attempt to Fortify FAR Defensive Positions Resulted in French Troops Running Afoul of the Cease-Fire.

In mid-October 1992, a trio of Rwandan military helicopters headed north from Kigali to allow General Quesnot, on a brief but densely packed visit to Rwanda, to inspect the FAR’s positions along the front.476 The cease-fire, in effect since mid-July 1992, had frozen the government troops in place, leaving them in a defensive crouch on the near side of the demilitarized zone.477 The FAR’s failure to retake the entirety of Byumba province before the halt in hostilities had been humbling, but they had managed to stop the RPF military’s advance and inflict heavy losses.478 To French observers, it seemed that neither camp was poised to launch a major offensive anytime soon.479 And yet, with negotiations in Arusha limping along and the prospects of an enduring peace still highly uncertain, both camps felt it necessary to prepare for the possible resumption of combat.480 For their part, FAR commanders took advantage of the break in fighting to train recent recruits and to replenish their stocks of equipment and ammunition.481

Ambassador Martres, who accompanied Quesnot in his meetings with President Habyarimana and other Rwandan officials, had no doubt that the Rwandan president, at least, had not given up hope of reconquering the territory the FAR had lost before the cease-fire.482 “[B]ut,” he wrote in a 15 October memo, “it is clear that [Habyarimana’s] entourage is convinced that it is prudent to focus on dissuading the RPF to return from the political field to the military field . . .
Chapter V

1992

"The short-term goal for the Rwandan government was to enhance the FAR’s capacity for "defensive combat." Martres reported that the “continuation and reinforcement of French military cooperation is strongly desired at all levels,” and emphasized, “it is on this defensive aspect that the reinforcement of our military cooperation must be focused.” The goal of preventing the RPF from taking the country by force continued to be the focus of French military cooperation.

Quesnot’s visit led to a reshuffling of French military resources in Rwanda. Not two weeks later, Col. Cussac, France’s defense attaché in Kigali, announced that the second Noroit company, dispatched in response to the RPF’s attack on Byumba in June 1992, would depart Rwanda on 10 November “and will not be replaced.”

At the same time, to help the FAR troops fortify their defenses along the front, France agreed to send a DAMI of engineering specialists, known informally as the DAMI “Genie.” The officers of this new DAMI made landfall in Rwanda on 4 November, joining a network of French servicemen in Rwanda that then included the remaining Noroit company, the DAMI instructors in Gabiro, and the various advisers and technicians assisting the Amy and Gendarmerie under the banner of the Military Assistance Mission.

The DAMI “Genie” officers’ stay would prove short, but controversial. Within a few weeks of their arrival, the RPF Army twice spied them out in the field, supervising the digging of new defensive trenches. A US cable on 12 December reported that American embassy officers “have been aware of French military involvement on the front lines for some time.”

The FAR, though, tried to conceal their presence from the Neutral Group of Military Observers [the GOMN], the team of international military officers that, under the July cease-fire agreement, was charged with monitoring the front. The GOMN’s chief of operations vented his frustration to a US diplomat in late November, saying he knew that French officers were training the FAR along the front on the use of 105 mm artillery pieces and rocket launchers, but that Rwandan soldiers had stalled GOMN observers at road blocks “in order to give the French the opportunity to leave the area.”

On 2 December 1992, the FAR slipped up. In Byumba, the RPF spotted FAR soldiers, in the company of French soldiers, advancing 500 meters to dig new trenches, a violation of the cease-fire agreement. RPF forces opened fire, and a GOMN patrol was caught in the crossfire. The episode angered the GOMN commander, Major General Ekundayo Opaleye, who, not for the first time, “expressed his displeasure with the French forces’ activities at the front, and stated categorically that these forces were directly involved in the [Government of Rwanda’s] attempt to reinforce forward.”

A US Department of State cable was similarly disapproving: “If, as the GOMN commander asserts, the French were supervising FAR soldiers digging foxholes in front of the ceasefire lines in order to take new ground, this constitutes a blatant disregard for the ceasefire line and should be addressed.”

In Col. Nsabimana’s view, the takeaway from this incident was not that the French officers should show more respect for the cease-fire agreement, but that their “presence around the front must henceforth be more discreet.” The Rwandan Army chief of staff faulted the GOMN for hounding the French officers, having heard from the FAR’s Byumba sector commander that a
particular member of the GOMN team, a Zimbabwean lieutenant colonel, had been “pursuing French specialists of the DAMI Engineers in order, according to him, to surprise them in the field and thus have additional proof of French presence in the combat zone.”\textsuperscript{501} Nsabimana complained about the officer to the chief of the GOMN team in Byumba and insisted that the DAMI officers were there lawfully “within the framework of the co-operation agreements between France and Rwanda, two sovereign countries.”\textsuperscript{502} The GOMN chief, who was already familiar with the FAR’s complaints about the Zimbabwean officer, reportedly “promised to deal with [the officer] in an effort to ease the strained atmosphere.”\textsuperscript{503}


When peace talks resumed in Arusha on 5 October 1992, the parties remained distrustful, but observers saw reason for hope.\textsuperscript{504} The RPF signaled openness to the government’s proposal for cabinet control over presidential actions, in lieu of the RPF’s own proposal for the establishment of a “presidential council.”\textsuperscript{505} “All in all,” a US cable on the recommencement of peace talks summed up, “the [Government of Tanzania, which facilitated the talks,] seems to think there are grounds for confidence that the two sides may make more substantial progress in [the upcoming negotiations], provided the RPF can be persuaded to desist in its posturing and both parties can focus on negotiating a settlement as opposed to scoring points off each other.”\textsuperscript{506}

This would not do for the CDR. On 8 October 1992, CDR Party President Martin Bucyana sent an indignant letter to President Habyarimana and Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye, denouncing the Arusha negotiations and alleging that opposition party government negotiators had gone rogue as “allies of the RPF.”\textsuperscript{507} “It is clear that the new orientation in the negotiations is aimed at excluding the other political formations from power-sharing that represent . . . the majority of the population,” wrote Bucyana, expressing the fear that Arusha would diminish the CDR’s power.\textsuperscript{508} The CDR followed this letter with a march on 18 October 1992 protesting the Arusha negotiations and supporting “the presence of French troops and François Mitterrand [sic].”\textsuperscript{509} According to an account by historian Gérard Prunier, the CDR protesters chanted, “Thank you President Mitterrand!” and “Thank you French People!” among other slogans objecting to the peace process.\textsuperscript{510} The protest led to violence a few hours after its conclusion when a group of eight to ten “CDR Party fanatics” stabbed the representative of the PL party in Kanombe.\textsuperscript{511} CDR members also killed a local MDR party leader, although it is unclear whether that happened shortly before or after the march.\textsuperscript{512}

In a 21 October 1992 memorandum, the French Foreign Ministry’s new director of African and Malagasy affairs, Jean-Marc Rochereau de La Sablière, who had taken over the post in August 1992 when Paul Dijoud was named ambassador to Mexico,\textsuperscript{513} recognized the threat the CDR posed to peace.\textsuperscript{514} He reported that France, regardless, was encouraging President Habyarimana to “solidify the movement and accept the participation of the RPF in the government until elections are held.”\textsuperscript{515} De La Sablière wrote that France needed to publicly declare its support for the Arusha negotiations, and that France must also “persuade” Habyarimana, “so that his worries do not lead him to refuse the Arusha compromise.”\textsuperscript{516} At the same time, de La Sablière considered it prudent to help the Rwandan government prepare for war in the event the peace failed:
On the ground, insofar as the possibility of renewed hostilities cannot be entirely excluded, France should, potentially by reinforcing its cooperation, help the Rwandan Army to solidify the frontline. The focus should particularly be on training, the most operational use of available materials, and provision of munitions.\textsuperscript{517}

On 30 October 1992, the parties in Arusha reached a “Protocol of Agreement” that sketched out how power would be distributed within the during the transitional period after the war.\textsuperscript{518} The protocol’s most notable feature was that it allowed President Habyarimana to stay on as president, but stripped him of much of his authority, devolving the bulk of his powers to a “Broad-Based Transitional Government” (made up of the prime minister, deputy prime minister, and ministers and secretaries of state).\textsuperscript{519} The protocol also called for the repatriation of refugees and for the elimination of “all types of discrimination and exclusion,” among other items demanded by the RPF,\textsuperscript{520} while leaving the issue of force integration for another day.\textsuperscript{521}

This time, Habyarimana did not endorse the negotiators’ work. He took the hint from the CDR and tacked right. In two radio addresses in early November 1992, he spoke against the GOR delegation at Arusha.\textsuperscript{522} Later that month, during a speech in Ruhengeri, Habyarimana declared that while he supported the negotiations, the July 1992 cease-fire was merely a piece of paper. “Peace is not confused with papers,” he declared.\textsuperscript{523} “There will be peace if Rwandans understand that their representative in Arusha is actually speaking in their name . . . . That is what we ask of him. . . . That he should not bring papers to us and then claim that he has brought peace. Is peace obtained from papers?”\textsuperscript{524} At that, the crowd applauded and whistled its support.\textsuperscript{525}

Elsewhere in the speech, Habyarimana celebrated the links between the MRND and the Interahamwe by promising to purchase new uniforms for Interahamwe members, questioning allegations of Interahamwe crimes—“People say that investigations were carried out, but I have not seen their results!”—and telling the audience of his political future, “it is mostly the Interahamwe who will do my campaign, because I am with them.”\textsuperscript{526}

The president’s strident support for the militia had clear implications for the steps to be taken moving forward. “I heard instructions had been given to us [Interahamwe] to kill some people after the Ruhengeri rally,” a former Interahamwe leader told the East and Central Africa specialist Andrew Wallis. “I remember Habyarimana’s speech was all about the need to stop ‘the enemy.’ We took this to mean both Tutsi generally and anyone who opposed the party.”\textsuperscript{527} As one Rwandan magazine observed of the days that followed the Ruhengeri address:

Fear has gripped the town of Kigali. . . . [G]renade explosions are heard throughout the night. People are cut up with the sword with total impunity. Many houses have been demolished. All these acts are committed by the Interahamwe militia of MRND. Since their leader once more reminded them of their mission at the MRND rally held in Ruhengeri on 15 November 1992, much blood has flown. Before, they beat people and destroyed houses, but did not commit many killings. Now the dead are no longer counted. In Shyorongi, there were more than 31 persons killed and more than 50 wounded who are now in hospital.\textsuperscript{528}
News of Habyarimana’s remarks quickly reverberated among the other parties to the ongoing Arusha negotiations. As one US cable noted, “The Tanzanians were particularly miffed that Habyarimana, in a recent speech in Ruhengeri, had reportedly characterized the Arusha IV round as a ‘civil coup d’etat.’”529 Likewise, a subsequent US cable speculated that while it was possible that RPF representatives were unwilling to discuss military integration at Arusha because of a breakdown in communication among the party, “a more substantive, and probably more likely explanation” was that the RPF, “in close consultation with internal allies, either reassessed the Habyarimana motivations on the basis of the President’s November 15 speech and the deteriorating security situation, or decided on an effort now to put maximum pressure on the MRND. The decision could be a combination of the two . . . .”530 Meanwhile, Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye expressed disbelief at the President’s abrupt betrayal of the spirit of the negotiations; as Nsengiyaremye said in a speech the following week, “it is quite regrettable to note that the chairman of the MRND, who is President of the Republic at the same time, characterized the Arusha Accords as pieces of paper when he delivered his speech during an MRND rally in Ruhengeri . . . . Men and women of Rwanda, such language is incomprehensible. Power, for all times, has functioned on the basis of agreements.”531

Ultimately, however, Habyarimana’s rally would be remembered as tame compared to the one that took place the following Sunday, 22 November 1992 (the day before the resumption of talks in Arusha). This time, the microphone belonged to Leon Mugesera, the vice-chairman of the MRND, speaking before a crowd in Kabaya, in the Gisenyi prefecture.532 Mugesera was known to US diplomatic sources at the time as “a close associate of the President’s entourage” who had been “generally attributed with complicity in the massacres of an estimated 300 Tutsi that wracked Kibilira (just south of Kabaya) shortly after October 1990.”533

Two years after his alleged crimes at the start of the war, as Col. Laurent Serubuga looked on from his seat on the stage,534 Mugesera stood before the crowd and called for the death of Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye for having ceded territory to the RPF on the battlefield:

The punishment for such people is unequivocal: “Any person who demoralizes the country’s armed forces on the war front shall be punishable by death.” That is what the law says. Why would such an individual not be killed? Nsengiyaremye should be prosecuted and found guilty. The law is there and it is written. He should be sentenced to death as stipulated by the law. 535

Mugesera went on to call for the arrest and “extermination” of Tutsi families that were, he claimed, sending their sons to join the RPF, and death for those recruiting them.536 His words were as chilling as they were explicit, as Mugesera told the crowd that he wanted those Tutsi families to be “put on a list” and brought to justice.537 And if judges of Rwanda refused to prosecute, Mugesera declared, “then the people, in the interest of whom justice should be done, should take it upon ourselves.”538

“The delegates you will hear are in Arusha do not represent Rwanda,” Mugesera went on.539 “Recently, I told someone who came to brag to me that he belonged to the P.L. [Parti Liberal, with many Tutsi members—ed.]—I told him ‘The mistake we made in 1959, when I was still a child, is to let you leave. . . . Your home is in Ethiopia [and] we will send you by the Nyabarongo River so you can get there quickly.’”540 In a chilling allusion to the violent mob that attacked

Levy | Firestone | Muse
Education Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana at her home in May 1992, Mugesera promised, after repeatedly deriding her actions as education minister, that defenders of the cause “will set out for Nyaruhengeri, to Minister Agathe’s home, to look after the education of her children!” His followers would deliver on his promise at the start of the Genocide, when Uwilingiyimana, by that point prime minister, would be murdered.

On the same day as Mugesera’s speech, the Belgian paper *La Cite* reported that “death squads” directed by lead figures in the Habyarimana regime were engaged in mass killing around the country. Violence continued to intensify in the days that followed Mugesera’s speech, prompting the prime minister to convene an emergency 26 November meeting with members of his cabinet “to discuss mounting political violence and banditism that is causing widespread insecurity, even terror, among Rwandans.”

Justice Minister Stanislas Mbonampeka dispatched a warrant for Mugesera’s arrest, writing, “He allegedly stated among others, that certain Rwandans should go back to their homes . . . and that, if they failed to do so, he would ask the inhabitants to entrust them to [the] River Nyabarongo.” Facing imminent arrest, Mugesera found protection among government elements sympathetic to the anti-Tutsi extremist cause, according to a 2 December cable by US Ambassador to Rwanda Robert Flaten. The justice minister submitted his resignation in protest, as the Belgian newspaper *La Libre Belgique* reported.

When the MDR sent Habyarimana a 2 December letter to protest the ongoing terror wrought by the Interahamwe, it was with the increasing sense that no one was listening. It referenced atrocities northwest of Kigali that had started two weeks before, on the same day that Habyarimana had given his speech in Ruhengeri, and it described violence committed “by MRND militiamen, with the support of soldiers disguised as civilians and under the supervision of the Mayor of Shyorongi . . . who is providing all the logistics and ferrying the executioners to their victims’ homes.” Referring to “the MRND-CDR scheme to systematically massacre all the Tutsi,” the MDR letter exhorted Habyarimana:

> We believe that you are always Head of State before being Head of Party . . . and that as such you have the imperative responsibility of ensuring the security of all Rwandan citizens whatever it is, even if it does not belong to your party. The Almighty and the Rwandan people will demand it. . . . [P]lease stop these massacres in Shyorongi Commune and order your services to sheathe the sword . . . . [I]t is not enough to declare on the radio that there is democracy in Rwanda when people die for daring to take the path of freedom by fleeing the tyranny of the MRND and its President.

Talks in Arusha had resumed on 23 November, and there was no hiding the divisions within the Rwandan government delegation. A French observer to the negotiations, Jean-Christophe Belliard, would later say it was as though the government had sent three delegations. The first was led by the MDR-affiliated foreign minister, Boniface Ngulinzira, officially the government’s chief negotiator. Separately, he recalled, there was “Habyarimana’s man,” the Rwandan ambassador to Uganda, Claver Kanyarushoki. “And then,” he said, “there was somebody at
the end of the table who did not speak a word, but we could see was influential”: the Ministry of Defense Chief of Staff Colonel Théoneste Bagosora.554

Belliard had Foreign Minister Ngulinzira’s ear in Arusha but came to find that this was not worth much.555 “Ngulinzira was powerless,” he recalled at a conference in the Hague in 2014. “It was not he who made decisions. The real decisions were made elsewhere.”556 Ambassador Kanyarushoki’s role, it seemed, was to slow the process down557—to keep Ngulinzira from getting ahead of the rest of the delegation. Col. Bagosora, meanwhile, “did not speak but seemed to think a lot,” Belliard said. “I had the sense that a lot of things got decided at his level. So we had the negotiations going on every day, a kind of shadow theatre, and then the real negotiations going on in parallel with people who did not want to make any progress.”558

Back in Kigali, it was increasingly apparent that Habyarimana was boxed in.559 On the one hand, he seemed to recognize that the Rwandan army, even after two years of French wartime aid, was weak and ill-prepared to go back to war.560 It was also clear, though, that the extremists within his party, and within the CDR, would be hostile to virtually any compromise that might break through the impasse in Arusha.561 “[T]he current situation looks more and more like a puzzle whose various parts seem less than ever to want to fit together harmoniously,” Habyarimana mused in a 5 December letter to President Mitterrand.562 The new era of multiparty politics in Rwanda had complicated his rule. Habyarimana seemed to lament this development, telling Mitterrand that his administration, no longer under the sway of a single party, was too riven by partisanship to “succeed[] in imposing itself and restoring public order.”563 This, he suggested, is why the Broad-Based Transitional Government must not reign long; elections must be held within 12 months at most, so that “my country can regain a strong government capable of escaping the current transition phase.”564

Habyarimana’s letter went on to say that, until peace is restored in Rwanda, it would be incumbent on France not only to maintain, but to “intensify,” its military presence, which he described as an “invaluable” force for stability in a time of crisis.565 In Habyarimana’s telling, France’s military support for the government was helping to pressure the RPF—and, he could not help but add, Uganda—to be “realistic” in its negotiations in Arusha.566 His argument, essentially, was that the RPF would be more inclined to accept a fair deal if the prospect of resuming its war with the government was too daunting to contemplate, in light of the government’s continued support from France.567

Habyarimana, it bears noting, was not alone in thinking this way. Ambassador Martres, reflecting back on his tenure in Rwanda, would similarly argue in his 1993 end-of-mission report that France’s military support for Habyarimana’s government, “especially during the period of intense fighting in July 1992,” had helped “convince the RPF that [France] would hinder any plan to resolve by arms a problem that should only be resolved by democratic means.”568 But in mid-December 1992, Martres had expressed an “increasingly critical view” of the Habyarimana regime that cast doubt on its commitment to peace.569 In his notes marked “consultations w ith] The French on Rwanda,” David Rawson, who was the initial US observer during the Arusha peace talks, and would be appointed as the US ambassador to Rwanda in November 1993,570 wrote that Martres thought Habyarimana was “playing for time” and was “no longer acting in good faith.”571 Martres understood that “people around Habyarimana” were “fearful for [their] own lives in [a]
Bruno Delaye, the head of the Élysée Africa Cell, sensed that the negotiations in Arusha were “rapidly approaching the end-game,” according to a US cable. Delaye and Quai d’Orsay African Affairs Director de La Sablière told a State Department official that Habyarimana had indicated he was “prepared to accept 90 percent of the RPF’s demands at Arusha.” In exchange, the Rwandan president wanted assurances that local elections would be held promptly, and, more controversially, that the agreement would “bring extremist Hutu elements into the government”—in order, he insisted, to “preclude their taking their cause into the streets.” De La Sablière said the French government viewed both of these demands as reasonable. (Belliard would later tell the MIP that it had been the settled position of the Quai d’Orsay’s Directorate of African and Malagasy Affairs that the power-sharing agreement should reserve a place for the CDR in the interim government, or, failing that, in the national assembly. The thinking, he said, was “it was better to integrate these extremists in politics to prevent them from becoming uncontrollable.”)

Word made it back to Rwanda late on 22 December that Foreign Minister Ngulinzira, as head of the government delegation, had reached an agreement with the RPF. Under the agreement, which remained unsigned, the MRND would retain the presidency and would hold four posts in the transition cabinet. The MDR and RPF would each get four posts as well, with the position of prime minister going to the former and vice-prime minister to the latter. The rest of the posts would go to the PL and the center-left PSD (three positions apiece), with two more posts yet to be allocated.

The reaction in Kigali was, at first, muted. Even as Radio Rwanda was reporting the announcement, it was continuing to report on an MRND communiqué, pegged to a party meeting just one day earlier, that accused the MDR-affiliated prime minister of spreading lies about the MRND and hampering the peace process. “Thus,” a US cable reported, “everyone who heard the radio on the evening of December 22 or the morning of December 23 knew there was something amiss.”

The MRND formally confirmed suspicions about its dissatisfaction with the deal the morning after the announcement. In a statement, the party’s national secretary denigrated the deal as unfair and criticized Ngulinzira for short-circuiting ongoing discussions between the MRND and other parties. The statement left open the possibility that the MRND would refuse to participate in the new government. It was fast becoming evident that Ngulinzira, in approving the deal when he did, had been gambling that the MRND would come around. Even PL President Justin Mugenzi, whose party would get three seats in the proposed cabinet, was willing to acknowledge privately that the announcement had been premature and, in his words, “stupid.”

Col. Bagosora, too, was unhappy that the foreign minister had not sought out his blessing before accepting the deal. There could be little doubt that, had Ngulinzira done so, he would not have assented to it. Bagosora had been adamant that the CDR must be represented in the government, at one point pulling Belliard aside to make this clear. To deny the CDR a seat at the table, he wrote in a 23 December letter to Ngulinzira, “does not take into account the political reality in the country and risks creating a difficult situation to manage.”
Negotiations in Arusha were not yet complete when Christmas rolled around. In particular, the parties had yet to hash out a plan for integrating the military. By 26 December, though, Bagosora had had enough. In a terse letter to President Habyarimana, Ngulinzira wrote that Bagosora had walked out in the middle of a meeting and did not come back, having apparently decided to return to Kigali. “I consider that he has just abandoned the mission you entrusted to him and that disciplinary action should be taken against him,” the foreign minister wrote.

Years later, at Bagosora’s trial on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity, a witness for the prosecution testified about an encounter he and two colleagues had with Bagosora during the negotiations in Arusha before Christmas. The witness, a member of the RPF delegation, recalled that, one day, while heading to lunch after a morning of negotiations, the three colleagues came upon Bagosora in a hotel elevator, his suitcases in hand. When the witness asked why Bagosora was heading home early, the colonel replied, ominously, that he “was going to prepare the ‘apocalypse.’”
Notes to Chapter V


2 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”).


4 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”).

5 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”).

6 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”).

7 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”) (“Faced with this situation, the AD contacted the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie [Rwagafilita] while emphasizing that this mission (at least on a judicial level) should have been incumbent upon the Gendarmerie. If he agreed, he has nevertheless hid behind the argument of digital inadequacy of his personnel and lack of their professional training.”); see also ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 141 (2019) (describing Rwagafilita’s lack of professionalism).

8 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”).

9 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”).

10 Excerpt of Cable from Bernard Cussac, signed by Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “BRAVO: Arming of civilian populations”).


12 MIP Tome I 99.

13 See Chapter V, Section I.

14 Letter from Alphonse Kibibi to Juvénal Habyarimana (7 Oct. 1991). In Kinyarwanda, the word interahamwe was used to connote a coming together, such as in this quote from a 7 Oct. 1991 letter to Habyarimana: “This is how we should behave in the difficult times we are going through. Difficult times for our Rwanda. [A]ll of us Rwandans should continue to support the policy of peace and unity for all the people of Rwanda. Tutsi, Hutu, Tw a and all those who live in Rwanda, we must be those who come together [interahamwe] and do the job well, striving to promote the truth by staying together as brothers.”

15 See Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 456-57; Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41, Expert witness report of Dr. Alison Des Forges 17 (3 Sept. 2002). Some accounts suggest that the Interahamwe was created in response to the formation of militias by opposition parties, such as the MDR’s Inkuba [Thunder]. See Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, ¶¶ 182, 199 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 2 Feb. 2012); see also Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41, Expert witness report of Dr. Alison Des Forges 17 (3 Sept. 2002). Other accounts, like the 1993 FIDH commission, suggest that armed militia of other parties were created in response to the Interahamwe. See Communiqué De Presse, FIDH Report (8 Mar. 1993),


19 Anastase Gasana, Interahamwe za Muvoma or the MRND Party Hardliners 12 (14 May 1992).

20 Anastase Gasana, Interahamwe za Muvoma or the MRND Party Hardliners 12 (14 May 1992).


22 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 457 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008) (“President Habyarimana made the first donation of 500,000 Rwandan francs to the organization, which was used to purchase uniforms and to provide transport to meetings and rallies.”). A Belgian intelligence official would later write, shortly before the Genocide, that “support from personalities of the [Habyarimana] regime” enabled the Interahamwe to operate “with almost total impunity.” Rapport - Étude sur les milices interahamwe préparée par le Major Hock [Report – Study on the Interahamwe Militias prepared by Major Hock] 2 (2 Feb. 1994).

23 Anastase Gasana, Interahamwe za Muvoma or the MRND Party Hardliners 5-7 (14 May 1992).

24 The MRND originally filled the Interahamwe’s ranks with unemployed youth from in and around Kigali. See Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 457 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 14 (1999) Of the nearly 60 percent of Rwandans under the age of twenty, tens of thousands had little hope of obtaining the land needed to establish their own households or the jobs necessary to provide for a family. Such young men, including many displaced by the war and living in camps near the capital provided many of the early recruits to the Interahamwe, trained in the months before and in the days immediately after the Genocide began.

25 Anastase Gasana, Interahamwe za Muvoma or the MRND Party Hardliners 5-7 (14 May 1992).

26 Anastase Gasana, Interahamwe za Muvoma or the MRND Party Hardliners 6-7 (14 May 1992).

27 Anastase Gasana, Interahamwe za Muvoma or the MRND Party Hardliners 10 (14 May 1992). See page 7 of the same for Major Nkundiye, a battalion commander in the Presidential Guard, recruiting from within the Presidential Guard for the Interahamwe and for Captain Pascal Simbikangwa doing the same within the Rwandan Service Central de Renseignements.


30 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 259, 261 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 3 Dec. 2003). Prior to the creation of the CDR, Barayagwiza (like all Rwandans before multipartyism) was an MRND member. See Letter from Bonaventure Habimana, Secretary General of the MRND to Juvénal Habyarimana, President of Rwanda 1 (5 Sept. 1990).


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37 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 179 (1999). According to the HRW report, “Once the genocide began, there was virtually no distinction between Impuzamugambi and Interahamwe in the field.”


43 Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 675 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 3 Dec. 2003). The FIDH Report investigators later determined that the letter broadcast on Radio Rwanda was fraudulent. That finding was echoed in the MIP, which reported that Rwandan officials, possibly Nahimana, authored the false letter. MIP Tome I 98.


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Pierre Bucyensenge, *Tales from Bugesera, Where Tutsis were ‘Exiled’*, THE NEW TIMES (31 Mar. 2014). Bugesera, as described in Bucyensenge’s article, was Rwanda’s version of the barren steppes where undesirables and the politically suspect were deported throughout Soviet history. The communal violence that followed Belgium’s departure in 1959 and Rwanda’s transformation into a one-party state founded on the principle of Hutu domination left thousands of Tutsi dead and some 300,000 refugees dispersed internally and in neighboring countries. The authorities often “replanted” internal refugees in Bugesera and a neighboring district, places of “dense forests, gigantic savannah, wild animals and tse-tse flies,” and left them largely to fend for themselves. Many, especially the young and old, succumbed to hunger and disease. The survivors erected makeshift grass huts and, though the region was hot and dry, began to farm small plots of land. Three decades later, some had managed to carve out a modest prosperity, owning cattle and family cars.


FIDH Report 27 (1993). There were other signs of the violence ahead. By February 1992, the Interahamwe was threatening the kind of violence that would come to characterize the coming massacres. *See also* Press Release, MDR (12 Feb. 1992) (Subject: “Announcement No. 2”) (warning MDR members that the Interahamwe was stockpiling traditional weapons like cudgels, swords, and commando rope); Press Release, MDR (25 Feb. 1992) (Subject: “Announcement No. 4”) (updating the previous MDR notice, notifying its members that the Interahamwe was now armed with grenades).


FIDH Report 27 (1993). *See also* id. at n.14. The FIDH points out that facilities to make photocopies of a document (in this case the pamphlet) in Bugesera are virtually non-existent outside of government or party offices.


MIP Tome I 97.


*HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY* 72 (1999). Notably, human rights reports claimed that Rwandan military joined forces with the Interahamwe at Bugesera. During the massacres, “soldiers in civilian dress joined groups of killers while others in uniform disarmed Tutsi and kept them cornered until the killing teams could arrive.”


Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.


Cable from George Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

Cable from George Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

Cable from George Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

Cable from George Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).


Cable from George Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).
Rwanda Imposes Curfew in Area of Ethnic Fighting, Reuters, 8 Mar. 1992. The article reported that, according to witnesses, “bands of Hutus armed with machetes, spears, and clubs were still roaming the mountainous area,” several days after the violence started.


Cable from George Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

Cable from George Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

Cable from Johan Swinnen (8 Mar. 1992).


Transcript, Interview by RFI with George Martres in JEUNE AFRIQUE, 9 Mar. 1992. As a March 1992 letter from 13 Rwandan expatriates in Nairobi sent to President Mitterrand after the Bugesera massacres would reiterate: “The presence of your troops . . . does not have the effect of tempering the murderous ardor of Rwandan civil and military authorities against innocent populations.” MONIQUE MAS, PARIS-KIGALI 1990-1994 92 (1999). French officials intended French troops to serve as a deterrent of the RPF, but the attackers of unarmed Tutsi did not see these troops’ presence as a reason to restrain themselves.


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State 1-2 (27 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “GOR Seeks Emergency Assistance”).
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99 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State 6 (27 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “GOR Seeks Emergency Assistance”).

100 Cable from Johan Swinnen (7 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Troubles sérieux dans le Bugesera”).

101 Cable from Johan Swinnen (7 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Troubles sérieux dans le Bugesera”).

102 Cable from Johan Swinnen 1 (8 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Ethnische onlusten in de Bugesera”) The Canadian consul and a representative of the papal nuncio also made trips to Nyamata that day.

103 Cable from Johan Swinnen (8 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Ethnische onlusten in de Bugesera”).

104 Cable from Johan Swinnen (8 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Ethnische onlusten in de Bugesera”).

105 Cable from Johan Swinnen (8 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Ethnische onlusten in de Bugesera”).

106 Cable from Johan Swinnen (8 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Ethnische onlusten in de Bugesera”).


108 Cable from Johan Swinnen (8 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Ethnische onlusten in de Bugesera”).

109 Cable from Johan Swinnen (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Onlusten Bugesera”).

110 Cable from Johan Swinnen (8 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Émeute ethnique - demarche auprés des autroitures Rwandaises”).

111 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).

112 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).

113 Cable from Francois Ngarukiyintwali 1 (10 Mar. 1992).

114 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).

115 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).

116 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).

117 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).

118 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (13 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Prime Minister Comments on Politics and Bugesera”).

119 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).

120 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Demarche to President Habyarimana on Bugesera and Democracy”).


124 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (13 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Prime Minister Comments on Politics and Bugesera”).

125 Cable from Johan Swinnen (12 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Onlusten in Rwanda”).

126 Memorandum from Donat Hakizimana to Juvénal Habyarimana (7 Feb. 1992). (Subject: “Note à Son Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République sur la mise en place des cadres de l’Administration Centrale et des Société mixtes”).
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128 Cable from Johan Swinnen (12 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Onlusten in Rwanda”).

129 Cable from Johan Swinnen (12 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Onlusten in Rwanda”).

130 Cable from Johan Swinnen (12 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Onlusten in Rwanda”); see also Cable from Johan Swinnen (27 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda – onlusten Bugesera”).

131 Cable from Johan Swinnen (27 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda – onlusten Bugesera”).

132 Cable from Johan Swinnen (27 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda – onlusten Bugesera”)

133 Cable from Johan Swinnen (27 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda – onlusten Bugesera”).

134 Cable from Johan Swinnen 2 (27 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda – onlusten Bugesera”).


138 Note from Paul Dijoud (10 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nécessité de réaffirmer et préciser la politique de la France”); see also Note from Paul Dijoud (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nécessité de réaffirmer et préciser la politique de la France”). The MIP report includes a revised version of Dijoud’s note, which bears some slight—but telling—differences. That version, dated 11 March 1992, is softer in tone. There, one can find passing references to France’s “effort to help this country end the crisis” and to its hope of “[t]ruly taking responsibility” for refugees. Most notably, it acknowledges that “violence . . . is multiplying against Tutsi populations which are deemed to be close to the rebels.” The 10 March note contains none of these statements.

139 Note from Paul Dijoud (10 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nécessité de réaffirmer et préciser la politique de la France”).

140 Note from Paul Dijoud (10 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nécessité de réaffirmer et préciser la politique de la France”).

141 MIP Tome I 184.


143 Note from Paul Dijoud (10 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nécessité de réaffirmer et préciser la politique de la France”).

144 Note from Paul Dijoud (10 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nécessité de réaffirmer et préciser la politique de la France”). Dijoud’s plan had two other points. First, he called for France—and, “if necessary,” other Western countries—to “exert strong pressure on Uganda and in particular on President Museveni to play a more positive role in seeking peace.” Second, UNHCR’s proposals to resolve the region’s refugee “problem” should “finally see the light of day” (though, Dijoud wrote, there should be a common understanding that a fix will take some time—more than a few months, certainly).

145 Note from Paul Dijoud (10 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Nécessité de réaffirmer et préciser la politique de la France”).
146 Excerpt of cable from W.B. to unknown recipient (11 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Troubles inter-ethniques dans le Bugesera”). “W.B.” is likely William Bunel, counselor to the French Ambassador to Rwanda. The cable on 11 March reported that the situation was still not yet under control.


150 Memorandum from Boniface Ngulinzira to Juvénal Habyarimana 5 (approximate date 13 May 1992) (Subject: “Visite du Ministre français de la Coopération et du Développement au Rwanda”).


156 Account taken from interview by LFM with Immaculée Songa.

157 Cable from Georges Martres (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

158 See Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 668 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 3 Dec. 2003); see also MIP Tome I 98 (reporting rumors of Nahimana’s involvement in creating the leaflet).


161 Thomas Kamilindi, Journalism in a Time of Hate Media, in THOMPSON ET AL., THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 136 (2007); see also American Cultural Center at the United States Embassy in Kigali, Media Situation in Rwanda 19 (10 Jan. 1992) (“It may even be that private radio stations will start up and break Radio Rwanda’s stranglehold on the most important medium in the country.”). While the RPF’s radio station, Radio Muhabura, was received in Rwanda, it broadcast from Uganda.


163 American Cultural Center at the United States Embassy in Kigali, Media Situation in Rwanda 18-19 (10 Jan. 1992) (noting “Radio Rwanda’s stranglehold on the most important medium in the country”); Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 342-343 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 3 Dec. 2003) (“Radio was increasingly important as a source of information as well as entertainment and a focus of social life. . . . [Y]oung people could always be seen on the street with a radio listening to RTLM and . . . the broadcasts were a common topic of conversation in homes, offices and on the street. . . . [P]eople listened to RTLM in bars and at work, and . . . you could hear it in taxis and at the market. . . . [O]ne would find little radios in offices, cafes, bars and other public gathering places, even in taxis.”).

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177 Association Rwandaise pour la Défense des Droits de la Personne et des Libertés Publiques, Déclaration sur les massacres en cours de la population de la région du Bugesera [Declaration on the Ongoing Massacres of the Population of the Bugesera Region] (10 Mar. 1992). The statement said, “We particularly disapprove of the spreading of fake communiques and other leaflets by the national radio, which, by doing so, is acting as an effective conduit for the fascists of that country, and which is thereby making itself co-responsible for the loss of human lives through its calls for interethnic hatred and division.” See Cable from Ambassador Johan Swinnen (March 10, 1992) (showing Belgian Ambassador Johan Swinnen forwarding the statement to Brussels on 10 March 1992)


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183 Interview by LFM with Christophe Mfizi.

184 Interview by LFM with Christophe Mfizi.


189 Gouvernements, representation politique, principaux corps d’état, institutions de la société civile [Governments, Political Representation, Main Bodies of State, Institutions of Civil Society] 5-6 (30 Mar. 2000). The MDR, Parti Liberal (PL), and Social Democrats (PSD) each received three seats, while the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) received one. Habyarimana’s party, the MRND, did at least retain some of the most powerful posts in the cabinet, including minister of the interior (Faustin Munyazesa, a holdover from the previous cabinet) and minister of defense, which passed from Augustin Ndindiliyimana to the moderate James Gasana.


192 Cable from the US Embassy in Kigali to US Secretary of State 2 (21 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “Internal Insecurity: An Ongoing Problem”).


194 President’s Party Accused Over Blast, AFP, 2 May 1992.


196 Radio Interview with Agathe Uwilingiyimana, transcription by INFORDOC-MINAFFET (11 May 1992).

197 Radio Interview with Agathe Uwilingiyimana, transcription by INFORDOC-MINAFFET (11 May 1992).

198 Radio Interview with Agathe Uwilingiyimana, transcription by INFORDOC-MINAFFET (11 May 1992).


201 Radio Interview with Agathe Uwilingiyimana, transcription by INFORDOC-MINAFFET (11 May 1992).


204 Colette Braeckman, Des militaires rwandais en colère se livrent au pillage à Gisenyi [Angry Rwandan Soldiers Turn to Looting in Gisenyi], LE SOIR, 1 June 1992.


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210 Memorandum from François Munyengango to James Gasana (11 May 1992).

211 Memorandum from François Munyengango to James Gasana (11 May 1992).

212 Memorandum from François Munyengango to James Gasana (11 May 1992).

213 Memorandum from François Munyengango to James Gasana (11 May 1992).

214 Memorandum from François Munyengango to James Gasana (11 May 1992).

215 Memorandum from François Munyengango to James Gasana (11 May 1992).

216 Report from Bernard Cussac, Activités de la Mission d’Assistance Militaire depuis le 1er Octobre 1990 [Activities of the Military Assistance Mission since October 1, 1990] 5 (14 May 1992). At the Rwandan government’s urging, France had opened a second training site in the northeastern community of Gabiro to accommodate units fighting in that region. See Cable from the French Ministry of Defense (5 Sept. 1991) (Subject: “Emploi du DAMI/RWANDA (PANDA)”; Cable from Dominique Delort (26 Dec. 1991) (Subject: “Visite de l’Amiral CEMA au Rwanda du 23 au 25 décembre”). There, the instructors sought mainly to prepare their trainees for nighttime operations. Chollet’s successor as commander of the DAMI, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Louis Nabias, felt it was important, as well, to teach the units how to properly effect circumvention maneuvers, as all of their offensives, to that point, had been frontal attacks. His methods seemed at first to work. In a memo that month, Col. Cussac boasted that, on several instances, the trainings in Mukamira and Gabiro proved their worth, as freshly trained Rwandan units obtained “brilliant results” on the battlefield. See MIP Tome I 152; Report from Bernard Cussac, Activités de la Mission d’Assistance Militaire depuis le 1er Octobre 1990 [Activities of the Military Assistance Mission since October 1, 1990] 5 (14 May 1992).

217 MIP Tome I 152.


227 Marie-France Cros, Opposition et guérilla rwandaise: “Nous nous sommes découverts” [Opposition and Rwandan Guerrilla Fighters: “We Discovered Each Other”], LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 12, 2 June 1992.

228 Marie-France Cros, Opposition et guérilla rwandaise: “Nous nous sommes découverts” [Opposition and Rwandan Guerrilla Fighters: “We Discovered Each Other”], LA LIBRE BELGIQUE, 12, 2 June 1992.


231 Bagarres meurtrières [Deadly Brawls], REUTERS, 1 June 1992.

233 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (1 June 1992) (Subject: “Tensions in Rwanda”).

234 Colette Braeckman, *Des militaires rwandais en colère se livrent au pillage à Gisenyi* [Angry Rwandan Soldiers Turn to Looting in Gisenyi], LE SOIR, 1 June 1992.

235 Colette Braeckman, *Des militaires rwandais en colère se livrent au pillage à Gisenyi* [Angry Rwandan Soldiers Turn to Looting in Gisenyi], LE SOIR, 1 June 1992.

236 Cable from Georges Martres (5 June 1992) (Subject: “Appel du Président Habyarimana”).

237 Report from Marc Verschoore, Rwanda (Synthèse) 9 (18 Jan. 1993); Cable from Georges Martres (7 June 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

238 See Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake; Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe. The RPF announced at the time that it had attacked Byumba to head off a FAR offensive following the buildup of forces and weaponry there. See Press Release, RPF (5 June 1992).

239 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake. See also Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe (“[W]e had not launched the attack to capture towns but to create impact to force the government to go back to the negotiating table.”). The day of the offensive, 5 June, was the date RPF and government delegations were scheduled to meet for talks in Paris. See Cable from Walter Curley Jr. to the US Embassy in Kigali (5 June 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda talks in Paris: DAS DAVIDOW meeting with Quai Africa director Dijoud”).

240 See Cable from Robert Flaten to US Embassy in Dar es Salaam (8 July 1992) (Subject: “GOR-RPF Peace Talks”) (“The RPF attack on Byumba town on June 5 . . . has had a profound effect on Rwandan politics. For the first time since the invasion in October 1990, Rwandans have had to face the possibility that the RPF might actually win militarily.”).

241 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake


250 Cable from Georges Martres (7 June 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

251 Cable from Georges Martres (5 June 1992) (Subject: “Appel du Président Habyarimana”). Habyarimana, as was his habit, said the attack had been “launched by President Museveni.”

252 Cable from Georges Martres (5 June 1992) (Subject: “Appel du Président Habyarimana”).
253 Cable from Georges Martres (7 June 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”); Stephen Smith, La Guerre secrète de l’Élysée en Afrique de l’Est [The Élysée’s Secret War in East Africa], LIBÉRATION, 11 June 1992 (reporting the number of troops as 150).

254 Cable from Georges Martres (7 June 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

255 Cable from Georges Martres (7 June 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

256 Meeting Notes Taken at the Cabinet Meeting Held on 9 June 1992 (9 June 1992); see also Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 June 1992) (Subject: “Council of Ministers retires top military officers”) (“[T]he GOR announced today, 10 June, that the Council of ministers has taken the decision to reorganize the Armed Forces.”).


258 Cable from Bernard Cussac (10 June 1992) (Subject: “Changements a La Tete Des Armees Rwandaises”).


261 Cable from Bernard Cussac and Georges Martres (10 June 1992) (Subject: “Changements a La Tete Des Armees Rwandaises”).

262 See MIP Tome I 104-05.

263 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 June 1992) (Subject: “Council of Ministers Retires Top Military Officers”).

264 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 June 1992) (Subject: “Council of Ministers Retires Top Military Officers”).

265 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 June 1992) (Subject: “Council of Ministers Retires Top Military Officers”).

266 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 June 1992) (Subject: “Council of Ministers Retires Top Military Officers”).

267 Memorandum from Déogratias Nsabimana 2 (21 Sept. 1992) (Subject: “Diffusion d’information”). The document had been prepared by a 10-person committee appointed in December 1991 by Rwandan military leaders. Nsabimana, in circulating the document, asked recipients to disseminate it “widely[,] drawing particular attention to the chapter on the definition of the enemy, his identification as well as on his recruitment locations.”

268 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

269 AFP, L’Envoi de renforts au Rwanda ne vise qu’à assurer la sécurite des ressortissants etrangers, selon le Quai d’Orsay [Sending Support to Rwanda is Only to Ensure Security of Foreigners, According to the Quai d’Orsay] (11 June 1992) (“Paris had ‘no other objective than to help the country [Rwanda] move towards democracy’”); Guerre d’octobre, DIALOGUE No. 157, 48 (Aug. 1992).


282 Pas de fonctions de conseiller auprès du président [No Advisory Functions to the Rwandan President for the Head of the French Military Assistance Mission], AFP, 28 Feb. 1992.


284 MIP Tome I 158. The MIP report would treat Chollet’s departure on 3 March 1992, just a few weeks after the leak of the Rwandan Foreign Ministry’s letter, as proof that the letter’s assertion that Chollet was advising Habyarimana and the FAR’s chief of staff was inaccurate. See id. at 158-159.


286 Duclert Commission Report 158.


290 Duclert Commission Report 696 (quoting ADIPLO, 610COOP/2, Note to the Minister for Cooperation and Development, [April 1992], pp. 2-3).

291 Duclert Commission Report 158 (quoting SHD, GR 2003 Z 17/7, MSG NMR 3100/DEF/EMA/EMP3, 26 February 1991 and 9003 Z 17/16 Directive NMR 3145/DEF/EMA/EMP.3, 20 March 1991). As Serabuga’s advisor, Maurin was “integrated into the heart of the Rwandan army.” Id. at 167. Maurin was “working on the reorganization or creation of several units focused on intelligence, a very well-known weakness of the FAR.” Id. But, “Maurin remained far from the sensitive areas of the front, which seemed to be hidden from him” and Habyarimana, initially, did not meet with Maurin. Id. The Duclert Commission posited that whatever arms-length treatment Maurin received may have been the result of Maurin’s close proximity to Serabuga, who Habyarimana would soon remove from his position. Id. The Duclert Commission suggested also that the FAR attempted to shield Maurin from its “desertions and poor command.” Id.

292 Report from Marc Verschoore 9 (18 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”); Cable from Georges Martres (7 June 1992) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

293 Muyco Report 50-51.

294 MIP Tome I 154.


Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (22 June 1992).

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (22 June 1992).

Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (22 June 1992).

Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (22 June 1992).

Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (22 June 1992). (Subject: “Instruction sur les canons 105 mm”).


See Duclert Commission Report 181 (“Clearly, our ‘semi-direct’ aid, as I had initially told [a Rwandan official], was only temporary” (quoting SHD, GR 2003 Z 17/9, Fm Rosier to Mercier “strictly private,” 24 July 1992)); id. at 231 (observing “the transition from indirect to semi-direct support” in the summer of 1992).


BERNARD LUGAN, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND, L’ARMÉE FRANÇAISE ET LE RWANDA [FRANCOIS MITTERRAND, THE FRENCH ARMY AND RWANDA] 102 (2005); see also Mucyo Report 421-422 (2008). According to testimony to the Mucyo Commission by ex-FAR soldier, Isidore Nzeyimana (given on 12 November 2006), the French taught the FAR to use the “122 mm Egyptian guns,” as well as the 105 mm French-supplied weapons, because they were similar.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga; Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera; Mucyo Report Sect. 1.1 (2008).
317 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.
318 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
319 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
320 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
321 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
322 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe; Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera; Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.
323 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
324 Interview by LFM with James Kabarebe.
326 Interview by LFM with Gonzague Habimana; Interview by LFM with Jean Damascene Kaburame; Mucyo Report Sect. 1.1 (2008) (highlighting the testimony of ex-FAR officers Evariste Murenzi (30 Oct. 2006) and Paul Rwarakabije (26 Oct. 2006)).
328 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
331 Letter from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (1 July 1992).
332 See, e.g., Letter from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 July 1992) (characterizing the RPF as the “aggressor” for its cease-fire violations).
334 Telephone interview by LFM with Françoise Carle.
337 Jacques Isnard, *Le Métier de démineur ou le face-a-face avec la perversité humaine* [Either the Bomb-Disposal Profession or a Face-to-Face with Human Depravity], LE MONDE, 21 Oct. 1982; see also Claude Denis Mouton, *Le Génie parachutiste au Liban* [Paratrooper Genius in Lebanon], Amicale 17e Regiment du Génie Parachutiste (last visited: March 15, 2021).
338 Christian Quesnot, *Le Facteur humain, composante de la dissuasion* [The Human Factor, Component of Dissuasion], OFFICIER UN JOUR, 1, 26 Oct. 2015.
339 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (1 July 1992) (emphasis omitted).
340 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (1 July 1992).
341 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (1 July 1992).
344 The N’sele Ceasefire Agreement, as amended, Rw. – RPF (12 July 1992); see also The N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement, Rw. – RPF (29 Mar. 1991).
346 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (13 July 1992).
Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (13 July 1992); see also Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (1 July 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Situation militaire”) (stating that the RPF was receiving significant support from the Ugandan Army).

Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 July 1992).


Memorandum from Francois Nicoullaud to Roland Dumas (6 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “Application de l’accord de cessez-le-feu au Rwanda”). Also copied at the Élysée were Gilles Vidal of the Africa Cell and General Quesnot’s office.


MIP Tome I 181.

MIP Tome I 181. More specifically, France provided 14.9 million French francs (roughly $2.7 million) in weapons at no charge to the Rwandan government.

MIP Tome I 181. In 1990, France provided 3.3 million French francs ($600,000) in weapons. In 1991, the figure was 1.7 million French francs ($310,000).


Notes on Memorandum from Dominique de Combes de Nayves to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (6 Aug. 1992) (“Compliance with Article II-6 [the portion of the cease-fire addressing removal of foreign troops—ed.] should normally lead to the departure of the two “Noroît” companies whose mission is to protect the French community, the departure of the military training assistance detachment (DAMI) ‘Panda’ whose members do not have the status of military technical assistant, [and] the departure of the artillery training team and the transmission team.”); MIP Tome I 29.


MIP Tome I 29.

Notes on Memorandum from Dominique de Combes de Nayves to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (6 Aug. 1992)


347 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (13 July 1992); see also Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (1 July 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda. Situation militaire”) (stating that the RPF was receiving significant support from the Ugandan Army).

348 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 July 1992).

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354 Memorandum from Francois Nicoullaud to Roland Dumas (6 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “Application de l’accord de cessez-le-feu au Rwanda”). Also copied at the Élysée were Gilles Vidal of the Africa Cell and General Quesnot’s office.


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364 MIP Tome I 29.

365 Notes on Memorandum from Dominique de Combes de Nayves to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (6 Aug. 1992)


Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

See Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana; AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, RWANDA PERSECUTION OF TUTSI MINORITY AND REPRESSION OF GOVERNMENT CRITICS 1990 – 1992 5-6 (May 1992); Report of the Rwandan National Gendarmerie Etat-Major, signed by P. Célestin Rwagafilita and J. Baptiste Iradukunda (27 May 1992) (Subject: “Compte-rendu de réunion d’EM Gd. N. tenue en date du 27 mai 1992 de 09h00 à 10h05”) (showing that French officers were present at the May 1992 meeting at which it was decided to change the name of the Fichier Central).

Duclert Commission 776 (quoting SHD, Late Versement n°1, Fax to EMA. Cab c 32/colonel Fruchard, 6 June 1991) (Galinié insisted to President Habyarimana that the FAR should “finally take prisoners, especially Ugandans, and that they [the prisoners] must stop ‘dying of their wounds.’”).

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana; MIP Tome I 177. The late historian and human rights activist Alison Des Forges testified to the MIP that former Rwandan Defense Minister James Gasana had reported the presence of French officers at the CRCD, “a place well known for being the place of torture by the Gendarmerie and the Rwandan police.” See MIP Audition of Alison Des Forges, Tome III, Vol. 2 83. In a subsequent letter to the Mission, however, Des Forges stated that after being questioned by on the matter by members of the Mission, she conducted “a small survey” that convinced her that torture had stopped at the CRCD after the installation of the coalition government in 1992 and that “it is possible that it is the French presence that helped to end the use of torture.” Mukagasana’s testimony contradicts the results of Des Forges’ small survey.

Account taken from interview by LFM with Gerard Nshimyumuremyi.

See Report from the MAM, French Embassy in Rwanda, Actes de terrorisme perpétrés au Rwanda depuis décembre 1991 [Acts of terrorism perpetrated in Rwanda since December 1991] 7, 9 (31 May 1992) (noting that the Rwandan prime minister, an MDR member, “seemed to be completely convinced of the ‘Akazu’s’ guilt in recent acts of terrorism and that it “was within this framework that he asked France to increase its assistance to the judicial police”).

Interview by LFM with François Nsanzuwera.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

Interview by LFM with Liberata Mukagasana.

See, e.g., Memorandum from Jean-Louis Nabias to Bernard Cussac (19 Apr. 1992) (“The field service period took place at the Ruhengeri and Gabiro sites in order to apply the technical and tactical know-how acquired . . . to perform live reconnaissance.”); Memorandum from Jean-Louis Nabias to Bernard Cussac (24 Apr. 1992) (discussing training “that took place at Camp Mukamira and at Gabiro between 1 March and 4 April 1992”); Memorandum from Jean-Louis Nabias to Bernard Cussac (30 April 1992) (noting that “instruction was given by 9 instructor specialists based at the Gabiro Guest House”).

See Prosecutor v. Bernard Munyagishari, Case No. ICTR-05-89-T, Indictment ¶14 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 9 June 2005); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 83 (1999) (identifying Gabiro as a militia training site); Transcript of Interview with Prosper Ngendahimana in Kanombe, Rwanda, 19 Dec. 2002 (interview with FAR soldier who identified Gabiro as a militia training site); Interview by LFM with Vital Mucanda. Mucanda
said he spent about a month at Gabiro at the end of 1992 or the beginning of 1993, where FAR soldiers trained him and other Interahamwe in firearm operation outside of the camp.


392 Former Rwandan Mayor Sentenced to Life Over Role in Genocide, VOICE OF AMERICA, 29 Dec. 2015.

393 Some French military cooperants dressed in Rwandan military uniforms. See MIP Tome I 29.

394 Mucyo Report Sect. 2.2.1; Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Mwumvaneza.

395 Mucyo Report Sect. 2.2.1.

396 Mucyo Report Sect. 2.2.1.

397 Mucyo Report Sect. 2.2.1; Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Mwumvaneza. Additional Rwandan witnesses have provided corroborating testimony. For example, Elias Nkurunzi, another councilor in Muvumba commune, observed the same 1992 meeting between bourgmestre Rwabukome and French soldiers. The similarities in their testimony are striking: both remembered being asked to recruit civilians for training, both traveled by bus to Gabiro, and both received small arms training outside Gabiro. The differences in their testimony were slight; for example, Mwumvaneza recalled training in a valley, but Nkurunzi recalled training in an airplane landing field, and while Mwumvaneza recalled four French soldiers present at the initial meeting, all but one with blackened faces, Nkurunzi recalled only three present and only one with a blackened face. Also worth noting is that Nkurunzi recalled the French soldiers arriving at the initial meeting in a Suzuki Jeep, somewhat consistent with Liberata Mukagasana’s recollection of her colleagues traveling to Mutara in a Land Rover. Mucyo Report Sect. 2.2.1. Another witness, Sylvestre Munyadinda, recounted being recruited by a Muvumba commune councilor to be trained in the use of weapons around June 1992. He recalled boarding a bus for Gabiro and then receiving training in the same place that Nkurunzi identified, Rwangingo. He also recalled that at times white men would inspect their training with high-ranking FAR officers. Initially, Munyadinda did not identify the men as French, only non-Rwandans. Mucyo Report Sect. 2.2.1. During a subsequent interview, however, he referred to them as French, said they wore FAR uniforms and black berets (as did Emmanuel Mwumvaneza), and recalled one of them going by the name Eugene. However, he also placed the date earlier, in July 1991, potentially misremembering due to the passage of time. See Interview by LFM with Sylvestre Munyadinda.

398 Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije. Munyadinda Sylvestre echoed these sentiments when he explained that he trained outside Gabiro to conceal the firearms training from opposition political parties. See Interview by LFM with Sylvestre Munyadinda. And a FAR soldier named Martin Ndamage testified that he saw civilians at Gabiro for training, but when he asked about them, he was told they were forest rangers receiving military training, which he interpreted as a lie intended to conceal the secretive training. Mucyo Report Annexes, Witness Testimony #21, 380.

399 Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

400 Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

401 Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije. Evariste Murenzi, a para-commando in 1992 who in 1993 moved to the Presidential Guard, eventually becoming second-in-command, also received reports of French soldiers training militias in Gabiro, specifying that the training was in the use of small arms such as pistols. See Interview by LFM with Evariste Murenzi.


406 MIP Tome I 1370.


Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

See, e.g., VENUSTE KAYIMAHE, FRANCE-RWANDA: LES COULISSES DU GÉNOCIDE [BACKSTAGE OF A GENOCIDE] 144-45, 157 (2001). Kayimahe named French Adjutants Lebarde and Gratade of the 3rd RPIMa as supervising the training of Interahamwe in 1993 and said that he witnessed French soldiers jogging with militia trainees in the Kigali neighborhoods of Gikondo, Nyamirambo, Kacyiru and Muhima. The MIP noted, however, that Lebarde and Gratade denied Kayimahe’s account and suggested that Kayimahe may have been confused because Lebarde and Gratade had been in charge of training the Presidential Guard (which, in addition to the militias, would play a key role in carrying out the Genocide). MIP Tome I 369. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Rwandan para-commando who was a confidential witness with initials DA at the ICTR’s Military II trial testified to witnessing French soldiers train Interahamwe leaders to use firearms in the Presidential Guard camp in Kimihurura around May 1993. Prosecutor v. Augustin Nindiliyimana et al., Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Transcript of trial proceedings, 24 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 13 Jan. 2005).

Cable from Bernard Cussac and Georges Martres (22 Jan. 1992) (Subject: “Armement des populations civiles”). Although the MIP did not publish the complete document—this NMR does not contain the first [Alpha] section, but picks up with Bravo—this report originated with DA Cussac [FM: “MilFrance Kigali”], and it is assumed that it was sent to “MINDEFENSE Paris” and others military commands; Ambassador Martres is copied on all NMR reports.

Cable from Johan Swinnen (27 March 1992) (Subject: “Rwanda – onlusten Bugesera”).

Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

MIP Tome I 370-71 (referring to the allegation of French soldiers training militias as “never seriously supported to date”); BERNARD LUGAN, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND, L’ARMÉE FRANÇAISE ET LE RWANDA [FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND, THE FRENCH ARMY, AND RWANDA] 95 (2005) (citing Col. Étienne Joubert, who denied during an interview that the DAMI under his command trained militias in Gabiro).

Letter from Juvénal Habyarimana to François Mitterrand 1, 3, 4 (21 Apr. 1992).

See, e.g., Letter from Bernard Cussac to James Gasana (4 May 1992) (suggesting that Habyarimana decorate French soldiers throughout the year in order to ensure that the soldiers are decorated before they leave); Letter from Bernard Cussac to James Gasana (22 May 1992) (requesting awards for various French soldiers); Letter from James Gasana to Juvénal Habyarimana (26 June 1993) (recommending awards for French soldiers).


Letter from Bruno Delaye to Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza (1 Sept. 1992); Bruno Delaye, Reponse de Francois Mitterrand [Response of Francois Mitterrand], ZIRIKANA NO 001, 10 (1 Sept. 1992).

MIP Hearing of Hubert Védrine, Tome III, Auditions, Vol 1, 206-207.
Paul Rwarakabije, then the operational commander of the Rwandan Gendarmerie, has since echoed these sentiments, saying, “It was clear to me that the militia was an alternative force for those who opposed Arusha.” See Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.


Interview by LFM with Protait Musoni.


Letter from A. Mulindabigwi et al to foreign diplomats in Rwanda (18 Sept. 1992) (appended to cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (13 Oct. 1992)). The list of government officials reads like a list of ICTR defendants (plus others who have been accused of planning the Genocide but either died or managed to otherwise escape international justice), including Zigiranyirazo, Bagosora, Rwabukumba, Nsengiumva, Pascal Simbiikangwa (convicted in a French court), Kangura publisher Hassan Ngeze (convicted by the ICTR), ORINFOR director Ferdinand Nahimana (convicted by the ICTR), CDR leader Martin Bucyana, Managing Director of OCIR-Tea Michel Bagaragaza (convicted by the ICTR), bourgmestre of Murambi Jean-Baptiste Gatete (convicted by the ICTR), and Kigali Prefect Tharcisse Renzaho (convicted by the ICTR).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha III”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha III”).

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Memorandum from Augustin Ndindilyimana and Mathias Nsabimana (5 Sept. 1992) (Subject: “Rapport de la Visite Du Chef Em Gd N en Communes Gishyita et Rwamatamu (Kibuye”).

Memorandum from Augustin Ndindilyimana and Mathias Nsabimana (5 Sept. 1992) (Subject: “Rapport de la Visite Du Chef Em Gd N en Communes Gishyita et Rwamatamu (Kibuye”).

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Letter from A. Mulindabigwi et al to foreign diplomats in Rwanda (18 Sept. 1992) (appended to cable from Johan Swinnen to Willy Claes, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs (13 Oct. 1992)).


MIP Tome I 155.


Memorandum from Bernard Cussac to James Gasana (17 May 1993) (Subject: “Poste d’Assistants Militares Techniques Francais au Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Bernard Cussac to James Gasana (17 May 1993) (Subject: “Poste d’Assistants Militares Techniques Francais au Rwanda”).


472 See Excerpts from interview by Laure de Vulpian with Thierry Prungnaud (22 April 2005); LAURE DE VULPIAN & THIERRY PRUNGAUD, SILENCE TURQUOISE [TURQUOISE SILENCE] 74 (2012).


474 Excerpts from interview by Laure de Vulpian with Thierry Prungnaud (22 April 2005) (“I had information that the guys I had trained had actually been involved in the massacres.”).


480 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (25 Nov. 1992) (Subject: “Ceasefire Continues to Hold”) (noting that “both forces have used the ceasefire to reinforce their positions and restock weaponry”).


488 Memorandum from unknown author (28 Oct. 1992) (Subject: “Mise en place du DAMI/GENIE en Rwanda”). This letter appears under the letterhead of the French état-major headed by Admiral Jacques Lanxade and notes, with apparent dismay, that the état major had not received advance notice of the proposed mission.

489 Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana and Anatole Nsengiyumva to James Gasana (8 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Demande de decorations a l’équipe DAMI Genie”).


Cable from Robert Houdek to US Embassy in Kigali and US Embassy in Paris (10 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “French Military Involvement in Rwandan Ceasefire Process”) (describing the digging of foxholes as “a blatant disregard for the ceasefire line”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (25 Nov. 1992) (Subject: “Ceasefire Continues to Hold”).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (4 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “NMOG Reports Ceasefire Violation”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (4 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “NMOG Reports Ceasefire Violation”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (4 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “NMOG Reports Ceasefire Violation”).


Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (9 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Visite au sect OPS BYB”).

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Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (9 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Visite au sect OPS BYB”).

Letter from Deogratias Nsabimana to James Gasana (9 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Visite au sect OPS BYB”). The GOMN had other reasons for being frustrated with the FAR, and with Nsabimana in particular. During his 3 December visit to Byumba, Nsabimana learned that members of the GOMN team there had heard about the controversial document he had circulated to the Rwandan Army troops (the one defining the enemy as Tutsi). See id. at 7. The rumor among the GOMN officers was that the document called for Rwandan soldiers “to continue fighting” in spite of the ceasefire. Nsabimana told the GOMN’s team leader in Byumba “that the document was an ordinary official document defining ENI which was fighting against us,” and authorized the FAR’s Byumba sector commander “to show him the document so that he could see for himself that there was no mention anywhere of the fact that our men must continue with the hostilities at all cost.”

Cable from Raymond Ewing to US Secretary of State (5 Oct. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha IV: Opening Notes”). There had been an earlier round of talks in September 1992, with three French delegates participating as observers. Notably, this group of supposedly neutral French observers included Col. Dominique Delort, who had helped Col. Rosier deliver the armaments and training necessary for the FAR to deploy the 105 mm howitzers against the RPF. See Memorandum from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (3 Sept. 1992) (Subject: “Instructions de la Delegation Qui Participera a la Phase III Des Negotiations D’Arusha (7 – 16 Septembre 1992)”).

Cable from Raymond Ewing to US Secretary of State (5 Oct. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha IV: Opening Notes”).

Cable from Raymond Ewing to US Secretary of State (5 Oct. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha IV: Opening Notes”).


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514 Memorandum from Jean Marc de La Sablière (21 Oct. 2019) (Subject: “Politique de la France au Rwanda”).

515 Memorandum from Jean Marc de La Sablière (21 Oct. 2019) (Subject: “Politique de la France au Rwanda”).

516 Memorandum from Jean Marc de La Sablière (21 Oct. 2019) (Subject: “Politique de la France au Rwanda”).

517 Memorandum from Jean Marc de La Sablière (21 Oct. 2019) (Subject: “Politique de la France au Rwanda”).


523 Juvénal Habyarimana, Speech delivered in Ruhengeri (16 Nov. 1992) (Note that several other sources indicate this speech actually occurred 15 November 1992). See, e.g., Persons Displaced Following Interahamwe Attacks, 73 ISIBO 3 (29 Nov. 1992); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (25 Nov. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha Delays”).


527 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 284-85 (2019).

528 Persons Displaced Following Interahamwe Attacks, 73 ISIBO 3 (29 Nov. 1992).


530 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (25 Nov. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha Delays”).


532 Leon Mugesera, Speech delivered at MRND meeting in Kabaya (22 Nov. 1992), in 77 ISIBO 5-9 (29 Nov. 1992).

533 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (27 Nov. 1992) (Subject: “Prime Minister Takes Steps to Improve Internal Security”).


535 Leon Mugesera, Speech delivered at MRND meeting in Kabaya (22 Nov. 1992), in 77 ISIBO 5-9 (29 Nov. 1992).

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540 Leon Mugesera, Speech delivered at MRND meeting in Kabaya (22 Nov. 1992), in 77 ISIBO 5-9 (29 Nov. 1992).
541 See Radio Interview with Agathe Uwilingiyimana, transcription by INFORDOC-MINAFFET (11 May 1992).
542 Leon Mugesera, Speech delivered at MRND meeting in Kabaya (22 Nov. 1992), in 77 ISIBO 5-9 (29 Nov. 1992).
545 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (27 Nov. 1992) (Subject: “Prime Minister Takes Steps to Improve Internal Security”).
546 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State 7 (Dec. 2, 1992) (Subject: “Canadian Missionary Killed”); Memorandum from Stanislas Mbonampeka to the National Security Court, Kigali (25 Nov. 1992) (Subject: “Injonction de pourrsuivre” [Injunction to persecute]).
547 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State, 7 (Dec. 2, 1992) (Subject: “Canadian Missionary Killed”).
549 Letter from Ubalijoro Bonnventureto to Juvénal Habyarimana (2 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Massacre des innocents, venalisme et pilage en Commune Shyorongi par les Interahamwe (malice du MRND)”).
550 Letter from Ubalijoro Bonnventureto to Juvénal Habyarimana (2 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Massacre des innocents, venalisme et pilage en Commune Shyorongi par les Interahamwe (malice du MRND)”).
552 THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE: RWANDA 1990-1994, Annotated Transcript, 24 (2 June 2014); see also Letter from Boniface Ngulinzira to Juvénal Habyarimana (Subject: “Demande d’ordres de mission de la delegation du Gouvernement Rwandais pour les negociations avec le FPR prevues a Arusha du 23 Novembre au 20 Decembre 1992”) (identifying Kanyarushoki and Bagosora as part of the delegation of which Ngulinzira was the chief).
554 THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE: RWANDA 1990-1994, Annotated Transcript, 25 (2 June 2014); see also Letter from Boniface Ngulinzira to Juvenal Habyarimana (Subject: “Demande d’ordres de mission de la delegation du Gouvernement Rwandais pour les negociations avec le FPR prevues a Arusha du 23 Novembre au 20 Decembre 1992”) (identifying Kanyarushoki and Bagosora as part of the delegation of which Ngulinzira was the chief).

559 See Cable from Walter Curley Jr. to US Secretary of State (16 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “A/S Cohen’s Discussions with the French on Rwanda, December 14”) (“Rwandan President Habyarimana is nervous and feels like he is in trouble.”).

560 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Consultations with French on Rwanda”).

561 Letter from Juvenal Habyarimana to Francois Mitterrand (5 Dec. 1992) (observing that pro-Hutu right-wingers seemed “to take a very negative view of any concession” that would secure for the RPF a “prominent place” in the government).


573 Cable from Walter Curley Jr. to US Secretary of State (16 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “A/S Cohen’s Discussions with the French on Rwanda, December 14”).

574 Cable from Walter Curley Jr. to US Secretary of State (16 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “A/S Cohen’s Discussions with the French on Rwanda, December 14”).

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576 Cable from Walter Curley Jr. to US Secretary of State (16 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “A/S Cohen’s Discussions with the French on Rwanda, December 14”).

577 MIP Tome III Audition of Jean-Christophe Belliard, French Representative to the Arusha Negotiations (2 July 1998).

578 MIP Tome III Audition of Jean-Christophe Belliard, French Representative to the Arusha Negotiations (2 July 1998); Notes on TD Diplomatie (6 January 1993) (Subject: “Negotiations in Arusha, on CDR participation in the enlarged transition government” (“The Department is sympathetic to the arguments you make in support of the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) participating in the expanded transitional government. It seems that a solution to the portfolio allocation problem is only conceivable in that scenario.”)).

579 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (23 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha Agreement: Kigali Reaction”).

580 Meeting of Belgian House Foreign Relations Committee (6 Jan. 1993) (enclosed to Memorandum from Pierre Beaufays to Emmanuel Bahyana Songa and J. Bihozagara (9 Jan. 1993)).

581 Meeting of Belgian House Foreign Relations Committee (6 Jan. 1993) (enclosed to Memorandum from Pierre Beaufays to Emmanuel Bahyana Songa and J. Bihozagara (9 Jan. 1993)).

582 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (23 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha Agreement: Kigali Reaction”).
Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (23 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha Agreement: Kigali Reaction”).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (23 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Arusha Agreement: Kigali Reaction”).


Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora, et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence ¶ 213 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008). The international tribunal that tried Bagosora found that the prosecution, having presented only one confidential witness able to provide direct evidence about the encounter, had not proven the incident “beyond reasonable doubt.” See id. ¶ 222. The court based this determination on the “significant discrepancy” between the witness’s insistence that the encounter took place in October 1992 and the defense’s evidence that Bagosora participated in the Arusha negotiations only in December 1992. Id. ¶¶ 217-18. The court did not conclude that the incident could not have happened; on the contrary, it stated that the discrepancy “could be explained if [the witness] was simply mistaken about when this exchange occurred,” as both the witness and Bagosora had been in Arusha in December 1992. ¶ 218. The witness, later revealed to be Patrick Mazimhaka, the RPF’s commissioner for diplomatic affairs and a member of its delegation in Arusha (see Jacques Morel, La France au Coeur du Genocide des Tutsi [France at the Heart of the Tutsi Genocide] 662 n.69 (2nd ed. 2018)), has continued to maintain that he was in the elevator with Bagosora and heard the remark. See Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed (2nd ed. 2009) (citing Linda Melvern interview with Patrick Mazimhaka (Sept. 2009)); Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder 40 (2004); The National Security Archive, et al., International Decision-Making in the Age of Genocide: Rwanda 1990-1994, Annotated Transcript, 59-60 (2 June 2014). Supporting Mazimhaka’s account is an MDR press release dated 15 January 1993 that reported on Bagosora’s pledge to plan the “apocalypse.” Press Release, MDR, Itangazo No. 34. It is unclear, however, whether the MDR’s account initially came from Mazimhaka.

President Habyarimana believes that the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs did not take into account his observations during the negotiation, and that the RPF “negotiated with friends.” He finds himself, he told our Ambassador, faced with “a fait accompli,” which he won’t be able to get his supporters to accept.

The President feels that he has been cheated, and that preparations are being made for his removal. He could reject the arrangement reached in Arusha. All this is a sign of new unrest in Rwanda, by Hutu extremists in particular.1

– Dominique Pin, Deputy Chief of the Élysée Africa Cell

As Rwandans settled into the new year, all eyes were on the MRND and its ally, the CDR. The former, through its national secretary, Matthieu Ngirumpatse, was continuing to threaten to boycott the coalition government so long as the MRND felt marginalized within it.2 The latter was threatening much worse, fueling fears that its members would disrupt the peace process—through violence, if necessary—unless the negotiators in Arusha acceded to its demands for representation in the new government.3 The two parties had closed out 1992 with a day of demonstrations that shut down key roadways between Kigali and various northern prefectures,4 and there was ample reason to anticipate more disruptions to follow. Tensions were high enough that, on 6 January 1993, when a loud explosion rocked the neighborhood near the US embassy, the Americans immediately suspected that the MRND or CDR was announcing its rejection of the protocol.5 “What a relief to discover the next morning that it was a simply a grenade thrown by a disgruntled client at a businessman’s house,” Ambassador Flaten quipped in a US cable.6

The weeks following the announcement in late December 1992 of a tentative agreement in Arusha had been disquieting. On Christmas Day, in Kigali, a bomb exploded in a crowded nightclub owned by one of President Habyarimana’s sons.7 The club was a known hangout for MRND party members, as well as off-duty French soldiers, four of whom were reportedly injured in the blast.8 Authorities soon arrested two suspects, who, in a twist, turned out to be members of the MRND Interahamwe.9 A few days later, ethnic violence broke out in Gisenyi prefecture, as assailants set houses on fire, slaughtered livestock, and attacked Bagogwe Tutsi residents of the area abutting the Gishwati Forest.10 The attacks presaged many more reprisals to come over the ensuing three months, a spate of ethnic violence that would claim hundreds of lives, spread terror, and visit terrible suffering on Bagogwe Tutsi and opposition Hutu victims.
To their surprise, Western ambassadors found President Habyarimana “amazingly relaxed and jovial” when they joined him for dinner on 7 January 1993.11 (The dinner was billed as a farewell gathering for French ambassador to Rwanda George Martres.12 Habyarimana, though, had lobbied Mitterrand in December to extend Martres’ tour,13 and Mitterrand complied, authorizing Martres to remain in Kigali for an additional three months.14) At the dinner, Habyarimana offered no opinion on the draft protocol then circulating in Arusha, and, according to US Ambassador to Rwanda Robert Flaten, none of the ambassadors at the table felt comfortable advising Habyarimana to accept it.15 Flaten explained:

As Western observers, we are in a very delicate position. It is very difficult for us to openly reject a peace agreement signed by the foreign minister of Rwanda with the authorized representatives of the RPF under the aegis and urging of the government of Tanzania. On the other hand, to urge the president to accept this accord as written is in essence a recommendation that he abdicate. At least that would be his perception of our recommendations.16

Two days later, on 9 January 1993, Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs Boniface Ngulinzira (MDR) and the chief of the RPF delegation, Pasteur Bizimungu, signed an accord that was not much different than the one they backed in December 1992.17 The MRND still retained the presidency and still received the same number of cabinet posts as the RPF, at five apiece.18 The MDR received four posts, including prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, while the PL and PSD received three cabinet posts each.19 The sole remaining spot, which might conceivably have gone to the CDR, did not. The negotiators handed that portfolio to a new beneficiary, the Christian Democratic Party,20 leaving the CDR unrepresented, not only in the cabinet, but in the transitional national assembly as well.

The MRND, as it happens, had previously scheduled a rally for 10 January 1993 at the regional stadium in Kigali, and had dispatched trucks all through the weekend to publicize the event via loudspeaker.21 The turnout, though, proved disappointing, with an estimated crowd of less than 5,000.22 “Those MRND faithful, who hoped that a large show of force would give them leverage, must be disappointed,” a US cable commented.23 Those who came heard speakers slam Ngulinzira and an agreement that, among other perceived failings, excluded the CDR from the new government.24 The speakers threatened, yet again, that they would not participate in a government in which they would not have a significant role to play, though Ngorumpatse, the MRND national secretary, made clear that Habyarimana would not be resigning as president.25

Privately, Habyarimana vented his frustrations to Martres, complaining that the delegation in Arusha had presented him with a fait accompli—one “which he won’t be able to get his supporters to accept.”26 “The President feels that he has been cheated and that preparations are being made for his removal,” Dominique Pin, Bruno Delaye’s new assistant at the Élysée’s Africa Cell, reported in a 14 January 1993 note to President Mitterrand, based on information from Ambassador Martres.27 Pin warned that Habyarimana might reject the deal.28 “All this is a sign of new unrest in Rwanda, by Hutu extremists in particular,” he cautioned, foretelling that Habyarimana’s dissatisfaction would translate into more killing. Mitterrand evidently took the note under advisement, scribbling at the top: “Deal directly with Habyarimana,”29 that is, without Martres as an intermediary.
When Mitterrand wrote to Habyarimana a few days later, he voiced his support for the Arusha process generally, without expressly endorsing the new power-sharing agreement.\textsuperscript{30} Mitterrand assured Habyarimana that he, personally, remained committed to the stability of Rwanda, but Mitterrand did not respond to Habyarimana’s plea, one month earlier, for an intensification of French military support.\textsuperscript{31} That subject remained delicate, in part because the July 1992 cease-fire agreement had called for the withdrawal of foreign troops (not present under bilateral cooperation agreements) upon the effective establishment of the Neutral Military Observer Group.\textsuperscript{32} Mitterrand, in his letter, said he had “made note of the terms” of that agreement.\textsuperscript{33} Even still, he was not prepared to pull the remaining Noroit company, at least not without Habyarimana’s consent. “I do not want anyone to blame France for undermining the proper implementation of the [Arusha cease-fire] agreement,” he wrote, “but I wish to confirm that, on the question of the presence of the Noroit detachment, France will act in agreement with the Rwandan authorities.”\textsuperscript{34}


[T]he report that the mission will deliver at the end of January in Belgium will only add horror to the horror we already know.


The violent backlash to the agreement would come to pass, as Dominique Pin had predicted on 14 January 1993. First, though, came a pause in the bloodshed, as a team of experts in social sciences, law, and medicine from eight countries representing four international human rights NGOs traveled to Rwanda between 7 and 21 January 1993 to investigate alleged ethnic violence and human rights abuses dating back to 1 October 1990.\textsuperscript{35} The group, led by the organization Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (International Federation of Human Rights) and known as the “FIDH Commission,” initiated their investigation at the request of a coalition of Rwandan human rights groups called the Liaison Committee of Associations in Defense of Human Rights in Rwanda (“CLADHO”).\textsuperscript{36} Although a number of Rwandan officials loyal to the MRND fiercely opposed the investigation and attacked it as a hitjob launched by their political opposition\textsuperscript{37} the investigation went ahead. The Commission collected evidence by reviewing documents, speaking to hundreds of witnesses, and excavating mass graves; its members visited five prefectures, being blocked from the others by political demonstrations.\textsuperscript{38} The investigators focused on massacres in Kibilira (October 1990), massacres of Bagogwe in the area around Ruhengeri (January – March 1991), and massacres in Bugesera (March 1992), but collected information on other violence that had occurred in communes throughout the country over that time period.\textsuperscript{39} During its mission, FIDH commission members witnessed the specter of violence hanging over the country, having been stopped themselves by Interahamwe manning a roadblock who threatened to kill their Tutsi interpreter.\textsuperscript{40}
Before leaving Rwanda, Jean Carbonare, a member of the FIDH investigative team and president of French NGO Survie, previewed the Commission’s findings for Ambassador Martres at an in-person meeting, on 19 January 1993. Martres then reported the FIDH’s grim—but hardly surprising, given what France already knew—preliminary findings to the head of the Élysée Africa Cell, Bruno Delaye:

[The mission] has collected an impressive amount of information about the massacres that have occurred since the beginning of the October 1990 war and, in particular, on the Bagogwe (Tutsi ethnic group) after the [RPF’s] Ruhengeri attack in January 1991. As for facts, the report that the mission will deliver at the end of January in Belgium will only add horror to the horror we already know. However, Mr. Carbonare says the mission was able to obtain the confessions of a “repentant” member of the [Hutu] “death squads,” Janvier Africa [sic], currently detained in jail in Kigali for different crimes. These confessions contradict the official thesis until recently accepted and according to which ethnic violence had been provoked by the population’s reaction to [RPF military] attacks seen above all as coming from the Tutsi. According to Janvier Africa [sic], President Habyarimana himself apparently ordered the massacres during a meeting with his collaborators. Mr. Carbonare showed me a list of attendees (the President’s two brothers-in-law [likely referring to Protais Zigiranyirazo and Colonel Elie Sagatwa—ed.], Casimir Bizimungu, Colonels Bagasora [sic], Nsengiyumva, Serubuga, etc. . . .). During this meeting, the operation was apparently planned, including the order to carry out a systematic genocide using, if necessary, assistance from the Army and involving local populations in the assassinations, probably to create a sense of national solidarity in the fight against the ethnic enemy. 

Ambassador Martres continued:

[T]he report will not fail to emphasize the “neutrality” of the French Army in those massacres, considered as proof of French “complicity.” Mr. Carbonare himself is quite hostile to our military presence in Rwanda and would hope this presence be justified by a humanitarian action larger than the mere protection of expatriates. . . Mr. Carbonare would like to meet Mr. Bruno Delaye after January 25. It seems to me that President Mitterrand’s adviser for African Affairs would do well to accept this meeting, given the seriousness of the charges the mission is able to make.

Carbonare did meet with Delaye on 29 January 1993, and the two corresponded again on 1 February 1993. While the French government has not released a report of their meeting (if one exists), Carbonare’s 1 February letter thanking Delaye for the meeting attached excerpts of Janvier Afrika’s testimony, suggesting that Carbonare had covered the same preliminary conclusions with Delaye that he did with Martres. In a book published in 2005, former French DAMI would claim to have investigated Afrika’s claims sometime in early 1993 and found them not credible. The timing and methodology of this purported investigation are unclear, and the reports of investigation are unavailable. But any investigative conclusion that Afrika was unreliable could not have undermined the FIDH’s findings, based on “oral and written testimony from several hundred witnesses,” that “[t]he Rwandan government [had] killed or caused to be killed about 2,000 of its
citizens,” that “[t]he majority of the victims [had] been members of the minority group, the Tutsi,” and that “they [had] been killed and otherwise abused for the sole reason that they [were] Tutsi.” Based on Martres’ reaction that the FIDH findings only “add[ed] horror” to “the horror we already know,” French officials did not doubt them. Indeed, more horror quickly followed.

Between 19 and 20 January 1993, the CDR and the MRND organized massive demonstrations against the Arusha agreement, and those protests rendered large parts of Kigali impassable. On the next day, the day the FIDH fact-finding mission departed Rwanda, anti-Tutsi violence resumed. As Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye later wrote: “With the backing of local authorities, the MRND organized violent protests across the country from 20 to 22 January 1993.” According to a representative from Africa Watch, one of the NGOs that participated in the FIDH investigation, “several [Rwandan] officials had ordered a temporary halt to the violence during the commission’s stay in Rwanda, but had asserted that the violence would resume once the investigation was completed.” After the FIDH Commission left Rwanda, “young Hutus from the [MRND] attacked members of the Tutsi minority ethnic group and members of opposition parties,” injuring and killing dozens. Moreover, “several houses and cars belonging to particular members of opposition parties were ransacked and looted in Kigali.” In response to reports of this violence, “Habyarimana offered no condemnation of the violence and treated it as the result of popular displeasure with the most recent version of the Arusha Accords.”

During this new wave of violence, the FIDH was particularly concerned about reprisals against “the many Rwandans who have assisted its work, either by providing testimony or by collaborating in its research.” On 27 January 1993, Africa Watch reported:

The father of one witness is dead, either by suicide or murder, after a crowd attacked his house in retribution for his son’s assistance to the Commission. Many others associated with the Commission have been threatened with death, including one who was menaced in full view of Commission members as they boarded their plane to leave Rwanda. At the church of Nyamata [a site where Tutsi seeking refuge were gunned down during the Bugesera massacres—ed.] where the Commission was taking testimony, witnesses awaiting their turn to speak were photographed by an agent of the secret service.

One of the Commission’s partners wrote in a private letter, two days after leaving Rwanda, that she had been threatened by Captain Pascal Simbikangwa—relative of the Habyarimanas and member of the Akazu, who in 2014 would become the first Rwandan génocidaire to be convicted in France—as the Commission members were departing. Simbikangwa, she wrote, warned her at the airport that “if he’s included in the Commission’s report, he was going to kill us.”

The resurgence of violence was well reported in France. On 28 January 1993, Le Monde republished an AFP article reporting that “at least 53 people, mostly members of the Tutsi ethnic group, were killed in a week . . . in northwestern Rwanda.” The prime minister “implicated young Hutu militants” connected to the MRND. The next day, Le Monde published a longer article, updating the number of deceased to 80 and placing the number of wounded at “several hundred.” (The numbers would continue to rise with Le Monde publishing a third article on 5 February 1993, estimating the number killed between 120 and 150, and Libération, on 8 February 1993,
estimating the number at 300 in “killings . . . orchestrated by those close to the President.”\textsuperscript{64} The French external intelligence service, the General Directorate of External Security (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, or DGSE), would eventually put the number at 300 or more.\textsuperscript{65}

The FIDH report had urged “\textit{both} the Rwandan government and the RPF to halt the\[ir\] abuses and to bring to justice those guilty for past violations,” having assessed that the RPF had, on various occasions, “attacked civilian targets and . . . killed and injured civilians.”\textsuperscript{66} The Commission did not, however, equate the alleged misconduct of some RPF troops with the organized massacres of Tutsi perpetrated by the government. There was no equivalence. In a 28 January 1993 interview on the French TV channel France 2, Jean Carbonare compared the killings of Tutsi in Rwanda to the ethnic cleansing taking place in the Balkans. “What we have discovered, too, and this is just like [what happened in] Yugoslavia: all the women from the Tutsi minority see their husbands, their brothers, their fathers being killed. [T]hey then become like abandoned animals: raped and abused.”\textsuperscript{67} Carbonare insisted on the organized nature of the violence:

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\text{[T]here was talk of ethnic confrontation[s], but in reality, there is much more than ethnic confrontation; it is an organized policy . . . because in several regions of the country incidents are breaking out at the same time . . . in the preliminary report that our committee has prepared, we spoke of ethnic cleansing, of genocide, of crimes against humanity, and we highly insist on these words.}\textsuperscript{68}
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Carbonare exhorted France to use its influence in Rwanda to stop these massacres: “\textit{Our country, which militarily and financially supports this system, has a responsibility . . . Our country can, if it wants, influence this situation.}”\textsuperscript{69}

The next day, Ambassador Martres sent a cable copied to the Armée Paris (the abbreviation used in official French cables referring to the French Armies chief of staff—land, air, and marine) in which he discussed the French diplomatic ongoing monitoring of the violence in Ruhengeri.\textsuperscript{70} According to Martres, while the violence that began the week previous had slowed, killings that took place on the night of the 27 January 1993 caused 400 Tutsi refugees to flee their homes and leave everything behind them.\textsuperscript{71} Martres’ cable detailed examples of destruction perpetrated against Tutsi in the area. Martres relayed a conversation his colleague had with the bishop of Gisenyi in which the bishop estimated that the number of deaths in January 1993 came to about 120.\textsuperscript{72} The bishop had been accosted by Ierahamwe who threatened to push him in his car into a ravine.\textsuperscript{73}

The US State Department threatened diplomatic action against the Rwandan government. Washington instructed Ambassador Flaten to remind President Habyarimana that it was his responsibility “to control the violence, particularly that part of which is carried out by the MRND youth” and to warn him that “such violence if continued could jeopardize our ability to carry out economic assistance work in Rwanda.”\textsuperscript{74} A week later—after French-embassy staff coordinated a fact-finding mission in the northwest with their American and Belgian counterparts, which produced a scathing report, according to Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda Johan Swinnen\textsuperscript{75}—France joined a joint demarche from diplomats from Belgium, the United States, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and the European Community, urging the Rwandan government to stop the violence and noting that the climate of insecurity and violence threatened international
humanitarian and development assistance.76 The “donor countries” delivered the demarche in person during a meeting on 5 February 1993 with President Habyarimana, who pledged to replace officials complicit or negligent.77 At the meeting, Ambassador Martres told Habyarimana that “if he did not change some officials immediately, his response would not be understood overseas.”78 “We have seen for two years,” Martres continued, “that there have been incidents of this sort, and no one has been punished.”79 Martres would, in fact, send a cable to Paris that same day with information about recent “inter-ethnic massacres” in Gisenyi. The cable explained that the attacks, which had been instigated by the CDR and “MRND/Interahamwe,” were in keeping with a long history in Rwanda of fomenting “ethnic quarrels for political purposes.”80 Throughout that history, he wrote, “[t]he local authorities have been, with a few exceptions, deficient or complicit.”81

Even though French officials joined other Western diplomats in expressing their displeasure through the joint demarche, they demanded nothing further of the Rwandan government and continued to support the Rwandan president for the remainder of the year and beyond.

Following the demarche, Habyarimana took cosmetic steps to address the violence.82 As Bruno Delaye told the MIP, after the 5 February meeting:

The [Rwandan] President. . . announced the arrest of [150] perpetrators. . . their bringing to justice and sanctions against the failing local authorities, and on February 8, the Rwandan Government announced the suspension of the prefect of Gisenyi [where a significant part of the violence had taken place—ed.], a sub-prefect and six mayors.83

During his MIP hearing, Bruno Delaye emphasized these and similar efforts, presumably to explain why France felt enough was being done. While eleven MRND and CDR officials were suspended—including Leon Mugesera, the counselor in the Ministry of Family who had incited violence with his fiery 22 November 1992 speech—the core extremist leaders who would lead the Genocide—like Simbikangwa and Bagosora—remained in place.84 And, as the DGSE would conclude in an 18 February note, there were two possible explanations for the massacres:

According to the first, it is one element in the vast “ethnic purification” program directed against the Tutsi, the planners of which are allegedly individuals close to the Head of State, or at least influential MRND and CDR figures, and which was taken over by prefects and mayors.

The second explanation lies in the opposition to the democratic process by those . . . in power, who do not hesitate to rekindle old ethnic demons in order to derail any progress in the democratic process.85

Either way, Habyarimana’s supposed crackdown on the perpetrators of anti-Tutsi violence was just theater; the people most responsible for the massacres remained at large, and their work was far from done. In late February 1993, opposition leaders in Rwanda would be alarmed to learn that the Rwandan Army, not long after a Habyarimana speech warning that the RPF was sending spies to Kigali and was preparing to massacre civilians,86 had begun distributing weapons to
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communal-level “civil defense units.” Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye, a moderate, told US diplomats he feared the arms had been given to the CDR and MRND Interahamwe in Ruhengeri and would be used for ethnic or political killings. The Americans pressed the Rwandan military authorities about it and confirmed, on 2 March, that the Army had handed out 300 weapons (G3 battle rifles, apparently) and 18,000 rounds of ammunition, mostly to MRND and CDR supporters. Defense Minister Gasana, who soon received orders to confiscate the illegally distributed weapons, at first defended the operation by telling US Ambassador Flaten its purpose “was to protect against RPF infiltrators and against deserters who pillage and kill civilians as they proceed from the battle front.” He later told the ambassador that the order to distribute the weapons had been issued under false pretenses by his cabinet director, Colonel Bagosora.

C. When the RPF Launched Its 8 February 1993 Counter-Offensive in Response to the January 1993 Ethnic Killings, the French Government Increased Military Support of the FAR with Another 120 French Troops and More Weaponry.

This situation is disastrous: it provides an avenue to the RPF, which, with Ugandan military support, Belgian sympathy for the Tutsis, [and] an excellent system of propaganda emphasizing the wretched abuses committed by extremist Hutu, . . . continues to score points militarily and politically.


The RPF, for its part, was losing faith in its agreements with the government. In Kampala, during a 27 January 1993 meeting with US Ambassador to Uganda Johnnie Carson, one of the RPF’s representatives warned that “the option of ceasefire [was] increasingly becoming more expensive in terms of human loss. . . . We think we can no longer sit back and watch Habyarimana’s regime kill our people indiscriminately.”

From the RPF’s perspective, President Habyarimana’s ridicule of the peace negotiations (having referred to them in November 1992 as “mere pieces of paper”) and the massacres of Tutsi civilians in January 1993 broke the cease-fire. On 8 February 1993, the RPF took action. Responding not only to the recent anti-Tutsi massacres, but also to the Rwandan government’s role in enabling them, the RPF countered the state’s facilitation of the massacres with an offensive into northern Rwanda. In the early morning hours on the 8th, the RPF troops circled past the demilitarized zone and initiated their attack behind FAR lines, first advancing into three sectors in northern Rwanda, then entering the town of Ruhengeri, and finally attacking two more sectors in Byumba.

The RPF troops would advance quickly over the coming days, nearly doubling their territory in the initial offensive. The advance stopped only once it reached the tactically advantageous position in the mountains overhanging the capital, about 30 kilometers from Kigali. By 18 February 1993, RPF troops had conquered more than a dozen strategic positions including bridges, roads, and hills, effectively gaining control of two axis roads to Kigali.
In an interview with a Christian Science Monitor reporter embedded for four days with the RPF troops during the second week of the offensive, Paul Kagame, chairman of High Command of the RPF forces, would explain the move as a reaction to the massacres, which he saw as a political tool used by Habyarimana to repudiate an unsatisfactory agreement in Arusha:

MONITOR: What were the Objectives of your latest offensive, and did you achieve them?

KAGAME: The objectives were limited. They were to send a strong signal to the government that while we are pursuing a peace process they must respect it. They have been repudiating the agreements that we reached in Arusha. You must have heard about the recent massacres [in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri districts] that were instigated by the government.

MONITOR: Yes. What are your figures of the people massacred?

KAGAME: Anything between 300 and 400. This is not the first time they have done this, they killed people in Bugyesira, and Kibilira near Gisenyi and also killed the Bagogwe people in the Gisenyi area. We thought these killings would die out as we pursued the peace process but they did not. So we could not be indifferent; just stand by and watch.

MONITOR: What was the political motive for these killings in your view?

KAGAME: It was intimidation. During the power sharing negotiations in Arusha, President Habyarimana’s party (Republican National Movement for Democracy and Development—MRND) was trying to include an extremist Hutu party (Coalition for the Defense of the Republic—CDR) in the government. That would have resulted into a pro-Habyarimana majority in the cabinet, so we refused on the basis that we could not allow a sectarian party in the government. So, when the agreement was signed leaving CDR, the MRND was trying to show its strength, combined with CDR’s, could make things go wrong in the country; that there would be no stability hence the massacres. The government instigated MRND and CDR supporters to kill members of the opposition parties and fanned ethnic violence against the Tutsis.\footnote{102}

Four days after the RPF launched its offensive, the spokesperson of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs pushed back on the RPF narrative by expressing firm support for the Habyarimana government, accusing the RPF of breaking the cease-fire,\footnote{103} and rejecting the deterrence of state-sponsored massacres of Tutsi civilians\footnote{104} as a legitimate basis for the resumption of hostilities:

We are aware of the reasons invoked by the RPF to explain the attack. France does not consider the given reasons [to be] a justification for the resumption of fighting, even if France condemns, in Rwanda as elsewhere, all violations of human rights. We have taken note of the measures taken by the Rwandan authorities to restore security in the north of the country.\footnote{105}
Yet, four days after the statement, a 16 February 1993 US cable reported ongoing state-sponsored human rights abuses in northern Rwanda, suggesting that the measures taken by Rwandan authorities had been inadequate. This included unlawful arrests of “suspected RPF supporters . . . linked with severe beatings and reports of extrajudicial killings;”\(^{106}\) the abduction by Rwandan soldiers of three students from a Seventh Day Adventist University Campus north of Gisenyi (The bodies of the students, all Bagogwe Tutsi, would later be found near the school.\(^{107}\); the FAR arrest of 24 suspected RPF accomplices in Gisenyi and Gitarama, twelve of whom were severely beaten before being released,\(^{108}\) and “unconfirmed reports” of “suspects” taken to the Kigali Military Camp where three to five may have been killed.\(^{109}\)

For senior French officials, an RPF military advance always summoned urgency that ethnic massacres did not. Late in the morning on the first day of the offensive, 8 February 1993, French officials held a crisis meeting at the Foreign Ministry.\(^{110}\) General Quesnot and Bruno Delaye submitted their proposal for approval to President Mitterrand:

1 - On the diplomatic level:

- reminder of our support of the Arusha process and condemnation of this unilateral breaking of the cease-fire (statement from the Quai spokesperson)
- warned Museveni (President of Uganda): Mr. Dumas [minister of foreign affairs] should call him on the phone.

We will also alert Washington, London, and Brussels.

2 - On the military level:

- reinforcement of our support for the Rwandan Army, with the exception of any direct participation of French forces in the confrontations;
- delivery of ammunition and equipment;
- technical assistance, especially with artillery;
- one company was put on alert at six o’clock in case the security of the French community requires its intervention.\(^{111}\)

Mitterrand recorded his response by hand: “Agreed. Urgent[.].”\(^{112}\) The same day, France dispatched a company of approximately 120 soldiers from the 21st regiment of the marine infantry (“RIMa”),\(^{113}\) commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Philippe Tracqui since 1992\(^{114}\) and stationed in Bouar, Central African Republic at the time.\(^{115}\) Lt. Col. Tracqui’s company landed in Kigali on 9 February 1993 to reinforce the single Noroit company remaining after the departure of a company in November 1992, raising the number of Noroit troops from 170 to 291.\(^{116}\)
More aircraft would soon follow, bearing weapons for the Rwandan Army. On 12 February, a Douglas DC-8 jet airliner delivered fifty 12.7 mm machine guns and 100,000 cartridges for the FAR—gratis from the French Ministry of Defense. Five days later, when another French plane landed, members of the FAR “discreetly” unloaded from it a delivery of 105 mm shells and 68 mm rockets.

These shipments were among 8.4 million French francs (approx. $1.5 million) worth of weapons and military equipment the French government provided free-of-charge to the Rwandan military in 1993, much of it arriving in the weeks following the 8 February offensive. For example:

- On 24 February, the French Ministry of Cooperation donated 200 68-mm helicopter rockets to Rwanda.
- On 5 March, the French Ministry of Defense authorized the no-cost transfer of 2,000 81-mm shells and 1,000 60-mm shells to Rwanda.
- On 9 March, the French Ministry of Cooperation donated 1,000 shells for 120-mm mortars to Rwanda.

France provided another 6 million French francs (approx. $1.1 million) in direct, for-payment shipments over the course of the year.

Despite the assistance provided by the French government, General Quesnot remained pessimistic about the FAR’s viability. “The Rwandan Army,” Quesnot wrote in a 13 February 1993 letter to President Mitterrand “will not be able to resist the [RPA]. Our logistical aid, otherwise rather weak with respect to needs, will not compensate for the existing balance of power.” Bruno Delaye also seemed to view weaknesses in the Habyarimana regime as more concerning than abuses committed against Tutsi: “This situation is disastrous,” he wrote regarding discord amongst Rwandan leadership in a 15 February 1993 letter to President Mitterrand. “It provides an avenue to the RPF, which, with Ugandan military support, Belgian sympathy for the Tutsis, [and] an excellent system of propaganda that is based on the wretched abuses committed by extremist Hutu, . . . continues to score points, militarily and politically.”

The cause of the RPF’s military response—the government’s role in ongoing anti-Tutsi massacres—did not merit mention in the notes written to the President by either General Quesnot (a military leader) or Bruno Delaye (a diplomat). It did not merit mention even in 1998, when Bruno Delaye described the moment to the MIP. In his testimony, Delaye focused on what he characterized as the RPF’s violation of the cease-fire and their quick advance by choosing to cast the events as unjust on the side of the RPF and urgent with respect to the FAR. He said that Mitterrand deemed it necessary to augment the FAR’s fighting power in order to “compel the RPF to renounce the armed fight, but also because it was feared that its [the RPF’s] offensive might trigger a logic of ethnic reprisals on the part of the FAR, replacing a conventional military defense strategy.” Foreshadowing its policy during the Genocide, French senior leaders—rather than press their allies in the Rwandan government to stop the massacres—developed a strategy to defeat the RPF as a round-about means of discontinuing the mass murder of Tutsi civilians.
French decisionmakers seemed indifferent to even the practical (to say nothing of moral) value of prioritizing the prevention of massacres. Such “a humanitarian action larger than the mere protection of expatriates”—in the words of French Ambassador to Rwanda Georges Martres, referring to the hopes of Jean Carbonare, the head of the FIDH mission—might have not only kept the RPF at the negotiating table, but revived its trust in French intentions. But France’s agreement was to provide military support to its ally, and honoring that agreement was its priority both to protect its interests in the region and to signal its fidelity to allies around the continent. Intervention against the government to protect human rights might have scrambled the message President Mitterrand and his advisors wanted to send. As a result, his government met massacres with “tut tuts” and met the RPF with force.

D. Even a Mission to Evacuate Foreign Nationals from Ruhengeri Served the Unstated French Goal of Deterring the RPF.

The same morning the RPF launched its advance on Ruhengeri, 8 February 1993, French forces stationed in and around Ruhengeri initiated a mission, known as Operation Volcan, to evacuate French nationals and other expatriates from the southern limits of Ruhengeri. Stepping into the combat zone would invite accusations of taking part in the fight. Whether or not those accusations were true, the presence of French forces in the field of battle would remind the RPF that their new offensive could draw French troops into the fight.

On 8 February, DAMI soldiers participating in Volcan were following FAR soldiers toward Ruhengeri when they encountered heavy opposition by the RPF military. Upon the DAMI’s counsel, a FAR company launched about a dozen 60 mm mortar shells on the perceived RPF targets. Even so, the RPF Army kept the French forces from reaching the city. In Kigali, the next day, 9 February, French officials conferred with Rwandan commanders and concluded that, given RPF military positions around Ruhengeri, “a force action to recover foreign nationals could not be considered without serious fire support from the 105 FAR cannons and, if possible, a patrol of French jaguars [fighter jets].”

Late in the afternoon of 9 February, the French commanders learned that the RPF Army had made “courteous contact” with French forces to indicate the RPF was ready to let foreign nationals safely leave the city. The French commanders passed the information to Paris, where, by midnight, officials in the Army état-major, who had considered and rejected more belligerent options, such as a warning pass by French fighter jets, opted to attempt to broker an agreement between the RPF and the FAR in order to allow a Noroît detachment to exfiltrate foreign nationals.

Following negotiations held on 10 February 1993, French troops, accompanied by Major General Opaleye, commander of the OAU-led GOMN, successfully extracted 67 expatriates from an agreed-upon meeting point. Opaleye was the same GOMN commander who had in December 1992 accused DAMI forces of a cease-fire violation, and Col. Bernard Cussac, who commanded both Noroît and the DAMI, quickly alerted Paris that Opaleye had been accompanied by a cameraman who had photographed, amongst other scenes, “Noroît in gathering position on the road 3km south of Ruhengeri in the middle of a FAR attack device.” Indeed, on 16 February
1993, *AFP* and *Reuters* would jointly report a statement from the OAU, which oversaw the GOMN, as follows:

“French troops have bombed rebel positions south of Ruhengeri,” said the OAU representative, a member of an international military mission charged with the task of upholding the bilateral ceasefire signed last year in Arusha, in Tanzania. “The French troops are stationed in Nyakinama, about 80 kilometers from the capital Kigali,” the spokesman said. A second testimony, from someone close to the Rwandan government, said that French troops bombed rebel positions with “sophisticated weapons.”

Rwandan Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye, who presumably had received similar information days before the *AFP* and *Reuters* articles broke, reportedly remarked to Belgian Ambassador Johan Swinnen on the day of the evacuation that “there are among these French some soldiers who like to shoot.”

France denied direct engagement in the fight, telling *Reuters* that “the highest (French) political authority is categorically opposed to French troops getting involved on the ground,” and that “[w]e did not take part in the fighting.” But whether French soldiers shot at the RPF forces during Operation Volcan, or, instead, simply trained FAR soldiers to shoot and then directed them on when and how to shoot, is of little moral significance. As the MIP report acknowledged, French troops

intervene[d] very closely with the FAR in the field[,] . . . continuously participated in the development of battle plans, provided advice to the chief of staff and to the sectors’ commands, proposing restructuring and new tactics . . . dispatched advisers to instruct the FAR in the use of sophisticated weapons[,] . . . [and] taught techniques of laying traps and mines, suggesting the most appropriate locations for them.

French troops, whether or not they ever pulled a trigger, were co-combatants with their FAR allies.

Even a mission, like Volcan, devoted to the French intervention’s stated goal of protecting French nationals in Rwanda, furthered the unstated goal of stopping the RPF. To Bruno Delaye, this was intentional. In a 15 February 1993 note to President Mitterrand, Delay referred to the “ambiguity” of French troop deployment in Rwanda “as necessary for a good deterrent”—i.e., if the RPF did not know France’s true mission, it would have to assume the mission was to stop the RPF.

E. **Disregarding His Defense Minister’s Objections, Mitterrand Ordered the French Army to Reinforce Noroît.**

While the FAR had managed to regain much of the city of Ruhengeri by 11 February 1993, the RPF retained large gains throughout northern Rwanda. During the initial phase of its offensive, the RPF nearly doubled the land it controlled. With RPF forces in the mountains overhanging the capital roughly 30 km north of Kigali, General Quesnot described, in a brief
note to President Mitterrand on 11 February 1993, the situation at the front as “worrying.” Or, as Bruno Delaye put it in a message to President Mitterrand a few days later, “According to our officers in KIGALI, the RPF is militarily in a position to take KIGALI.”

On 15 February 1993, a week after the RPF launched its offensive, Bruno Delaye advised Mitterrand that France was “at the limit of the strategy of indirect support to the forces of the Rwandan Army.” He worried that the FAR could not resist an RPF attempt to take Kigali, leaving France with “no other choice than to evacuate KIGALI (the official mission of our two infantry companies is to protect expatriates), unless we become co-belligerents.” Mitterrand would decide that, rather than evacuate, France should become a co-belligerent.

By 15 February, the RPF was fighting the FAR 30 kilometers from the capital city. And by 18 February, panic in Kigali and Paris reached a fever pitch. A cable sent that day from the Rwandan embassy in Kampala warned that the “Inkotanyi [RPF] are determined to go up to the end and to grab power by force. They are saying they have reached a point of no return.” The cable warned of reinforcements coming from Uganda and pleaded for “an emergency mobilization of all volunteers in order to be able to contain the RPF advance and to force them to return to their known positions before [8 February 1993].” To General Quesnot, the stakes were clear. In an 18 February note to Mitterrand, Quesnot reminded the president of what France stood to lose in the event of an RPF victory: “If we do not find sufficient pressure to stop Museveni, who has implicit British support, the French-speaking front will be permanently damaged and compromised in the region.”

That evening, in Paris, a meeting was held with Admiral Lanxade, General Quesnot, and the secretary general of the Quai d’Orsay. Delaye’s deputy, Dominique Pin, reported on the meeting to Mitterrand, setting out the same choice Delaye had presented on 15 February: withdraw or join the fight by sending 1,000 men to protect Kigali “mainly.”

Pin showed his distaste for evacuation, emphasizing the message evacuation would send to other allies in Africa: “President Habyarimana’s power should not survive this departure, which will be interpreted as the failure of our policy in Rwanda. All this will not be without consequences for our relations with other African countries.” In closing his note, Pin again emphasized the role of French interests elsewhere in Africa: “[I]t would also be good if we could obtain the support of Presidents Houphouet-Boigny (Ivory Coast), Abdou Diouf (Senegal), and [Omar] Bongo (Gabon) before any intervention in Rwanda.”

By the next morning, 19 February, Habyarimana had called Paris to say that “Ugandan involvement in the RPF is such that, according to cross-checked information, the Rwandan forces will not be able to hold the present lines near KIGALI for much longer.” He requested “a rapid intervention by French troops to stop the rebel offensive and prevent the RPF from taking Kigali.”

Habyarimana’s urgent plea was out of step with what other observers were seeing, which, by and large, was simply more of the same, and not the imminent fall of Kigali. France’s intelligence service, the DGSE, predicted no imminent attack in the report it had drafted the day before (18 February). It did not mention Ugandan support and even noted that the RPF forces
could retake Ruhengeri “if they wanted to,” but had not yet done so—a restraint inconsistent with the bloodthirsty opponent portrayed in the cable from the Rwandan embassy in Kampala.161

What France seems not to have known is that the RPF forces were running low on ammunition and were having trouble replenishing their supplies. In an interview, Paul Kagame recalled that the RPF had purchased a large quantity of ammunition that, though acquired from sources outside Uganda, would need to be transported through Ugandan territory to reach the RPF troops in Rwanda.162 President Museveni refused, however, to release the shipment to the RPF.163 As Kagame recalled, Museveni, who was under tremendous pressure from the international community (including France) to use his leverage to stop RPF forces from taking Kigali,164 demanded that the RPF stop its advance.165 Kagame, as previously noted, said in February 1993 that the objectives of RPF’s offensive were “limited” and intended to “send a strong signal” to the Habyarimana regime to respect the peace process.166 Agreeing to Museveni’s demand, which Kagame did,167 was consistent with these objectives. Museveni withheld the shipment long enough to ensure the RPF honored its promise.168

French leaders continued to see an emergency, and their information appears to have come directly from President Habyarimana. Determined to act, Pin and Quesnot presented Mitterrand with three options.169 The first was to evacuate French nationals.170 The second involved sending two companies to protect French and other foreign nationals, which had the added benefit of sending “a clear message to the RPF to curb its appetite.”171 The third was to “dispatch a larger contingent, de facto prohibiting the RPF from taking Kigali and allowing [FAR] units to reestablish their positions along the previous cease-fire line.”172 This third option would require a request from the Rwandan government specifying “that the country [was] the victim of external aggression.”173 Pin and Quesnot blatantly counseled mission creep: “For now, we support solution 2, which, in case of failure, could form a base structure for solution 3. These two solutions, each accompanied by intense diplomatic action, could, at the opportune moment, allow us to withdraw under more dignified conditions.”174 As Pin had done in his earlier note, he and Quesnot again invoked relations with Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Gabon:

[Solution 3] would require both an external Rwandan request stating that the country is a victim of external aggression and consultation with Presidents HOUHOUET-BOIGNY, ABDOU DIOUF, and BONGO. It would have the advantage of showing our determination to resolve the Rwandan crisis solely by political means. However, it would be the signal for semi-direct involvement.175

A handwritten note by Hubert Vedrine, the President’s principal advisor, indicates that Mitterrand chose Solution 2.176 And an official note by Quesnot confirmed this choice to the chief of staff for the minister of defense, stating misleadingly that the President had decided to send two companies to Rwanda to “ensure the immediate security of our nationals and if necessary other expatriates.”177

The message was not well received by Defense Minister Pierre Joxe. The same day, 19 February, he pushed back in a note to President Mitterrand: “[I]n the absence of an immediate threat to Kigali the two companies that are present, one of which holds the airport, should be sufficient.”178 France had already reinforced Noroît with a second company on 9 February.179 Joxe
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continued: “I remain convinced that we must strictly limit ourselves to the protection of our nationals.”

He warned, “If we let ambiguity shroud the meaning of this movement, the Rwandan presidency will not fail to present it as support from France.”

Thus, Joxe not only questioned the need to send more French troops to Rwanda, but also suggested that doing so could embolden Habyarimana.

President Mitterrand did not heed Joxe’s warning. Over the next two days, 20 and 21 February 1993, 279 additional French troops arrived in Kigali, swelling the number of Noroit troops to 570.

The new arrivals included paratroopers dispatched from the French base in Bangui, Central African Republic and a heavy mortar section stationed in Libreville, Gabon.

The order given these troops was to protect French citizens. “Concerning the use of Noroit,” Lanxade wrote, “it is a question of clearly showing our determination to oppose any threat against our nationals in Kigali.” (Noroit’s numbers would continue growing over the ensuing weeks, rising to 688 troops as of 16 March.)

Admiral Lanxade named Col. Dominique Delort commander of operations in Kigali, placing him in charge of all French troops in Rwanda—effectively replacing Col. Cussac’s command. By superseding Cussac, Delort’s appointment effectively stripped authority from General Varret, because Cussac reported to the French Army’s chief of staff and also to General Varret, while Delort reported only to the Army chief of staff (headed by Admiral Lanxade). That said, Varret had already been sidelined, for all intents and purposes, since July 1991.

F. French Soldiers Manned Checkpoints Alongside Rwandan Gendarmes, Despite a History of Abuses.

Lanxade ordered Delort to “set up a deterrent system at the northern exits of Kigali” on the roads toward Ruhengeri and Byumba. These positions, according to Lanxade, would buy the French forces enough time to retrieve and evacuate French nationals if need be. Lanxade also placed under Delort’s command about 20 special forces of the RAPAS (Airborne Research and Special Action) company of the 1st RPIMA (infantry paratroopers), newly arrived in Kigali on 22 February 1993 with a mission “intended to strengthen our assistance to the RWANDAN command . . . and to ensure advanced guidance of aerial actions.” (See discussion of Operation Chimère below.) Lanxade warned Delort, “You could be called upon to open fire. Whenever possible, if time permits, you will first ask for my authorization.”

Col. Delort placed a heavy mortar section and checkpoints at the outskirts of Kigali. French soldiers manned the checkpoints alongside Rwandan gendarmes, providing “limited action in support” of their Rwandan counterparts. “Suspects” were to be delivered to the Gendarmerie, while GOMN observers were to be restricted from entering the Noroit zone, and French soldiers were not to speak to the press without approval.

French activities at checkpoints, in early 1993 and before, have been the subject of a good deal of controversy. Rwanda is known as the “land of a thousand hills,” and getting from one place to another typically requires travel along the few roads that wind their way through the valleys of those hills. Thus, checkpoints—which typically involved blocking the road and stopping travelers
to check their papers and/or interrogate them—were an effective way of controlling travel, one that had been used before and throughout the war in the early 1990s. 196

By 1993, however, abuses by Rwandan gendarmes at checkpoints was a problem that had been well known to French officials for years. 197 In August 1992, for instance, a collection of French officers, including Col. Bernard Cussac and Lt. Col. Michel Robardey, told Colonel Augustin Ndindiliyimana, the Gendarmerie chief of staff, that the French had received reports of “abuses” at roadblocks manned by Rwandan forces. 198 Robardey highlighted specific roadblocks between Ruhengeri and Gisenyi where, according to the meeting notes, he said Rwandan “soldiers engage in strange behaviour that is not conducive to the public peace they should be striving for.” 199 He posited an excuse for the reports to Ndindiliyimana: in his opinion, Robardey suggested, “such abuses are observed at roadblocks held by [F]AR soldiers” as opposed to the Gendarmerie. 200 If the Gendarmerie takes control over roadblocks from the FAR, he continued, “it will be easy to find out if it is the gendarmes who are holding people to ransom or not.” 201 Also present at this meeting was Col. Alain Damy, who had recently been assigned as the technical advisor to Ndindiliyimana and the head of the French DAMI assistance. 202 Damy informed the Rwandan officer that he intended to visit all of the Gendarmerie units “to have an accurate idea of the reality on the ground.” 203

Past reports were reinforced on 19 February 1993, the day President Mitterrand decided to send additional troops to Rwanda who would, among other things, fortify Rwandan gendarmes at checkpoints. During a meeting of the Gendarmerie état-major that day, Col. Ndindiliyimana intoned that gendarmes manning roadblocks should conduct themselves with “more seriousness” and “respect people.” 204 Col. Damy attended the meeting and would have certainly understood that Ndindiliyimana was responding to reports of abuses at roadblocks because Damy had been aware of such accusations from the beginning of his deployment months earlier and, perhaps, from what he saw during his planned tour of gendarme positions around Rwanda. 205 (Damy also oversaw the French trainers stationed in the Fichier Central where, according to Gen. Paul Rwarakabije, a member of the Gendarmerie état-major, Tutsi were taken for interrogation after being arrested at roadblocks. 206 The Fichier Central, Rwarakabije noted, was commonly referred to as an “abattoir.” 207) A 1 March 1993 cable from Georges Martres reported on a reduction in the number of abuses at roadblocks when French soldiers were present and explained that “there is no more ransoming of passers-by and there are much fewer thefts.” 208

Additional accounts have placed French soldiers as eyewitnesses to abuses against Tutsi at checkpoints throughout the war beginning in 1990, 209 with some accusing French soldiers of facilitating the abuses. Several such accounts were provided to the Mucyo Commission established in 2004 by the Rwandan government to investigate the role of France in the preparation and implementation of the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda. 210 For example, one witness, Emmanuel Nshogozahizzi, recounted:

In 1992, I was in a minibus coming from Kigali with my cousin Mudenge Jean-Baptiste who worked at the Kicukiro Brewery. When we arrived in Mukamira, around 7pm, the French stopped the minibus and asked us for our identity cards. Seeing that my cousin was Tutsi, they took him out and kept him. Since then, I have not seen him again. However, I immediately started searching for him, and my
status as an Interahamwe allowed me to go everywhere, which means that if he had stayed alive, I would certainly have found him, but I never knew what his fate was.211

Another example, not from the Mucyo Commission’s report, comes from Pierre Damien Habumuremyi, the prime minister of Rwanda from 2011 through 2014. Habumuremyi has recounted traveling home to Rwanda in December 1990 for the holidays from Lumbumbashi, Zaire, where he was studying as a university student. At the northeast border town of Gisenyi, he approached a checkpoint “manned by five French officers and two Rwandan soldiers, all armed to the teeth.” Habumuremyi did not have a Rwandan ID card, only a passport that did not list his ethnicity, so the frustrated soldiers told him to return the following day. The next day, Habumuremyi was allowed into the country and boarded a bus to travel the final 80 km home, but his bus was stopped again at a checkpoint outside of Ruhengeri manned by four “combat-armed French soldiers.” The French soldiers ordered all of the passengers to disembark and proceeded “through the gruesome drill of identifying and sorting the passengers along ethnic lines as indicated on the national IDs with the Tutsi being targeted.” While Habumuremyi remembered these encounters in chilling detail, he noted that the experience of other Tutsi was much worse because “[t]hey were either imprisoned, tortured or both and even killed.”

In February and March 1993, French soldiers checked identification at checkpoints outside Kigali. And, per operational orders, they were expected to turn over “suspects” to the Gendarmerie, despite French officials’ knowledge of the rich and recent history of abuses at the hands of the Gendarmerie at checkpoints. Testimony given before the Mucyo Commission and in recent interviews suggests that the Gendarmerie continued to abuse Tutsi travelers detained at roadblocks in February and March 1993. For example, Gen. Rwarakabije told the Mucyo Commission:

In 1993, the French soldiers had a position at Mount Jali in the Gendarmerie camp for the Mobile Intervention Group, which they trained in road security techniques. I remember holding in my hands a report by the camp commander on the screening and arrests carried out at this roadblock by French soldiers. It was in 1993, at the time of the capture of Ruhengeri. The report pointed out that if someone was a Hutu, they let him pass, and when it was a Tutsi, they kept him, abused and insulted him in such humiliating terms: “you stupid Tutsi, cockroach!,” etc. Tutsis underwent very tight questioning there. I even think that the Rwandan gendarmes sometimes beat them up.

In its 1998 report, the French Parliamentary Commission acknowledged the presence of French soldiers at Rwandan Gendarmerie checkpoints. But the report failed to appreciate that when, in February and March 1993, French soldiers manned checkpoints alongside the Rwandan Gendarmerie, French officials knew of the abuses that some Rwandan gendarmes had committed at checkpoints throughout the war. A 2 March 1993 operational order instructed French soldiers not to allow international observers from the GOMN to access the French observation posts at the checkpoints. The order also instructed soldiers manning the checkpoints not to speak to the press. The Parliamentary Commission observed that this secrecy reflected a preference “not to highlight” that French troops were performing a law enforcement function typically reserved for
Rwandan authorities.222 More specifically, however, French officials likely sought to hide from the international community French participation in checking identification for ethnicity. Although reports from Col. Delort and Lt. Col. Tracqui do not suggest that French soldiers turned anyone suspected of being an RPF collaborator over to the Gendarmerie,223 accounts of abuses against Tutsi detained at checkpoints in February and March 1993 (cited above) suggest there was good reason to emphasize secrecy.

Bernard Kayumba224

*Bernard was born on 4 September 1969 in former Kibuye Prefecture.*

The first time I had an encounter with the French that was harmful to me personally was in 1993. This was after the 8 March 1993 RPF Inkotanyi attack on the outskirts of the capital city. At the time, I was a student at the Major Seminary in Kabgayi. I had left my school, boarded a public transport vehicle on my way to visit family friends in Kigali. When I got to Nyabarongo, there was a roadblock manned by French soldiers and Rwandan gendarmes. The taxi was stopped. A French soldier asked me “Tutsi/Hutu?” I kept quiet. He asked me again and I gave him my student ID that did not have my ethnicity. He refused to take it and asked for my national ID. I gave it to him, and he lifted my photo in the ID to read my ethnicity and said “Tutsi.” He added that he knew I was Tutsi because Tutsis were tall with small noses and ordered me to step aside before letting the vehicle continue to Kigali without me.

At the side of the road where I was forced to sit, I found about six other Tutsis. They had similarly been taken out of vehicles. We heard rumors that the soldiers were waiting for our number to increase before transporting us in military trucks to be killed. As luck would have it, a Red Cross vehicle came, and its occupants saved us. They asked why we were sitting by the side of the road. A Rwandan gendarme said we did not have IDs. We heard him say this, and we contradicted him. A white man who worked for the Red Cross came and looked at our IDs. He told the soldiers manning the roadblock that they had lied to him, and that we did have IDs. The man from the Red Cross asked the soldiers to release us. I found a vehicle heading back to Gitarama and boarded it in the presence of the Red Cross staff. I have no doubt if the Red Cross vehicle had not come at that moment, bad things would have happened.

I was very hurt by the French soldier’s actions. How could a foreign soldier deny me my rights in my own country? It was very humiliating that a French soldier, a foreigner in my country, could forcibly remove me from the taxi I was
traveling in because of my ethnicity. All my life, I had been harassed by fellow Rwandans for being Tutsi. I could not understand why a foreigner felt he had to visit the same humiliation upon me. The French identified more with our tormentors than with their victims.

When the Genocide began, I spent many weeks trying to survive and ended up in Bisesero. After fleeing my home following the deaths of my entire family, I ended up in Bisesero with four friends that survived the journey.

When the French came to Kibuye, we saw their helicopters fly over Gishyita, a mere five kilometers from Bisesero. We were hopeful we would be saved. On 27 June, French soldiers came towards Bisesero with trucks and military hardware. Some of the refugees, among them Eric Nzabihimana, a teacher who hailed from Gisovu, stopped the convoy. He was able to communicate in French, and he spoke to the soldiers.

The other refugees and I all left our different hiding places in the bushes and converged around the French convoy by the roadside because we all thought we were about to be rescued by the French. The French soldiers were in the company of Interahamwe who were supposed to show the French that there were no problems in Bisesero and take them to Gisovu. We pleaded with the French to protect us, but they said they would not stay.

For the three days that followed the French soldiers’ departure from Bisesero, the attacks became more vicious and sustained, and survivors were massacred. We had all been hiding in the bushes but when we came out to speak with the French soldiers by the side of the road, our hiding places were exposed to our attackers. On 30 June 1994, the French soldiers came back and took us to a camp in Bisesero.

Because I was one of the leaders of the camp, the French had asked me and the other camp leaders to build a tent next to theirs so they could access us anytime to give instructions to other refugees. I said to one of the French soldiers, “why are you leaving our killers to flee with their weapons? Won’t they continue killing us?” He said to me, “you are no longer the priority; the priority are the Hutus fleeing the war.”

Another painful thing is that even after the French came back to Bisesero on 30 June 1994, Tutsis continued to die in Kibuye. I lost two of my aunts, both named
Felicita, one who was my mother’s older sister, who was killed with her daughter-in-law, her granddaughter and her son in the Bisesero area.

G. French Special Forces Embarked on a Secret Mission to Direct the War Effort for the Rwandan Government.

I am to take indirect command of the FAR, an army of 22,000 men.225


The secrecy surrounding Noroit checkpoints in February 1993 paled in comparison to a secretive mission run parallel to Noroit and initiated the same day: Operation Chimère.226 On 22 February 1993, Colonel Didier Tauzin arrived in Kigali with 20 special forces of a RAPAS (Airborne Research and Special Action) company of the 1st RPIMa (infantry paratroopers).227 The 1st RPIMa, heir to the World War II Special Air Service of the Free French, is a special forces unit that is known for conducting air-to-land missions.228 Since 1970, the paratroopers of the 1st RPIMa had been participating in all major deployments in Africa, and in Rwanda, they participated in Operations Noroit, Chimère, Amaryllis,229 and Turquoise.230 Col. Tauzin succeeded Col. Rosier as commanding officer of the 1st RPIMa in July 1992, while Rosier was in Rwanda standing up the 105mm howitzer battery following the RPF offensive in Byumba (see discussion above).231

Tauzin, who wrote a book on his missions in Rwanda, handpicked 20 men and was given orders by the head of the Army Operational Center, to “at least save Kigali, stop the RPF, and allow the diplomatic process to resume, or at best send the RPF back to where it came from, Uganda.”232 The MIP’s account of the mission was more specific:

- Enhance the technical operation level of the FAR chief of staff and of the commands of at least two sectors;
- Participate in the remote safety of the Noroit operation, whenever the situation requires it;
- Complete the level of training of FAR personnel on scientific equipment;
- Train FAR specialists on new equipment;
- Be able to guide air support.233

As the MIP summarized, “the detachment’s objective was to indirectly supervise and command an army of about 20,000 men.”234 Or, as Tauzin put it, “I am to take indirect command of the FAR, an army of 22,000 men.”235

But “indirect” may not fully capture the extent of his control. According to Tauzin, the FAR’s chief of staff, Col. Déogratias Nsabimana (who would perish in President Habyarimana’s plane at the outset of the Genocide) “was obviously ready to accept whatever I ask him to do. He will put himself de facto under my command and will carry out without fail all the orders that will be prepared for him by Chéreau [Tauzin’s deputy—ed.] who, with two or three officers, will take
over the direction of his staff.” 236 Tauzin teamed French officers with FAR commanders located in the same operational sectors; for example, pairing Augustin Bizimungu, the operation sector commander in Ruhengeri (who would later lead the FAR during the Genocide and be sentenced in the ICTR to 30 years for committing genocide) with Gilles Chollet, the former DAMI commander whose near-appointment in February 1992 as advisor to both the FAR état-major and President Habyarimana had created a furor amongst the Rwandan opposition and in the international press. 237 Pairing other French officers with FAR commanders in Byumba and Rulindo (north of Kigali), Tauzin established “a hierarchy parallel to the Rwandan one,” which allowed him to “effectively direct all Rwandan operations on the entire front, without ever directly engaging my paratroopers in combat, and while remaining incognito because all orders will apparently be written by Rwandan officers.” 238

This last point was critical because Operation Chimère was conducted under strict confidentiality. In providing Tauzin with his orders, the head of the French Army Operational Center emphasized the need to keep the mission out of the press:

There are five of us in confidence: the Head of State, his chief of staff, the Chief of Army Staff (CAS), me . . . and you! Apart from your “Operations” Officer and your Chief of “rens” [intelligence—ed.], no one must know anything before boarding the plane. The press must not know anything, before, during and after! 239

In Tauzin’s appraisal:

It is obvious that this confidentiality was primarily intended not to announce our arrival in the field to the RPF through the press! It is equally obvious that it was intended to preserve the necessary freedom of action of the head of state, President François Mitterrand. Indeed, it’s an understatement to say that abroad we did not only have friends in this venture. 240

In other words, President Mitterrand was well aware that providing operational assistance to the FAR would be unpopular in the press and unpopular with other Western governments, so he proceeded in secrecy.

On 21 February 1993, Tauzin and his men left Parma airport in Biarritz, France, arriving in Kigali around noon the next day, following a short stopover in Bangui. 241 Col. Delort placed the DAMI detachments currently in Rwanda under Tauzin’s command, 69 men in total. 242 And, on his first day in Rwanda, Tauzin flew by helicopter to Ruhengeri to meet with Lt. Col. Augustin Bizimungu, 243 whom he would see several times over the next few weeks. 244 In his 2011 memoir, Tauzin described Bizimungu—sector chief in Ruhengeri at the time of their first meeting and later commander of the FAR during the Genocide, who ultimately was convicted of genocide before the ICTR—as “a remarkable man of the field as I have met few in my 35-year military career marked by many operations. I have always considered it an honor to have known him and to have fought alongside him.” 245 (By contrast, General Roméo Dallaire, who would command the United Nations peacekeeping mission later that year and into the Genocide, would describe Bizimungu as “a brutal, hard-drinking tyrant who commanded through fear.” 246) Tauzin continued with his recollection of FAR leaders:
Nsabimana, Bizimungu and Kabiligi [acquitted of genocide charges before the ICTR—ed.] . . . are among the small number of Hutu who have almost completely freed themselves from the psychological and intellectual oppression that the Tutsi have subjected them to for centuries.247

On 25 February 1993, Tauzin, the now de facto leader of the FAR, drew up a plan to stop the RPF’s offensive north of Kigali and to execute a counter-offensive in Byumba.248 Tauzin later recounted the ensuing operation in his book:

It is true that for a few days we gave the RPF a hard time! With local counter-offensives, concentrations of artillery fire on entire units on the move, also thanks to a better organization of the ground in defense, we broke their momentum towards Kigali. In fact, we estimated the RPF’s losses at about 800 killed and therefore, according to the usual proportions in this kind of conflict, about 2,500 wounded, or nearly 15 percent of the troops it had committed, which is considerable in 8 days of fighting.249

Tauzin clarified that French soldiers never fired unless fired upon.250 He noted that it might have been tempting to order a direct assault, which would “have solved the military problem by an assured defeat of the RPF,” but

would not have been consistent with the political context and with the French strategy in Rwanda, a strategy whose main line of force was the desire to bring about a “national reconciliation” of Hutus and Tutsis by leading President Habyarimana to democratize his regime, in the logic of the speech made by President Mitterrand in La Baule in June 1990.251

“We have remained in our role as advisers,”252 Tauzin proudly concluded. But “advisors” here seems a bit too narrow and sanitized a description in light of Tauzin’s self-described “indirect” command over the Rwandan Army.253 Again, whether French soldiers in Chimère engaged the RPF themselves or through their command of the FAR is a distinction without a difference. Instead, the issue of direct engagement seems more relevant to public relations. As Tauzin put it, had France directly engaged the RPF, “[t]he national and global media and political outcry would most likely have put France in a very delicate situation.”254 In roughly one month—28 March 1993—French voters would be returning to the polls for national elections.255

To prevent such an outcry, Mitterrand and his administration continued to insist, including on the day Chimère forces landed in Kigali, that the sole mission of French forces in Rwanda was the protection of expatriates.256 Steven Smith, writing for Libération the same day, was skeptical of the official line, pointing out that the number of French troops in Rwanda exceeded the number of French civilians.257 Even when pushed by RPF statements that French troops had fought alongside government forces, French officials maintained their false narrative line.258 On 1 March 1993, a Quai d’Orsay spokesperson defended French military intervention in the strongest, but false, terms:
As for the presence of French forces, I make it my duty to remind you that it has no other objective than to ensure the security of the French community and that of the expatriates who are in Rwanda. I have already had the opportunity to say that any other interpretation of this presence was fallacious or biased.\textsuperscript{259}

But the Mitterrand administration’s media strategy was not only to conceal France’s true intentions in Rwanda, but also to demonize the RPF—justifying the French commitment required it. Bruno Delaye had complained about the RPF’s “excellent system of propaganda emphasizing the wretched abuses committed by extremist Hutus,” presumably referring to the willingness of certain journalists in Belgium and France, rightly, to take seriously RPF reports of human rights abuses by the Rwandan government.\textsuperscript{260} He acknowledged in a 15 February 1993 note to President Mitterrand, “Our isolation in this case at the international level (the Belgians, English, and Americans do not like HABYARIMANA) must lead us to \textbf{deploy an even more offensive diplomatic effort} to obtain the diplomatic support necessary for implementation.”\textsuperscript{261}

Three days before Delaye penned his note to Mitterrand, the Quai d’Orsay released a statement that emphasized the plight of Rwandan civilians displaced by the resumption of hostilities:

\begin{quote}
We deplore and are particularly concerned by the new suffering imposed on the civil populations as a result of fighting and violence. These new victims . . . [are] in addition to the approximately 350,000 people displaced by the war, who have been driven from their land, who cannot, due to the various offensives, return to their homes, and who, despite the efforts of the Rwandan government, live in conditions that in many ways pose human rights problems.\textsuperscript{262}
\end{quote}

The poor conditions of internally displaced people was indeed a humanitarian disaster and threat to stability,\textsuperscript{263} which had started with the October 1990 war and had only grown worse as the DMZ remained empty, fields remained fallow, and production plants ground to a halt.\textsuperscript{264} Compounding the instability, according to a report in \textit{Libération}, the FAR stole food aid intended for the refugees, and the Government of Rwanda had begun to distribute arms throughout the refugee camps, allegedly to prepare for further massacres.\textsuperscript{265}

French officials deflected attention away from their aid to a government that was presiding over mounting massacres of Tutsi by elevating the war’s displacement of Rwandans as the focus for the French public.\textsuperscript{266} These French officials disproportionately blamed the RPF for the displacement of people in a two-sided war, in which France itself had become a co-belligerent.

In addition to unfairly blaming only the RPF for the problem of internal displacement, the French government further spun the French public by co-opting and promoting partisan reports of human rights abuses purportedly carried out by the RPF—in particular the FAR’s claim that the RPF had attacked a refugee camp in Rebero, in northeastern Rwanda, supposedly massacring 500 people.\textsuperscript{267} That international aid organizations on the ground in Rebero could not confirm the FAR’s accusations did not stop the deputy spokesman for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maurice Gourdault-Montagne, from declaring on 19 February 1993 that according to “indications” of which he did not specify the origin, “massacres [had been] perpetrated in areas currently
controlled by the RPF.”²⁶⁸ Three days later, a cable from US Ambassador Flaten to Washington would observe that the Vatican’s diplomatic mission in Rwanda (the Nonce Apostolic) had not received any reports of massacres in RPF-controlled areas, and that a member of the White Father Catholic missionary group, who was “reportedly the last person to have left the Rebero displaced persons camp,” had “told people that he saw no . . . bodies there. These reports cast doubt on reports of RPF massacres both at the Rebero camp and at the Nemba church.”²⁶⁹

Despite the Mitterrand government’s media campaign, voices in the French press remained skeptical of the President’s Rwanda policy. For example, a 17 February 1993 article in *Le Canard Enchaîné*, titled, “Mitterrand is hiding an African war from us,” declared, “Morality according to the Élysée: the sole mission of the French contingent is to protect Kigali, its airport and 400 or so nationals residing in the country. That’s the official version. In reality, it provides the Rwandan Army with advisors and instructors, particularly in artillery.”²⁷⁰ Even French politicians began to join in the criticism, with Gérard Fuchs, the French Socialist Party national secretary, releasing a statement on 28 February 1993 that he “question[ed] the decision to send new French troops to Rwanda, when human rights violations by the Habyarimana regime continue[d] to multiply.”²⁷¹ He continued, “I hope that either our minister for cooperation will find convincing reasons in Kigali for a military presence which today appears to be a help to a hard-pressed dictatorial regime, or that this [military] presence will be ended.”²⁷²

**H. As the FAR Flailed, Mitterrand Hatched a Plan to Disengage from Rwanda while, in the Short Term, Keeping Pressure on the RPF.**

> It is not in our interest for the Tutsis to advance too quickly. We must buy time, delay [things] by all diplomatic means and continue to support the Rwandan Army by supplying it with the munitions it needs.²⁷³

— François Mitterrand, President of France (1981 – 1995)

The surge in French military support for the government forces between 9 and 22 February 1993 showed President Mitterrand had not, to that point, lost confidence in his administration’s power to turn around the war effort. Patience, though, was wearing thin. Just one week after the launch of Operation Chimère, his ministers and advisors seemed dismayed to find that reports from Kigali remained grim: the RPF military was still gaining ground, the FAR was still in disarray, and Habyarimana was “out of breath.”²⁷⁴ Those who had consistently advocated for expanding aid to the FAR were forced to acknowledge that, for all the financing, equipment, and manpower France had provided, it was still not enough.²⁷⁵

This sudden reckoning with the reality on the ground would lead the Mitterrand administration to settle on a new strategy, one whose ultimate goal was to extricate France from Rwanda without having to admit its policy of backing the government had been a failure.²⁷⁶ The strategy had two components, in effect: first, a lobbying campaign in New York to persuade the United Nations to send a peacekeeping team as soon as possible; and, second, maintaining a continued overt deterrent presence in Kigali as well as covert support for the Rwandan Armed Forces, to stave off a military defeat in the interim. It was a strategy that aimed, in the short term, to ward off bad press ahead of the March 1993 French legislative elections and, in the long term, to spare Mitterrand the embarrassment of a foreign-policy failure.
1. As Prospects of a FAR Victory Dimmed, the French Government Sought a UN Lifeline.

The FAR’s flatfooted response to the 8 February 1993 offensive had been revealing in more ways than one. It exposed, above all else, a Rwandan government in deep distress, with a disgruntled and increasingly feckless president as its head. Habyarimana, sensing the opposition parties were conspiring to marginalize him, had become increasingly recalcitrant and, since mid-December 1992, had barely spoken with the MDR-affiliated prime minister, whom, according to a 13 February 1993 note by General Quesnot, Habyarimana suspected of “complicity with the aggressors.” The air of distrust at the highest levels of the Rwandan government had already sabotaged one round of Arusha negotiations and was threatening to torpedo the next one, assuming there would even be a next round.

France’s message to the governing coalition, in the weeks following the 8 February 1993 offensive, was that the in-fighting had to stop—not only because it was weakening the Rwandan government’s bargaining position in Arusha, but because it was threatening to undermine the Habyarimana regime’s war effort. In a 14 February cable, Ambassador Martres said he urged President Habyarimana to recognize “that, more than ever, the military situation—about which he has brought before me increasingly alarming information—required a common front of all Rwandans.” French envoys, visiting Kigali on 12 February, went so far as to keep the Rwandan president and the prime minister up until 2 a.m. preparing a joint declaration condemning the RPF, calling for a renewed cease-fire, and espousing their commitment to the Arusha process. Even then, tensions between the president and prime minister persisted. “We have maintained the feeling,” Ambassador Martres wrote after the joint declaration’s release, “that both [the president and the prime minister] remained, both of them, more sensitive to the defense of their respective political positions than to the immediate military danger represented by the RPF.”

France’s efforts to keep the governing coalition from unraveling were not faring much better than its efforts to prop up the FAR. Where, once, there had been hope of besting the RPF Army on the battlefield, now the best the French government could hope for was that the FAR, with its support, could hold off enemy forces long enough for the two sides to achieve a peace deal. The French government’s gravest concern was that Kigali would fall: the threat, by Defense Minister Joxe’s account, did not appear imminent, but Rwandan authorities, including President Habyarimana, often spoke as if it were just a matter of time before RPF forces marched into the capital, and the prospect evidently troubled President Mitterrand’s advisers. (Dominique Pin and General Quesnot would characterize the threat, in a 19 February memo, as “very worrisome.”)

Despite all the assistance they had provided the FAR, French officials were under no illusions about the poor state of the FAR and could see that it was ill-equipped to stop a potential assault on Kigali. The French intelligence agency, the DGSE, characterized the FAR in late February 1993 as “not very combative and demoralized.” FAR soldiers—particularly those from southern Rwanda—were refusing to go to the front and, in many cases, had deserted; one US cable estimated the Army had lost the equivalent of three to four battalions due to desertions. Those who continued to wear the uniform were, in many cases, unreliable and poorly behaved. “The
Army has spent more time looting and attacking civilians than fighting the RPF,” Foreign Minister Ngulinzira told US embassy officials. It seemed, too, that the MRND and CDR had riled up many of the troops with their incendiary rhetoric, to the point that some soldiers were killing FAR comrades they viewed as RPF sympathizers.

The FAR still had numbers on its side, with a force ranging from three to six times larger than the RPF’s, but it had squandered this advantage by scattering its units across the long battlefront. A US cable, attributing its information to “French sources,” reported there were “not many troops left to defend Kigali.” Even Defense Minister Joxe, after saying he saw no “immediate threat” to Kigali, had trouble imagining the RPF would not reach out for a prize that appeared to be within its grasp. “I don’t see the RPF abandoning such a close victory, which probably does not even call for a general offensive on their part,” he wrote in a 26 February 1993 note to Mitterrand. Joxe warned: “If the RPF retakes the offensive, our soldiers could, in a matter of hours, find themselves faced with the rebels.”

The RPF profited from the Rwandan and French fears that its troops might, at any moment, plow onward toward the capital. Its show of force strengthened its hand in upcoming peace talks in Arusha, where negotiators hoped to decide, among other things, how many FAR and RPF troops, respectively, to integrate into the post-war armed forces. All the while, though, RPF leaders were adamant that they would strongly prefer to resolve the conflict peacefully. Twice, in mid-February, they offered a truce. For all of the predictions that an attack on Kigali was imminent, no attack ever came.

The first of the two RPF cease-fire proposals that month proved to be a non-starter. Rwandan authorities viewed the offer as unacceptable because, as they understood it, it would have allowed the RPF troops to remain in place, keeping all of the territory they had taken over the previous two days of fighting. A second cease-fire declaration, on 21 February 1993, had more traction. The RPF promised to pull its troops back to the pre-8 February cease-fire line, the government forces would remain in their current positions, and the ground that the RPF Army had gained would serve as a buffer zone controlled by GOMN. The government issued its own statement, accepting the RPF’s terms, the next day: 22 February 1993.

The RPF had proven its capabilities and was in a position of strength when its delegation arrived in Bujumbura, Burundi that week. They were there to meet with representatives from the four main Rwandan opposition parties: the MDR, the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Liberal Party (PL), and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). The opposition parties had pitched the meeting in hopes of striking a deal that would recommit both sides to the Arusha process, but the MRND undermined the endeavor by refusing to participate. (The MRND had declared weeks earlier that it would not meet with the RPF until RPF troops returned to the positions they held before the 8 February offensive, and the MRND did not soften its stance even after the RPF promised, in its latest cease-fire declaration, that its troops would do just that.)

The RPF sensed an opportunity and seized it. When the discussions turned to whether its troops would, indeed, return to the cease-fire line, the delegation said they would, but only if France agreed to withdraw the Noroit troops from Rwanda. The demand would have met MRND resistance, but the president’s party had not shown up to hear it. The opposition parties found the
idea acceptable, in light of the RPF’s assurances that it would pull its troops back to their previous positions and would take part in the next round of peace talks in Arusha.\textsuperscript{312}

The joint communiqué that emerged from Bujumbura on 2 March 1993 was an astonishing document.\textsuperscript{313} It showed, first, just how intensely leaders of the opposition parties had come to resent President Habyarimana following the MRND’s rejection of the 9 January 1993 power-sharing accord, and how free they felt to speak ill of him in public.\textsuperscript{314} The communiqué denounced both Habyarimana and his party for their “racist regionalistic, war-mongering dictatorial policies,” and said the party’s refusal to participate in the Bujumbura talks “confirms its opposition to the peace process, to the principles of national unity and reconciliation.”\textsuperscript{315} Habyarimana readied a response that same day, gathering a group of representatives from various minor parties, as well as dissenters within the ranks of the MDR, PSD, PL, and PDC, to speak out against the “RPF Inkotanyi” and to praise France for its military assistance.\textsuperscript{316}

There was nothing new about the RPF’s demand that the French government withdraw its forces. RPF leaders had been pressing this point for years—not because they viewed France as a threat, but because they believed French support gave the FAR “false confidence” and made its leaders less willing to compromise.\textsuperscript{317} (“Habyarimana’s regime behaved better when they were pressured,” explained RPF Commander Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.\textsuperscript{318}) The Rwandan government had, in fact, twice before conceded to the demand: first in the March 1991 N’Sele cease-fire agreement and then again in Arusha, in July 1992, both times contingent on “the deployment establishment of the [GOMN].”\textsuperscript{319} The French government, though, had not abided by either agreement. Ambassador Martres had brushed off the N’Sele agreement’s troop-withdrawal provision in 1991, telling a reporter that France, as a non-party to the agreement, was not bound by it.\textsuperscript{320} The French government was equally dismissive when the same provision reappeared in the Arusha accord in July 1992, even after the OAU established the GOMN in late summer 1992, in theory triggering the country’s obligation to withdraw Noroît. While President Mitterrand had, according to an 18 January 1993 letter to President Habyarimana, “made note of the terms” of the July 1992 accord and did “not want France to be blamed for undermining the proper implementation of the agreement,” he nonetheless agreed “to act in agreement with the Rwandan authorities” on whether to keep Noroît forces in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{321} “It is just sad that all the agreements signed have not been respected,” RPF Commander Karake said in a March 1993 interview published in \textit{Rwanda Rushya}.\textsuperscript{322}

The RPF—when the parties reached agreements in 1991 and 1992—had been under no pretense that Habyarimana’s government or the FAR would adhere to the agreements or take them seriously. But circumstances changed in 1993. The difference this time was that the RPF had never been stronger, and the governing coalition never more fractured. This shift in fortunes for the two belligerents put more weight behind the RPF’s demands. More than that, though, it forced President Mitterrand to confront a hard reality: that after two and a half years of combining pressure for political liberalization with military support against the RPF, his policy had conjured a democratic opposition in Rwanda more closely aligned with the RPF than with the Habyarimana regime it sought to protect. French military support had also emboldened Habyarimana to eschew compromise and had drawn him closer to hardliners who sought to undermine the peace process. Rwanda had become a quagmire, and the authorities in Paris would, at last, have to consider whether the time had come to find a way out.
This realization registered earliest with Defense Minister Joxe. “We are at an impasse. I recommend that we leave,” he said, bluntly, at a 24 February 1993 “restricted council” meeting.323 (The Élysée had begun hosting these weekly meetings shortly before the March 1993 legislative elections, when the prospect of a cohabitation government appeared likely.324 The meetings served as a forum for Mitterrand to discuss matters of defense and foreign policy with the prime minister, other key ministers, and various high-level advisors.) Joxe would reiterate his concerns in writing a few days later, telling Mitterrand: “I am still concerned about our position in Rwanda and by the role into which our . . . soldiers could find themselves drawn since the Rwandan Army is de facto no longer fighting.”325 Joxe argued the 20 February deployment of two additional Noroît companies had, regrettably, led Habyarimana “to feel he is one of the African leaders best protected by France. This is not the best way to persuade him to make the necessary concessions.”326 What was needed, Joxe said, was an ultimatum: “Our only serious remaining leverage—excluding direct intervention—seems to me to be the possibility of our disengagement.”327 Joxe argued this could make Habyarimana more flexible in negotiations and, if presented to the RPF and Museveni, “would make them give up a military victory for a solely political victory.”328

Mitterrand knew, by the time of the 24 February 1993 Restricted Council meeting, that the RPF was on the cusp of “a political-military victory.”329 Two of his advisors, General Quesnot and Africa Cell Deputy Chief Dominique Pin, had warned him of this probability in a note the day before the meeting, lamenting that, in the face of the RPF’s determination and power, “our indirect strategy of support to the Rwandan armed forces no longer seems sufficient.”330 Quesnot’s and Pin’s note presented three options. First, they said, France could evacuate its nationals out of Rwanda and withdraw its troops—but, they warned, its departure would likely precipitate the end of Habyarimana’s rein, and “will be interpreted as a failure of our policy in Rwanda.”331 Pin and Quesnot did not recommend this option.332

The second option—better than the first, in their opinion—was to maintain the status quo and keep France’s present contingent of roughly 600 soldiers (including Noroît as well as the DAMI and MAM cooperants reinforced by the Chimère special forces) in Rwanda.333 This, at least, would preserve “a certain ambiguity” about France’s intentions in the country, which “may seem temporarily desirable,” they wrote.334 Pin and Quesnot made clear, though, that they would prefer a more assertive response. They championed a third option: to “strongly intervene in support of the Rwandan Army.”335 This would not necessarily mean sending French soldiers out onto the battlefield to join the FAR as co-combatants; direct military intervention, though “technically possible,” would not be justifiable, they explained, absent “irrefutable evidence of direct Ugandan military intervention, which is not the case now.”336 Rather, they said, what France could, and should, do was boost its military presence in the combat zone, without actually firing any weapons. “It is a question of reversing the balance of power by increasing our assistance to the Rwandan Army through a strong logistical contribution and a commitment of advisers and artillery [that matches] the level of our determination,” they wrote.337

Mitterrand’s remarks at the 24 February Restricted Council meeting show he remained ambivalent about how to proceed, but he was certain of one thing: “Withdrawing from Rwanda is out of the question.”338 To withdraw, he said, would send “a bad signal.”339 His prime minister,
Pierre Bérégovoy, was of the same mind: “It is politically impossible for us to withdraw from Rwanda at this time.” As the meeting progressed, Mitterrand mused, as he often did, about Uganda’s role in the war. The thought perplexed him: He was sure that Uganda had been behind the RPF’s invasion in 1990, but he could not understand why President Museveni would support what, in Mitterrand’s mind, would amount to a Tutsi takeover of Rwanda. “If the RPF... wins, there will be revenge,” Mitterrand said. “What is Museveni looking for?” Convinced that Uganda remained the key to the whole affair, Mitterrand decided to send French Minister of Cooperation Marcel Debarge to meet with authorities in both Kigali and Kampala at the end of the month.

Mitterrand, to be sure, had not sworn off diplomacy; his advisors, Quesnot and Pin, had been in agreement that however much military support France might provide the Rwandan government, it ought to be accompanied by “firm diplomatic action.” This meant continued support for a revival of the Arusha talks, but it also meant leaning on the OAU and United Nations to step up the role of international observers. This latter option raised some intriguing possibilities for President Mitterrand, as it just might take some heat off of his administration, and perhaps provide it with the cover it needed to disentangle itself from Rwanda.

The OAU already had a presence in Rwanda. Officers of the GOMN, formed under its auspices, had been on the ground since August 1992. France had initially welcomed the group as an “essential element” of the 12 July 1992 cease-fire agreement, but complained that the effort to launch the group’s work of monitoring the cease-fire was taking too long. The group would soon become a thorn in France’s side: FAR leaders complained that the group was biased toward the RPF and that some of its officers were hounding FAR units on the front in hopes of catching French troops working alongside them. (The GOMN did, in fact, observe the involvement of DAMI officers in a cease-fire violation in December 1992, as discussed in Chapter 5.) French officials worried that with just 50 observers, the GOMN was not up to the task of effectively surveilling the cease-fire line. “The operational utility of the GOMN is seriously questioned by most observers and by the Rwandan government,” Catherine Boivineau, the Quai d’Orsay’s director of East and Central Africa, wrote in a March 1993 telegram. “The very fact that they did not see coming, or signal, the general offensive the RPF launched on 8 February is a telling testimony.

A movement to enlist the United Nations to supplement, or perhaps take over for, the GOMN in the demilitarized zone began, curiously enough, with a pair of letters, both dated 22 February 1993, from the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, respectively, to the president of the UN Security Council. The letters pleaded for the deployment of a team of UN military observers—not to the demilitarized zone, but to the Rwandan-Ugandan border. Rwanda’s letter, signed by its permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Jean-Damascène Bizimana, argued that such a team would help “promote respect for the cease-fire and the search for a negotiated solution” to the conflict by “ascertaining that no military assistance, in men or in equipment, reaches Rwandese territory from Ugandan territory.” The letter from the Ugandan permanent representative sought the same, but for a different reason: “to forestall any accusations as has happened in the past, against Uganda of any involvement in the internal conflict in Rwanda.”
France embraced this idea. Quesnot and Pin stated without reservation, “We support this initiative,” in their 23 February note to Mitterrand, though they did not elaborate on how, exactly, placing a team of international observers along the Rwandan-Ugandan border would help resolve the conflict.\textsuperscript{357} One observes, though, that in the same note to the president, Quesnot and Pin explained that French direct military participation in combat would not be possible without “irrefutable evidence of a direct Ugandan military intervention”—evidence that, by their own admission, France did not have,\textsuperscript{358} but that a UN observer team might, in theory, uncover.

Pin, offering Minister of Cooperation Debarge a list of talking points for his upcoming trip to Kigali and Kampala, advised the minister to explain to President Museveni that a “military resolution” to the conflict in Rwanda was “unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{359} “[A]sk him to use his (obvious) influence on the RPF to get [the RPF] to implement, on the ground, the cease-fire that it claims to accept. We want solid proof of the RPF’s willingness to put an end to its current offensive,” Pin wrote.\textsuperscript{360} The memo encouraged Debarge to “leave [Museveni] worried about our [France’s] degree of commitment” in the FAR’s war effort. (The message was apparently received. A news report following Debarge’s encounter with Museveni on 1 March described a contentious meeting, stating that the two men “differed on a number of issues[,] with the Ugandan leader accusing France of interfering in the Rwandan conflict.”\textsuperscript{361})

Debarge struck a different tone in Kigali. There, as Belgian Ambassador Swinnen reported in a cable, the French minister reassured Rwandan authorities that France stood in solidarity with the Rwandan people—and that the French Army stood in solidarity with the Rwanda.\textsuperscript{362} “Minister Debarge’s message is a clear political and military endorsement offered by France to Rwanda against the RPF,” Swinnen assessed.\textsuperscript{363} Debarge’s one plea to the Rwandan president and prime minister was that they and their factions must bury their disagreements and “present a united front against the RPF”\textsuperscript{364}—who, Debarge insisted, were not the liberators they claimed to be,\textsuperscript{365} and who would all but certainly rule as totalitarians, were they to succeed in toppling the government.\textsuperscript{366}

Habyarimana agreed to work with the opposition in preparations for the upcoming talks with the RPF in Dar es Salaam, then just a few days away.\textsuperscript{367} Pin, though, had his doubts. In a remarkably candid assessment, Pin intimated in a 2 March 1993 memo to Mitterrand that France’s recent decision to send two additional Noroit companies to Rwanda had “[r]eassured” Habyarimana in a way that may have been counterproductive.\textsuperscript{368} “[H]e no longer seeks a political compromise with the opposition,” Pin wrote.\textsuperscript{369} “Convinced of our commitment to him, he cannot believe that we will let the RPF seize Kigali.”\textsuperscript{370}

Pin was just as concerned about the prime minister and opposition parties, who appeared to him “more worried about driving Habyarimana from power than opposing the RPF, despite the fear [the latter] inspires in them.”\textsuperscript{371} (The Bujumbura joint communiqué, issued the same day as Pin’s note to Mitterrand, was so laden with disdain for the Rwandan president,\textsuperscript{372} it could only have confirmed this view.) Pin suspected that the opposition parties in the governing coalition viewed themselves as a potential “third force” in Rwandan politics which could seize power as a more acceptable alternative to the RPF following the government’s collapse.\textsuperscript{373}

Pin’s prescription, as it had been before, was to increase French aid to the FAR “so that Kigali remains standing.”\textsuperscript{374} General Quesnot, a fellow advocate for expanding military assistance
to Rwanda, argued in a memo the next day that France should, at a minimum, maintain its current military presence, even as he acknowledged, “Our military and technical assistance to the Rwandan forces is still not sufficient to reverse the balance of power.”375 (Nor, he wrote, had it achieved France’s political objectives, “which seems more serious to me.”376) He preferred, too, that the French government do more to strengthen the FAR.377

Debarge poured cold water on this talk when President Mitterrand and roughly a dozen ministers and advisers gathered at noon of 3 March 1993.378 Notes of the meeting indicate that when Mitterrand turned the discussion over to Debarge to recount his findings during his visit to Kigali a few days earlier, the minister’s report was bleak.379 “President Habyarimana is disoriented and gasping for breath,” he said.380 While the FAR continued to fight “unevenly,” the RPF had reinforced its positions and “can now pursue its political and military offensive.”381 “The question everyone is asking,” Debarge said, “is: what will the French Army do?”382

One option, certainly, would have been to send more troops. This, in fact, is precisely what France’s commander of operations in Kigali, Col. Delort, had recommended in a proposal just one day earlier.383 In a 2 March 1993 memo, Delort had sought to roughly double the number of men in the Chimère detachment, from 65 to 126.384 The new men would include an adviser to the FAR chief of staff, Col. Nsabimana; another adviser to the FAR état-major, this one specializing in intelligence and operations; an adviser to the commanders of three of the most active operational sectors; and several dozen trainers and instructors, some specializing in firearms training.385 Delort also recommended that the French government dedicate some Noroît troops to intelligence-gathering operations, an area in which he perceived the FAR as “still weak.”386

Delort’s proposal was only one day old and was still working its way up the chain of command in the Ministry of Defense when President Mitterrand and the team of ministers and advisers he had gathered for the 3 March 1993 council meeting took up the question Debarge had posed: “what will the French Army do?”387 It is notable, though, that no one at the meeting urged the president to consider placing more troops at the FAR’s disposal, as Delort had just recommended. Instead, the discussion rather quickly turned to recent developments at the UN Security Council, which was then considering two proposals: first, to send a team of observers to the Rwandan-Ugandan border, and, second, to augment the observer team (the GOMN) in the demilitarized zone.388 French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas let it be known that he supported these initiatives, saying, “[The situation] is clearer now. We must jump at these opportunities.”389

Mitterrand needed no more convincing. “We must be replaced by international forces from the UN as soon as possible,” he announced.390 The notion of internationalizing the conflict seemed to energize him. “[I]f our soldiers become UN soldiers, that changes the nature of things,” he said.391 “But,” he said, “we must not be alone.”392 To simply put blue helmets on the heads of French soldiers already in Rwanda would not be enough; other countries would have to send troops as well.

Not wanting to waste time, Mitterrand urged the Quai d’Orsay to get ahold of France’s permanent representative to the UN Security Council, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, “within the hour” in order to “hurry up to get the system in place.”393 The message evidently was received; according to a US cable, Mérimée reached out at once to all of the other permanent representatives to the
Security Council and urged them to support a resolution authorizing an inter-positional force situated between the RPF and the Rwandan government of 500 to 1,000 UN soldiers “as soon as possible.”³⁹⁴ He framed the proposal as urgent, noting that RPF troops were just outside Kigali and arguing that “the council needs to tackle this situation to prevent possible massacres.”³⁹⁵ He told his colleagues that, if asked, France could make 600 of its own troops available to the United Nations.³⁹⁶ Twenty-four hours later, a Rwandan diplomat formally requested an “immediate meeting” of the Security Council to discuss the Rwandan crisis,³⁹⁷ a plea that Mérimée seconded in a letter that same day.³⁹⁸

The French government’s interest in replacing Noroît with UN forces was, in effect, an acknowledgement that France’s intervention in Rwanda had not been the cakewalk that Mitterrand’s son, Jean-Christophe, had forecasted at the outset of the war, when he reportedly predicted “the whole thing will be over in two or three months.”³⁹⁹ “Today, the French presence is unanimously opposed,” a former Matignon advisor wrote in a 15 March 1993 note to Michel Rocard, who had been France’s prime minister when the war first started. “That is why Paris has just asked that the baton be taken up by UN peacekeepers and hopes to be able to get out very quickly.”⁴⁰⁰

Mitterrand’s perspective, as he explained during the 3 March meeting, was that a handoff to the United Nations would not be without some risk,⁴⁰¹ but it would, in any event, be “wise.”⁴⁰² “To stay,” the president said, “would be to risk being helpless spectators of the victors’ arrival.”⁴⁰³ (This, to be sure, was not an image Mitterrand would have welcomed,⁴⁰⁴ especially with his party’s grip on power in the National Assembly on the line. The elections were just a few weeks away, with a first round of voting scheduled for 21 March and a second round for 28 March.) The United Nations, however, would not send troops to Rwanda overnight. Meanwhile, RPF troops were within reach of Kigali and could, perhaps, conquer the city in just “a few days,” in Mitterrand’s estimation.⁴⁰⁵ “It is not in our interest for the Tutsis to advance too quickly,” he stated at the 3 March meeting.⁴⁰⁶ “We must buy time, delay [things] by all diplomatic means and continue to support the Rwandan Army by supplying it with the munitions it needs.”⁴⁰⁷ Delaye, who took notes during the meeting, understood this to mean that the French government must do what is necessary to keep the FAR in the fight long enough for the peace talks to run their course.⁴⁰⁸ “We can neither leave nor engage militarily any further,” Delaye wrote. “So if we want Kigali to remain standing, we must increase the Rwandan Army’s defensive means (equipment and assistance).”⁴⁰⁹

2. Mitterrand’s Decision to Pursue a Handoff to the United Nations Disrupted French Special Forces’ Preparations for a Major Counter-Offensive against the RPF.

French military officials came to understand, soon enough, that the winds had shifted. Delort received evidence of this on 5 March 1993, when the Special Operations Command (COS) in Paris responded to his recent proposal to expand Operation Chimère.⁴¹⁰ COS did not reject the proposal outright; it said a temporary reinforcement of Chimère was only “conceivable” due to the urgent operational situation on the ground.⁴¹¹ It noted, though, that there were reasons to be wary. “The implementation of this reinforcement comes late, in the context of a crisis rather than prevention, and amidst much international media hostility,” the memo stated.⁴¹² “We may wonder if, in light of the risks of compromise that have become substantial, the near doubling of the force
is timely in a local, military, and political context that has become unfavorable.” Chimère had always been risky; now, with French legislative elections just two weeks away, decision-makers in Paris had even more reason to fear the bad press that the secret operation, if discovered, might generate. Those fears proved too much, apparently, because, based on our review of French and Rwandan government documents, it appears the French government did not, in the end, send Delort the troops he had requested.

Col. Tauzin’s reaction to the Mitterrand administration’s reassessment of France’s strategy, once word of it reached his post in Kigali, was tinged with “a strong sense of bitterness and immense disappointment.” Tauzin, the leader of Operation Chimère, had been planning a “major counter-offensive to try to send the RPF back to Uganda.” The FAR’s chief of staff, Col. Nsabimana, had approved the operation, nicknamed “Miyove.” The plan, as initially drafted, was for a team of commandos, specially selected by French officers, to steal into Byumba at night in preparation for a FAR attack at dawn on 2 March. The operation, though, was delayed because of a logistical snag, which proved fateful. The day before it was to launch, Delort delivered some surprising news to Tauzin: “Paris was wondering if this offensive was really timely.” The top priority, Delort said, was to protect Kigali. Peace talks were expected to resume soon. A counteroffensive, at this time, would be questionable—“especially since it is not certain that it will succeed!”

Tauzin felt blindsided. Recounting the episode in his memoir, years later, he wrote that he had been “absolutely certain” that the offensive would succeed and “change the course of events” in Rwanda. Lt. Col. Maurin, then heading Delort’s intelligence office, had shared his frustration, at one point throwing his arms up in the air and shouting, “We have to go! You will surely succeed!”

Tauzin’s understanding was that the final decision rested with him. In the end, according to his memoir, he agreed with his deputy, Lt. Col. Chéreau, that the operation could not proceed if political leaders in Paris did not stand behind it. He promptly broke the news to Nsabimana:

I will never forget his despair. . . . Like me, infinitely better than me, he knows intimately that the war is lost; it was only a matter of time now. He also knows, infinitely better than I do, what the final consequences of the Hutu defeat [by] the Tutsis will be. . . . As I leave his office alone at dusk, I cry with rage against “Paris”!

Tauzin, in self-aggrandizing fashion, framed this moment in his memoir as a point of no return. He imagined that, had the operation gone forward, the FAR might have recovered much of the territory the RPF had gained over the previous two years, precipitating more FAR victories to come and strengthening the Rwandan government’s hand in the Arusha negotiations. And then? “I have often thought that the ‘genocide’ would probably not have taken place at that time,” he wrote. Untold lives—most of them Hutu, he was quick to point out—might have been spared. Tauzin cursed himself for falling in line with the new directive from Paris. “[A]bove all,” he wrote, “when the so-called ‘Genocide of the Tutsis’ began, I deeply regretted being so disciplined! And this is the only regret I have about my decisions and actions during this conflict.”
3. Relenting under Pressure, the French Government Withdrew Two Noroît Reinforcement Companies.

The RPF may not have known just how close France came to orchestrating a major counteroffensive in early March 1993, but it did suspect plans to that effect were in the works. “The rebels were convinced that France was preparing a real plan of attack that aimed to drive them out of Rwandan territory altogether. . . . The deterrent effect of our determination was significant, and the prime minister is well aware of it. The Rwandan delegation would not have gained anything if it didn’t have this card in its hand,” Ambassador Martres reported in a cable on 9 March, shortly after the conclusion of a three-day summit between the RPF and Rwandan government delegations in Dar es Salaam.429 As Tauzin’s memoir confirms, the RPF had not been wrong. The Rwandan government delegation, though, denied it, going to lengths “to persuade their interlocutors that [France’s] only objective was to foster a negotiated solution.”430

The Dar es Salaam summit, whose purpose, ostensibly, was to seek assurances from the two sides in hopes of steering the Arusha process back on course,431 would leave little doubt about the RPF’s priorities in early March 1993. RPF leaders did not know exactly how many troops France had sent to Rwanda—the delegation apparently believed there were at least 1,500 French soldiers on the ground (when in fact there were less than half that number)432—but they knew full well that the French government was not telling the truth when it repeatedly insisted its men were there only to protect French nationals. (Delaye’s notes following the 3 March restricted council meeting in Paris acknowledged that the stated mission of protecting expats had always been a “pretext”—one that now, with fears of an RPF military assault on Kigali mounting, was “no longer illusory.”433 ) They had no doubt that the true mission of the French troops was, as Major Kagame put it, “to prop up the Habyarimana regime,”434 and they correctly surmised that French officers were helping coordinate the FAR’s military tactics.435 Rwandan authorities, suspecting the RPF Army still hoped to launch an attack on Kigali, assumed that the group viewed Noroît as an impediment and was determined to secure their expulsion from the country.436 For this reason, a French Ministry of Defense memo, dated 9 March, stated, “Thus, all of the RPF’s efforts are now focused on making us evacuate our forces from Rwanda.”437

The talks in Dar es Salaam began auspiciously enough. Within the first 24 hours, the RPF announced it had agreed to a partial retreat to the pre-8 February cease-fire line, on two conditions: first, the OAU must take control of the evacuated positions and, second, the government must respect the cease-fire.438 The expectation was that the meeting would wrap up the next day, but, according to an AFP report, the RPF forced a delay by issuing a “last minute demand” for an immediate withdrawal of French troops.439 The gambit frustrated some observers, who had hoped to save more contentious issues for a later date,440 but it worked. On 7 March, the delegations signed two agreements. The first, which was public, called for a cease-fire to begin at midnight on 9 March, required the RPF forces to retreat to the old cease-fire line between 14 and 17 March, and set a date (15 March) for the resumption of talks in Arusha.441 A second agreement, deemed “confidential,” called on France to scale back its military presence.442 The key provisions stated, in particular:
1. The French troops which arrived in Rwanda on 8th February 1993 (2 companies) should pull out from the country within a period of eight (8) days effective from 17 March 1993.

2. The French troops which arrived in Rwanda before 8 February 1993 (2 companies) shall be confined in Kigali with effect from 17th March, 1993 until they are replaced by a neutral international force to be mutually agreed upon by the two parties.\footnote{443}

French officials noted that the agreement referred only to Noroît. It had entirely glossed over Chimère (whose presence, of course, had been kept secret), as well as the dozens of French advisers and technicians whose work with the FAR was authorized by a 1992 amendment to the 1975 Franco-Rwandan military assistance agreement.\footnote{444}

Even still, for French officials, there was a clear risk in reeling back two of the four Noroît companies. France had long viewed Noroît as a deterrent, believing its presence was all that stopped the RPF from seizing Kigali.\footnote{445} An adviser in the French Ministry of Defense predicted on 9 March that the RPF military would attack Kigali “at the first opportunity.”\footnote{446} This prospect was particularly concerning because the RPF, at that moment, was just 30 kilometers outside Kigali. If it did launch an attack, the Defense Ministry advisor wrote, it would be impossible for France to send reinforcements in time.\footnote{447} Kigali, in this hypothetical scenario, would fall, ending the war before the French government could succeed in taking what General Quesnot, in a handwritten note also written 9 March, called “the honorable and favorable way out”—that is, lining up UN troops to take the place of its own (or placing French troops under UN authority).\footnote{448} Quesnot abhorred the thought, arguing an RPF military victory at this point, with French boots still on the ground, “would not be without consequences for the credibility of our engagements in Africa.”\footnote{449}

French officials recognized, though, that as long as the Rwandan authorities were standing behind the Dar es Salaam agreements, it would be awkward for the French government to protest.\footnote{450} And, for the moment, at least, it seemed they were: President Habyarimana told Ambassador Martres that he did not object to the confidential agreement’s most critical provisions (those calling for the withdrawal of the two Noroît reinforcement companies and requiring the remaining companies to confine themselves to Kigali).\footnote{451} Delaye, the head of the Élysée Africa Cell, accentuated the positive for France, arguing in a note to President Mitterrand that the 7 March agreement could prove to be France’s “exit ticket”—provided, he said, “that everyone plays along.”\footnote{452} That was far from a certainty. Habyarimana, in his conversation with Martres, had said he doubted the RPF would honor its own commitments under the 7 March joint communiqué (referring, presumably, to its promise to withdraw its troops from the positions they had occupied since 8 February).\footnote{453}

In one respect, at least, France was getting what it wanted: Habyarimana had not undermined the government delegation or its chief, Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye. The “united front,” which Cooperation Minister Debarge had urged the two leaders to forge at the end of February 1993, appeared, temporarily, to be holding. At one point, not long after the summit, the Rwandan president and prime minister held a joint meeting with senior military leaders, and a
radio broadcast reported that Habyarimana “expressed his appreciation to the prime minister for participating in the meeting.” A US cable remarked, “This is the first time we can remember the president saying anything nice to the prime minister in public.”

Predictably, though, not everyone was pleased. On 10 March, members of the president’s own party (the MRND) and the CDR organized demonstrations in front of the French embassy to protest the Dar es Salaam accords and to demand that French troops stay put. The CDR issued a press release blasting Habyarimana, saying, “This shows clearly that Mr. Habyarimana Juvénal, President of the Republic, is no longer concerned with the interests of the nation; he has other interests to defend instead.” Its statements spurred speculation that the CDR might soon sever ties with the president’s party, as, in fact, it did, on 27 March.

The growing tensions within the MRND-CDR alliance fueled rumors of a possible coup. A US cable on 22 March reported that the rumors had been “floating around Kigali” for a couple of weeks and took a variety of forms, though all ended the same way: with Habyarimana “departing gracefully for some foreign shore.” The “alleged chief plotter,” according to the cable, was Colonel Théoneste Bagosora. The cable, however, dismissed the rumors as “probably far-fetched in current circumstances.” Defense Minister Gasana acknowledged he had heard such rumors, but insisted “that no coup could succeed at this time, even if some officers were dumb enough to try.”

Habyarimana encountered dissension within the ranks of the FAR, as well. On 10 March, unit commanders at Camp Kayuya formalized their concerns about the pending departure of French troops in a memo addressed to the Rwandan Army état-major. The commanders were notably critical of the FAR leadership for their complacency, asking why the FAR was “staying silent” in the face of grave problems threatening to tear the country apart.

More and more, Habyarimana seemed tired. On 30 March, he announced his resignation as chairman of the MRND, the party he had created and led for nearly two decades. Speaking with unusual frankness to Ambassador Martres shortly before this announcement, the president “implied that... he would not look unfavorably on the prospect of relinquishing the presidency of the Republic,” once the peace process was completed and a new government installed. Habyarimana confided, though, that he worried his opponents would seek to have him prosecuted for alleged human rights abuses (allegations he vociferously denied). “He only asks to live in peace in his country,” Martres wrote. The president pressed Martres to relay this message to President Mitterrand “with the greatest discretion,” suggesting the French government might help him secure a formal promise from his opponents not to take legal action against him and his family after the end of his presidency.

The French government, meanwhile, was making strides in its effort to spur the United Nations to take action in Rwanda. On 12 March, the Security Council unanimously approved a resolution inviting Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to “examine” the possibility of sending troops to the region. The resolution envisioned dispatching one multinational force to monitor the cease-fire and protect civilians, and a second force to surveil the Rwandan-Ugandan border. The French representative, the first to speak after the vote, framed the resolution as an urgently needed...
response to a “very serious humanitarian crisis,” saying, “The French Government felt that resolute action had to be taken to reach an effective and lasting cessation of hostilities, to promote the intensification of humanitarian assistance, and to enable the peace efforts to continue.” Suffice it to say, he did not mention that the French government had only decided to push for the resolution after President Mitterrand resolved that French forces in Rwanda “be replaced by international forces from the UN.”

The confidential Dar es Salaam agreement had called for France to begin withdrawing two Noroît reinforcement companies by 17 March and to complete the process within eight days. However, as the deadline approached, President Habyarimana signaled the drawdown may not happen quite so soon. In a national broadcast on 14 March, the Rwandan president said French soldiers would not leave until the RPF honored its commitment to retreat to the agreed-upon cease-fire line. French officials likewise viewed the two commitments as linked. “The problem,” General Quesnot wrote in a 17 March memo, “is whether we should begin the withdrawal of these two [Noroît] companies on the scheduled dates, even if the RPF has not previously withdrawn to the cease-fire line agreed upon in the Dar es Salaam agreement.” Quesnot, saying he was “certain of the RPF’s bad faith,” recommended that France start by withdrawing only one of the two reinforcement companies, while, at the same time, “maintain[ing], if not reinforc[ing], our indirect help to the Rwandan Army, which is in the process of pulling itself together.”

When President Mitterrand presided over a restricted council meeting later that day, Admiral Lanxade confirmed that the RPF was, indeed, “making arrangements for withdrawal,” but was, at the same time, “playing a double game and leaving troops in position.” Lanxade agreed with Quesnot—and with Rwandan authorities—that France could reasonably withdraw one company as a first step. Mitterrand consented. “I agree,” he said, according to notes from the meeting. “We asked for an agreement, we have it. It must be applied. Only, we must be vigilant.”

Lt. Col. Tracqui, the commander of the Noroît forces, issued the order on 19 March, announcing that the RPF Army “seems to be withdrawing its first elements” to the cease-fire line and that the French government, in return, had decided to withdraw the motorized infantry company, the lighting and support company, and the heavy mortars section, starting on 20 March. The order cautioned the remaining French companies: “This measure is more political than military in nature and should not imply any loosening of the surveillance system.”

President Mitterrand was forced to confront the issue again several days later, as the deadline to withdraw the second reinforcement company approached. In a 24 March briefing, General Quesnot made it known he remained unsatisfied. The RPF military had still only partially retreated. Nevertheless, he wrote, it was the recommendation of both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense that France withdraw the second Noroît reinforcement company—if only, he said, “to avoid any polemic against us.” Mitterrand, presiding once again over a meeting of the restricted council, deferred to Admiral Lanxade: “Your final position on this topic—are we withdrawing a company?” Lanxade’s answer was yes. “Agreed,” Mitterrand said. The order went out later that day, leaving France with two companies in Kigali prefecture—more, still, than it had had before the 8 February offensive, but not enough, it was believed, to beat back an RPF assault on Kigali.
As Col. Dominique Delort’s command over all French forces in Kigali came to a close, he summed up France’s military response to the RPF’s 8 February counter-offensive with a declaration of mission accomplished. In a 25 March 1993 “Ordre Du Jour”—a daily agenda drafted by a commanding officer announcing the day’s priorities—he credited a reinforced Noroit protecting Kigali and “support in the areas of advice and training” to the FAR with preventing the fall of “the capital of a friendly state” at the hands of “an armed rebellion.”494 “For 45 days the French forces in Rwanda both presented a credible deterrent and a know-how that was equally decisive.”495 On 1 April 1993, Col. Tauzin and “most” of his detachment, which had helped provide much of the “know-how” that Delort praised, returned to France, ending Operation Chimère.496 Yet, while units were leaving Rwanda, the work of French forces in Rwanda continued, as Delort added in his 25 March note: “Noroît, a DAMI [contingent] and the AMT continue on a mission that is always very delicate.”497

To Col. Cussac, however, who remained in his role as defense attaché and chief of the Military Assistance Mission in Rwanda and returned to commanding Noroit in April,498 the future looked bleak. The FAR had not acquitted itself well on the field (save the French-trained units that had preserved Byumba and Ruhengeri); the President and the opposition remained divided, “underestimating an enemy whom they too naively believed could become an ally;”499 and Habyarimana, who feared that the FIDH report would become the “centerpiece of a criminal charge” against him,500 might “soon find himself alone, deprived of the C.D.R. and diehard Hutus who are abandoning him on the right, while his former single party will collapse when he no longer holds on to it tightly.”501 “Inexorably,” Cussac bemoaned, “‘Tutsiland’ is taking shape.”502
Notes to Chapter VI

1 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (14 Jan. 1993) (capitalization in original).
2 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Impasse Again”).
3 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Progress Toward Political Compromise”).
4 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Party Demonstrations Block Roads, Bottle Up Kigali; Ethnic Violence in Gisenyi Prefecture”).
5 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Kigali Awaits Protocol”). Although the cable identified significant evidence supporting the arrest of the two Interahamwe members, including that they were found at the scene with a hand grenade, it separately raised some doubt as to their connection to the detonated explosive.
6 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Kigali Awaits Protocol”).
7 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Two Terrorist Attacks in Kigali Leave 20 Injured”).
8 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Two Terrorist Attacks in Kigali Leave 20 Injured”).
9 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Two Terrorist Attacks in Kigali Leave 20 Injured”).
10 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “Party Demonstrations Block Roads, Bottle Up Kigali; Ethnic Violence in Gisenyi Prefecture”).
11 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Kigali Awaits Protocol”).
12 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Kigali Awaits Protocol”).
15 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Kigali Awaits Protocol”).
16 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Kigali Awaits Protocol”).
21 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Reactions to Arusha Protocol”).
22 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Reactions to Arusha Protocol”).
23 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Reactions to Arusha Protocol”).
24 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Reactions to Arusha Protocol”).
25 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Reactions to Arusha Protocol”).
26 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (14 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
27 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (14 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
28 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (14 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
29 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (14 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
32 The N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement, as amended, art. II, Rw. – RPF, 12 July 1992. Specifically, Article II of the accord called for “[t]he withdrawal of all foreign troops after the effective deployment of the Neutral Military Observer Group (GOMN), with the exception of military cooperants present in Rwanda pursuant to bilateral cooperation agreements.” This provision could be read to authorize the continued presence of the MAM advisers and technicians working with the Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie, but not the Noroit troops.
34 Letter from François Mitterrand to Juvénal Habyarimana (18 Jan. 1993) (original capitalization removed).
35 FIDH Report (1993). No allegations of violence during the FIDH Commission’s two-week stay in Rwanda were included in its report. In its press release of 8 March 1993 upon releasing its final report, the Commission wrote: “The Commission left Rwanda on 21 January 1993, when it completed its investigations. The following day, [the Commission] was made aware of further new massacres in north-western Rwanda was brought to its attention, as well as summary executions, including of one of its witnesses.” See Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme et al., Communiqué de Presse (8 Mar. 1993).
44 Letter from Jean Carbonare to Bruno Delaye (1 Feb. 1993).
45 Letter from Jean Carbonare to Bruno Delaye (1 Feb. 1993).
46 Letter from Jean Carbonare to Bruno Delaye (1 Feb. 1993). While Martres and the FIDH Report spelled Janvier’s name as “Africa,” the correct spelling, according to how it is listed in the magazine he published, Umurava, is “Afrika.”


Press Release, Africa Watch, Outbreak of Violence Follows Human Rights Investigation in Rwanda (27 Jan. 1993). Before the Commission left Rwanda, its members met with President Habyarimana to “express concern for the security of persons who cooperated with the Commission’s work.” According to the release, “[d]uring their visit to Rwanda, two Commission members were stopped at an illegal roadblock set up by the MRND militia. The Tutsi interpreter with them was threatened with death by the youth who were armed with machetes and who openly identified themselves as Interahamwe, or members of the MRND militia.” The team protested the “threats [made] against those who had helped with its work and called upon the President and Minister of Interior . . . to provide its witnesses and collaborators with full protection.”

Quatre-vingt morts dans les violences au Rwanda, selon un nouveau bilan [Violence in Rwanda Leads to 80 Dead, According to a New Report], AFP, 27 Jan. 1993; see also Deux morts et dix blesses graves dans des manifestations au Rwanda [Two Dead and Ten Seriously Injured in Rwanda Demonstrations], AFP, 21 Jan. 1993.


Fieulle de Motivation of Pascal Senyumuhara Safari alias Pascal Simbikangwa by Court of Assizes of Paris 3 (14 Mar. 2014); Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (12 Mar. 1992).

Maia de la Baume, France Convicts Rwandan Ex-Officer of Genocide, N.Y. TIMES, 14 Mar. 2014.

Letter from Monique Mujawamariya to Fernand Boedts (23 Jan. 1993). Mujawamariya wrote on behalf of the Association rwandaise pour la defense des droits de la personne et des libertes publiques [Rwandan Association for the Defense of Human Rights and Public Freedoms], which was part of the CLADHO cohort of Rwandan human rights associations that had requested the FIDH Commission come to Rwanda.


Fiche, Direction Generale de la Securite Extérieure (18 Feb. 1993); see also Cable from US Secretary of State (6 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Africa Bureau Friday Report, 2/5/93”) (“ICRC has confirmed over 300 killed and 4,000 displaced in January violence.”)

FIDH Report 4, 37-38 (emphasis added). The RPF’s response to allegations that it had targeted civilians was that the FAR had “installed its posts too near civilian targets, thus making it likely that civilians would suffer in the course of attacks.” Id. at 37. The Commission did not dispute this assertion but reported that eyewitnesses had described three “deliberate RPF attacks” on a clinic where FAR soldiers were hospitalized. See id.

Interview by France TV 2 with Jean Carbonare (26 Jan. 1993).
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68 Interview by France TV 2 with Jean Carbonare (26 Jan. 1993).

69 Interview by France TV 2 with Jean Carbonare (26 Jan. 1993). Jean Carbonare would return to French television on 3 February, telling an interviewer for France’s TV5 that he believed “the murders had been organized by the bourgmestres [mayors] and the Army,” adding “the French military must have been aware and are obligated to intervene.”

70 Cable from Georges Martres (29 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Les evenements du Rwanda et la communauta Francaise”).

71 Cable from Georges Martres (29 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Les evenements du Rwanda et la communauta Francaise”).

72 Cable from Georges Martres (29 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Les evenements du Rwanda et la communauta Francaise”).

73 Cable from Georges Martres (29 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Les evenements du Rwanda et la communauta Francaise”).

74 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (27 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Demarche on President Habyarimana”) (emphasis added).

75 Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (5 Feb. 1993). Swinnen reported that amongst the conclusions of the investigation were the following: “The victims are essentially Tutsi but are also Hutu affiliated with Tutsi, people from other regions, and people from parties other than the MRND and CDR. The disturbances and massacres are organized. The instigators and organizers have exploited the reflexes for fear of the other ethnic group, other regions or other parties to mount the populations against each other.”

76 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Demarches to President and Prime Minister”).

77 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Demarches to President and Prime Minister”).

78 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Demarches to President and Prime Minister”).

79 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Demarches to President and Prime Minister”).


82 See Cable from US Secretary of State (6 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Africa Bureau Friday Report, 2/5/93” (“The President was to have visited the areas of violence February 4 with the intention of suspending those local officials implicated. We see this action as the essential minimum requirement to demonstrate Habyarimana’s good faith.”)).


84 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (9 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Back to Arusha”). PL leader Justin Mugenzi told the US ambassador that Habyarimana had planned to replace only four officials, but increased that number in response to the RPF offensive on 8 February. Simbikangwa continued in his role as an intelligence officer until the Genocide, remaining close with President Habyarimana. See Memorandum from Marc Nees to Joseph Dewez (15 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Liste des noms d’Interahamwe distribuant des armes et des munitions”); see also Memorandum from Joseph Kavaruganda to Juvénal Habyarimana, (19 Mar. 1994).


87 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Minister of Defense on GOMN and Civil Defense”).

88 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Minister of Defense on GOMN and Civil Defense”).

89 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Minister of Defense on GOMN and Civil Defense”).
90 Memorandum from Dismas Nsengiyaremye to James Gasana (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Illegal Distribution of Weapons to Civilians”).

91 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Minister of Defense on GOMN and Civil Defense”).

92 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Minister of Defense”).

93 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission a Kigali et Kampala”).

94 Notes from C. Rusagara on Meeting at US Embassy in Kigali (27 Jan. 1993). These are handwritten notes, the contents of which are corroborated by other sources. See, e.g., Cable from Johnnie Carson to US Secretary of State (1 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “RPF Comments on Recent Events in Rwanda and Urges American Statement and Support”).

95 Press Release, RPF, Resumption of Hostilities in Rwanda (8 Feb. 1993) (“The ceasefire agreement [of July 1992] stipulated that, among other things, 1) the negotiations had to be conducted and concluded by the 10th of October 1992, 2) violations of human rights are violations of ceasefire, 3) withdrawal of the French troops in Rwanda is part and parcel of the ceasefire agreement.”); see also Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga; Interview by LFM with Richard Sezibera.


97 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “New RPF Attack”).

98 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “New RPF Attack”).


100 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake; Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.


103 Cable from Colonna (12 Feb. 1993).

104 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (18 Feb. 1993). Even the DGSE would conclude in a note dated 18 February 1993 that the RPF had attacked “because of ethnic massacres perpetrated in the East of the country (the RPF considers them to violate the cease-fire).”

105 Cable from Colonna (12 Feb. 1993).

106 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (16 Feb. 1993).

107 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (14 Dec. 1993).


109 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (16 Feb. 1993). Separately, while this cable confirmed that the French shared their intelligence with the Americans, it does not necessarily confirm an information flow in the opposite direction. However, given the information sharing practices described by Swinnen and evidenced by this and other US cables, it seems the French officials would have been informed of the contents of the 16 February 1993 US cable as well.

110 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – offensive militaire du FPR”).

111 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – offensive militaire du FPR”).

112 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (8 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – offensive militaire du FPR”).
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113 Report from Philippe Tracqui, Rapport concernant l’opération de récupération des ressortissants de Ruhengeri du 10 février 1993 (Operation Volcan) (17 Feb. 1993) (“The operation involved 7 officers, 16 non-commissioned officers, 95 master corporals and porpoises (soldiers) of the 21st Marine Infantry Regiment and the head of the detachment that was deployed.”).


117 See Chronologie Générale des Évènements (22 Apr. 1993); Memorandum from Michel Fruchard to François Leotard (6 Apr. 1993) (noting the French Ministry of Defense on 10 February 1993 authorized a direct transfer of 50 12.7 mm machine guns and 100,000 cartridges at no cost to the FAR).

118 See Chronologie Générale des Évènements (22 Apr. 1993); Memorandum from Michel Fruchard to François Leotard (6 Apr. 1993). Tauzin defined “discrete operations” as “official but conducted without the knowledge of all if possible” and defined “‘secret’ operations” as “in fact clandestine.” See BERNARD LUGAN, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND, L’ARMÉE FRANÇAISE ET LE RWANDA [FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND, THE FRENCH ARMY AND RWANDA] 127 n.1 (2005).

119 MIP Tome I 181.

120 Memorandum from Michel Fruchard to François Lépine (16 Feb. 1993); Memorandum from Michel Fruchard to François Leotard (6 Apr. 1993).

121 See Memorandum from Dominique Delort to French Ministry of Defense et al.; Memorandum from Michel Fruchard to François Leotard (6 Apr. 1993).

122 Memorandum from Michel Fruchard to François Leotard (6 Apr. 1993).

123 MIP Tome I 181.

124 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (13 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

125 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission a Kigali et Kampala”).


128 MIP Audition of Bruno Delaye, Tome III, Vol. 1, 107. In similar testimony, Jean-Marc de La Sablière briefly acknowledged the massacres in his MIP testimony but quickly pivoted to attack the RPF, insisting that they had “committed abuses” as well. In his recollection of February 1993, he pinned the blame for breaking the cease-fire on the RPF; the massacres, which preceded the rearmament of the RPA, did not register as a violation. To justify the deepening French military involvement, he claimed that massacres would have been a consequence of the RPF taking the capital in 1993. MIP Audition of Jean Marc de La Sablière, Tome III, Vol. 2, 153.


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135 Report from Philippe Tracqui, Rapport concernant l’opération de récupération des ressortissants de Ruhengeri du 10 Février 1993 (Operation Volcan) (17 Feb. 1993). The OAU (Organization of African Unity) was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It disbanded in 2002 and was replaced by the African Union. The OAU was, like the United Nations, an intergovernmental organization. Unlike the United Nations, however, “where important decisions are taken by the Security Council dominated by its five permanent members” (China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the important decisions of the OAU were “taken by its Assembly of 52 Heads of States.” ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY, RWANDA: THE PREVENTABLE GENOCIDE ¶ 11.3 (July 2000)

136 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (4 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “NMOG Reports Ceasefire Violation”).


139 Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (10 Feb. 1993).

140 France Denies Involvement in Rwanda Fighting, REUTERS, 15 Feb. 1993; see also Question de Jean-Pierre Brard: il proteste contre le soutien militaire français au régime de Kigali [Question from Jean-Pierre Brard: He Objects to French Military Support of the Kigali Regime], L’HUMANITÉ, 4 July 1992 (“In a question to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Communist MP Jean-Pierre Brard protested against French military support for the Kigali regime. Roland Dumas responded by saying that the only task of the expeditionary force is the protection of French and foreign nationals in Rwanda.”).

141 MIP Tome I 171.

142 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission à Kigali et Kampala”).

143 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update number 5: Ruhengeri seige [sic] broken”); Memorandum from Rwandan Service de Renseignements (11 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Note de synthèse au chef de service”).

144 See, e.g., Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (12 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update Number 6: Arusha to Pause; Fighting Continues”) (“Government forces still hold Ruhengeri, but they have been unable to push the RPF even as far north as the communal centers of Kinigi . . . and Nkumba . . . . shelling continued to the east in the contested commune of Bwisigne . . . . The RPF is still in Tumba commune, southwest of Byumba town near the Kigali-Ruhengeri road.”).


146 MIP Tome I 110.

147 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (11 Feb. 1993).

148 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission à Kigali et Kampala”) (emphasis and capitalization in original).

149 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission à Kigali et Kampala”).

150 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission à Kigali et Kampala”) (capitalization in original).


Notes on Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – situation militaire”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (emphasis added).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Appel du President Habyarimana”).


Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

See Duclert Commission Report 256-257 (discussing a French delegation’s meeting with President Museveni in Kampala on 13 February 1993).

Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.


Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame. Kagame said he insisted, though, that the RPF should not be forced to forfeit the territory it had gained since the launch of the 8 February offensive, if that would permit the FAR to reconquer that territory. The ensuing debate over this issue would ultimately lead to the creation of a demilitarized zone.

Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

180 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
182 MIP, Tome I 164, 167.
183 MIP, Tome I 164.
185 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Directive pour le colonel Delort, ambassade de France au Rwanda”).
187 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Directive pour le colonel Delort, ambassade de France au Rwanda”).
188 See generally MIP Tome I 153-54. Cussac admitted to the French Parliamentary Mission that, in practice, for matters concerning the DAMI, he reported to the Army état-major.
189 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Directive pour le colonel Delort, ambassade de France au Rwanda”).
190 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Directive pour le colonel Delort, ambassade de France au Rwanda”).
191 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Directive pour le colonel Delort, ambassade de France au Rwanda”).
192 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Directive pour le colonel Delort, ambassade de France au Rwanda”).
193 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Leotard (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Point de situation au Rwanda le 23 février 1993”) (mentioning the mortar company (“1 SML and six tubes”)); Excerpt of cable from Dominique Delort (7 Mar. 1993).
194 MIP Tome I 175.
196 Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.
197 See, e.g., Cable from Georges Martres to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (29 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Les evenements du Rwanda et la communauté francaise”) (noting that expatriates in Gisenyi had been hassled at roadblocks); Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana) (memorializing Col. Cussac discussing with Col. Ndindilyimana the Gendarmerie’s hassling of foreigners and Rwandans at roadblocks); Cable from Georges Martres (13 Nov. 1991) (Subject: “Situation militaire et renseignements divers”) (noting that Gendarmerie sentry at roadblock pointed his weapon at a driver who was with a Belgian in a vehicle and fired at the vehicle after they had driven off in fear).
198 Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana).
199 Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana).
200 Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana).
201 Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana).
202 Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana); see also Fiche recapitulative COOP / MMC en date du 23 mars 1994 (23 March 1994).
203 Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana).
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205 Meeting Notes (19 Feb. 1993) (signed Mathias Nsabimana and Augustin Ndindilyimana) (meeting occurred on 16 Feb. 1993); Meeting Notes (23 Nov. 1992) (signed Mugiraneza Ildephonse and Augustin Ndindilyimana). Also on 19 February 1993, a US Embassy cable from US Ambassador to Rwanda Robert Flaten reported to Washington that: “Two Rwandan men who went by motorcycle to their home area just east of Ruhengeri to search for family were, according to one who survived, treated politely at an RPF checkpoint and permitted to pass. Upon reaching their destination, they were beaten severely by government troops; one died and the other sustained serious injuries and is now in Kigali hospital.” Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update Number 10: Fighting continues; more RPF war crimes reported”).

206 Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

207 Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije. An “abattoir” is a slaughterhouse for animals.

208 Notes on Cable from George Martres (1 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Visite de M. Marcel Debarge au Rwanda”).

209 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Nshongozabahizi (10 Aug. 2017) (recalling, as a former Interahamwe, seeing the French man a roadblock on the road from Kigali to Gisenyi in 1990); Interview by LFM with Charles Bugirimfura (recalling, as a former FAR soldier, French soldiers manning a roadblock near the Kigali airport in late 1990, as well as in Nyacyonga and Shyorongi from 1991 until the end of 1993).

210 See generally Mucyo Report Section 1.4 (2008) (summarizing witness testimony on various violent incidents committed by French soldiers at roadblocks or committed by Rwandan soldiers at roadblocks or after arresting Tutsi at roadblocks).


216 See, e.g., MIP Tome I 176 (“This active surveillance, under the form of patrols and ‘checkpoints,’ even if it occurs in conjunction with the Rwandan Gendarmerie, inevitably leads to exercising checks on persons. If the rules of behavior at the ‘checkpoints’ refer to the ‘delivery of any suspect, weapon and document seized to the Rwandan Gendarmerie,’ it is unclear how such a procedure can take place if there was no prior identity check or search.”); Kigali, AFP, 3 Mar. 1993 (“French troops accompanied by Rwandan soldiers are manning roadblocks on the outskirts of the capital. The French soldiers were checking identification papers of Rwandans travelling to and from Kigali on Wednesday. They were also searching cars, apparently for guns.”); Makombe, Rwanda: Ubufaransa Burivanga! [Rwanda: France Interferes!] KANGUKA NEWSPAPER 12 (23 Mar. 1993) (reporting that French soldiers asked the population to show identity cards at Nyabarongo and Shyorongi checkpoints and asking people if they are either Hutu or Tutsi); see also MIP Audition of Jean Hervé Bradol Tome III, Vol. 1, 390. Bradol, a French humanitarian worker with Doctors Without Borders in Rwanda, told the MIP that he saw French soldiers at the northern entrance to Kigali either carrying out the checks themselves or observing their Rwandan colleagues carrying them out from their posts.


218 See, e.g., Mucyo Report Section 1.4 (2008) (summarizing witness testimony on violence against Tutsi at roadblocks or Tutsi taken from roadblocks for interrogation elsewhere in 1993); see also Interview by LFM with Straton Sinzabakwira (describing a group, assumed to be Tutsi, pulled aside at a French-FAR jointly manned roadblock at Nyabarongo in February 1993); Interview by LFM with Kayiranga Wellars (describing Rwandan soldiers raping Tutsi women in the tents of French soldiers at jointly-manned roadblocks near the Kabuye Sugar Factory, as well as verbal and physical abuse of Tutsis by Rwandan soldiers in the presence of French soldiers); Interview by LFM with Djuma Mbaru shimana (describing French soldiers denying Tutsis passage at a roadblock in Giti Cy’Inyoni, Kigali); Interview by LFM with Vital Mucanda (describing the detention and disappearance of his Tutsi family members at a French-
manned roadblock in Shyorongi in 1993); Interview by LFM with Abdoul Maka Ntirenganya (describing being trained to operate roadblocks by French and FAR soldiers at MRND Headquarters in Gisenyi in 1992 and noting the harassment, beating, and detention of Tutsis at roadblocks).

220 MIP Tome I 176.
221 MIP Tome I 176.
222 MIP Tome I 176.
223 See Excerpt of Cable from Dominique Delort (7 Mar. 1993) (reporting that Noroit’s “contribution to Rwandan control at checkpoints in the last 15 days” was to hand over eight FAR deserters to the Gendarmerie as well as several confiscated weapons, but saying nothing about the detention of alleged RPF collaborators); Report from Philippe Tracqui, Compte rendu d’activités du détachement Noroit (20 Mar. 1993) (noting the arrest of “many deserters and the seizure of many arms and ammunition” but nothing about the arrest of alleged RPF collaborators”).
224 Account taken from interview by LFM with Bernard Kayumba.
226 Didier Tauzin, Rwanda: Je demande justice pour la France et ses soldats [Rwanda: I Demand Justice for France and Its Soldiers] 61 (2011). Gen. Didier Tauzin, who led the operation, has said that Chimère was not the operation’s code name. Instead, he wrote, the operation was named Birunga (referring to the Virunga mountains), and Chimère, the name given to the dragon on the 1st RPIMa insignia, was the name favored by a media that hoped to evoke a shadowy association. That said, at least one contemporaneous French document refers to the operation as Chimère, and since the name has been used widely, it will be used here to avoid confusion. Chronologie Générale des Événements (22 Apr. 1993) (identified as Annex 4).
227 MIP Tome I 165; Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).
228 1er Régiment de parachutistes d’infanterie de marine [First Regiment of Marine Infantry Parachutists], MINISTERES DES ARMÉES (updated on 21 August 2020).
229 Letter from Survie Gironde to Alain Juppe (2 Apr. 1994).
233 MIP Tome I 165.
234 MIP Tome I 165. See also Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to Dominique Delort (20 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Directive pour le colonel Delort, ambassade de France au Rwanda”) (“As of the use of the RAPAS Unit is concerned, its staff is initially intended to reinforce our assistance to the RWANDAN command, without going below the level of sector commander, and to ensure advanced guidance of possible aerial actions.”).
237 Didier Tauzin, Rwanda: Je demande justice pour la France et ses soldats [Rwanda: I Demand Justice for France and Its Soldiers] 71-74 (2011); see also MIP Tome I 165 (“After a helicopter flyover of the threatened zones, it is decided to send a team of officer-advisers to the FAR chief of staff and a team of advisers to each of the sector commanders (Ruhengeri, Rulindo, Byumba). Elements of DAMI Engineering fulfill an advisory mission to the sector commanders in terms of defensive organization of the field. An artillery DAMI performs an advisory role for the use of 122D30 and 105 mm batteries.”).


242 MIP Tome I 165. Tauzin put the number at “67 men, including 5 senior officers, 9 junior officers, 30 non-commissioned officers and 23 master corporals, all very seasoned specialists and, for the most part, excellent connoisseurs of Rwanda where they have already made one or more stays under the DAMI. With the exception of about ten officers and NCOs, artillerymen coming from the 35th RAP (Parachute Artillery Regiment) or sappers, we are all from the 1stRPIMa. I therefore command a detachment of exceptional military quality: remarkable cohesion, a wide variety of military skills brought to the highest level, a composure that will stand the test of time, a perfect understanding of the situation, and adaptability that will take my breath away every day.” DIDIER TAUZIN, RWANDA: JE DEMANDE JUSTICE POUR LA FRANCE ET SES SOLDATS [RWANDA: I DEMAND JUSTICE FOR FRANCE AND ITS SOLDIERS] 68 (2011).


246 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 293 (2004).


248 DIDIER TAUZIN, RWANDA: JE DEMANDE JUSTICE POUR LA FRANCE ET SES SOLDATS [RWANDA: I DEMAND JUSTICE FOR FRANCE AND ITS SOLDIERS] 75 (2011) (“On the morning of the 25th, two days after Chéreau took up his post at headquarters, Nsabimana issued a coherent and pugnacious order of operations, probably the first in a long time. This order was, of course, prepared by Chéreau according to the decisions that I made with him.”).


256 Cable from Colonna (22 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda – Declaration du porte parole”).

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258 See, e.g., Adam Lusekelo, *Rwandans Agree to Negotiate Peace*, Reuters, 8 Mar. 1993 (“The RPF says French troops fought alongside government forces last month but France says its forces are in Kigali only to protect its citizens.”).

259 Cable from Colonna (1 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Declaration du porte parole”); see also *Une seconde compagnie a été dépêchée à Kigali, annonce le Quai d’Orsay* [A Second Company has been Dispatched to Kigali, Announces the Quai d’Orsay], AP, 9 Feb. 1993 (quoting Quai d’Orsay spokesperson Daniel Bernard as saying, “[t]he presence of these additional French forces has no other objective than to ensure the security of our nationals”).

260 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission a Kigali et Kampala”).

261 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: Mission a Kigali et Kampala”) (emphasis and capitalization in original).

262 Cable from Colonna (12 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda - Declaration du Porte Parole”).


264 *Guerre au pays des mille collines: Rwanda, la menace d’une catastrophe* [War in the Land of A Thousand Hills: Rwanda on the Brink of Disaster] (International Committee of the Red Cross 1993) (Directed by Adrian Ulrich) (available at https://avarchives.icrc.org/Film/191. See 00:02:00-00:02:35 and 00:09:25-00:12:00).


266 Cable from Colonna (12 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda – Declaration du Porte Parole”).


268 *Rwanda: L’Armée accuse les maquisards d’avoir massacré cinq cents réfugiés* [Rwanda: Army Accuses Guerrilla Fighters of Killing 500 Refugees], Le Monde/ AFP, 21 Feb. 1993; see also Rebels Massacre 500 Civilians: Report, AFP, 19 Feb. 1993 (stating that the accusation came from “sources close to the Rwandan army high command” and that the “French Foreign Ministry, without specifying the reported Rebero incident, said it had information that there were massacres in rebel-held areas, and was checking”).

269 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update 11; Fighting continues but positions stabilize”); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda parties to meet RPF in Bujumbura”). The 22 February 1993 cable did note reports by the human rights group CLADHO of RPF targeting killings of MRND and CDR members in and around Ruhengeri. But these reports contrasted with NGO reports noted in a 19 February 1993 US cable that it was Rwandan government troops, and not the RPF, who were responsible for abuses in and around Ruhengeri. Some of these reports came from “French cooperants” (presumably civil and not military cooperants) who “said the RPF they came in contact with were polite and provoked no fear. Government forces subsequentlyashed the homes of the cooperants following their departure.” The 19 February cable also recounted the story of a group of secondary school students who were “accompanied throughout most of their 60km walk from Ruhengeri to safety by RPF soldiers who aided rather than abetted the group. Government soldiers, on the other hand, encountered at their destination, verbally abused the students, and threatened them saying u[n]less they fully supported President Habyarimana they would be treated as the enemy.” Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update Number 10: Fighting continues; more RPF war crimes reported”).


275 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (“Our military and technological aid to the Rwandan forces has still not reversed the balance of power, nor has it achieved the political objectives decided on October 22, which seems more serious to me.”); Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (2 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Mission de M. Debarge”) (“Our indirect strategy of supporting the Rwandan armed forces has reached its limits.”).
276 Notes on Cable from French Embassy in Kampala (Subject: “Entretien de M. Debarge avec Museveni”) (1 Mar. 1993) (“[W]e do not want to get too involved, but we also refuse to lose face.”).
277 Cable from US Secretary of State (11 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “INR/AA’s African Trends – 2/4/93 (No. 2)”).
279 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (13 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
280 Notes on Cable from George Martres (14 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Voyage de MM. Delaye et de La Sablière au Rwanda 2/2”).
282 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (26 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Mission de M. Debarge au Rwanda et en Uganda – Éléments de langage”). Just two weeks later, a higher-ranking French official, Minister of Cooperation Marcel Debarge, was holding his own meetings with Habyarimana and Nsengiyaremye and issuing the same pleas for a rapprochement between the two leaders. Liste des Participants au diner qui sera offert par le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères et de la Coopération, S.E. Mr. Nguilinzira Boniface, a l’occasion de la visite au Rwanda de Mr. Marcel Debarge, Ministre Français délègue a la Coopération et au Développement (28 Feb. 1993); Cable from Colonna (1 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Declaration du Porte Parole”); Cable from Johan Swinnen (1 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “visite du ministre français de la coopération”).
283 Notes on Cable from George Martres (14 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Voyage de MM. Delaye et de La Sablière au Rwanda 2/2”).
284 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”); see also Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in London (27 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “INR Analysis – Rwanda: RPF Goals”) (“An early RPF attack on Kigali is unlikely as long as some 500 French troops provide a deterrent.”).
287 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
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288 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).


290 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (16 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update Number 7: Military Situation Worsens; Ceasefire Offers Remain on Table”).

291 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (4 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister”).

292 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (4 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Meetings with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister”).

293 A 26 February DGSE report estimated the FAR had 30,000 men, compared to 5,000 to 10,000 for the RPF. See Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (26 Feb. 1993).

294 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (16 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update Number 7: Military Situation Worsens; Ceasefire Offers Remain on Table”).

295 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (16 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update Number 7: Military Situation Worsens; Ceasefire Offers Remain on Table”).

296 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).


298 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (26 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

299 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (26 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

300 Bruce Jones, The Arusha Peace Process, in THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE 141-42 (Howard Adelman & Astri Suhrke eds. 1999) (“Negotiating strength on this issue would turn out to be a precise function of fighting strength on the ground. In this interpretation, the RPF launched the offensive at this point to prove their fighting strength and thus put them on firm ground for these most important negotiations.”).

301 See, e.g., Cable from Johnnie Carson to American Embassy in Kigali (27 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “U.S. Meeting with RPF Military Commander”).

302 See Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Politics and a Ceasefire”) (discussing the RPF’s 10 February cease-fire proposal); RPF, Declaration of Ceasefire (21 Feb. 1993) (signed Alexis Kanyarengwe).

303 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Politics and a Ceasefire”).

304 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Politics and a Ceasefire”).


307 Final Communiqué Published at the End of the Bujumbura Meeting Held from 25 February to 2nd March 93 Between the Political Parties (2 Mar. 1993) (Signed Alexis Kanyarengwe (RPF), Faustin Twagiramungu and Ignace Karuhije (MDR), Félicien Ngango and Théoneste Gafaranga (PSD), J. Népomucene and Michel Niyibizi (PDC), and Justin Mugenzi and Stanislas Nyilinkwaya (PL)).

308 MIP Tome I 14-15.

309 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Politics and a Ceasefire”).

310 Notes of 24 Feb. 1993 Radio Rwanda broadcast of speech by Juvénal Habyarimana, RPF Archive (25 Feb. 1993). President Habyarimana would later make different excuses for the MRND’s non-participation in the Bujumbura summit, telling a visiting French official that he had objected to the summit “because he believed that the negotiation should be led by the government and not by the parties and that in any case a meeting of the latter should have been held under the aegis of a mediator or facilitator.” Notes on Cable from George Martres (1 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Visite de M. Marcel Debarge au Rwanda”).

311 MIP Tome I 115 (quoting MDR President Faustin Twagiramungu as saying that the RPF delegation “proved determined to only agree to withdraw its forces if the French forces agreed to do the same by leaving Rwanda. In other
words, for the peace talks to continue, for the RPF forces to withdraw from the zone they occupied and that this zone by demilitarized, the Noroît forces needed to leave”).

312 MIP Tome I 115.

313 See Final Communiqué Published at the End of the Bujumbura Meeting Held from 25 February to 2nd March 93 Between the Political Parties (2 Mar. 1993) (Signed Alexis Kanyarengwe (RPF), Faustin Twagiramungu and Ignace Karuhije (MDR), Félicien Ngango and Théoneste Gafaranga (PSD), J. Népomucene and Michel Niyibizi (PDC), and Justin Mugenzi and Stanislas Nyilinkwaya (PL)). The DGSE wrote, dryly, that the communiqué “will not facilitate the resumption of negotiations.” Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (5 Mar. 1993).


315 Final Communiqué Published at the End of the Bujumbura Meeting Held from 25 February to 2nd March 93 Between the Political Parties (2 Mar. 1993) (signed by Alexis Kanyarengwe (RPF), Faustin Twagiramungu and Ignace Karuhije (MDR), Félicien Ngango and Théoneste Gafaranga (PSD), J. Népomucene and Michel Niyibizi (PDC), and Justin Mugenzi and Stanislas Nyilinkwaya (PL)).

316 MIP Tome I 115.

317 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake; see also Ikiganiro na Koimanda Karenzi wa GOMN [Conversation with Commander Karenzi of GOMN], in RWANDA RUSHYA (1993).

318 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.


322 Ikiganiro na Koimanda Karenzi wa GOMN [Conversation with Commander Karenzi of GOMN], in RWANDA RUSHYA (1993).

323 Notes on Restricted Council Meeting Notes (24 Feb. 1993). Minister of Cooperation Marcel Debarge said he agreed, “especially since a media campaign on the respect of human rights is going to be launched in Belgium.” His explanation offers further evidence that officials in Paris understood that France was inviting criticism by continuing to support Habyarimana in spite of his regime’s record on human rights.

324 See Duclert Commission Report 717-19; Jacques Lanxade: “Le Président suivait généralement mon avis, je dirais même quasiment toujours,” AGONE, 17 Feb. 2020 (interview by François Graner with Jacques Lanxade (22 Aug. 2018)); see also MIP Tome I 367, 383. Participants included the prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister, and minister of cooperation. President Mitterrand was frequently joined by Hubert Védrine, his secretary general, and General Christian Quesnot, his chief military advisor. Admiral Jacques Lanxade, the chief of defense staff, was also a regular attendee. See MIP Tome I 383; see also, e.g., Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 April 1993). The meetings facilitated coordination between the president and prime minister and covered a range of subjects, Rwanda often among them. See generally MIP Tome I 383; see also, e.g., Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 April 1993).

325 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (26 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

326 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (26 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

327 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (26 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

328 Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (26 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

329 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
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330 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
331 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
332 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
333 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
334 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”); see also Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (15 Feb. 1993) (arguing that the “ambiguous” nature of French troop deployment in Rwanda was “necessary for a good deterrent”).
335 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
336 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
337 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”). French authorities did, indeed, consider upping their military support for the FAR at this time. On 27 February 1993, four days after Pin and Quesnot penned their note to the president, command for French jaguar fighter pilots stationed in Bangui received a briefing “to prepare a possible jaguar fire support for Noroit.” Report from Philippe Tracqui, Compte rendu d’activités du détachement Noroit (20 Mar. 1993).
343 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
344 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).
346 Cable from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (9 Sept. 1992) (Subject: “Composition et deployment du GOMN”).
348 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (4 Dec. 1992) (Subject: “NMOG Reports Ceasefire Violation”).
350 Cable from Catherine Boivineau (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “OUA – Rwanda”).
351 Cable from Catherine Boivineau (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “OUA – Rwanda”).
352 Cable from Catherine Boivineau (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “OUA – Rwanda”).


Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).


Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint sur le Rwanda”); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Update Number 11: Fighting Continues but Positions Stabilize”). Among the more notable developments on the war front in the days preceding Pin and Quesnot’s memo—at least, according to a US cable—had been the discovery of a Ugandan truck on the road from Cyanika to Ruhengeri. A Radio Rwanda report said a search of the truck, which bore a Ugandan license plate, uncovered Kalashnikovs and ammunition, as well as orders signed by a Ugandan military official. A DGSE report on 26 February cited this discovery first on a list of three indicators of Ugandan military support for the RPF. The report nevertheless acknowledged that there was “no formal proof of Kampala’s assistance to the RPF.”


Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1 Mar. 1993).

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Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1 Mar. 1993).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (2 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Mission de M. Debarge”); see also Cable from Colonna (1 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Declaration du porte parole”); Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1 Mar. 1993); GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 178 (1997). Prunier saw something insidious in this message, writing: “[T]he public nature of the French minister’s declaration was shocking. In such a tense ethnic climate, with massacres having taken place in recent weeks, this call for a ‘common front’ which could only be based on race was nearly a call to racial war. It seemed that some French authorities involved in the Rwandese crisis were in danger of globalising the conflict in ever cruder and more paranoid terms.”

Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (2 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Mission de M. Debarge”). Debarge warned that disunion within the Rwandan government might create an opening for a perceived “third force,” which would surely fail. “Caught between the Rwandan Army and the RPF, the latter would soon be shattered and the RPF would be the sole beneficiary of the country’s internal divisions,” he said, according to researcher’s transcription of a French cable. Notes on Cable from George Martres (1 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Visite de M. Marcel Debarge au Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (2 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Mission de M. Debarge”).

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371 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (2 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Mission de M. Debarge”).

372 See Final Communiqué Published at the End of the Bujumbura Meeting Held from 25 February to 2nd March 93 Between the Political Parties (2 Mar. 1993) (signed Alexis Kanyarengwe (RPF), Faustin Twagiramungu and Ignace Karuhije (MDR), Félicien Ngango and Théoneste Gafaranga (PSD), J. Népomucene and Michel Niyibizi (PDC), and Justin Mugenzi and Stanislas Nyilinkwaya (PL)).

373 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (2 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Mission de M. Debarge”).

374 Memorandum from Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (2 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Mission de M. Debarge”).

375 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

376 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

377 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).


383 Fax from Dominique Delort (2 Mar. 1993). Delort’s proposal offers a striking example of French officials’ tendency, throughout the war, to compartmentalize their suspicions about the FAR’s involvement in massacres and other human rights abuses. Cable from Georges Martres (2 Mar. 1993) (signed Dominique Delort). Delort issued the proposal on 2 March 1993. That same day, in a sitrep sent to officials in Paris, he wrote that war and political divisions were causing Rwandans to “lose all common sense,” driving some Hutus to kill their neighbors, either because they were Tutsi or because they belonged to an opposition political party. He wrote: “Only the civilian population seems, for the moment, to be committing these massacres, but information indicates future participation by the Rwandan Army.” In short, Delort was urging France to bolster its support for an institution he suspected would soon be taking part in the ethnic violence enveloping the country.

384 Fax from Dominique Delort (2 Mar. 1993); Report from COS, Renforcement du volet stratégie indirecte au Rwanda (5 Mar. 1993).

385 Fax from Dominique Delort (2 Mar. 1993).

386 Fax from Dominique Delort (2 Mar. 1993).


394 Cable from Madeline Albright to US Secretary of State (4 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “France wants Security Council Action on Rwanda”).


396 Cable from Madeline Albright to US Secretary of State (4 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “France wants Security Council Action on Rwanda”).


401 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (3 Mar. 1993). Mitterrand immediately recognized that a handoff to UN forces would surprise and concern some French allies in other parts of Africa. “[I]f France pulls out, which would be wise, everyone will feel threatened,” he said.


404 Notes on Restricted Council Meeting Notes (3 Mar. 1993) (noting that Mitterrand alluded to the risk of “damage [French] prestige” if France left Rwanda).


413 Report from COS, Renforcement du volet strategie indirecte au Rwanda (5 Mar. 1993).


Cable from Georges Martres (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Retrait des troupes Francaises du Rwanda”).

Rwandan Negotiators Arrive for Contact Meeting, AFP, 4 Mar. 1993.


Memorandum from Bruno Delaye (3 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Propositions de recommendations”).

Cable from Johnnie Carson to American Embassy in Kigali (27 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “U.S. Meeting with RPF Military Commander”).


Memorandum from Michel Rigot (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda, le 9 mars 1993 – Point de situation”).

Memorandum from Michel Rigot (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda, le 9 mars 1993 – Point de situation”).


Rebel Demand Delays Signing of Joint Communiqué, AFP, 6 Mar. 1993.

Rebel Demand Delays Signing of Joint Communiqué, AFP, 6 Mar. 1993.

Joint Communiqué Issued at the End of the High-Level Meeting Between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Held in Dar-Es-Salaam from 5 To 7 March 1993 (7 Mar. 1993).


Confidential Document Between the Rwandese Government and the Rwandese Patriotic Front Regarding the Modalities of the Withdrawal of Foreign Troops, Rw. – RPF, 7 Mar. 1993 (signed Dismas Nsengiyaremye and Alexis Kanyarengwe). Note that contrary to the text of this agreement, according to French documents, on 8 February 1993, there was only one Noroit company in Rwanda, not two; reinforcements arrived the next day.

Memorandum from Michel Rigot (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda, le 9 mars 1993 – Point de situation”).

See, e.g., Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (calling for the deployment of Noroit reinforcement companies not only to protect French nationals, but to “send a clear signal to the RPF in order to curb its appetite”).

Memorandum from Michel Rigot (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda, le 9 mars 1993 – Point de situation”).

Memorandum from Michel Rigot (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda, le 9 mars 1993 – Point de situation”).

Handwritten note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand on memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (9 Mar. 1993).

Handwritten note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand on memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (9 Mar. 1993).

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restreint du 10 mars 93”) (“[A]s long as the Rwandan government accepts these provisions, it is difficult for us not to side with them.”).
Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restreint du 10 mars 93”).

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restreint du 10 mars 93”).

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (9 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restreint du 10 mars 93”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Peace and Politics”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Peace and Politics”).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “CDR Splits from MRND”).

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Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (29 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “CDR Splits from MRND”).

Notes on Cable from George Martres (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Entrevue avec le président Habyarimana”).

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Habyarimana reportedly returned to this subject in a meeting with Ambassador Martres in late April 1993. Following the meeting, a French embassy official sent a cable to Paris reminding officials there that the Rwandan president was “still awaiting France’s advice as to whether he should commit himself not to seek a new mandate at the end of the transitional period,” and that he “would like us to assure him by our presence and our support that his security and that of his entourage will not be endangered if he leaves the political scene.” Notes on Cable from George Martres (26 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Rencontre du Président Habyarimana avec M. Georges Martres”).


Chapter VI

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479 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restraint du 24 mars”).

480 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restraint du 24 mars”).


485 Memorandum from Philippe Tracqui (19 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Ordre de Conduite No. 9”).

486 Memorandum from Philippe Tracqui (19 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Ordre de Conduite No. 9”).


488 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restraint du 24 mars”); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Minister of Defense”). Defense Minister Gasana told US Ambassador Flaten on 19 March that “the RPF had withdrawn from its March 17 positions, but that he could not verify if the pullback was all the way to the Feb. 8 positions, or if 100 percent of the RPF forces had withdrawn.” The government had imperfect information because, as a US cable explained, the only entity permitted to access the buffer zone and verify whether the RPF had indeed withdrawn was the GOMN.

489 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restraint du 24 mars”).


491 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda – Conseil restraint du 24 mars”).


493 Memorandum from Philippe Tracqui (24 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Ordre de Conduite No. 10”).

494 Memorandum from Dominique Delort (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Ordre du jour”).

495 Memorandum from Dominique Delort (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Ordre du jour”).


499 Report from Bernard Cussac, Compte Rendu Semestriel de Fonctionnement (5 Apr. 1993).


A. The French Government’s Support for Habyarimana Continued at the Dawn of a New Era of “Cohabitation” Government in Paris, with French Diplomats Working behind the Scenes to Neutralize the RPF.

The March 1993 legislative elections ended in disaster for President Mitterrand’s Socialist Party. After two rounds of voting, beginning 21 March and concluding 28 March, the moderate conservative bloc claimed 484 of the 577 seats in the National Assembly, humbling Mitterrand and setting up a divided, or “cohabitation,” government for the second time in his presidency. Mitterrand wasted no time choosing a prime minister. Pressed to select a member of the conservative alliance, he settled on Édouard Balladur—a former finance minister and legislator. Balladur cut a genteel figure, with an abiding courtesy that tended to mask his tenacity. (Those who knew him well described him as “an iron fist in a velvet glove.”) Most critically, from Mitterrand’s perspective, Balladur was a known commodity, having served the previous cohabitation government, from 1986 to 1988. Indeed, it was Balladur who, in a 1983 article, had first worked out how political cohabitation could work in practice.

“My dear compatriots,” Mitterrand said in a four-minute televised address on 29 March 1993, “by electing a new, very large majority to the National Assembly, you have signaled your desire for a different policy. This wish will be scrupulously respected.” The 76-year-old president, appearing pale, but calm, presented Balladur as a sensible choice in an era of divided government, touting his “competence” and his ability to unify the various factions within the conservative majority. (The Mitterrand-Balladur partnership would prove workable, by many accounts. In contrast with the previous period of cohabitation (1986-1988), marked by frequent clashes, the Balladur years would be described as the “velvet cohabitation.”)

“As for me,” Mitterrand added, in his 29 March 1993 address, “I will observe the duties and responsibilities that the constitution grants me. I will ensure the continuity of our foreign policy and our defense policy.”

The election results were an unavoidable topic of conversation in Paris on 1 April, when Admiral Lanxade addressed a gathering of the city’s many foreign military, naval, and air attachés. Rwanda’s military attaché in Paris, Colonel Sébastien Ntahobari, found the admiral’s remarks reassuring, writing in a memo two weeks later that Lanxade had told the group that “France’s policy with African countries will not change even with the Right in power.” Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana, who, as Rwanda’s ambassador to France, had been tracking the legislative races closely, viewed the elections as a referendum on Mitterrand’s handling of the French economy. If the president’s televised speech on 29 March was any indication, Mitterrand did not read the results as a signal that voters were unhappy with his administration’s foreign policy, and Ndagijimana saw little reason to expect any dramatic changes in that arena. Mitterrand, Ndagijimana wrote in a 30 March analysis, “will probably have his
say,” though Mitterrand would likely need to secure Balladur’s buy-in on any major decisions.\(^\text{17}\) “It appears, moreover, that there are no fundamental differences between the African policy led by the Right and that led by the Left, the main [goal] being to preserve France’s interests and influence in the world,” Ndagijimana wrote.\(^\text{18}\) He expressed confidence that France would not abandon the La Baule policy of requiring democratic reforms as a condition for aid in developing countries.\(^\text{19}\) He did expect, though, that the new French cabinet would prioritize security and stability over the pro-democratization policy, recognizing that many African leaders were “of the opinion that the current political mess in many French-speaking African countries [was] not conducive to development.”\(^\text{20}\) “That is to say,” Ndagijimana wrote, “that the necessary democratization of African countries will be encouraged, but the socio-economic specificities and the political stability of each country will be taken into account.”\(^\text{21}\)

The reshuffling of power in Paris came at a frenzied and challenging time in France’s dealings with Rwanda. The FAR was proving to be outmatched, even after two and a half years of steadfast French support. Now, Operation Chimère was over—it concluded on 28 March,\(^\text{22}\) at the very moment of the French Socialist Party’s resounding defeat at the polls—but French military operations continued, with two Noroit companies remaining in Kigali, and several dozen instructors and technical advisers still assisting the FAR.\(^\text{23}\) The goal now, as President Mitterrand had framed it in a 3 March 1993 restricted council meeting, was to provide enough military support to prevent the FAR from losing any further ground on the battlefield while the gears of diplomacy continued to spin,\(^\text{24}\) not only in Arusha, but at the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa and the UN headquarters in New York.\(^\text{25}\)

The Arusha peace talks, after resuming in mid-March, had been productive at first, with the government and RPF delegations needing just nine days to reach an agreement on how many troops would serve in the new Rwandan military.\(^\text{26}\) While their initial proposals were far apart—the government, having drastically enlarged its armed forces during the war, pitched a much higher figure than the RPF was willing to accept—both sides had shown a willingness to compromise on this issue, ultimately agreeing to equip Rwanda with a 13,000-man army and a 9,000-man gendarmerie.\(^\text{27}\) The talks became considerably more contentious, though, when the negotiators turned to the harder questions of how to integrate the two sides’ forces. When, at first, the government declared that 80 percent of the troops should come from the FAR, and just 20 percent from the RPF, the latter’s chief negotiator, Pasteur Bizimungu, called the proposal an “insult.”\(^\text{28}\) Bizimungu reportedly blasted the FAR as “a defeated army” and announced that if the government wanted an 80-20 split, it could have it—but with 80 percent for the RPF, and 20 for the FAR.\(^\text{29}\) The back and forth on this issue would take up most of the next three months.\(^\text{30}\)

Mitterrand, having resolved on 3 March that French troops should “be replaced” by the United Nations “as soon as possible,”\(^\text{31}\) was not content to wait for the Arusha process to run its course. In late March, his administration dispatched a high-level delegation led by the Foreign Ministry’s Africa director, Jean-Marc de La Sablière, to prod the United Nations to follow through on the recommendations the Security Council had outlined on 12 March 1993 in Resolution 812.\(^\text{32}\) The Security Council resolution had contemplated at least two types of international forces that might be deployed to the region. It first called on Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to consider collaborating with the OAU on an “international force” with wide-ranging responsibilities, among them protecting civilians, delivering humanitarian assistance, and
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supporting the Neutral Military Observer Group’s work of monitoring the cease-fire. It next invited Boutros-Ghali to examine the Rwandan and Ugandan governments’ requests to send observers to their shared border.

De La Sablière’s message during his meetings with UN officials and other diplomats on 25 and 26 March set the template for the French government’s messaging to the international community in the months ahead. France’s position, he explained, was that both types of forces were needed, but one was needed more urgently than the other. Tellingly, it was not the force with the mission of protecting civilians and monitoring the cease-fire. In the French government’s view, the proposed border force—a force designed, above all else, to neutralize the RPF as a military power—was the higher priority. This UN border force would not be designed to check both belligerents, but only one: the RPF.

Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée, France’s permanent representative to the United Nations, sought to explain the French government’s rationale in a 2 April letter to Boutros-Ghali. By his account, the Arusha talks were “deadlocked,” and the RPF had not yet fulfilled its promise to pull its troops back to the 8 February 1993 cease-fire line. (Mérimée did not call out the RPF by name, but the implication was clear.) “In that context,” he wrote, “it is to be feared that the fighting will soon resume, leading to further massacres and to a very serious deterioration in the humanitarian situation.” The letter called the proposed deployment of observers to the Rwandan-Ugandan border “a matter of priority,” explaining: “We are of the view that such a deployment, which has been requested by the authorities of Rwanda and Uganda, could reduce tension in the region and promote the negotiation process between the parties.”

An internal French Defense Ministry memo on 1 April was more direct. It said that RPF troops—which, according to the memo, had pulled back from the positions they occupied when the Dar es Salaam agreement was signed on 7 March 1993, but not all the way—to be battle ready. “The signs that the RPF may possibly resume their offensive are beginning to accumulate,” the memo warned. A UN observer force on the Rwandan-Ugandan border might keep this threat in check. According to the memo, “This deployment would considerably limit the assistance the Ugandan Army can provide to the RPF. It would therefore have the ability to bring down tensions in Rwanda.”

French concerns that the RPF military was preparing to storm Kigali continued to mount in late March and early April 1993. A note dated 1 April from General Quesnot and Delaye to Mitterrand referred to indications that an attack was just “a few days or weeks” away. Rwandan authorities were no less convinced than were the French. In a 31 March meeting with a US diplomat, Lt. Col. Anatole Nsengiyumva, the Rwandan Army état-major’s chief of intelligence, insisted that RPF negotiators in Arusha were merely stalling while the group’s armed forces laid the groundwork “for a massive, decisive attack, with the goal of taking Kigali.” Nsengiyumva mapped out the whole scenario, predicting that, “in the very near future,” the RPF would drive south from Ruhengeri toward President Habyarimana’s home commune of Karago, where it would “surround, capture or kill, and thus neutralize” between 7 and 10 elite FAR battalions. Having achieved a “major psychological victory by taking [the] president’s home area,” the RPF army would seize control of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, “close the loop” on Byumba, and march east to Gabiro, before finally streaming south to “take” Kigali. Nsengiyumva said the RPF forces have
“had a tendency to attack at the end of the week, on the full moon,” so 4 or 8-9 April “would be propitious.”\(^48\) The US diplomat, after hearing all of this, expressed some skepticism. How, he asked, could the RPF military consider taking Kigali, “when all observers and most Rwandans assume that such an event would lead to massacres on a massive scale of Tutsis country-wide”?\(^49\) Nsengiyumva’s response was that “such a loss of life does not concern the RPF.”\(^50\)

Paul Kagame, the RPF military’s chairman of High Command, was well aware of the rumors of an impending offensive, and sought a meeting with US diplomats to assure them the talk was unfounded.\(^52\) In the ensuing meeting on 6 April, he flatly denied that the RPF military was contemplating an attack and insisted that the RPF delegation in Arusha was taking its task seriously.\(^53\) Kagame viewed the allegations against his organization as all too convenient, knowing that the Rwandan and French officials were the ones peddling them. “This is just intended to put pressure on [the] UN to deploy both at the U[gandan] and R[wandan] border and in the DMZ later on in Kigali,” he wrote in a message to other RPF leaders.\(^54\) He further suspected that Rwanda and France were trying to create an impression that the OAU, as overseer of the Neutral Military Observer Group (GOMN), was not up to the task of monitoring the buffer zone and would need to be replaced, quickly, by UN forces.\(^55\) “O[ther]wise, they know the story is not true,” he wrote.\(^56\)

Kagame told the Americans, in his 6 April meeting, that the United Nations border force proposal was unjust. Its chief function, he noted, was to block the RPF’s supply routes.\(^57\) “[H]e thought it was unfair to worry about only supplies going to the RPF. What about supplies to the GOR?” a US cable about the meeting stated.\(^58\)

The RPF saw no justification for the proposed border force. That the French government was leading the charge for its creation was itself a cause for suspicion, suggesting its true purpose was to neutralize the RPF’s military advantage over the FAR (and, in so doing, undermine the RPF’s leverage in the ongoing Arusha talks). The Ugandan government, though, had also backed the proposal. “If Uganda allowed them on its side of the border, that was its own affair,” Kagame reportedly told US diplomats, explaining why, in spite of its objections, the RPF was willing to tolerate the presence of UN observers on the Ugandan side of the border.\(^59\) “[B]ut the Rwanda[n] side was ‘a different matter.’”\(^60\) It was all well and good for French and Rwandan authorities to ask the United Nations to send observers there, but the Rwandan government did not control its side of the border; the RPF did.\(^61\)

De La Sablière’s mission to New York in late March did not seem to generate much enthusiasm for the proposed border force, either from the UN Secretariat or from Security Council member states.\(^62\) “[N]one of our Western or African partners is really motivated about this issue,” Quesnot and Delaye wrote in their 1 April note to Mitterrand.\(^63\) De La Sablière did succeed, though, in persuading the Secretariat to dispatch a small team of UN officers to Rwanda to assess the practicality and potential benefits of sending observers to the Rwandan-Ugandan border.\(^64\) With that, the French government’s plan to weaken the RPF by cutting off its supply route was in motion.
B. France’s New Prime Minister Resolved to Bolster French Assistance to the FAR. An Expansion of DAMI Panda Soon Followed.

The UN Secretariat’s decision to seek out an on-the-ground assessment brought President Mitterrand one step closer to his goal of internationalizing the Rwanda crisis. It was, however, only a step, and with the government and RPF delegations still locked in tough negotiations in Arusha, the French government had some decisions to make about its military engagement in the region. There were few good options, and officials in Paris would reveal themselves to be conflicted about how to proceed.

In the view of one advisor in the Ministry of Defense, France had three options. The first, and probably riskiest, option would be to promptly evacuate French nationals and pull both of the remaining Noroît companies out of Rwanda. Explaining his thinking in a 1 April 1993 memo to Defense Minister Léotard, the advisor did not seem to favor this option, as he warned it could lead to ethnic violence. A second option would be to “freeze the current situation” by doing more to improve the FAR’s defensive capabilities, while waiting for the United Nations to deploy observers to the Ugandan border. According to the advisor’s memo, this could be accomplished by strengthening the DAMI and arming the FAR with more ammunition: “This solution is the most expensive. Its effectiveness is not guaranteed. [But] it has the virtue of seeking to keep the violence to a minimum.” The third and final option would be to maintain the status quo, while remaining ready to evacuate French nationals, should that become necessary. The advisor’s memo did not expressly recommend any one of the options over the others. Nor, for that matter, did General Quesnot and Delaye, when they presented a set of substantially similar options in a note to Mitterrand in advance of a “restricted” council meeting on 2 April.

Prior restricted council meetings, conducted before the elections, had provided a useful forum for Mitterrand as the French legislative elections approached and offered him a weekly opportunity to canvas a number of key ministers and advisers for their thoughts and recommendations on the Rwanda situation, among other subjects. This time, the room was packed with less familiar faces—among them, the new prime minister, Balladur; a new foreign minister, Alain Juppé; and a new cooperation minister, Michel Roussin. There was also the new defense minister, Léotard, who, according to notes from the meeting, opened the discussion with a grim report: “The situation is extremely serious and urgent,” he began. “The RPF is advancing towards Kigali. . . . We already withdrew two [Noroît] troops, and we are left with about 300 men facing many thousands coming from the north,” Léotard argued the Noroît companies, in their present configuration, would not be able to hold back the RPF military. “Should we have to stay, we would need reinforcements of up to 1,200 men,” he said.

Mitterrand, as he had done in previous restricted council meetings held before the elections, pressed Admiral Lanxade for his view. Lanxade said he was expecting the RPF army to launch an attack “within the next week,” and he saw few good options for responding to it. Either the French government could abandon Rwanda—that is, evacuate its nations and withdraw its troops—or it could “oppose the invasion of Kigali” by the RPF military. “[B]ut then,” he said, “we would have to consider [asking] our soldiers to engage in direct action.”
No one at the meeting spoke up for a total withdrawal. Juppé, the new foreign minister, said that was out of the question. “There is a risk that massacres may occur if we leave, and a risk of African [countries’] distrust toward France,” he said. On the other hand, he said, “if we reinforce [our troops], we risk digging ourselves deeper into this affair.”

Balladur was willing to take his chances. “The status quo is unsustainable,” he said, according to the meeting notes. “Our forces are too weak. We must be more present. Given the available manpower, we can add another thousand men, but we must know how long we can hold out. We must provide our armed forces with additional means.”

Mitterrand, who, as usual, retained the final word, struck a reflective tone. Ordinarily, he said, France would not intervene in a conflict “unless there is a foreign aggression, and not in cases of tribal conflict.” Here, he said, “in this case, it’s an amalgamation [of the two] because of the Tutsi problem. President Museveni himself is of Tutsi descent.” (The question of Museveni’s ethnicity had piqued Mitterrand’s interest before. He had, in fact, thought to ask President Habyarimana about it during a meeting in April 1991.) It was only a little more than a week earlier that Mitterrand had agreed (if, perhaps, reluctantly) to pare Noroit down to just two companies as the Dar es Salaam agreements had called on France to do. Balladur’s call for “additional means”—that is to say, more French troops—would mark a sudden and fairly radical reversal of that decision. Mitterrand could, conceivably, have overruled the new prime minister; he had, after all, vowed after his party’s losses in the recent legislative elections that, as president, he would “ensure the continuity of our foreign policy and our defense policy.” Mitterrand, though, did not take that route. Instead, he chose to show deference to his new partner in “cohabitation.”

“We must do as you wish, Prime Minister,” Mitterrand said.

Balladur had spoken, perhaps offhandedly, of sending 1,000 more soldiers to Kigali—far more than the number of troops France had just withdrawn over the past two weeks. France did not, in the end, go through with the deployment, though additional documents show it remained a topic of discussion five days later, at the next council of ministers meeting on 7 April. It is not clear why the plan was dropped, but, at the 7 April meeting, the Ministries of Defense and Cooperation persuaded Mitterrand to authorize the deployment of an “assessment mission” to study the FAR’s training needs. Balladur responded to the idea of an assessment mission by acknowledging the need “to take stock of several issues,” an acquiescence that may have delayed, and eventually superseded, his troop reinforcement proposal.

The assessment mission team, led by Colonel Philippe Capodanno, who had performed a similar mission in the fall of 1992, was charged with assessing the conditions on the ground and recommending next steps. Its itinerary included a 15 April 1993 meeting with the Rwandan National Gendarmerie chief of staff, Col. Ndindilyimana, who came prepared with a list of requests ranging from expanding riot-control training to providing clothing and typewriters, but the group let him know he would have to be patient. A Rwandan account of the meeting reported that Philippe Jehanne, a defense adviser to the French minister of cooperation,
pointed out that, due to the current state of war in Rwanda, the National Gendarmerie cannot hope to benefit from its traditional place of choice in the immediate future. Priority goes to the [Army] which alone benefits from 90 percent of direct aid from France. It would therefore be necessary, he added, to wait for the end of the war before the [National Gendarmerie] could benefit from a large contribution from France.101

Jehanne was not suggesting that the Gendarmerie could expect no aid from France in the short term. On the contrary, Col. Bernard Cussac, the French defense attaché and head of the Military Assistance Mission (MAM) in Rwanda, soon notified Defense Minister Gasana that the MAM had decided to create a permanent position for a police forensics instructor to work alongside the French DAMI officers at the Centre de recherche et de documentation criminelle (Center for Criminal Research and Documentation, or CRDC), the Gendarmerie’s records and investigation center in Kigali.102 These DAMI officers, who, since summer 1992, had been helping the Rwandan gendarmes investigate politically motivated violence and acts of terrorism, had been set to return home on 18 May, but Cussac let Gasana know that the French government had decided to partially renew the DAMI’s mission order to avoid any gaps in French assistance to the center.103 (The DAMI wrapped up its work at the CRDC in July 1993. The MAM, however, left behind two permanent technical advisers to continue the work the DAMI officers had started.104)

Following their meetings with numerous other Rwandan military officials, Capodanno and his assessment team concluded: “[I]t appears necessary to make a special effort during the next six months to place the FAR in better conditions to oppose a possible resumption of combat and to integrate with the RPF in the future Rwandan Army.”105 The most essential tasks, according to Capodanno, were to reorganize the battalions, retrain officers, and provide additional training for intelligence-gathering units.106 To do this, he recommended increasing the DAMI Panda staff from 45 to 69 officers.107

The assessment quickly led to action. French and Rwandan authorities reopened the DAMI training facility in Mukamira,108 which had been inactive since Operation Volcan in February.109 By June 1993, the number of DAMI officers had swelled to 80.110 French-led trainings resumed that summer “at an intensive pace.”111 Noroît officers, as well, had a role to play in professionalizing the FAR—notably, by providing shooting training for the reconnaissance battalion’s MILAN platoon (specializing in anti-tank guided missiles).112

French advisers throughout this period continued their efforts to prepare the FAR to take up arms against the RPF, should the peace talks fail. In April 1993, the French and Rwandan governments agreed to reappoint Lt. Col. Jean-Jacques Maurin as technical adviser to the chief of the Rwandan Army état-major.113 French assistance persisted further down the chain of command, as well. Between March and September 1993, French MAM officers working with the FAR’s aviation squadron (ESCAVI) oversaw 170 flight training missions.114 The Rwandan paracommando battalion likewise kept a busy training schedule and benefitted from a shipment of French parachutes, which, according to a French report, was “perceived by the French cooperants and the Rwandan paratroopers as a significant gesture of support for a unit that did not spare any effort or blood to defend its country.”115
Even the MIP would later question these decisions, most especially the June 1993 expansion of DAMI Panda.\textsuperscript{116} For one thing, it noted, the Arusha negotiations were winding down. With peace nearly at hand, reinforcing French military cooperation “made less sense,” the MIP remarked.\textsuperscript{117} Even assuming, though, that France had something to gain in redoubling its efforts to train the FAR, its decision to do so would still be hard to justify. As the MIP observed, French officers were well aware of the “absence of ethics” among some of the FAR’s leaders and “the dilapidation of the FAR.”\textsuperscript{118} (The MIP noted that one French officer had referred to Colonel Bagosora, the Ministry of Defense cabinet director who would later mastermind the Genocide, as “trash.”\textsuperscript{119}) The MIP rhetorically asked whether it was “appropriate to continue to teach the basics [of military tactics] to individuals, the majority of whom were clearly more interested in the material benefits being a soldier could provide them, than [motivated by] a desire to fight and defend their country.”\textsuperscript{120} The commission left this specific question unanswered, but concluded that considering the FAR’s complicity in the Genocide, it “would no doubt have been preferable to refrain from this last reinforcement of French military cooperation during the summer of 1993.”\textsuperscript{121}

\textbf{C. The French Ministry of Defense Disregarded an Internal Recommendation to Reassess French Policy in Rwanda.}

France’s policy on Rwanda had detractors even within the French government. No fewer than two defense ministers, Jean-Pierre Chevènement and Pierre Joxe, questioned France’s efforts to prop up the Habyarimana government, as did the head of the Military Cooperation Mission, Jean Varret.\textsuperscript{122} French decision makers ignored them all. They repeated this error in April 1993, when a Defense Ministry official, Pierre Conesa, delivered what may have been the government’s most clear-eyed analysis to date of the senselessness of French policy in Rwanda.

Conesa, a civil servant in a military intelligence division known as the Delegation for Strategic Affairs, drafted a 10 April 1993 note in response to the FIDH report’s revelations, a few weeks earlier, that Rwandan authorities had orchestrated ethnic killings. “In the Rwandan crisis, we cannot ignore . . . [how President Habyarimana] has amassed reasons for criticism from human rights organizations,” the note stated.\textsuperscript{123}

Conesa argued that French policymakers were viewing the Rwandan crisis through the wrong prism. The French government’s view was that the Ugandan government had disturbed Rwanda’s sovereignty, and that France, by intervening as it had, was simply protecting “the territorial and political integrity of Rwanda.”\textsuperscript{124} “This logic,” he wrote, “obliges [France] to defend the regime in place in Kigali, which supposedly represents 90 percent of the population of Rwanda (the Hutu).”\textsuperscript{125} Conesa saw the fallacy in this argument. Habyarimana was “only weakly representative” of the Rwandan people.\textsuperscript{126} The French government’s error was to assume that a Hutu president must represent the collective will of a majority-Hutu nation. “The regime in place is no more representative than the RPF,” Conesa wrote.\textsuperscript{127}

Conesa suggested that a better reading of the situation was that Rwanda was in the throes of an “African-style” internal crisis, that is, an ethnic-based revolt with a sanctuary in a neighboring state.\textsuperscript{128} The RPF was not a Ugandan proxy, and its campaign to depose
Habyarimana was not a foreign invasion of the kind that might justify a French military response.129

“It seemed to me there was no justification for grasping onto to the Habyarimana regime so tightly,” Conesa said in a 2018 interview with journalist David Servenay.130 What is more, Conesa saw no reason for continuing to support Habyarimana after two and a half years of war. By staying, his note argued, France was sending a message to other African autocrats, that France would defend them against challenges to their rule.131 With crises ongoing in South Sudan, Angola, and other parts of Africa, the “classic argument” in favor of staying the course—i.e., that to leave would “give our African friends the impression that France abandons them”—was “flawed.”132

“What will happen,” Conesa asked, “when allied states confronted with problems of the same nature—half internal, half external—call for help?”133

Conesa has since characterized the April 1993 note as “a frontal criticism of the Élysée’s Africa Cell and the French military system,” telling Servenay in the 2018 interview, “the purpose of the note was to say: let’s distance ourselves, because the Élysée is going astray.”134 According to Conesa, the civilian cabinet of Minister of Defense François Léotard, headed at the time by François Lepine, responded positively to the April 1993 note, while the minister’s military cabinet responded negatively to it.135 The latter was headed at the time by General Jean Rannou, but Conesa said that Rannou himself was not involved with Rwanda, and that someone else from the minister’s military cabinet (he could not remember who) had criticized the note.136

The Élysée’s response to the note was disappointing, if not surprising. “My conclusion,” Conesa said in 2018, “is that the hierarchical process at the Élysée filtered reality.”137 In all likelihood, he said, Mitterrand’s advisers screened the note and “never put directly on the president’s desk.”138 Conesa’s call for a reassessment of France’s Rwanda policy was not merely unheeded; it was scarcely even noticed.


On 20 May 1993, shortly after Pierre Conesa drafted his memo, French officials ousted General Jean Varret as head of the Military Cooperation Mission (MCM), replacing him with General Jean-Pierre Huchon.139 The MCM’s portfolio included military cooperation with about 26 countries, but according to Varret, it was his dissenting views on France’s Rwanda policy, specifically, that cost him the position.140

Varret had taken on the MCM position in the Ministry of Cooperation in October 1990, just as the war was starting. As discussed in Chapter 3, his concerns with French policy took root soon afterward, when the chief of staff of Rwanda’s national Gendarmerie, Colonel Rwagafilita, pulled him aside to ask that France supply the FAR with weapons so that it could “liquidate” the Tutsi.141 Varret has said that, after that, he issued a series of “unambiguous” diplomatic reports and telegrams emphasizing “the risks of a massacre of the Tutsis.”142 The messages were not well received.143 When, in July 1991, France sent several officials to Rwanda, but excluded him, it was clear to him that his point of view was not welcome.144
Varret’s superiors sent an even clearer signal of their displeasure with him later in the war, following his final visit to Rwanda as head of the MCM. In his memoir, Varret recalled that it was during this visit that he learned that members of the DAMI had conducted an unauthorized reconnaissance mission in Uganda. “This detachment was under my orders,” he wrote, “and, of course, it was not I who ordered this mission that went against the orders of neutrality for all French soldiers in the internal Rwandan struggle.” Varret said he reprimanded the DAMI officers, only to find, upon his return to Paris, a message on his desk informing him that the DAMI was no longer under his orders.

A leadership change in the Ministry of Cooperation, following the conservative rout in the March 1993 legislative elections, only left Varret feeling more ostracized. Varret recalled that the new minister of cooperation, Michel Roussin, carefully avoided meeting him after taking office. Varret felt he understood why: “I am in the way because I am not on the side of the friends of the Hutu who must be helped to fight the Tutsi.” It was Roussin who notified Varret later that spring that his services were no longer required in the Ministry of Cooperation, and that he could return to his former office in the Ministry of Defense.

“I said, ‘Why?’ I did not get an answer,” Varret recounted in a 2018 interview with a French journalist. “Never had an answer. And Lanxade did not give me an answer. Nobody did. Not even the president. . . . The least you can do when you sack a four-star general is tell him why! But, my answer, it’s that I was no longer trusted.”

In 2018, during an interview with the Rwanda scholar François Graner, Admiral Lanxade said that he had requested for Varret to remain in his position, but it was “the Élysée Palace, to my knowledge no doubt Quesnot, who pushed to replace Varret with Huchon.” In an interview with documentarian Jean-Christophe Klotz, General Quesnot was blunt: “I have nothing against General Varret, he’s a colleague. We commanded regiments at the same time. I’ve known him for years. I respect his point of view. . . . But the mechanics of the Republic are such that either you obey . . . or you get out.” French policy “at that point,” according to Quesnot, could not be changed. Klotz then asked if Quesnot regretted this, to which Quesnot replied: “You know, hindsight is 20/20.”

**E. At France’s Urging, the UN Security Council Voted to Send Observers to the Ugandan Border in a Bid to Cut Off RPF Supply Routes.**

As the French government ignored its internal dissenters and continued to prop up the FAR, its diplomats, led by the Foreign Ministry’s Africa director, Jean-Marc de La Sablière, continued to push the United Nations to send observers to the Rwandan-Ugandan border. The French diplomats were able to line up American and Belgian support for the initiative, but UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali expressed some reluctance, indicating he thought it would be better to wait until a peace agreement was signed before sending UN troops to the region. De La Sablière wondered if perhaps the Rwandan and Ugandan authorities had said something to undermine the case for the border force. Neither country had formally withdrawn its support for the proposal. It did appear, though, that President Habyarimana had gone off message, reportedly letting it be known that, in his view, it was more important to send observers to Kigali than to the border. De La Sablière had not expected this from the president. “These indications are not in
line with what we consider to be the priorities of the Rwandan authorities,” he wrote.162 He urged his colleagues in the French government to press the issue with the Rwandan government.163

An opportunity presented itself when a new French ambassador, Jean-Michel Marlaud, arrived in Kigali in early May 1993, replacing Martres. Marlaud was a career diplomat, though one of limited experience. Just 40 years old, he was more than two decades younger than Martres, and this was his first ambassadorship.164

Marlaud seems to have been a useful instrument of the Élysée. One senior French official said Marlaud executed the Élysée’s pro-regime positions and policies without question.165 His overlap with the tenure of Col. Bernard Cussac—another pro-regime figure—as France’s defense attaché (as well as head of the MAM and commander of Noroit) in Rwanda may have contributed to the pro-regime bias of Marlaud’s cables, as he and Cussac tried to present a unified line in their messages to Paris.166 Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the commander of United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), similarly referred to Cussac’s outsized role. “Marlaud was open and friendly, showing none of the usual arrogance that I had encountered with French officials on other occasions,” observed Dallaire, “But it seemed that the military attaché had greater influence.”167

While presenting his credentials to President Habyarimana on 7 May, Marlaud pressed him about the Rwandan government’s support for the proposed border force, explaining that Boutros-Ghali appeared to be under the impression that there had been a “change in Rwandan priorities.”168 Habyarimana reportedly “expressed total amazement.”169 His government’s priorities had not changed; “the priority was the deployment of observers at the border” and he “did not see how such a misunderstanding could have arisen.”170 Defense Minister Gasana, arriving in New York just a few days later, sought to clear up any ambiguity in an 18 May meeting with Boutros-Ghali, in which he delivered a letter from Habyarimana reiterating the government’s hopes for a UN observer force at the border.171

Boutros-Ghali signaled his willingness to support the proposal two days later, with his submission, to the UN Security Council, of an “interim report on Rwanda.”172 The 20 May 1993 report, which stopped short of endorsing the proposal outright but touted its potential benefits, noted that the RPF “has expressed the view that similar monitoring activities regarding the provision of military assistance to the Government of Rwanda should also be considered.”173 There is no indication, though, that the United Nations ever pursued this suggestion prior to the Genocide.

With the resolution’s prospects looking good, de La Sablière told US diplomats that France hoped “to get the observers onto the border as quickly as possible, and that he did not want to get hung up on details.”174

While French and US diplomats were readying the resolution for a vote, the negotiators in Arusha were on the cusp of a breakthrough.175 After months of wrangling over the integration of the two sides’ forces, RPF leaders on 8 June tentatively agreed to a Tanzanian proposal to allocate 60 percent of the military positions to the government and 40 percent to the RPF.176 The Rwandan government delegation indicated those figures would be acceptable, as well, though divisions were, as ever, apparent.177 A US cable noted the members of the delegation allied with President Habyarimana had “strong reservations about even going to 40 percent.”178
The Tanzanian delegation, willing itself to believe the end was in sight, labored tirelessly to produce a signed peace agreement before the next OAU summit, scheduled for 28-30 June. While some disagreements remained, observers were optimistic that a signing could take place by 24 June. The Tanzanian delegates suggested that President Habyarimana should plan to come to Arusha to “complete the negotiations himself, so that the signing can take place with a minimum of delay.”

The Tanzanians, though, could not keep pace with the French, who, at that moment, were preparing their border-force proposal for a vote at the UN headquarters in New York. On 22 June, the Security Council unanimously approved the proposal, known as Resolution 846, authorizing the deployment of UN observers to the Ugandan side of the border for a six-month period, subject to renewal every six months. The force, known as the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, or UNOMUR, was to “monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda.” The resolution characterized the force as “a temporary confidence-building measure.”

RPF leaders, continuing to chafe at the proposal’s disparate treatment of FAR and RPF forces, had lobbied against the resolution to the last. In New York, an RPF official, Ngombwa Muheto, had tried to attend the Security Council’s informal session the day before the vote, but UN security personnel barred him from entering the building. (Muheto accused the French and Rwandan representatives of conspiring to lock him out.) A letter from RPF Director for Diplomatic Affairs Théogène Rudasingwa on the day of the vote argued the resolution “would have a negative impact on the Rwandan Peace Process.” He said the French and Rwandan governments had wanted a border force since the beginning of the war, as both “look at the Rwandan conflict as a war between two countries (Rwanda and Uganda).” Rudasingwa cautioned: “Once this force is deployed, it will serve as an incentive and catalyst for President Habyarimana to go to war since he will have a false sense of security that [the] RPF has been contained and can therefore be defeated within Rwanda’s borders.”

The French government’s contention, all along, was that the border force would complement the negotiations in Arusha and help the two sides reach a compromise. In the short term, though, there was reason to suspect that Rudasingwa may have been right. On 22 June, the day the Security Council passed the resolution creating UNOMUR, the Rwandan cabinet decided, in a meeting chaired by Habyarimana, to postpone the signing of the peace agreement in Arusha, explaining the agreement was not yet ready. Habyarimana, despite the Tanzanians’ entreaties, stayed home, a decision that, according to a US cable, was “viewed in Arusha as a slap in the face of the facilitator, [Tanzanian] President Mwinyi.”

F. Anti-Tutsi Extremists Launched RTLM in July 1993, Inciting Rwandans with Messages of Hate.

RPF leaders remained hopeful that, despite recent setbacks, an agreement remained within reach. “There is always a Plan A and a Plan B,” then-RPF Secretary General Tito Rutaremara has since said. Plan A was to negotiate. At the same time, he said, “[w]e could also see that the government was mobilizing, writing lists, training Interahamwe.”
Increasingly that summer, it was evident that opponents of peace and reconciliation were marshalling their forces. “The Hutus’ dream is finally coming true,” the virulently anti-Tutsi newspaper Kangura trumpeted in its July 1993 issue. The occasion for this pronouncement was the launch of Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines, or RTLM, a privately run radio station with an unmistakable anti-Tutsi bent. Like Kangura, RTLM would become a leading platform for hate speech and a tool of the génocidaires. Thanks, though, to the power of radio and the popularity of RTLM’s broadcasts, it would prove to be an even more potent weapon in the extremists’ arsenal.

The driving force behind RTLM was Ferdinand Nahimana, the former director of the Rwandan broadcasting agency the Office Rwandais d’Information (ORINFOR), whose directives as editorial director of the state radio station, Radio Rwanda, instigated the Bugesera massacres in March 1992. Nahimana was ousted from ORINFOR amid the outcry over Radio Rwanda’s role in the slayings, a humiliation that, according to a 1995 book examining the media’s role in the Genocide, fueled his paranoia. In the book, historian Jean-Pierre Chrétien and others wrote that Nahimana came to believe that the RPF had infiltrated Radio Rwanda as part of a plot to prevent Hutus from mobilizing in self-defense.

Nahimana and the other founders of RTLM conceived of the station as the Hutu majority’s answer to Radio Muhabura, the clandestine station the RPF had been operating from the mountains along the Rwandan-Ugandan border since the summer of 1991. At his 2002-2003 trial for his role in the Genocide, Nahimana testified that two former colleagues, Joseph Serugendo and Vénuste Nshimiyimana, first approached him with the idea for RTLM in the fall of 1992 (Serugendo was a leader of the Interahamwe). In 2006, he pleaded guilty to incitement to commit genocide and persecution as a crime against humanity, admitting he had helped plan political rallies with the goal of inciting Interahamwe members to kill Tutsi and had used RTLM as a vehicle to foment racial hatred. He received a six-month sentence but died two months after sentencing.

The three men immediately set to work, placing a call to one of Rwanda’s richest businessmen, Félicien Kabuga. Kabuga would go on to serve as chairman of the RTLM steering committee and one of the station’s chief benefactors. He is currently under indictment for genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and other offenses in an international criminal court, having been arrested in May 2020 after more than two decades on the run.

The financing to launch and operate RTLM came not only from Kabuga, but from a host of influential backers, many of them members of Rwanda’s ruling elite. President Habyarimana was a shareholder (one of the largest, in fact), as were at least two members of his family: his son-in-law Alphonse Ntilivamunda and his cousin Charles Ntazibageza. Several high-ranking members of his administration also owned shares, including:

- Augustin Ngirabatware (Minister of Planning and Cooperation)
- André Ntagerura (Minister of Transport and Communications)
- Col. Déogratias Nsabimana (Army Chief of Staff)
- Télésphore Bizimungu (Director General of the Ministry of Planning)
• Jean Marie Vianney Mvulirwenande (Adviser to President Habyarimana);\textsuperscript{221}
• Cyprien Ndagijimana (Technical Affairs Adviser in the Ministry of Public Works and Energy);\textsuperscript{222}
• Stanislas Simbizi (Head of Civil Aviation in the Ministry of Transportation and Communications);\textsuperscript{223}

The list of shareholders would go on to include several architects of the Genocide. Among them:\textsuperscript{224}

• Col. Théoneste Bagosora (Cabinet director for the Ministry of Defense), later found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity, among other offenses;\textsuperscript{225}
• Col. Elie Sagatwa (head of security for President Habyarimana), who was among the victims of the 6 April 1994 plane crash;\textsuperscript{226}
• Col. Anatole Nsengiyumva (commander of Gisenyi military operations), later found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity;\textsuperscript{227}
• Major Aloys Ntabakuze (commander of the para-commando battalion), later found guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity;\textsuperscript{228}

From its start in July 1993, RTLM built a following among younger listeners, drawing them in with “hot” music from popular Congolese artists (in contrast with Radio Rwanda, which more often broadcast “old standard tunes”).\textsuperscript{229} Its reputation, though, was built on political talk, which soon alarmed some listeners.\textsuperscript{230} “The language of the broadcasters changed,” the trial court noted in Nahimana’s case, recounting the testimony of one listener.\textsuperscript{231} “[T]hey began to campaign to promote the idea that all Tutsi were Inkotanyi and enemies of the nation, and that all Hutus married to Tutsi were naïve and enemy accomplices.”\textsuperscript{232}

French officials in Kigali were aware of the new station,\textsuperscript{233} and at least a few of them were familiar with the content of its broadcasts.\textsuperscript{234} Michel Cuingnet, the head of the cooperation mission in Rwanda, told the MIP that, from its earliest broadcasts, RTLM personalities “were broadcasting on the air that it was necessary to ‘finish the job’ and crush all the cockroaches.”\textsuperscript{235} Nonetheless, not everyone in France took issue with the station. An undated and unsigned draft contract between RTLM and Telediffusion de France suggests that there was an effort to establish a five-year partnership between the two and another entity called Eclipse-Rwanda to bring television to Rwanda.\textsuperscript{236} (At the time, Telediffusion de France was part of France Telecom,\textsuperscript{237} the telecommunication agency whose unique shareholder was the French government.\textsuperscript{238}) Little is known about the deal or whether it was consummated, but the venture, to be known as RTLM-Association, was likely intended to allow RTLM to stand up the “television” in its name, and may have been connected to Nahimana’s efforts in 1992\textsuperscript{239} to earn support in France for a Rwandan television station.

RTLM’s rhetoric would only grow sharper and more violent with time.\textsuperscript{240} The evolution was gradual, but noticeable, such as when news broke that Burundian President Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, had been killed in a failed military coup on 21 October 1993.\textsuperscript{241} RTLM sensationalized the story, reporting, for example, that the Tutsi plotters had tortured and castrated the president, despite no evidence to support those assertions.\textsuperscript{242} A US cable reported that, while state-run Radio Rwanda had “played all government communiqués calling for calm,” RTLM was pumping out
unsubstantiated claims and urging all Rwandans to “resist the threat to democracy by every possible means.” One listener’s notes of the broadcasts featured the statements, “We Hutus must prove to the Tutsis that we are strong,” and, “You Hutus, you must be on the look-out. You might meet the fate of the ones in Burundi.”

The repugnance of RTLM’s broadcasts in the days after the Burundian president’s death spurred Minister of Information Faustin Rucogoza to issue the station a formal warning. In a 27 October letter, Rucogoza, an MDR member, chided the station for using events in Burundi as an excuse “to broadcast communiqués and programmes which may incite to violence and undermine national unity and reconciliation advocated under the Arusha Peace Accords.” The warning did not chasten the station’s broadcasters, one of whom responded, shortly afterward, by airing more false claims about the “bloodthirsty Tutsi dog-eaters” who killed the Burundian president. The broadcaster also read aloud a letter from a “high-level Hutu Power official” condemning Rucogoza for his “evil intentions.” Rucogoza remained a target of RTLM broadcasters in the months that followed. These were the last months of his life. Rwandan soldiers rounded up and killed Rucogoza, his wife, two daughters, and a domestic servant on 7 April 1994, at the dawn of the Genocide.

G. With Peace, at Last, Seemingly at Hand, France Inched Closer to the Exit.

The setbacks in Arusha in mid-to-late June 1993 made Col. Cussac uneasy. Negotiators had twice penciled in dates for a signing ceremony, and both times the Tanzanian facilitators were unable to coax the parties to accept a final agreement. Cussac, ever mistrustful of the RPF, feared one more breakdown in the talks could spur the rebel forces to retake the offensive against a Rwandan Army that, in his view, was plagued by discord and disciplinary problems. “A solution will have to be found quickly to avoid a new resumption of the RPF offensive, which could be decisive,” he wrote in a 6 July report.

Although Cussac remained optimistic that peace was achievable, he had less confidence in Rwandans’ capacity to rebuild their country after Arusha. “There will be many obstacles, and the most difficult one to overcome will doubtless be the revitalization and empowerment of the political and administrative authorities,” he wrote. Cussac intimated he was not convinced Rwandans were up to that challenge, writing, in patronizing tones, that “[t]he sense of the common good is indeed, not yet in Africa, the best mastered virtue.”

It was clear enough that the French government had a limited interest in helping Rwanda restore normalcy after the war. French officials were prepared to lead the charge in persuading the United Nations to send a large peacekeeping force, but it was understood that the French government did not intend to shoulder any more of the cost for it than France’s status among Security Council member states would ordinarily require, nor did it intend to contribute troops. Similarly, while the French government was comfortable leaving behind some military officers to help the newly integrated Rwandan Army find its footing, it preferred to keep its presence small. “[W]e do not intend on putting ourselves forward in the establishment of the new Rwandan Army. We want as much as possible to put the Belgians forward, and intervene in support with at most 20 technical military cooperants, financed according to Minister of Cooperation’s
usual procedures,” a Defense Ministry advisor wrote in a 21 June memo, following a meeting with Col. Delort, who had served as the commander of operations in Rwanda earlier in the year.\textsuperscript{261}

The French government’s “general objectives,” the advisor said, “remain unchanged.”\textsuperscript{262} The first objective, he wrote—reiterating the central component of France’s failed policy in Rwanda—was to “avoid[] seeing the legitimate government of a Francophone state be deposed by force.”\textsuperscript{263} The second was “gradually disengaging ourselves by involvement of the UN and the OAU as much as possible, in order to save the work that we have accomplished.”\textsuperscript{264} The advisor’s memo argued that the two Noroit companies would have to remain in place for now, but suggested that if the talks proved successful, it may be possible to withdraw one of the two companies.\textsuperscript{265} Even then, though, the French government would need to be careful in how it explained the withdrawal, he wrote. It would have to be clear that France is simply supporting the peace process—not abandoning the Rwandan government.\textsuperscript{266}

President Habyarimana felt compelled, on several occasions in late June and early July, to publicly reaffirm his commitment to the Arusha process now that the Tanzanian facilitators, having twice had to postpone plans for a signing ceremony, had indefinitely suspended the talks.\textsuperscript{267} In a 15 July address to Western diplomats, he complained that “[p]artisan exploitation” of the delay had compounded the “shock” Rwandans felt at the breakdown in the talks.\textsuperscript{268} “But in life, one should listen to the voice of reason,” he said.\textsuperscript{269} The simple fact, he said, was that the two sides still had a few points of disagreement to work out. Of the issues still on the table, the two biggest were: (1) the integration of the two sides’ military commanders, and (2) the timetable for inaugurating the post-Arusha transitional government.\textsuperscript{270}

The latter issue was deceptively complex, as it hinged in large part on the goodwill of the international community. Both sides agreed, albeit for different reasons, that some kind of UN- or OAU-led peacekeeping force would have to be in place before the new government could begin its work.\textsuperscript{271} The Rwandan authorities viewed the international force as an essential safeguard against the resumption of hostilities.\textsuperscript{272} The RPF, meanwhile, needed assurances that its leaders would be safe when they entered Kigali to join the new government.\textsuperscript{273} Their mutual need for international support was notable not only because it imbued the two foes with a common purpose, but because, in this one respect, at least, their interests aligned with those of France. Although—from the perspective of the RPF—the French government had forestalled the achievement of peace through diplomatic maneuvering and military assistance of years past, at this particular moment, all three—the RPF, Habyarimana, and France—were eager to see foreign peacekeepers sweep into Rwanda. The difference was in their reasoning: the Rwandan government and the RPF wanted peacekeepers there to help the new government stitch the country back together, while the French wanted an international force in Rwanda so that they, the French, could leave.

French and Rwandan officials did not view the OAU as well equipped to run a peacekeeping operation by itself and were hoping the United Nations would agree to oversee it.\textsuperscript{274} (A French political counselor in Washington, D.C. told US diplomats on 7 July that “the OAU does not have the capacity to act usefully, and thus the UN cannot escape a central role.”\textsuperscript{275}) French officials were well aware, though, that convincing the United Nations to send a large peacekeeping force to Rwanda was going to be a challenge. French diplomats in New York could see that the other Security Council member states had little enthusiasm for deepening the United Nations’
involvement in Rwanda, and the response from the Secretariat was no more encouraging. President Habyarimana had asked Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in Cairo in late June to consider, as a start, sending a small group of military observers, perhaps no more than 10 of them, before committing to anything larger. The secretary-general refused, saying the United Nations would not deploy observers to Rwanda unless and until a peace treaty was signed.

One option meriting some consideration was to expand the OAU-led Neutral Military Observer Group (GOMN), which, since the summer of 1992, had been responsible for monitoring the cease-fire zone, and place it under UN command. The GOMN was tiny, with only 50 observers to its name, but OAU Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim told French, Belgian, and US diplomats in mid-July he likely could bring that figure to 120, or possibly 240, if he could secure an additional two companies from Nigeria. That would be a start, but neither of the parties, nor the French, considered it enough. “It is . . . quite clear that the French will not withdraw their two companies on the arrival only of some expanded OAU troops,” a US cable reported on 14 July. “And it is equally clear that the RPF will not come to town [to join the new government—ed.] as long as the French are the largest foreign military force in town.”

The peace talks resumed on 19 July in Kinihira, a community in the demilitarized zone, but not before a major shakeup in Rwanda’s political leadership added a new layer of uncertainty to the process. On 16 July, the coalition parties dumped Dismas Nsengiyaremye as prime minister and replaced him with former Minister of Education Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a 40-year-old Butare native representing the less extremist wing of the MDR party. The change-out was intended as a short-term move; the parties had yet to settle on a candidate to serve as prime minister following the inauguration of the post-Arusha “Broad-Based Transitional Government.” Regardless, the unceremonious dismissal of Nsengiyaremye prompted the resignation of his loyalists within the cabinet, including Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira. Ngulinzira had been heading the Rwandan delegation in Arusha for 15 months. His sudden departure left the Tanzanian facilitator and RPF delegation to pick up the pieces of the negotiations with a reconstructed Rwandan delegation, now headed by Ngulinzira’s successor in the Foreign Ministry, Anastase Gasana.

The tumult within the Rwandan government continued on 20 July, when Defense Minister James Gasana abruptly tendered his resignation and fled the country. In his resignation letter, addressed to Habyarimana, Gasana wrote: “I feel compelled to make this decision because of the persistent threats and sabotage that I face in my current position. These threats which place me and my family in a state of permanent insecurity, are the work of an anonymous political-military group that has given itself the name ‘A.M.A.S.A.S.U’ and whose objectives remain obscure.” AMASASU, whose name was a play on the Kinyarwanda word for “bullets,” was a clandestine organization purporting to speak for Hutu nationalists within the Rwandan military. It had been threatening since January 1993 to retaliate against RPF sympathizers and “accomplices” in Rwanda. Though he belonged to the MRND, Gasana was a moderate and had infuriated hardliners within the Army, such as Col. Bagosora, most notably in spring 1993, when Gasana sought to confiscate weapons that Bagosora had secretly, and illegally, distributed to civilians in the northern prefectures of Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, and Byumba. The news that AMASASU had chased Gasana out of the country alarmed many Rwandans. “[I]f Gasana cannot protect...
himself,” former Foreign Minister Casimir Bizimungu commented privately to a US diplomat, “we are all threatened.”

The extremists were rewarded for their insurrection when the MRND nominated, and the parties confirmed, a known hardliner, Byumba Prefect Augustin Bizimana, as Gasana’s successor. Bizarrely, the defense minister’s ouster also ended up redounding to the RPF’s benefit in the peace talks. As a US cable noted: “When Gasana left, with a public explanation that his life was threatened, it was hard to imagine that the RPF could agree to come to Kigali under the security provisions previously considered.”

The government was obliged to consent to the RPF’s demand for the right to dispatch a battalion of roughly 600 soldiers to protect RPF officials in Kigali.

The negotiations concluded in the early morning hours of 25 July, after the Tanzanian facilitators succeeded in extracting concessions from both sides’ delegations. In addition to permitting the RPF to bring troops to Kigali to serve as bodyguards, the government agreed to give the RPF command of the Gendarmerie.

The agreement named MDR moderate Faustin Twagiramungu as prime minister designate. Twagiramungu had been the Rwandan cabinet’s choice for the position. According to Tito Rutaremara, the RPF saw the choice of Twagiramungu for the post as preferrable to the alternative, which was to pick a political party that would then have the right to propose one of its own for prime minister from within its ranks. This would have been highly risky, Rutaremara said, because Habyarimana had “divided all the opposition parties into parts,” creating “Hutu Power” extremist wings within many of the parties. The RPF did not want to take the chance that the selected party would propose a candidate from its “extremist wing.”

President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe signed the peace agreement in Arusha on 4 August 1993, in a solemn ceremony attended by several African heads of state. France, having played a modest role in the Arusha talks, comported itself accordingly, sending as its lone representative a member of its Dar-es-Salaam embassy staff. President Mitterrand and his foreign policy team spent the day in Paris, where, as it happens, a restricted council meeting was held, with Rwanda among the subjects up for discussion. General Quesnot and Dominique Pin had briefed the president one day earlier, explaining that one of the linchpins of the agreement was that the UN-led neutral international force would arrive within 37 days of the signing (that is, no later than 10 September 1993), at which point France would be expected to withdraw the two remaining Noroit companies. Of course, they noted, there was no guarantee the United Nations would send a force by that deadline, if it sent one at all. Russia, for “financial reasons, was opposed to creating a UN force for Rwanda, while Great Britain and the United States had “expressed their reservations,” they said.

Quesnot and Pin advised Mitterrand to keep the Noroit troops in Kigali, so long as the neutral international force was not yet on the ground. The DAMI Panda instructors, on the other hand, would no longer be needed, as “their mission of supporting the Rwandan Army on the front lines [would] become irrelevant.” The memo recommended that the DAMI be withdrawn “as soon as possible.”
The consensus among the officials at the restricted council meeting on 4 August 1993 was in line with Quesnot’s and Pin’s views. There, Cooperation Minister Roussin said France should immediately shut down the DAMI training sites in Gabiro and Mukamira and reel the DAMI advisers back to Kigali.316 “I’ll add,” Roussin said, “that if these advisers’ mission is finished, if they are not needed in Kigali, I propose putting an end to it.”317 Mitterrand concurred, saying, “We must align our decisions with the reality on the ground.”318

The president voiced no arguments, either, when the discussion turned to the subject of Noroit. “French troops are scheduled to withdraw when the international force is in place,” Foreign Minister Juppé said.319 Juppé acknowledged that the United Nations had shown “little enthusiasm” for the idea of sending UN troops to Rwanda, and that there was a chance France would have to settle for a mere expansion of the GOMN.320 In either event, he said, “we will only need to decide on the withdrawal of our forces when this [international] force is deployed. We will maintain our troops until the [new] force is on the ground.”321 “Agreed,” Mitterrand said.322

Back in Kigali, Ambassador Marlaud took time over the following week to share the French government’s plans with Rwandan officials. Defense Minister Augustin Bizimana received the news well, comforted by Marlaud’s promises that the French government would continue to support the Rwandan government—in particular, by lobbying the United Nations to send peacekeepers, and by continuing cooperation.323 (Bizimana likely interpreted the reference to cooperation as an indication that France intended to continue making some technical advisers available to the Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie through France’s Military Assistance Mission, or MAM, who, unlike the DAMI, fell under the auspices of the Ministry of Cooperation, as opposed to the Ministry of Defense.) Marlaud’s assurances did not have the same effect on President Habyarimana’s cabinet director, Enoch Ruhigira, when the two met on 10 August.324 Clearly, the thought of France’s withdrawal made Ruhigira nervous.325 “He emphasized that, even if the peace accord had been signed, nothing would be implemented before the arrival of a neutral, reliable international force,” Marlaud wrote afterward.326 “Until then, everything was possible, and it was necessary to stay vigilant.”327

Ruhigira may have been alluding to a concern that either extremists from Habyarimana’s inner circle or the RPF would undo the peace agreement, resulting in a resumption of hostilities for which French assistance would be vital to the FAR’s prospects for success. The expectation underpinning the Arusha Accords was that the new government, with international support, would manage to subdue the anti-Tutsi extremists threatening to sabotage the agreement. It was a questionable assumption, to be sure. By signing the accords, Habyarimana had infused the hardliners in his government—and, most especially, within the military—with a renewed sense of purpose.328 As they saw it, the president had shamefully capitulated to the enemy.329

In Paris, General Quesnot knew the FAR would find the peace agreement’s terms hard to swallow, and he could understand why.330 Quesnot, like many French officials of the era, viewed the Habyarimana administration as representative of Rwanda’s Hutu majority.331 Through this (distorted) prism, he perceived a Tutsi-dominated RPF as speaking for only 15 percent of the Rwandan population.332 And yet, the accords entitled the RPF to 50 percent of the command posts in the military, and 40 percent of the troops—an “exorbitant share,” in Quesnot’s view.333 “Knowing the mentality of the military, the FAR and the RPF, this point made me think that the
agreements would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement,” he told the MIP. And Quesnot, ever mistrustful of the RPF, doubted its leaders had any intention to abide by a power-sharing agreement.335

“No one ever believed in the Arusha peace accords,” Jean Kambanda told ICTR investigators in a 1998 interview. Kambanda, who served as prime minister during the Genocide, pleaded guilty in 1998 to genocide and crimes against humanity, among other offenses.337 As he told the ICTR investigators:

Kambanda: [The accords] were signed, but no one believed in them.

Investigator: No one believed in them?

Kambanda: No, not at all.

... 

Investigator: So people were preparing for war?

Kambanda: Yes.338

A further reminder of the insidious forces at work in Rwanda surfaced on 11 August 1993, just a week after the peace agreement signing ceremony, when a UN Special Rapporteur, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, issued his report on human rights violations in Rwanda.339 In a section addressing “the genocide question,” Ndiaye said it was not his place to declare whether the repeated massacres of civilians over the preceding three years qualified as a genocide, but wrote: “The cases of intercommunal violence brought to the Special Rapporteur’s attention indicate very clearly that the victims of the attacks, Tutsis in the overwhelming majority of cases, have been targeted solely because of their membership [in] a certain ethnic group, and for no other objective reason.”340

Prior to the Genocide itself, few people, inside or outside the United Nations, paid much attention to Ndiaye’s report.341 New Zealand Ambassador Colin Keating, who would assume the one-month presidency of the UN Security Council on 1 April 1994, just days before the Genocide began, criticized the UN Secretariat for its “silo-ization” of information and, in particular, its failure to share reporting like Ndiaye’s and the FIDH’s with the UN Security Council.342 Keating noted, however, that Ndiaye’s report was disseminated to the “interested parties,” e.g., the French government, before it was released on 11 August 1993, and, in any event, French officials would have been aware of Ndiaye’s findings about ethnic violence in Rwanda, which were predicated on the 1993 FIDH report about which senior French officials were well informed.

For those who did bother to read the report, it was evident that Ndiaye was “alarmed by a pattern of violence that was not directly related to the civil war but rather had a different and more sinister source,” the American international relations and political science professor Michael Barnett wrote in his 2002 book, “Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda.”344 Ndiaye’s report “was a warning for all to see,” Barnett wrote. “If only anyone had seen it.”345 In retrospect, Barnett has since said, it was simply not reasonable to expect the United Nations, given
its “gross limitations,” to hold the country together while forces near the center of power conspired to tear it apart.346 “To put it uncharitably,” he said at a 2014 event at the Hague, “it sounds like the diplomats were handing a ticking time bomb off to the UN.”347

H. Western Reluctance, Including on the Part of France, to Adequately Fund and Equip UN Peacekeeping Forces Set Up the United Nations for Failure.

Following the signing of the Arusha Accords, “[t]he primary French goal,” according to a US cable in mid-August 1993, was “to get out of Rwanda, but not leave a mess behind.”348 The cable’s authors had just met with a French official (whose identity is redacted) in New York, who had called for the meeting to lay out France’s vision for the “neutral international force [NIF],”349 which, under the Arusha Accords, was to help Rwandan authorities usher in a new era of peace.350 The NIF was the linchpin of the Arusha Accords. Under the agreement, its arrival was the trigger for several critical developments—specifically, the departure of French troops, the entry of the RPF security battalion into Kigali, and the establishment of the “Broad-Based Transitional Government.”351 As the DGSE put it in an 8 September 1993 report: “For the time being, the success of the transition process that will be gradually put in place can only depend on the arrival of a large and effective international force within a short period of time.”352

Rwandan and RPF officials had high expectations for the NIF. In their joint letter to the UN secretary general, dated 11 June, the two sides sketched out a long list of missions they wanted the NIF to fulfill. These included guaranteeing security throughout the country, assisting in the search for weapons caches, carrying out mine-clearing operations, monitoring the cease-fire, and supervising the demobilization of military personnel.353 The Arusha Accords, as signed, anticipated a similarly wide-ranging set of missions.354 Heedless of the slow pace at which the United Nations typically moves, the two sides’ delegations agreed the NIF would take its place in Rwanda no later than 10 September, just 37 days after the signing ceremony.355 It was an implausible deadline, and it would not be met.356

In New York, where the unidentified French official met with US diplomats on 17 August, the former explained that the French government “had certain requirements regarding Kigali, which to them is the key both for the success of the [UN] mission, and for being able to pull out French troops.”357 To satisfy France, the Kigali contingent would have to rival in size the security battalion (roughly 600 soldiers) the Arusha Accords allowed the RPF to bring to the capital.358 The unidentified French official suggested the French government was less concerned with the number of peacekeepers operating outside of the capital.359 Indeed, the French government resisted President Habyarimana’s original proposal of a force of between 3,000 and 4,000.360 French officials talked Habyarimana down, maintaining that 1,000 troops (including the Kigali contingent) would suffice.361

France’s lobbying on this point reflected an indisputable truth about UN peacekeeping operations at that time, which is that Western countries had, by and large, grown weary of them. As Samantha Power, then a journalist, author and academic, noted, the United Nations at that time had 70,000 peacekeepers working on 17 missions across the globe.362 The US Congress, in particular, she wrote, “had tired of its obligation to foot one-third of the bill for what had come to feel like an insatiable global appetite for mischief and an equally insatiable UN appetite for
missions. “The United Nations simply cannot become engaged in every one of the world’s conflicts,” President Bill Clinton declared in a 27 September 1993 speech at the UN General Assembly’s 48th session. “If the American people are to say yes to U.N. peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no.”

French officials, too, were increasingly coming to believe that their country had overextended itself. Since 1986, in the waning years of Mitterrand’s first term as president, France had staged military interventions not only in Rwanda, but in Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Togo, and Zaire. With the value of the CFA franc cratering, the French Treasury had directed large sums of short-term aid relief to several financially ailing francophone states—among them, Cameroon, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, and Senegal. “No one can disregard all the reasons that justify the continuation of a major French effort in favor of Africa,” Prime Minister Balladur wrote in an opinion piece in the 23 September 1993 issue of Le Monde. “But how can we ignore, too, that the current difficulties force us to question ourselves on how to make it more effective?” Pointing, in particular, to France’s ongoing military interventions in Chad, Somalia, and Rwanda, he wrote: “our action, as essential as it is today to keep the peace, is reaching its limits.”

While Balladur made clear that he had no intention of forfeiting France’s primacy among Africa’s Western partners, he felt that economic challenges demanded a reassessment of the country’s relations with the continent. The view in the Élysée was much the same. Expounding on the administration’s thinking in a two-hour lunch on 13 October, Bruno Delaye, the president’s Africa adviser, and two other Élysée officials told a visiting delegation from the US Department of State that France was “retrenching because of resource constraints.” The Élysée officials explained that, for the foreseeable future, France would “limit itself, even more than in the past, to its traditional sphere of influence,” a term the Americans understood to include only former French colonies. The implication, which surprised their American guests, was that France “would not get involved further” in former Portuguese colonies, such as Angola or Mozambique, or former Belgian colonies, such as Zaire or Rwanda.

What separated France from other budget-conscious UN Security Council member states at that time, such as the United States and Russia, was what it had at stake in Rwanda. Unlike those other countries, France had already poured considerable resources into Rwanda, and was still doing so. To Mitterrand, the decision to authorize and finance a new UN peacekeeping force for Rwanda was not an act of magnanimity—it was an essential part of his plan to disengage from the Rwandan conflict. To some degree, he may have viewed the UN peacekeeping force as stepping into the shoes of Noroit, but Noroit was not a peacekeeping force, it was a deterrent force and, as such, needed fewer resources.

Dallaire, the UN force commander, met with Ambassador Marlaud and other French officials twice during a fact-finding trip to Rwanda in mid- to late August 1993. Inviting Dallaire to his home, Marlaud made a good first impression. “He listened to me carefully, expressed genuine enthusiasm for my nascent ideas and even looked over my reconnaissance plan,” Dallaire wrote later. Marlaud told the fact-finding mission that Rwandans were not familiar with UN procedures and would be deeply disappointed if the United Nations could not deploy a peacekeeping force by the 10 September deadline. He warned, too, that extremists who oppose
the Arusha Accords and who “were waiting for the first opportunity to conclude that [the agreement] was ‘dead’” might exploit any delays in the UN deployment.\textsuperscript{379}

Marlaud assured Dallaire that France “would respect the Arusha Accord and leave Kigali whatever the size of the NIF, [be it] 10 or 10,000 men.”\textsuperscript{380} This may have been more of a rhetorical gesture than a genuine pledge on the part of France. In conversations with Western diplomats, French officials indicated that the strength of the NIF would have to cross some minimum threshold to prove itself “credible” before France would withdraw the Noroit companies.\textsuperscript{381} One French military deputy commander in Kigali told US diplomats the minimum was 1,000 UN-led troops,\textsuperscript{382} though Joyce Leader, the US embassy’s deputy chief of mission, noted in a cable that other French officials had cited lower figures.\textsuperscript{383} By mid-September, the official line in the Élysée was that the Noroit troops were not going anywhere until there were at least 800 troops under UN command in Rwanda.\textsuperscript{384}

RPF leaders let it be known, to Dallaire and to anyone else who would listen, that France’s retreat was of vital importance to them. “[W]e made it clear the French should leave Rwanda,” Tito Rutaremara, then RPF secretary general, recalled; “Pasteur Bizimungu said the French should go now.”\textsuperscript{385} “[T]hey firmly object to the presence of these French Forces on Rwandese soil,” Dallaire’s team wrote in the technical report it later distributed to UN staff.\textsuperscript{386} Until Noroit withdraws, they said, they would not join the Broad-Based Transitional Government, or BBTG.\textsuperscript{387} This, Dallaire knew, would be disastrous. “Without the BBTG,” his team wrote, “there is no peace process.”\textsuperscript{388}

By the time of his second meeting with Marlaud, on 29 August, Dallaire had a rough idea of how many troops he would recommend the United Nations dispatch, and he was willing to share those figures with the French ambassador. (Dallaire’s plan was to present the United Nations with three options: an “ideal” force of 5,500 personnel, a “reasonable viable option” of 2,500, and a barebones operation of between 500 and 1,000.\textsuperscript{389}) Marlaud suggested Dallaire’s approach seemed reasonable, but the French military attaché (Col. Cussac), who had been listening in on the discussion, would have none of it.\textsuperscript{390} As Dallaire recalled:

[A]s soon as I started to talk actual figures, the French military attaché leapt into the fray. He said he couldn’t understand why I needed so many troops. France had a battalion of only 325 personnel stationed in the country and the situation seemed to be well in hand. There was an awkward moment as the ambassador reiterated his support for my plan and the attaché sat back in his chair silently fuming.\textsuperscript{391}

Cussac’s insistence that Noroit had the situation “well in hand” says a lot about his objectives in Rwanda, and perhaps about his government’s priorities, more broadly. As defense attaché, Cussac knew as well as anyone that Noroit was not a peacekeeping operation, as the NIF would be. In less guarded moments, Cussac himself would acknowledge that Noroit had served not only to protect expatriates, but to present a “credible deterrent” to any RPF military designs on storming Kigali and toppling the government.\textsuperscript{392} To suggest that France’s Noroit troops, in their pursuit of these two goals, had “the situation . . . well in hand” was to fundamentally misapprehend the “situation” in Rwanda.
Cussac was not merely overlooking the obvious point that the Rwandan government and the RPF were asking the United Nations to do much more than Noroît had ever done—for example, ensuring the safety of the civilian population, recovering weapons and clearing mines, and helping the two sides integrate their militaries. What his outburst suggests, beyond that, is that, to Cussac, the RPF would always be “the enemy,” and impeding its takeover would always take priority over other objectives.

Dallaire circled back with Ambassador Marlaud in September 1993, recalling the warm rapport the two had struck during his visit to Rwanda. To his chagrin, though, “it seemed the military attaché had greater influence: France thought a force of a thousand was sufficient,” he wrote.

I. Following the August 1993 Truce, France Refused to Contribute Soldiers to the UN Peacekeeping Force, but Remained in Rwanda and Continued to Advise and Train the FAR.

President Habyarimana knew the day of Noroît’s retreat was coming; by signing the Arusha Accords, he had, in fact, assented to it, however reluctantly. It was, from his standpoint, a significant concession. The Noroît troops had, in varying numbers, been stationed in Kigali for roughly three years, and, as Ambassador Marlaud put it in a 10 August cable, were “considered here as the true symbol of our engagement in Rwanda.” With their impending departure, it appeared the French military presence in Rwanda would be reduced to just the DAMI Panda advisers (30, as of 4 October) and the other military cooperants (38, as of the same date). Most of the DAMI advisors remained into December 1993; by year’s end, they would be all but gone, too.

Anticipating the government’s concern, Ambassador Marlaud made a point in mid-August of assuring Minister of Defense Bizimana that France was not abandoning Rwanda. In a 17 August meeting, Marlaud explained that, while France was planning to continue the gradual reduction of its technical military assistance, the number of French cooperants would not dip below 50.

French military cooperation was still very much under way in August 1993, when the Arusha Accords were signed. Among the French officers who arrived between late July and mid-September were three squadron chiefs: Gino Groult, who would serve as adviser to the mobile Gendarmerie; Erwan de Gouvello, the new technical adviser to the commander of the FAR’s reconnaissance battalion; and Gérard Forgues, who would take over for Lt. Col. Robardey as adviser to the état-major of the national Gendarmerie. Groult was replacing Squadron Leader Denis Roux, who had trained the Presidential Guard. (As noted in the prior chapter, Roux’s superiors asked Roux to “step back a little” from his role with the Presidential Guard in mid-1992. Allegations would emerge that Presidential Guard members belonged to the MRND youth militia and had participated in massacres.) The Arusha Accords called for the Presidential Guard’s dissolution. Groult’s assignment, upon arriving in August 1993, was to supervise the training of recruits for the new Republican Guard, the entity that, under the peace agreement, was to replace it.

The August 1993 truce between the government and the RPF likewise did not stop the flow of weapons and other articles of military equipment from France to Rwanda. As the MIP noted,
the French government issued seven licenses in September 1993 authorizing companies in France to ship military equipment to the FAR.\textsuperscript{409} Licenses issued in 1993 included authorization to export 1,800 projectiles for 60 mm mortars, as well as licenses to ship spare parts for light armored vehicles and spare parts for a Gazelle helicopter.\textsuperscript{410}

Another French arrival around this time was Warrant Officer José de Pinho. De Pinho, who had served in Noroît earlier in 1993,\textsuperscript{411} was taking on a newly created position as technical adviser to the Commandos de recherche et d’action dans la profondeur (CRAP), an elite intelligence-gathering unit within the FAR’s para-commando battalion.\textsuperscript{412} French officers considered it vital to ramp up trainings for the unit, which, like the rest of the para-commando battalion, had suffered significant losses during the war.\textsuperscript{413} The fighting had stopped, but the training continued. Upon his arrival in September 1993, de Pinho spent about a month overseeing trainings on parachute jumping, intelligence techniques, information transfer, camouflage techniques, and the use of weapons.\textsuperscript{414}

De Pinho believed Noroît had been a tremendous force for good in Rwanda and worried what its departure would mean for the country.\textsuperscript{415} The idea of a handoff to the United Nations, in particular, did not sit well. “I’m well aware of the unflattering reputation of these international forces, because their interventions generally result in failures,” he wrote in a 2014 memoir.\textsuperscript{416} De Pinho said he took comfort in the thought that France would, he believed, probably contribute troops to the eventual UN peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{417} “My hope,” he wrote, “is to see the French forces of Noroît, who are on site, shield themselves with the blue helmet of the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{418}

Rwandan officials had the same hope. “[T]his participation is essential,” Rwandan military officials agreed at an 18 August 1993 meeting devoted to the subject of the future of Franco-Rwandan military cooperation.\textsuperscript{419} French troops, they noted, knew the terrain, and because they were already on the ground, their presence would speed up the NIF’s deployment considerably.\textsuperscript{420} In truth, France did not intend to participate in the NIF,\textsuperscript{421} and Rwandan authorities, whether they knew that or not, were certainly aware that RPF leaders would never consent to their participation.\textsuperscript{422} President Habyarimana, though, was not about to give up on his administration’s closest ally. In early October, just as the UN Security Council was taking up the resolution that would authorize the peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, he pleaded with UN, US, and Belgian officials to press France to lend troops to the international force, arguing “that a French presence should not pose a problem as long as the French forces were part of a larger force under UN command.”\textsuperscript{423}

President Mitterrand saw the plea coming when, on 11 October, Habyarimana came to speak with him in Paris.\textsuperscript{424} His response was unequivocal: no, French soldiers would not serve in the UN peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{425} His talking points for the meeting, prepared by de La Sablière, advised him to explain that France’s participation was simply not conceivable because the RPF opposed it.\textsuperscript{426} (This was true, though it may have also provided a convenient cover for France, as Mitterrand was eager to extricate French troops from the Rwandan quagmire. Bruno Delaye hinted at this a few days later, letting slip in a meeting with US diplomats that the RPF “fortunately” did not want French troops to take part in the peacekeeping force.\textsuperscript{427} ) Perhaps to soften the blow, de La Sablière encouraged Mitterrand to reassure the Rwandan president that France would
nevertheless “do everything in its power to ensure that the Arusha agreements are respected and that, in particular, the elections can be held within the expected time (22 months).”428

The exchange between the two presidents was part of a broader dialogue about the future of Franco-Rwandan relations in the post-Arusha era. To Habyarimana and the coalition government, France had been an invaluable ally, but to the RPF it had been an adversary. Now, with the RPF on the verge of sharing power in Kigali and merging its forces with the FAR, there was speculation that its leaders would refuse to permit French military instructors, through the Military Assistance Mission, to continue training Rwandan soldiers and gendarmes.429

Rwandan defense officials tried to persuade French cooperants in Kigali that the pending integration of RPF political leaders into the government, and of RPF troops into the Rwandan armed forces, did not need to spell the end of the two countries’ military cooperation.430 Significantly, one of those officials was Colonel Bagosora—who, as an unabashed hardliner and future architect of the Genocide, had ample reason to want French troops to remain in Rwanda, and was certainly not interested in what the RPF thought about it. In a 20 August meeting with various French officers, Bagosora argued that talk of the RPF army’s unwillingness to submit its troops to French instruction were mere “rumors,” with no formal complaint from the RPF to back them up.431 “[L]ogically,” he said, “the RPF could not refuse aid from a country [that has been] friendly to Rwanda for a long time.”432

Lt. Col. Damy (ordinarily the technical adviser to the National Gendarmerie chief of staff, but filling in for Col. Cussac as chief of the MAM during a temporary absence) assured Bagosora that France wanted the technical cooperation to continue.433 At his urging, the Rwandan government on 5 October submitted a formal request for direct aid and personnel.434 At the top of the list: 40 instructors for the Rwandan Army and 30 instructors for the national Gendarmerie.435 The request specified that these trainers were needed to assist with the integration of RPF troops into the Rwandan armed forces, adding that special training would be needed for RPF gendarmes, since “it is France that has taken care of the National Gendarmerie’s training since its creation.”436

This was precisely the opposite of what the Mitterrand administration, for much of 1993, had been saying it was trying to achieve. The purported goal was a clean exit from Rwanda, while leaving just enough technical cooperants in place to mollify France’s longtime partners in the Rwandan government and avoid giving other francophone leaders in Africa the impression that France had abandoned its ally.437 As de La Sablière’s talking points for the presidential tête-à-tête on 11 October noted, it was not yet clear whether the RPF, soon to join the transitional government, would object to continued French military cooperation, and France was not prepared to lock into a long-term commitment.438 “We hope that the broad-based transitional government will determine as soon as possible what it expects of France,” de La Sablière wrote.439 “[W]e do not intend, in any case, to go beyond the cooperation [framework from] before the offensive of October 1990, which focused on the Gendarmerie with about twenty cooperants.”440 Cussac would later tell Defense Minister Bizimana that France remained open to his request for instructors, but would prefer to “wait for the establishment of the transition institutions in order to study in detail . . . not only the needs of these two great bodies of the State, but also the structures and orientations that will determine these needs.”441
J. As a New, Larger UN Force Was Created, UNOMUR—the Previously Authorized UN Border Force, Championed by France—Proved to Be Little More than Symbolic.

The UN Security Council 5 October vote on Resolution 872, authorizing the peacekeeping force that would be known as the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, or UNAMIR, was unanimous, ultimately. The United States waited until the day of the vote to inform the Quai d’Orsay that it had overcome its reservations about the operation’s cost and decided to back the resolution.

Among the cost-saving measures that US and British officials succeeded in weaving into the resolution concerned UNOMUR, the UN border force that French diplomats had championed all through the spring and summer of 1993 as a means of cutting off the RPF’s supply lines. The public case for the border force was that it would turn down the heat on the conflict and encourage the two sides to make peace. As it turned out, though, the UNOMUR advance team did not even arrive in the region until 18 August, two weeks after the government and the RPF cemented a peace deal in Arusha. It was not until October that UNOMUR achieved its full strength of 81 military observers, and by that time the preparations for the new, substantially larger peacekeeping force (UNAMIR) were already under way. US and British officials, seeing an opportunity to cut costs, persuaded the Secretariat and the Security Council to roll UNOMUR into the new operation.

UNOMUR was, in essence, a gift from France to the Rwandan government. Its ostensible purpose was, if not to cripple the RPF’s military capabilities, at least to comfort the government, knowing that so long as RPF forces remained at full strength, the FAR would be overmatched. It would seem, though, that UNOMUR did not achieve even this much. Ambassador Claver Kanyarushoki, the Rwandan ambassador to Uganda, asserted in a 17 November letter to Foreign Minister Gasana that the RPF was continuing, despite UNOMUR, to receive “any required assistance from Uganda.” The mission had poorly chosen the locations of observation points and substations along the countries’ long, porous border and conducted few patrols, mostly during daylight hours, he complained. He suspected, too, that the Ugandans were tipping off the RPF about the mission’s movements.

While commending the UNOMUR troops’ determination and courage, Dallaire conceded the operation was of limited value. “The border was a sieve, riddled with little mountain trails that had been there for millennia,” he recalled in his book. “Given my tiny force of 81 observers and the fact that we had no access to helicopters with night-vision capability, the task of keeping the border under surveillance was at best symbolic.”
K. As Violence Spiked, the French Government Pulled the Last Remaining Noroît Companies, Leaving Military Advisers Behind.

France is not leaving Rwanda since it remains present through its military technical assistance detachment, which remains ready, as it has in the past, to help our Rwandan comrades in the main areas of their military activity.453


Already, there were signs that UNAMIR, while much larger than the border force, would prove similarly inadequate to the challenges awaiting it. Responses to the United Nations’ solicitations for troops were underwhelming, to say the least. Among NATO countries, only Belgium was willing to provide troops for the new force—a “mixed blessing,” in Dallaire’s view, given its colonial past.454 Belgium’s announcement energized the extremists at RTLM, the privately-run Hutu supremacist radio station, who immediately railed against the return of the colonialists, whom the extremists viewed as closely tied to the RPF.455 The resistance to peace and reconciliation was stirring, and its campaign to torpedo the Arusha agreement was about to enter a new, violent phase.

On 21 October 1993, the day Dallaire was due to fly into Kigali to begin laying the groundwork for UNAMIR, a faction of the Burundian Army attempted a coup d’état.456 The plotters kidnapped and murdered Melchior Ndadaye, the country’s democratically elected Hutu president.457

The attempted coup set off a wave of retaliatory killings of Tutsi in Burundi and a new refugee crisis, with some 300,000 Burundian Hutus fleeing to Rwanda and other neighboring countries.458 In his book, José de Pinho, the French technical adviser assigned to the elite CRAP unit within the FAR’s para-commando battalion, recalled traveling to the Burundian border shortly after the coup, as part of a “field survey” of southern Rwanda.459 There, he met up with members of his unit, who had been sent to the border for the dual purposes of protecting refugees and fishing dead bodies out of the Akanyaru River.460 “On the ground, the horror was indescribable,” he wrote. “There were piles of corpses in an advanced state of decomposition all along the river.”461 The scene, he said, only confirmed for him what was already evident to all of the French cooperants in Rwanda: that the horrific events in Burundi would “inevitably have serious consequences for Rwanda.”462

Quesnot and Delaye saw the threat no less clearly. In a 26 October memo to Mitterrand, they warned: “[T]he Arusha Accords are in grave danger. The Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Rwanda are going to get worse. A race against time is under way until the arrival of the blue helmets in Kigali.”463

A Rwandan government communiqué from the day of Ndadaye’s assassination, signed by Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, condemned the coup but urged Rwandans to respond to the crisis with “calm and vigilance.”464 That message, however, had to compete with the broadcasts on
RTLM, which, in response to the killing of Burundi’s first Hutu president, “poured out a torrent of propaganda, mixing constant harping on the old themes of ‘majority democracy,’ fears of ‘Tutsi feudalist enslavement’ and ambiguous ‘calls to action.’” At a “Hutu Power” rally in Kigali a few days after the coup, MDR Vice President Frodouald Karamira demonized Hutus working against Hutu solidarity, deeming them “the enemy.” That rally and another held the next day were followed by outbursts of ethnic violence, responsible for the hospitalization of roughly a dozen victims.

Ndadaye’s death cast a long shadow, one that was still in evidence on 1 November, when Dallaire held a flag ceremony in Kinihira to celebrate the launch of UNAMIR operations in the demilitarized zone. The occasion marked the United Nations’ takeover of the GOMN, the African observers, previously overseen by the OAU, who, since the summer of 1992, had been charged with monitoring the cease-fire. The transfer brought UNAMIR’s manpower to 150 people—that is, 126 GOMN observers, plus Dallaire’s own staff of about 25. Dallaire proudly raised the UN flag, but—as if to remind the assembled crowd of the challenges ahead—promptly lowered it to half mast, out of respect for the period of mourning President Habyarimana had decreed after Ndadaye’s death.

More violence was to follow. Most troublingly, on 17 November, a well-coordinated attack in Ruhengeri claimed the lives of close to 40 people, most of whom were promptly identified as members of Habyarimana’s party, the MRND. The assailants left virtually no witnesses behind, killing “entire families, including babies.” Habyarimana, evidently enraged, insisted the RPF was behind the attack. Defense Minister Bizimana, having previously warned that the RPF was scheming to sabotage the peace accords, lashed out on 21 October, declaring in a communiqué: “There is no doubt that these ignoble and savage acts have been perpetrated by the RPF . . . in order to plunge the country into a blood-bath.” The communiqué, issued without Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana’s consent, announced that all meetings and joint commissions with the RPF would be immediately suspended until the RPF renounced the violence. Uwilingiyimana promptly overruled the defense minister, a public rebuke that angered MRND officials.

French officials did not hesitate to blame the Ruhengeri killings on the RPF. Officially, a UNAMIR investigation was inconclusive. When, however, Dallaire covertly dispatched two UN officers to gather intelligence from moderates within the FAR, they came back with information suggesting that FAR para-commandos from the Camp Bagogwe training base had carried out the attacks.

The violence in mid-to-late November 1993 and Rwanda’s increasing instability made French officials in Paris anxious, which only added to Dallaire’s concerns. Dallaire was counting on France to keep Noroit in place for at least a few weeks longer, as he waited for the arrival of 370 para-commandos from Belgium and several hundred more from Bangladesh, who, together, would form the heart of the UNAMIR battalion in Kigali. Quesnot and Delaye, however, worried that increasing instability might draw their forces into a conflict and wanted Noroit to leave the country before that could happen. On 23 November, Delaye notified President Mitterrand that the French Prime Minister’s Office, Defense Ministry, and Cooperation
Ministry were all in agreement: French troops should leave as quickly as possible—perhaps as early as 1 December—without waiting for the Bangladeshi companies’ arrival.484

As the French government was working on logistics for the withdrawal, the insecurity worsened. On 30 November, the state-run radio reported that civilians were killed in Mutura, outside Gisenyi, in an attack that bore similarities to the coordinated assaults in Ruhengeri two weeks earlier.485 Once again, the radio blamed the RPF.486 UNAMIR officials, though, did not credit that account. According to a US cable, a UN officer said that “while UNAMIR cannot prove it, they strongly believe that Hutu extremists (possibly including FAR personnel and/or Habyarimana government officials) are behind these acts rather than the RPF.”487 Dallaire, who shared in this assessment, believed the extremists’ goal was to further destabilize Rwanda and block the implementation of the Arusha Accords.488

While Habyarimana and Defense Minister Bizimana wanted France to take its time, others in the Rwandan government were not sorry to see France go.489 In a 6 December 1993 interview with a Belgian journalist, Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana suggested that most Rwandans were glad to see the Belgian troops take Noroit’s place in Kigali.490 “The reality,” she said, “is that the population considers that the French soldiers . . . were there to support the head of state, while the Belgians are there to ensure the security of the people.”491 The quote infuriated President Habyarimana, whose cabinet director, Enoch Ruhigira, promptly denounced the article as “tendentious and slanderous.”492 In a 10 December letter to the paper’s editor, Ruhigira called the allegation that French troops’ mission was to support Habyarimana “absurd,” adding:

It is true that the presence of these French soldiers in Rwanda did not win the full support of all layers of Rwandan opinion. The same can be said for Belgian troops. The important thing to remember is that the vast majority of people and the Rwandan government are very happy with the mission accomplished by the French soldiers in Rwanda.494

Ambassador Marlaud would later refer to Uwilingiyimana’s remark as “the only false note” in an otherwise “unanimous” outpouring of gratitude for French troops upon their departure a few days later.495

Defense Minister Bizimana, too, was agitated about the prime minister’s comment, and felt compelled to respond to it in his speech on 10 December, at a farewell ceremony his Ministry hosted for the Noroit troops on 10 December.496 “It should be recalled once again,” he said, in his remarks during the ceremony at the Kigali airport, “that French troops were sent to our country with the primary mission of ensuring the safety of expatriates and not to guard the Head of State, as some uninformed or ill-intentioned people claim, who, in order to win the sympathy of the RPF, blindly repeat its speech.”497 Bizimana twice referred to Noroit as a “humanitarian” operation.498 Thanking the French Army, he wished them “a safe return to your beautiful country” and, in words that would later seem portentous, expressed his hope that he would “see you again in the land of a thousand hills in more pleasant conditions.”499 (French troops would, in fact, return just six months later, under conditions that were anything but pleasant.)
During his speech, Colonel Cussac boasted that Noroit had “fulfilled its mission with professionalism and discretion.” In contrast with Bizimana, Cussac did not insist that France’s primary mission over the preceding three years had been to protect its nationals. Seeming to dispense with that pretense, Cussac said, “[F]or a little more than 3 years, the French Armed Forces in Rwanda presented both a credible deterrent and an effective and decisive know-how that helped stop the fighting and reestablish a negotiation process that allowed the return of peace through negotiations.” (This claim that France sought “peace through negotiations” might have seemed more credible had Cussac not, in the first line of his speech, referred to the RPF as “the enemy.”)

As Cussac spoke, the handover was under way. At the US embassy, staff saw rifle-toting Belgian troops patrolling the streets of Kigali. They were highly conspicuous, as if to advertise their presence. The security of Kigali was in their hands.

The Noroit troops’ withdrawal concluded three days later, on 13 December. Cussac, in his speech at the farewell ceremony, had reassured the Rwandans that it was only Noroit, not France, that was retreating. “France is not leaving Rwanda since it remains present through its military technical assistance detachment, which remains ready, as it has in the past, to help our Rwandan comrades in the main areas of their military activity.” The MAM left roughly 25 men in Rwanda heading into the new year. Their work of training the FAR continued.

Charles Kayonga, who commanded the RPF troops protecting the RPF officials who were to join the Broad-Based Transitional Government, took part in the negotiations to decide where in Kigali the RPF would be housed. He traveled with his team to Kigali in early December to identify the location. The potential sites they viewed were the Parliament (CND), KAMI camp, Camp Kigali, and Amahoro Stadium. The RPF chose the CND, located atop a hill with a wide view of Kigali, because its high ground offered the required protection, its officials could work from the CND (which was large enough to house all of the politicians and the RPF security forces deployed to protect them), and the central location of the CND made it easier to move about the city. Cutting down on their movement was not only more convenient, it reduced the security risk. The Rwandan government, which had pushed the RPF to locate instead to KAMI camp, eventually relented and agreed to let the RPF reside at the CND.

With Noroit gone, and more than 1,200 UNAMIR service members newly in place, the implementation of the peace accords would at last begin. The RPF security battalion arrived in Kigali on 28 December, allowing Colonel Kanyarengwe and other RPF leaders to safely take their place at the CND. When the RPF deployed to the CND, Chairman of High Command Kagame briefed them as follows:

You are to protect the VIPs of the RPF. You are responsible. You are not to violate the Kigali Weapons Secure Area (any weapons there were known and recorded). You are going for peace. The violations of the ceasefire should not come from you. You are going to go and work for the peace process.

Upon arrival at the CND, the 600 RPF soldiers immediately began digging trenches for the sake of protection. That evening, Dallaire recalled, ambassadors from the diplomatic community came to welcome Kanyarengwe. “I was surprised to see the French ambassador come,” he wrote,
“since no foreign nation had done so much to prevent this day from happening.” He wondered if, perhaps, the French “were reconciled to a new Rwanda.”

L. The Remaining French Military Cooperants Continued to Advise and Assist FAR Leaders in Early 1994, Even As Evidence Emerged That the FAR Was Arming and Training the Interahamwe, the Militia Suspected of Planning to Exterminate Tutsi.

When you are supposed to advise, you must advise however it is necessary.


Defense Minister Augustin Bizimana, in his address at the farewell ceremony for Noroit on 10 December 1993, referred to the departing French servicemen and their Rwandan counterparts in the FAR as “brothers in arms.” “More than anyone else,” he told the Noroit troops, “you are well placed to testify that the Rwandan Army is a Force of sons of this country, committed and determined to defend the most cherished interests of their country.”

“Certainly,” he added, “within the Rwandan Army and the National Gendarmerie, there are some bad elements who dishonor their brothers by unworthy behavior, incompatible with a career in arms. Such elements exist in any society and therefore also in any army, but they do not make up the bulk of our men.” This was a sentiment the French commanders could appreciate. They, too, had been forced to confront misconduct within their own ranks over the course of the preceding three years. In what may have been the most egregious of these episodes, three Noroit soldiers allegedly gang raped a young Rwandan woman aboard a military truck in March 1993. A document later compiled by a French Ministry of Defense official in response to inquiries from the MIP indicates that the soldiers raped the victim with a bayonet before throwing her out of the truck. French gendarmes arrested the three soldiers, and French military authorities called for criminal charges to be filed. The soldiers, though, were never prosecuted, and the Ministry of Defense official’s notes, while not entirely clear, appear to suggest that authorities in Paris intervened to relieve a French judge of jurisdiction over the case, presumably for political reasons.

Chantal Ingabire

Chantal Ingabire was born in Ngarama, in the north-east of Rwanda. In 1990, she moved to Kigali to attend school and lived with an aunt and uncle in the Kiyovu neighborhood.

As a high school student in Kigali in late 1990, I first began to notice the growing presence of the French. Over time, I would see the French at the airport, roadblocks, and elsewhere in Kigali. They were recognizable because of their red hats and military vehicles. They would be either alone or with FAR soldiers.
You didn’t want to be involved with French soldiers, you’d run away, because there was no difference between them and the FAR soldiers. We felt like what the government was doing, the French went along with them and were their support. The FAR soldiers felt like they could get away with anything because the French were supporting them. The extremists became more extreme because the French were there as support. There was no one who condemned what was done. The Rwandan soldiers would beat people at roadblocks, and the French would observe and do nothing. The Government was so proud of what they were doing, and no one condemned it. They thought they could get away with it, and it made them even bolder.

At the checkpoints, we were terrified, and the French soldiers were present and could see we were terrified as the Rwandan soldiers were questioning and harassing us. The French would question and approach us, say we should please them, and ask to meet us later.

The French soldiers had a fixation on Tutsi women and viewed us as second-class citizens whom they could use without consequences. They felt like we were there to play with. They made us feel like they could just use us, misuse us, and take advantage of us as we were in a terrible moment of our lives. Rwandan soldiers were raping Tutsi girls.

My friends and I would try to avoid their notice. Every time we saw them, we would look down and find another way around. It was important to avoid eye-contact. We would tell our other friends and little sisters about this to help them dodge the French in the way they would Hutu soldiers. The French knew the Tutsi women were young and vulnerable, and wanted to use us like second-class people because we were in the minority and poor. They never saw value in us.

Even when the French looked at you favorably, it was to show that they wanted to meet you privately. We were young, even as young as 15. They were not—they were full grown men. They wanted to take advantage of us. Even when you were buying groceries, they would watch you, and you knew they wanted to take advantage of you. There would be times when you’re just walking, and a jeep of French soldiers would stop next to you and tell you to find them at the Meridien Hotel as if you were a prostitute! They treated us like second-class; they knew we were at risk, that many of our people were already in prison at that time. It reached a point where, if you see the French, you have to dodge and let their jeep pass.

Some of the girls were left pregnant by the French soldiers. Some girls said they had no choice. They felt if they would be hurt or even killed. They knew we were terrified to see them, but they would continue anyway. They knew the government would never condemn them. There was a big belief in the Hutu community that it was okay to sleep
with or rape Tutsi women. And the French were doing exactly the same thing the Hutu soldiers were doing.

I remember a friend, her name was M., sobbing as she told me and another classmate that she had been raped and was pregnant. She said that her child’s father was French, but she had no relationship with him. She said that some French soldiers had seen her walking in her neighborhood and convinced her to let them give her a ride. When they stopped her, one of the soldiers forced her to have sex in the car. It was the first time it had happened to her, because she had been a virgin. M. ultimately decided to keep the child, and I believe the child is still alive.

From 1990 to 1993, while the French were there, my family and I constantly suffered because we were Tutsi, and the French were aware of how we were treated. I remember a specific experience at a roadblock that occurred sometime around the beginning of 1991. I was walking with a group of friends—two Hutu and four Tutsi girls at a roadblock between my school and where I was living. Rwandan soldiers asked us for our identification. They then let the Hutu continue. There were three French soldiers there and their chief. They didn’t say anything about them letting the Hutu go, they didn’t ask why they were doing this. This was not unusual, and my sisters and my friends experienced the same treatment.

In the end of November 1990, after the RPF invasion, FAR soldiers came to search my uncle’s house in Kigali while we were there. One soldier pressed his gun to the back side of my head. My uncle was taken to prison. One of his friends got him out, but many people were put in prison as RPF collaborators.

The French soldiers never condemned people’s mistreatment by the FAR. I remember one of the soldiers told the French that we were the enemies, that our brothers were in the RPF and attacking. We were young, we were not even part of politics or anything. I remember them telling the French we were the enemy, and the French didn’t do anything. They were there as government supporters and to do what the Rwandan soldiers would do. The only difference was that they were French and wearing a different uniform.

The day after the crash, the Interahamwe came to kill the Tutsi. They had lists, and they knew where all the Tutsi lived. When people went out, they were killed on the way home. The next day, there were roadblocks everywhere. The first week after the plane crash, we were waiting to be killed. They were saying our names on RTLM. They would come and beat you, but not kill you, because that would be a favor. They said, “We want to torture you to make you regret being born Tutsi.”

I lost all the family on my father’s side, and my two younger sisters in Bugesera. I do not know exactly when they died, but I believe it was a week after the plane crash. The last time I saw my sisters was when I dropped them off for Easter break at my uncle’s house.
and told them I would pick them up the next weekend. When the Genocide started, I could not get to them in time.

If there was one assertion in Bizimana’s speech at the 10 December 1993 farewell ceremony for Noroit that was indisputable, it was that the French government knew the Rwandan armed forces as no one else did. Indeed, since the war broke out in October 1990, the French and Rwandan militaries had worked much more closely than virtually anyone outside of the two countries’ governments knew. For those who were not already aware, though, a fuller picture was starting to emerge.

In January 1994, the New York-based non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report that, among other things, explored the “large, but still not completely defined role” that the French government had played in arming and training the Rwandan military over the preceding three years.529 The French government, the report noted, “has either supplied or kept operational most of the heavy guns, artillery, assault vehicles and helicopters used by Rwanda in the war.”530 The report went on to discuss the assistance French military personnel had provided, a subject about which the French government had yet to be entirely forthcoming. Citing “non-French Western diplomats in country,” the report alleged that French soldiers “provided artillery support for Rwandan infantry troops both before and during the February 1993 offensive.”531 In addition, it stated, “western observers, diplomats and Rwandan military officers said that French advisors”—though technically prohibited from entering combat zones—“had been observed in tactical combat situations with Rwandan troops during the February 1993 offensive. When confronted with this statement, French Ambassador Marlaud told the HRW: ‘When you are supposed to advise, you must advise however it is necessary.’”532

HRW did not question the right of France or any other country to sell weapons or provide military assistance to a foreign ally such as Rwanda. Its point, rather, was that human rights ought to be “a paramount concern when governments make decisions” to arm or support a country “with a questionable human rights record.”533 In Rwanda, it concluded, “[w]ith the exception of Belgium, it does not appear that any military suppliers took human rights considerations into account.”534

France, as HRW noted, had substantially scaled back its support for the FAR by the time of the report’s release in January 1994. In keeping, though, with Colonel Cussac’s vow that France would remain “ready, as in the past, to help our Rwandan comrades in the main areas of their military activity,” the French Military Assistance Mission left behind 25 officers and non-commissioned officers to continue the work of professionalizing the Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie.535 They included:

- Lt. Col. Maurin, deputy defense attaché, who continued to serve as advisor to the FAR’s chief of staff, Major General Déogratias Nsabimana;536
- Battalion Chief Erwan de Gouvello, who served as technical advisor to the commander of the FAR’s reconnaissance “recce” battalion,537 and
• Captain Grégoire de Saint Quentin, who served as technical advisor to the commander of the para-commando battalion.538

These French servicemen helped the FAR maintain its battle-readiness during the final, tension-filled months before the Genocide.

In his 2001 memoir, Admiral Lanxade characterized the decision to continue supporting the FAR during this time as essentially beneficent: “[W]e believed that the political transition defined at Arusha would be difficult and that we needed to help the new regime with the delicate reconstitution of an army [by] integrating the RPF’s forces.”539 The reality, though, was that there was, as yet, no “new regime” for the French government to help. There was only Habyarimana, who, on 5 January 1994, was sworn in as president for a new 22-month term, becoming the first, and only, official to formally assume a position in the transitional government.540 The rest of the transitional government envisioned in the Arusha Accords did not yet exist and, in fact, never would. The political impasse, which persisted for months, stymied plans to integrate the two sides’ armed forces and left the Rwandan military under the command of anti-Tutsi hardliners— principally, Defense Minister Bizimana and Cabinet Director Bagosora, and Army Chief of Staff Nsabimana. The FAR, in short, was still the FAR, and French military cooperation was still accruing to its exclusive benefit.

That France continued during this period to offer the services of a technical adviser (Lt. Col. Maurin) to Major General Nsabimana remains particularly eyebrow-raising. Nsabimana’s reputation for cruelty preceded his June 1992 appointment as FAR chief of staff. While anyone, in some respects, would appear to be a welcome replacement for the cruel and corrupt Col. Laurent Serbuga, a US cable at the time nonetheless reported Nsabimana was “known as a man who gives no quarter, believed to have tortured prisoners to death and instituted summary executions on the battlefield.”541 A December 1993 US cable, following Nsabimana’s promotion to Major General, noted allegations that he had “made verbal death threats against former Defense Minister James Gasana.”542 (Gasana, as a reminder, abruptly resigned and fled the country in July 1993 after receiving death threats from a clandestine group of Hutu nationalists within the Rwandan military.543)

When, in mid-January 1994, an informant within the Interahamwe alerted UNAMIR that the MRND-affiliated militia was planning to reignite the war and slaughter Tutsi, one of the revelations was the extent to which Nsabimana and the FAR were complicit in the scheme.544 The informant identified himself as a former para-commando and member of the Presidential Guard who had left the military to become the chief trainer of the Interahamwe.545 The idea at first, he said, had been to whip the young men of the Interahamwe into an armed militia to “protect Kigali from [the] RPF.”546 Recently, though, his superiors had ordered the men to draw up lists of Tutsi from Kigali and their home communes.547 The informant suspected a plan was in the works to exterminate Tutsi.548

According to the informant, financial and material support for the Interahamwe trainings came from two sources: MRND President Mathieu Ngirumpatse and FAR Chief of Staff Nsabimana.549 As Dallaire noted in an 11 January 1994 cable to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and in briefings to French, Belgian, and US diplomats, the informant
explained that the trainings, in which 1,700 men had participated, were held at Rwandan Army bases, and were conducted by army instructors, with Nsabimana’s consent. The informant also said that the FAR had recently transferred to the Interahamwe four large shipments of AK-47s, grenades, and ammunition.

Dallaire, it turns out, had personally witnessed the Interahamwe in action on 8 January, at a violent demonstration outside the CND, the site of one of many ultimately aborted attempts to swear in representatives of the Broad-Based Transitional Government. UNAMIR officers had recognized some Presidential Guard members, dressed in civilian clothes, among the agitators inciting the mob. The informant confirmed that 48 FAR para-commandos and some gendarmes had taken part in the demonstration. He said the Interahamwe’s goal had been to provoke both the RPF security battalion and Belgian troops into a firefight. “[I]f Belgian soldiers resorted to force[,] a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda,” Dallaire wrote in the 11 January code cable. The ensuing pandemonium would also offer the militiamen a pretext for killing Tutsi in the capital. The informant said that, thanks to the lists the men had drawn up, the Interahamwe were capable of killing as many as 1,000 Tutsi in a single hour.

Dallaire and the UN secretary general’s special representative, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, shared this new intelligence with the Belgian and US ambassadors and the French chargé d’affaires, William Bunel, on 12 January. “None of them appeared to be surprised, which led me to conclude that our informant was merely confirming what they already knew,” Dallaire would later write. In a cable that day, Bunel characterized the intelligence as “serious and plausible.” However, he wrote, he could not rule out the possibility that the information was part of a ruse “to discredit the president at the same time that the new institutions are supposed to be set up.” He noted that UNAMIR had learned about the source through Prime Minister-designate Faustin Twagiramungu, the moderate former president of the MDR. “[W]e well know the state of relations between General Habyarimana and Faustin Twagiramungu,” Bunel wrote.

The possibility that the informant was laying a trap for UNAMIR had also occurred to Dallaire. Dallaire, though, was willing to take that chance. The informant had offered to disclose the locations of weapons caches in Kigali where the Interahamwe was hiding weapons, in what Dallaire viewed as a patent violation of a December 1993 agreement to restrict access to weapons in the capital. (The 24 December agreement between the government and the RPF created what UNAMIR officials referred to as the “Kigali Weapons Secure Area.”) By its terms, it placed all military weapons under UNAMIR’s control, restricted the movement of troops in the city, and allowed UNAMIR to search for and confiscate unauthorized arms, ammunition, and explosives.) Determined to seize the initiative, Dallaire set out to order his staff to begin preparations to locate and confiscate the weapons within the next 36 hours.

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) swiftly nixed the idea. Speaking with a Belgian diplomat the following week, UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Iqbal Riza explained that the view in the Department was that a raid would be too risky. The concern was not merely that it would put UN soldiers’ lives at risk. It was, more than this, that it threatened to turn Habyarimana and his allies against UNAMIR, imperiling the mission’s claim to neutrality. “Who guarantees that only the Habyarimana camp is cheating?,”
Riza reportedly suggested, alluding to the alleged violation of the weapons-restriction agreement. “If it appears that the RPF, for example, has also exceeded its powers, UNAMIR will certainly give the impression of being biased.”

Leaders of the UN DPKO preferred the Department present the newly acquired intelligence to Habyarimana himself, with diplomatic support from France, Belgium, and the United States. “Riza alluded to the good relations between Belgium and the RPF on the one hand, and between France and the Rwandan government on the other,” a Belgian cable reported, “It would be good for Belgium to alert the RPF to the danger of the situation and for France to do the same with the president.” (Bunel and other diplomats, including the US, Belgian, Egyptian, and Tanzanian ambassadors, did, ultimately, raise the issue in a meeting with Habyarimana on 14 January. While there, Bunel reportedly urged Habyarimana to use his “moral authority” to reduce tensions among the bickering political factions. Habyarimana obliged, issuing a call for reconciliation and cooperation in a public address on 15 January. The diplomats’ demarche otherwise appears to have had little impact, if any, either on the political impasse or on the security situation in Kigali.)

For their part, when Dallaire and Booh-Booh met with Habyarimana on 12 January, just a few hours after briefing the Western diplomats, the president was not alone. Among the coterie of advisors and officials sitting by his side were Bizimana, Nsabimana, and another official France had come to know well: National Gendarmerie Chief of Staff Augustin Ndindilyimana. (A French officer, Lt. Col. Alain Damy, had been serving as technical advisor to Ndindilyimana since August 1992. Six other French cooperants continued to work with the Gendarmerie as well.) Dallaire later stated that “Habyarimana denied any knowledge of such [weapons] caches.” The UNAMIR force commander recalled leaving the meeting certain that the information he and Booh-Booh had shared “would be transmitted to the extremists” (though, to be sure, several of them had been right there in the room, alongside the president).

That night, two UNAMIR officers rode with the informant to a building in Kigali where the informant had said they would find one of the weapons caches. The tip checked out: in the basement, they found at least 50 assault rifles, boxes of ammunition, clips, and grenades. The building—the MRND headquarters—was owned by Ndindilyimana.

“Some of the French people who were here in 1994, I’d like to see them again one day,” a French priest in Rwanda told a journalist from Le Monde in 1998. The priest, speaking on condition of anonymity, was incredulous of claims that French officials did not know the Genocide was coming, given how closely they had worked with the Rwandan military. “The genocide was planned! That ambassador, army officers and intelligence guys couldn’t have not known,” he said. The priest pointed, specifically, to a French officer advising the Rwandan Presidential Guard, who did not name and whose men executed some of the first targeted killings of the Genocide. The priest told the Le Monde reporter that this officer “hurriedly left Kigali” two weeks before the Genocide. “We felt that there was danger lurking,” the priest said, “but we knew nothing. He knew!”


M. The FAR Received a Delivery of Munitions from France in January 1994, Despite the Deteriorating Situation on the Ground.

I asked that the [French] Air Force transport [a shipment of mortar rounds] for us to BANGUI so that the ESCAVI [FAR aviation squadron] could retrieve them there. The Bangui proposal was deemed appropriate given that following the imminent departure of the French from Kigali, they should no longer openly show themselves.596

– Sebastian Ntahobari

The aim of the December 1993 weapons-restriction agreement between the Rwandan government and the RPF had been to minimize the risk of an armed confrontation once the RPF security force took up residence at the CND, in Kigali, just before the start of the new year.597 Enforcement, though, proved exceedingly difficult. “My troops reported that the [FAR] were moving heavy weapons just beyond the area covered by the agreement, and I was also hearing of militia training going on inside the KWSA,” Dallaire wrote in his 2003 memoir.598 “I got no satisfactory responses to my queries from the [FAR] chief of staff or the minister of defense, just shrugs and evasive answers.”599

As this report has elsewhere noted, the French government sold or donated about 42 million French francs ($7.6 million) worth of military equipment to the Rwandan government between 1990 and 1994, and doled out licenses for roughly 137 million French francs ($24.9 million) in military equipment exports.600 Total weapons deliveries from France (coming from the government and private industry) peaked in the aftermath of the RPF offensives in Byumba in June 1992 and Ruhengeri in February 1993, before tailing off as the Arusha peace talks were reaching their conclusion in mid-1993.601 To Dallaire’s consternation, though, one shipment came quite a bit later, arriving in the midst of the tense final months before the Genocide, when both sides to the conflict had agreed to place their weapons under UNAMIR control.

The DC-8 cargo plane first took off on 21 January 1994 from Zaventem, Belgium, carrying food, medicine, and three civilian vehicles, all of them bearing the label of the East African Cargo freight company.602 It was destined for Kigali, but on the way it stopped in Châteauroux, France, where it picked up roughly 3.5 tons of additional cargo: 1,000 mortar rounds (60 mm), manufactured by Thomson-Brandt Armements, a French company, for the Rwandan military.603

The shipment had been ordered more than a year earlier, in December 1992.604 A few months later, a French Defense Ministry memo noted that the FAR had “placed an order for 1,000 shells from the company Thomson-Brandt Armements, which is unable to supply them for ten months.”605 When by December 1993 ten months had passed, and still the shipment had not arrived, Rwanda’s military attaché in Paris, Colonel Ntahobari, raised the issue with Colonel Dominique Delort, who had led French forces during Operation Chimère and the simultaneous expansion of Noroît in February and March 1993.606 In a meeting on 2 December 1993 (about a week before Noroît’s departure), Ntahobari proposed that, once the munitions were ready for delivery, they be sent to Bangui—the site of a French military base in the Central African Republic—instead of Kigali.607 The Rwandan aviation squadron could pick up the shipment in
Bangui, according to Ntahobari’s proposal, to conceal the French role that might otherwise be revealed in a delivery made directly to Kigali.608 “The Bangui proposal was deemed appropriate given that following the imminent departure of the French from Kigali, they should no longer openly show themselves,” Ntahobari wrote in a memo a few days later.609 Delort referred Ntahobari to General Huchon,610 the head of the Military Cooperation Mission in the French Ministry of Cooperation.611 It is unclear whether Ntahobari ever contacted Huchon, or how Huchon responded if he did. In the end, the munitions were sent to Kigali on the privately contracted East African Cargo freight plane.

The plane landed at the Kigali airport in the evening on 21 January.612 When a Belgian UNAMIR officer arrived on the scene, he found Rwandan troops unloading the mortar rounds from the plane.613 Dallaire, incensed to see his efforts to control weapons in Kigali undermined, ordered the munitions impounded.614 He later warned Nsabimana “that any other aircraft landing in Rwanda with war material on board will not be permitted to offload and will be ordered to leave the country immediately.”615 “Due to the sense of insecurity and uncertainty prevalent in Rwanda,” Dallaire would explain to his superiors in the United Nations, “any ammunition resupply at this time would become an explosive issue with the parties.”616 Underscoring this point, the day of the weapons delivery, two UN peacekeepers, just after they had delivered Dallaire’s message to impound the ammunition, rescued a couple from a mob outside the CND. In Dallaire’s telling, the mob was taunting the RPF guards at the CND to try and save the couple. The attackers had sliced the man’s face “almost in two, exposing the blue-white glint of bone” and sliced the arm of the woman, pregnant at the time, “through the bone.” The peacekeepers interceded to prevent the RPF from responding and potentially escalating the conflict.617 This was “not the first time UNAMIR had witnessed the targeting of innocent civilians by machete-wielding mobs intent on killing Tutsis. But in the days that followed, these incidents accelerated at an alarming rate.”618

Rwandan defense officials pleaded with Dallaire over the following weeks to release the confiscated munitions, noting they had placed the order before the August 1993 peace agreement.619 Technically, this was true and, according to the United Nations, rendered the delivery an exception to the weapons restriction agreement.620 But since the FAR offered no proof of their claim, Dallaire refused.621 The last thing the FAR needed, in his view, was more weaponry. “We were all supposed to be moving toward peace, not preparing for war,” he wrote.622

N. Frustrated, but Not Yet Willing to End the Mission, the UN Security Council Voted on 5 April 1994—One Day before the Start of the Genocide—to Extend UNAMIR’s Mandate.

Western diplomats in Kigali spent the better part of January 1994 shuttling between meetings with President Habyarimana, on the one hand, and opposition party leaders, on the other, listening to each blame the other for the endless delays in establishing the Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG). “Your friends seem to be back on the brinkmanship kick (a skill they honed so well in Arusha),” a US State Department official in Washington quipped in a 7 January message to the new US ambassador in Kigali, David Rawson.623 The problem, essentially, was that two of the major political parties, the MDR and the Liberal Party, were each in crisis, having split into moderate and extremist factions incapable of agreeing on who should represent the parties in the BBTG and National Assembly.624 Habyarimana, meanwhile, was exploiting the parties’ descent into chaos, working behind the scenes to ensure that the hardline
Hutu-power coalitions’ picks for ministers and deputies were the ones seated in the new government.625

Amidst all the bickering and finger-pointing, the diplomatic corps thought it best, generally, to project an air of neutrality.626 One visiting French official, Minister Delegate for Humanitarian Action Lucette Michaux-Chevry, insisted over two days in late January that France was disinterested when it came to Rwandan internal affairs.627 A Belgian cable, though, subsequently reported that in a meeting with Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana, a leading figure in the MDR’s moderate faction, Michaux-Chevry said that “the opposition bore responsibility for the political deadlock.”628 The assertion, the cable noted, “was not appreciated by the Prime Minister.”629

Colonel Cussac’s sympathies lay, as usual, with Habyarimana. In a 14 January memo, he argued there were essentially two blocs in Rwandan politics: one represented by the president and the MRND, and the other represented by the RPF, with all other parties falling into one or the other camp.630 The president, he asserted, “retains the support of the majority of people,” but was afraid his opponents would use their power in the transitional government to oust him from office.631 (One possibility, which Habyarimana must have contemplated, was that the opposition ministers and legislators would launch an investigation of his administration’s crimes and human rights abuses, which might then form the basis for his impeachment.632) Cussac described the RPF bloc, by contrast, as “a faction that has only made itself heard through the use of arms and whose goals are both the fall of the President and [holding] total power.”633

Cussac’s assessment was, to a large extent, in line with Major General Nsabimana’s. In February, the Rwandan Army chief of staff was among a group of FAR commanders who told a US diplomat they were “still wary of the ‘Tutsi RPF.’”634 Recounting the conversation, a US cable reported that Nsabimana “still thinks that the Tutsi aim remains unchanged—total power.”635 Nsabimana predicted that RPF political and military leaders would wait until UNAMIR completes its mission and then, after losing in the elections, stage a coup.636

Views among the FAR’s mid-level officers and enlisted soldiers were less uniformly hostile to the RPF and its perceived sympathizers (i.e., the Tutsi).637 When, however, the US Navy Justice School brought FAR and RPF soldiers together in January 1994 for a multi-day conference on the role of militaries in a democracy, the US organizers could not help but note how differently the two sides saw the war they had just fought against each other:

In the enlisted ranks, the RPF soldiers were provided political education in the field. All were taught the RPF political programme that the nature of the three year conflict was not ethnic but rather one of fighting against a dictatorial regime for the rights of all Rwandans. By comparison, most of the [FAR] enlisted were given very little training and taught that Tutsis were their enemy.638

By mid-February, the political infighting that had been holding up the establishment of the BBTG was beginning to fade as an issue, only for a new impediment to take its place.639 The question now was, effectively, the same one that nearly derailed the Arusha peace process in late 1992 and early 1993: whether the Hutu supremacist CDR party should have a seat in the
transitional government. To claim a seat in the National Assembly, the CDR would need to do as other parties had and sign both the Arusha Accords and a political code of ethics. Habyarimana, desperate for allies in the legislature, not only defended the CDR’s right to participate in the government, but insisted it must not be excluded. RPF leaders vehemently disagreed, maintaining that the CDR was a sectarian party, and that its history of violence must not be rewarded.

The diplomatic corps, including the French, took Habyarimana’s side. To be sure, they were well aware of the party’s penchant for extreme anti-Tutsi rhetoric and violence. Regardless, as Belgian Ambassador Johan Swinnen explained in 2014, “We thought it would be better to involve [the CDR] fully in the dynamic of peace and reform rather than to exclude them.” RPF leaders, though, proved immovable on this issue, which, to them, was a matter of principle. They suspected that the real reason Habyarimana was harping on the issue was because he wanted to keep delaying the installation of the transitional government.

With frustrations mounting among UN Security Council member states, the Council president on 17 February issued a tersely worded statement that operated, in effect, as an ultimatum. The Council, he explained, was “deeply concerned” with the state of affairs in Rwanda, both because of the delays in establishing transition institutions and because of the deteriorating security situation, particularly in Kigali. The statement warned: “UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha Peace Agreement fully and rapidly.”

The crisis, though, was only deepening. On 21 February, gunmen assassinated Rwanda’s minister of public works and energy, Félicien Gatabazi, outside of his home in Kigali. Gatabazi was the executive secretary of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), which, while critical of Habyarimana, had played a productive role in the effort to break through the recent political stalemate. The next day, in the southern town of Butare, a PSD stronghold, an angry mob exacted revenge, murdering CDR President Martin Bucyana. Hours later, an RPF convoy outside of Kigali was ambushed in an attack that the RPF blamed on government forces. In the ensuing gunfire, one RPF soldier was killed, and a UNAMIR observer was injured. This last attack infuriated the RPF, which promptly issued a statement calling Habyarimana a terrorist and declaring that the party would not show up for a planned swearing-in ceremony the next day.

In New York, the French permanent representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Mérimée, consulted his US colleagues and found their patience was nearly at an end. “They reminded me that UNAMIR had been created under the strong condition that the parties cooperate in view of installing provisional institutions. It must be noted that we are at an impasse,” Mérimée wrote in a 2 March cable. “The withdrawal of the United Nations’ mission should therefore be considered if no progress has been made in the implementation of the Arusha peace accord.” A UN Secretariat official expressed a similar sentiment, complaining that “the Rwandan president has systematically sabotaged the initiatives intended to promote the emergence of a consensus.” The Secretariat was particularly concerned about the safety of UN staff, after Habyarimana personally warned Booh-Booh that “his security was no longer fully guaranteed.” “This warning was very worrying,” Mérimée wrote. “At the appropriate time, it would be necessary to remind the Rwandan authorities that they were responsible for the safety of all of the UN staff in Rwanda.
If attacks were to be committed against them, there would be no doubt that a withdrawal would be necessary."\textsuperscript{664}

By 22 March, just two weeks before its mandate was due to expire, UNAMIR had roughly achieved its full authorized strength of 2,539 troops.\textsuperscript{665} Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali recommended extending its mandate for another six months, and France drafted a Security Council resolution that would do just that.\textsuperscript{666} France was flexible, though, and when the Chinese, Russian, and British delegations sought to reduce the extension to two months, French officials said “they could live with three.”\textsuperscript{667} The Council ended up settling on a four-month extension, after Rwanda—which had lucked into a non-permanent seat on the Council at the start of the year\textsuperscript{668}—rallied the non-aligned caucus (Nigeria, Djibouti, Oman, and Pakistan) to push for more.\textsuperscript{669}

The skeptics won one notable victory, though, as the final draft called for the Council to revisit the matter within the next six weeks, unless the secretary-general could certify that the transitional institutions had been established, and that UNAMIR was progressing to its next phase of operations.\textsuperscript{670} The message, plainly, was that the Council was frustrated, and its patience was not infinite. “The [six-week deadline] they have provided for in the resolution is very serious,” an RPF official in New York wrote after the vote.\textsuperscript{671} “I can assure you that without institutions in place by that time [UNAMIR] will go. There will be nobody to defend it except perhaps France [and] Rwanda. They are all praying for a miracle.”\textsuperscript{672}

It was 5 April 1994. In Paris, General Quesnot wrote one of his routine memos to President Mitterrand, discussing the latest developments in the Baltics, Chad, and Cameroon.\textsuperscript{673} The memo, typical of Élysée memos in early 1994,\textsuperscript{674} made no mention of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{675} The country and its troubles had of late receded as a focus of the Élysée’s attention. That, however, was about to change.
Notes to Chapter VII

1 Rone Tempest, *Mitterrand Names Conservative Prime Minister: France: Edouard Balladur, Praised as a Polished Bureaucrat, Pledges Not to Interfere in President’s Role*, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 30 Mar. 1993. Traditionally, in the French political system, all ministers answer to the President of the Republic. When the President is of one political party and the majority of members of parliament are of a different political party, it is called “cohabitation.” During a cohabitation, “the government works for the Prime Minister who then reports to the President.” Michel Roussin, *Afrique Majeure* (1997) 54 (of Kindle version). Roussin served as France’s minister of cooperation from 1993 to 1994 under Prime Minister Balladur. It is generally acknowledged that, during cohabitation, the prime minister takes the lead in domestic politics, while the President remains the supervisory authority of foreign affairs. *Id.* at 57.


3 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Élections législatives françaises”). In recent years, Balladur has been the subject of two investigations, both related to the Karachi Affair, a corruption and kickbacks scheme involving submarine sales to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia during his term as Prime Minister. See Hélène Bekmezian et al., *Comprendre l’affaire Karachi en 6 épisodes* [*Understanding the Karachi Affair in 6 Steps*], LE MONDE, 31 May 2017. In October 2019, Balladur and Defense Minister François Léotard were indicted for “complicity in the abuse of corporate assets,” and, in Balladur’s case, the concealment of this offense. See *Affaire de Karachi: Balladur et Léotard comparaîtront devant la Cour de justice de la République* [*Karachi Case: Balladur and Léotard to Appear before the Court of Justice of the Republic*], LE MONDE, 1 Oct. 2019. Balladur appealed the indictment, but the French Cour de Cassation, France’s supreme court of appeal, confirmed the charges in March 2020. See *Affaire Karachi: Balladur sera jugé devant la cour de justice* [*Karachi Affair: Balladur Will be Judged Before the Court of Law*], LE MONDE, 13 Mar. 2020; *Affaire Karachi: Edouard Balladur sera jugé devant la cour de justice de la République après le rejet de ses pourvois en cassation* [*Karachi Affair: Balladur Will be Judged Before the Republic’s Court of Law after Rejection of his Appeals in Cassation*], LE MONDE, 13 Mar. 2020. Both Balladur and Léotard are set to stand trial. See *Affaire Karachi: Edouard Balladur sera jugé devant la cour de justice de la République après le rejet de ses pourvois en cassation* [*Karachi Affair: Balladur Will be Judged Before the Republic’s Court of Law after Rejection of his Appeals in Cassation*], LE MONDE, 13 Mar. 2020; *Affaire de Karachi: Balladur et Léotard comparaîtront devant la cour de justice de la République* [*Karachi Case: Balladur and Léotard to Appear before the Court of Justice of the Republic*], LE MONDE, 1 Oct. 2019.

4 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Élections législatives françaises”).


8 *La nomination du nouveau premier minister: “Je veillerai à la continuité de notre politique extérieure et de notre politique de défense” affirme M. François Mitterrand* [*The Nomination of the New Prime Minister: “I Will Ensure...*


13 Memorandum from Colonel Sébastien Ntahobari to James Gasana (14 Apr. 1993).

14 Memorandum from Colonel Sébastien Ntahobari to James Gasana (14 Apr. 1993).

15 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Eléctions legislatives françaises”).

16 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Eléctions legislatives françaises”).

17 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Eléctions legislatives françaises”).

18 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Eléctions legislatives françaises”).

19 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Eléctions legislatives françaises”).

20 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Eléctions legislatives françaises”).

21 Memorandum from Jean-Marie Vianney Ndagijimana to Boniface Ngulinzira (30 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Eléctions legislatives françaises”).

22 MIP Tome I 168.

23 As of 1 April 1993, France’s military presence in Rwanda consisted of 310 Noroit soldiers and 80 cooperants, according to a French Ministry of Defense memo. See Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).


25 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established in 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, with the majority of African nations as signatories to resolve issues on the continent. It disbanded in 2002 and was replaced by the African Union (AU).


27 See Rwanda Government, Rebels Agree on Size of Joint Army, AFP, 24 Mar. 1993; Cable from Catherine Boivineau (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “OUA – Rwanda”); Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (18 May 1993). The government had initially proposed a total force of 25,000 troops, with 17,000 going to the Army and 8,000 to the Gendarmerie. The RPF sought a considerably smaller force, hoping to cap the total at 15,000. See Cable from Peter Jon De Vos to US Secretary of State (26 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Background to Rwanda Talks Concerning Military Force Size”). Pasteur Bizimungu, the leader of the RPF delegation, pointed out that Rwanda’s pre-war Army consisted of just 7,000 soldiers, and its Gendarmerie consisted of just 2,500. He argued a large, poorly paid military would pose risks to the country and its new government. Id.

28 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (27 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Update on Rwanda Negotiations in Arusha: 3/26/93”).
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29 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (27 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Update on Rwanda Negotiations in Arusha: 3/26/93”).

30 Cable from Peter Jon De Vos to US Secretary of State (9 June 1993) (Subject: “Arusha Peace Talks: Breakthrough on Force Proportions”).


35 See Cable from Catherine Boivineau (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “OUA – Rwanda”); Memorandum from Kofi Annan to Boutros-Boutros Ghali (25 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Note for the Secretary-General”) (stating that, in his meetings on 24 March with UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan, de La Sablière “stressed that the most urgent task was the deployment of military observers at the border with Uganda”); Cable from Belgian Delegation to the United Nations in New York (26 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: entretien avec de La Sablière”) (“For France, observation at the border with Uganda constitutes the principal priority.”).


37 Letter Dated 2 Apr. 1993 from Jean-Bernard Mérimée, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to Boutros Boutros Ghali, UN Secretary-General, S/25536 (6 Apr. 1993). The letter alleged, specifically, that “the provisions of the Dar-es-Salaam agreement, particularly those relating to the withdrawal of the warning forces, appear to be a long way from being fully implemented.” A communiqué, co-signed by Dr. Nsengiyaremye Dismas, Prime Minister of Rwanda, and Colonel Kanyarengwe Alexis, President of RPF, contained only one provision relating to the withdrawal of one of the “warring forces,” and that provision applied only to the RPF. See Communiqué conjoint publie a l’issue de la rencontre de haut niveau entre le gouvernement de la republique rwandaise et le front patriotique rwandais, tenue a Dar-es-Salaam du 5 au 7 Mars 1993 (7 Mar 1993) (signed Dismas Nsengiyaremye and Alexis Kanyarengwe). Mérimée could not have been referring to the FAR, as the communiqué expressly allowed the FAR to remain in place.


40 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

41 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

42 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

43 See, e.g., Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”); Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (2 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil restraist du 2 avril 1993 – Rwanda”).


45 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Intelligence on Possible RPF Attack”).

46 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Intelligence on Possible RPF Attack”).
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47 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Intelligence on Possible RPF Attack”).

48 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Intelligence on Possible RPF Attack”).

49 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Intelligence on Possible RPF Attack”).

50 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Intelligence on Possible RPF Attack”).

51 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Mar. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Intelligence on Possible RPF Attack”).

52 Cable from A. Ellen Shippy to US Secretary of State (7 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Kagame”).

53 Cable from A. Ellen Shippy to US Secretary of State (7 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Kagame”).

54 Cable from Paul Kagame, to Joseph (approx. 7 Apr. 1993) (emphasis omitted) (message from “P.C,” short for “Political Commissar,” a title Kagame was known to use).

55 Cable from Paul Kagame to Joseph (approx. 7 Apr. 1993).

56 Cable from Paul Kagame to Joseph (approx. 7 Apr. 1993).

57 Cable from A. Ellen Shippy to US Secretary of State (7 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Kagame”).

58 Cable from A. Ellen Shippy to US Secretary of State (7 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Kagame”).

59 Cable from A. Ellen Shippy to US Secretary of State (7 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Kagame”).

60 Cable from A. Ellen Shippy to US Secretary of State (7 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Meeting with Kagame”).


64 PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL MISSION TO UGANDA & RWANDA 8, 17 (14 Apr. 1993). The assessment team’s preliminary report, issued on 14 April, generally endorsed France’s rationale for sending UN observers to the Rwandan-Ugandan border and recommended that the UN dispatch a force of 81 military observers, plus 24 civilian support staff, to the border “as soon as possible.”

65 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

66 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

67 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

68 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

69 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

70 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).

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73 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

74 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

75 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

76 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

77 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993). Lanxade argued the signs of a coming RPF attack showed the need for a UN border force. “Men and military arsenal pour in from Uganda,” he said. “This is made possible by the fact that there is no observer monitoring the Rwanda-Uganda border.”

78 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

79 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

80 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

81 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

82 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

83 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

84 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

85 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

86 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).


88 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

89 Communiqué conjoint publié à l’issue de la rencontre de haut niveau entre le gouvernement de la république rwandaise et le front patriotique rwandais, tenue à Dar-es-Salaam du 5 au 7 Mars 1993 (7 Mar 1993) (signed Dismas Nsengiyaremye and Alexis Kanyarengwe).


91 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Apr. 1993).

92 Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (23 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Point de situation au Rwanda le 23 février 1993”). At its February 1993 peak, the number of Noroit troops in Kigali was only 570. The withdrawal of two companies in March 1993 left Noroit with roughly 310 soldiers. Memorandum from Michel Rigot to François Léotard (1 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda le 1er avril 1993”).


95 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (7 Apr. 1993).

96 Memorandum from Bernard Cussac to James Gasana (23 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Mise en place d’un Assistant Militaire Technique”).


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102 Memorandum from Bernard Cussac to James Gasana (23 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Mise en place d’un Assistant Militaire Technique”).

103 Memorandum from Bernard Cussac to James Gasana (23 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Mise en place d’un Assistant Militaire Technique”).


108 See Cable from William Bunel (29 Apr. 1993) (signed Bernard Cussac) (Subject: “Reinstallation d’une partie du DAMI Panda a Mukamira”) (assessing it would be possible to return the DAMI to Mukamira).


110 MIP Tome I 168.


116 MIP Tome I 370.

117 MIP Tome I 370.

118 MIP Tome I 370.

119 MIP Tome I 370.

120 MIP Tome I 370.

121 MIP Tome I 370.

122 See JACQUES LANXADE, QUAND LE MONDE A BASCULÉ [WHEN THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN] 164 (2001) (recalling that Chevènement tried, in vain, to dissuade President Mitterrand from sending troops to Rwanda in the opening days of the war); Memorandum from Pierre Joxe to François Mitterrand (19 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (urging President Mitterrand to strictly limit France’s role to protecting French nationals); RETOUR À KIGALI: UNE AFFAIRE FRANÇAISE [BACK IN KIGALI: A FRENCH AFFAIR] (2019) (Directed by Jean-Christophe Klotz) (recounting Varret’s concerns about extremists in the Rwandan government at 20:00-23:00).

123 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).

124 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
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125 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
126 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
127 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
128 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
129 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
131 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
132 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
133 Memorandum from Pierre Conesa (10 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “Plaidoyer pour un reèxamen de la politique française au Rwanda”).
135 Interview by LFM with Pierre Conesa.
136 Interview by LFM with Pierre Conesa.
138 Interview by LFM with Pierre Conesa.
139 Décret du 24 mai 1993 portant maintien en 1re section, ré intégration dans la 1re section, élévation aux rang et appellation de général de corps d’armée, admission par participation dans la 2e section, nomination dans la 1re et la 2e section et affectation d’officiers généraux (26 May 1993).
140 MIP Audition of General Jean Varret, Tome III, Vol 1, 3 & 7.
145 JEAN VARRET, J’EN AI PRIS POUR MON GRADE [MY WAR STORIES] 157 (2018). In his memoir, Varret wrote that the visit took place in early 1993. Our research, however, uncovered no records of a visit at that time. See Report from Jean Varret, Compte rendu de mission au Rwanda et au Burundi (27 May 1992). While we cannot rule out the possibility that records of such a visit do exist, but remain unavailable, it is possible that Varret simply misremembered the timing of his visit. Varret, we know, did visit Rwanda in May 1992. MIP Tome I 154. We also know that, according to the MIP, the DAMI was placed under the authority of an operational commander, Colonel Jacques Rosier, the following month, and remained under Rosier’s authority until November 1992. This sequence of events is consistent with Varret’s claim that his superiors stripped him of his authority over the DAMI shortly after he visited Rwanda.
159 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Brussels (7 May 1993) (Subject: “UN/OAU Initiatives on Rwanda: What Next”).
160 Cable from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (4 May 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
161 Cable from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (4 May 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
162 Cable from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (4 May 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
163 Cable from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (4 May 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
165 Interview by LFM with Laurent Contini.
166 MIP Audition of Jean-Michel Marlaud, Tome III, Vol 1, 73.
168 Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (7 May 1993) (Subject: “Remise des lettres de créance au président Habyarimana. Observateurs des Nations Unies à la frontier Ougando-Rwandaise”).
169 Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (7 May 1993) (Subject: “Remise des lettres de créance au président Habyarimana. Observateurs des Nations Unies à la frontier Ougando-Rwandaise”).
170 Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (7 May 1993) (Subject: “Remise des lettres de créance au président Habyarimana. Observateurs des Nations Unies à la frontier Ougando-Rwandaise”).
171 Interim Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda, S/25810 (20 May 1993); Letter Dated 18 May 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/25797 (19 May 1993). The Ugandan government clarified its position the same day, assuring Boutros-Ghali in a letter that “we have no objections to the monitoring team coming to Uganda.”
173 Interim Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda, S/25810 (20 May 1993).
174 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (7 June 1993) (Subject: “GOR Requests Urgent Meeting to Resolve Rwanda Impasse”).
175 Cable from Peter Jon De Vos to US Secretary of State (9 June 1993) (Subject: “Arusha Peace Talks: Breakthrough on Force Proportions”).
Cable from Peter Jon De Vos to US Secretary of State (9 June 1993) (Subject: “Arusha Peace Talks: Breakthrough on Force Proportions”).

Cable from Peter Jon De Vos to US Secretary of State (9 June 1993) (Subject: “Arusha Peace Talks: Breakthrough on Force Proportions”).

Cable from Peter Jon De Vos to US Secretary of State (9 June 1993) (Subject: “Arusha Peace Talks: Breakthrough on Force Proportions”).

Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (17 June 1993).

Cable from Peter Jon De Vos to US Secretary of State (21 June 1993) (Subject: “Arusha Peace Talks: Itching [sic] Toward Conclusion”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (23 June 1993) (Subject: “Cabinet Delays Signature, Rejects Prime Minister”).


Letter from Théogèn Rudasingwa to President of the United Nations Security Council (22 June 1993).

Memorandum from Ngombwa Muheto (21 June 1993).

Memorandum from Ngombwa Muheto (21 June 1993).

Letter from Théogèn Rudasingwa to President of the United Nations Security Council (22 June 1993).

Letter from Théogèn Rudasingwa to President of the United Nations Security Council (22 June 1993).

Letter from Théogèn Rudasingwa to President of the United Nations Security Council (22 June 1993).

See Letter Dated 2 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, S/255366 (6 April 1993).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (23 June 1993) (Subject: “Cabinet Delays Signature, Rejects Prime Minister”).

Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (23 June 1993) (Subject: “Arusha Peace Talks: Can they be Salvaged?”).

Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.


Mary Kimani, RTLM: The Medium that Became a Tool for Mass Murder, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 111 (Allan Thompson ed. 2007); see also Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 1031-32, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 3 Dec. 2003) (“The nature of radio transmission made RTLM particularly dangerous and harmful, as did the breadth of its reach. Unlike print media, radio is immediately present and active. The power of the human voice . . . adds a quality and dimension beyond words to the message conveyed.”). Alison Des Forges, Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 41 (Allan Thompson ed. 2007). One Rwandan listener described the talk on RTLM as “a conversation among Rwandans who knew each other well and were relaxing over some banana beer or a bottle of Primus in a bar.”


216 Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines, Societe Anonyme (R.T.L.M. SA), Statuts (8 Apr. 1993) (signed Isaac Muliniano et al.) (RTLM Memorandum of Association); see also Le Ministre, M. Gatabazi, dépasse les limites [The Minister, Mr. Gatabazi, Crosses the Line], La Médaille, 13 Mar. 1993 in LA REVUE DE LA PRESSE RWANDAISE, 15, 4 Apr. 1993 (noting that Nilivamunda was director general of bridges and roads in the Ministry of Public Works and Energy); ANDRÉ GUICHAOUA, FROM WAR TO GENOCIDE: CRIMINAL POLITICS IN RWANDA 1990-1994, 49 & 53 (2010); see also Letter from Andre Ntagerura (1 Dec. 1992) (noting that Nzabagerageza, a former prefect of Ruhengeri, was cabinet director for the Ministry of Transportation); Prosecutor v. Juvénal Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 258 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 1 Dec. 2003); ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 243 (2019).


218 Augustin Ngitabatware v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, Judgement (Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, 18 Dec. 2014). Ngitabatware received a 35-year sentence following his convictions on counts of genocide; direct and public incitement to commit genocide; and rape as a crime against humanity. An appeals court later reversed the rape count and reduced his sentence to 30 years.
Prosecutor v. André Ntagerura et al., Case No. ICTR-99-46-T, ¶¶ 78 & 829 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 25 Feb. 2004). Ntagerura was charged with several crimes in connection with the Genocide but was acquitted on all counts.


Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 1031-32 & 177 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 3 Dec. 2003). Simbizi was a founding member of the CDR.


LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 115 (2000).


Cable from Georges Martres (13 Apr. 1993). Ambassador Martres, in an April 1993 cable, reported on the plans to launch the new radio station, reporting that “the Hutu nationalist circles of Kigali are trying to compete with the RPF in the media war.”


Cuingnet appears to have been mistaken about what RTLM began broadcasting. The station started airing original programming in July 1993, not April 1993, as Cuingnet is reported to have said. See Mary Kimani, RTLM: The Medium that Became a Tool for Mass Murder, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 111 (Allan Thompson ed. 2007).

Convention D’Association Entre La Société Eclipse-Rwanda, La Radio-Television Libre Des Mille Collines (RTLM SA) et Telediffusion de France (TDF).

Telediffusion de France, Buyoutsinsider.com (last visited 11 Apr. 2021), https://www.buyoutsinsider.com/telediffusion-de-france-8/ (noting that the European Commission has approved the sale of Telediffusion de France to CDC, a private equity fund).


See Memorandum from Ferdinand Nahimana to Juvénal Habyarimana (14 Apr. 1992) (Subject: “Rapport de mission à Bruxelles et à Paris”) (advising President Habyarimana that Simone Tardy of the French Ministry of Cooperation “reaffirmed that France is always ready to help us set up a national television” in Rwanda).
Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 170 & 485 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 3 Dec. 2003) (“[T]he Chamber finds this progression to be a continuum that began with the creation of RTLM radio to discuss issues of ethnicity and gradually turned into a seemingly non-stop call for the extermination of the Tutsi.”).


Alison Des Forges, *Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994*, *in The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* 45 (Allan Thompson ed. 2007). The human rights activist Alison Des Forges wrote that the false report of castration was intended to remind listeners of the pre-colonial era, when “some Tutsi kings castrated defeated enemy rulers and decorated their royal drums with the genitalia.” The allusion was meant “to elicit [listeners’] fear and repulsion; it did so with great success.”


Letter from Faustin Rucogoza to the Chairman of the RTLM Initiative Committee (27 Oct. 1993).


Letter from Faustin Rucogoza to the Chairman of the RTLM Initiative Committee (27 Oct. 1993).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (22 July 1993) (Subject: “Peacekeeping and Observing in Rwanda”).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (30 July 1993) (Subject: “Support for Peace”).

Memorandum from Laurie Shestack to Karl Inderfurth (26 July 1993) (Subject: “Meeting on Rwanda”). The US Department of State-Defense Department document noted that France supported an assessed UN force but was “unwilling to contribute to a voluntary fund.”

*See* Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (16 July 1993) (Subject: “French Views on Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda”) (citing a French diplomat as saying that “French troops would probably not be able to participate in a UN-led NIF [neutral international force], given the RPF’s strong objection to French presence in Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Laurent Bili (21 June 1993) (Subject: “Présence militaire au Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Laurent Bili (21 June 1993) (Subject: “Présence militaire au Rwanda”).

Memorandum from Laurent Bili (21 June 1993) (Subject: “Présence militaire au Rwanda”).

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Memorandum from Laurent Bili (21 June 1993) (Subject: “Présence militaire au Rwanda”).

See Juvénal Habyarimana, Speech to the Heads of Diplomatic and Consular Missions (26 July 1993); Meeting Notes (7 July 1993) (signed Juvénal Renzah); Juvénal Habyarimana, Speech before the 29th Session of the Conference of Heads of State and Government in Cairo (29 June 1993).


Meeting Notes (7 July 1993) (signed Juvénal Renzah).

See Meeting Notes (7 July 1993) (signed Juvénal Renzah); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (14 July 1993) (Subject: “Expanded NMOG”).

Meeting Notes (7 July 1993) (signed Juvénal Renzah).

See Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (14 July 1993) (Subject: “Expanded NMOG”).

See Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (16 July 1993) (Subject: “French Views on Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda”); Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (22 June 1993) (Subject: “SC to Adopt Rwanda Resolution 6/22”) (“The command of the neutral international force (NIF) is shaping up to a matter of great controversy. The Russians, and reportedly also the British, prefer an OAU-led force, rather than a UN force. The French, and presumably UN U/SYG Jonah, will continue to push for a UN-led force.”).

Cable from US Secretary of State to American Mission at UN (14 July 1993) (Subject: “French Views on Current UN Issues”); Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (16 July 1993) (Subject: “French Views on Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda”). The same counselor told a US State Department official the following week that France “does not think that the OAU has the necessary resources or expertise to mount an NIF [neutral international force], nor do they have the confidence of the Rwandan government.”

Cable from American Embassy in Addis Ababa to US Secretary of State (13 July 1993) (Subject: “Expansion of OAU NMOG for Rwanda”).

Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (8 July 1993) (Subject: “UN SYG Won’t Send Observers to Rwanda”).

Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (8 July 1993) (Subject: “UN SYG Won’t Send Observers to Rwanda”).


See Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Rwabnda (7 Apr. 1993) (Subject: “INR Analysis: OAU/Rwanda: Blessed are the Peacekeepers”).

Cable from American Embassy in Addis Ababa to US Secretary of State (13 July 1993) (Subject: “Expansion of OAU NMOG for Rwanda”); see also Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (30 July 1993) (Subject: “Support for Peace”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (14 July 1993) (Subject: “Expanded NMOG”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (14 July 1993) (Subject: “Expanded NMOG”).


Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (19 July 1993) (Subject: “Transition Government extended—MDR Splits”); see also Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (19 July 1993) (Subject: “Transition Government extended—MDR Splits”) (noting that the parties “did not announce Agathe as the prime minister candidate for the new enlarged transition government after the peace accord”). As previously noted, the two sides agreed in principle in July 1992 to establish a “broad-based transitional government,” or BBTG, to wield political power in Rwanda during the transitional period after the war. See the N’Sele Ceasefire Agreement, as amended, art. 5, Rw. – RPF, 12 July 1992.
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289 JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR 202 (2020).

290 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (19 July 1993) (Subject: “Transition Government extended—MDR Splits”).

291 Letter from James Gasana to Juvenal Habyarimana (20 July 1993); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “The MDR vs the MDR”).

292 Letter from James Gasana to Juvenal Habyarimana (20 July 1993).

293 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 546 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 December 2008); JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR xix (2020). The name stood for Alliance des Militaires Agacés par les Séculaires Actes Sournois des Unaristes, or Alliance of Soldiers Annoyed by the Underhanded Acts of the Unarists.

294 Memorandum from Tango Mike to Juvenal Habyarimana (20 Jan. 1993) (Subject: “Naissance et Raison d’Étre des AMASASU”).


296 ANDREW WALLIS, STEPP’D IN BLOOD 337 (2019); JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR 201 (2020).

297 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “The MDR vs the MDR”).

298 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “The MDR vs the MDR”).


300 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “Agreement on Peace”).

301 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (30 July 1993) (Subject: “Support for Peace”); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “Agreement on Peace”).

302 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “Agreement on Peace”).

303 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “Agreement on Peace”).

304 See Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “Agreement on Peace”); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “The MDR vs the MDR”).

305 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

306 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara; Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (26 July 1993) (Subject: “Agreement on Peace”).


309 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (4 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda et au Congo”).


311 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint du 4 août – Afrique”).
Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint du 4 août – Afrique”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint du 4 août – Afrique”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint du 4 août – Afrique”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint du 4 août – Afrique”).

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (4 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda et au Congo”).

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (4 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda et au Congo”).

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (4 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda et au Congo”).

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Restricted Council Meeting Notes (4 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda et au Congo”).

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (4 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda et au Congo”).

Letter from Augustin Bizimana to French Embassy in Rwanda (9 Aug. 1993); Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (10 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Allègement de la coopération militaire française”).

Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (10 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Allègement de la coopération militaire française”).

Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (10 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Allègement de la coopération militaire française”).

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Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (10 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Allègement de la coopération militaire française”).

Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (10 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Allègement de la coopération militaire française”).

Philip Gourevitch, After the Genocide, in THE NEW YORKER (18 Dec. 1995) (“In August of 1993, when the Hutu President Juvénal Habyarimana signed a power-sharing peace accord with the R.P.F., extremist Hutus began to speculate whether the President himself had become an accomplice.”); ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 29 (1998) (“It was a fateful time for Rwanda as its president was being drawn into a course of action against his inclinations and those of Hutu extremists.”).

Cable from William Claes (16 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Attitude du CDR face aux accords d’Arusha”).

MIP Audition of Christian Quesnot, Tome III, Vol. 1, 123.

MIP Audition of Christian Quesnot, Tome III, Vol. 1, 124 (asserting that the government “represented 80 percent of the population”).


MIP Audition of Christian Quesnot, Tome III, Vol. 1, 123.

MIP Audition of Christian Quesnot, Tome III, Vol. 1, 123.

MIP Audition of Christian Quesnot, Tome III, Vol. 1, 123.

Transcript of Interview with Jean Kambanda, Cassette 77 JK – Side A, 16 (1998).


Transcript of Interview with Jean Kambanda, Cassette 77 JK – Side A, 16 (1998).

Mr. B.W. Ndiaye of Senegal, the UN “Special Rapporteur”—independent expert appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights (now called the UN Human Rights Council) with the mandate to monitor, advise, and publicly report on human rights situations in Rwanda—conducted his investigation in April 1993 in the wake of the March 1993 release of the report of the FIDH Commission (see Chapter 6). See UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT BY MR. B.W. NDIAYE, SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, ON HIS MISSION TO RWANDA FROM 8 TO 17 APRIL 1993, ¶ 4 (1993).
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340 UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT BY MR. B.W. NDIAYE, SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR, ON HIS MISSION TO RWANDA FROM 8 TO 17 APRIL 1993, ¶ 79 (1993).

341 JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR 153 (2020).

342 Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.

343 Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.

344 MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 59 (2002).

345 MICHAEL BARNETT, EYEWITNESS TO A GENOCIDE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 59 (2002).


348 Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (18 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “French Ideas About Rwanda NIF”).

349 Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (18 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “French Ideas About Rwanda NIF”). The name of the French official is redacted in the US cable.


351 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Conseil Restreint du 4 août – Afrique”).


355 Arusha Peace Agreement, Rw. – RPF, 4 August 1993.

356 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 58 (2003). Brig. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, who would go on to lead the UN peacekeeping force, made this explicit during a press conference on the airport runway upon his arrival in Kigali on 19 August 1993. In his book, Shake Hands with the Devil, he wrote: “I remember raising my finger to make the point that our presence was only phase one, that a series of decisions had yet to be made by the UN and the troop-contributing nations before anybody would be sent to Rwanda. There would definitely be no UN mission on the ground by September 10.”

357 Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (18 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “French Ideas About Rwanda NIF”).

358 Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (18 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “French Ideas About Rwanda NIF”); Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (30 July 1993) (Subject: “Support for Peace”).

359 Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (18 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “French Ideas About Rwanda NIF”).

360 Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (18 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “French Ideas About Rwanda NIF”).


364 Bill Clinton, Address to the UN General Assembly (27 Sept. 1993).
Bill Clinton, Address to the UN General Assembly (27 Sept. 1993).

Guy Martin, *Continuity and Change in France-African Relations in THE JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES* 17 (Mar. 1995). In each of these instances, the intervention was “in support of those in power.”


Cable from Walter J.P. Curley to US Secretary of State (18 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Élysée Africa Watcher Offers Tour d’Horizon to Ambassador Glaspie”).

Cable from Walter J.P. Curley to US Secretary of State (18 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Élysée Africa Watcher Offers Tour d’Horizon to Ambassador Glaspie”).

Cable from Walter J.P. Curley to US Secretary of State (18 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Élysée Africa Watcher Offers Tour d’Horizon to Ambassador Glaspie”).

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (3 Mar. 1993) (“We must, as soon as possible, hand over our position to international forces from the UN.”).


*UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION TO RWANDA* 12 (1993).

*UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION TO RWANDA* 13 (1993).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “The French Military and the Neutral International Force (NIF)”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “The French Military and the Neutral International Force (NIF)”).

Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (31 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “The French Military and the Neutral International Force (NIF)”).

Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (21 Sep. 1993) (Subject: “Points chauds – Situation”).

Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

*UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION TO RWANDA* 41 (1993).

*UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION TO RWANDA* 41 (1993).

*UNITED NATIONS, REPORT OF THE UN RECONNAISSANCE MISSION TO RWANDA* 41 (1993). In summation, Dallaire wrote: “Without a credible NIF, the foreign [i.e., French] troops will not withdraw. Without the withdrawal of foreign troops, the RPF will not enter the city to participate in the BBTG. Without the BBTG, there is no peace process. The above conditions are inextricably linked and the key is the rapid deployment of a credible NIF to provide security [for] Kigali.”

*ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL* 75-76 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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392 Bernard Cussac, Speech on the Occasion of the Taking Up of Arms in Kanombe During the Farewell Ceremony to the French Troops, in LE JOURNAL DES FORCES ARMÉES RWANDAISES 2 (Dec. 1993) (“Thus, for a little more than 3 years, the French Armed Forces in Rwanda presented both a credible deterrent and an effective and decisive know-how that helped stop the fighting and reestablish a negotiation process that allowed the return of peace through negotiations.”).


394 Bernard Cussac, Speech on the Occasion of the Taking Up of Arms in Kanombe During the Farewell Ceremony to the French Troops, in LE JOURNAL DES FORCES ARMÉES RWANDAISES 1 (Dec. 1993) (referring to the RPF as “the enemy”).

395 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 84 (2003).

396 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 84 (2003).

397 LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 87 (2000); Six School Children Killed, 18 Wounded in Mine Blast, AFP, 3 Dec. 1993 (stating, “the Noroit unit which has been (in the country) since October 1990”); Mel McNulty, France’s Role in Rwanda and External Military Intervention: A Double Discrediting, in INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 31 (1997).

398 Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (10 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Allègement de la coopération militaire française”).

399 Memorandum from French Ministry of Defense (4 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda: dispositif militaire français”). This figure includes 22 soldiers under the command of the Military Assistance Mission, plus 16 soldiers in an anti-aircraft unit.

400 Notes on Cable from French Embassy in Kigali (30 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Réorganisation du dispositif AMT au Rwanda”).

401 Timeline of French commitment of military resources in Rwanda (undated) (indicating that one DAMI member remained in Rwanda from January 1994 to April 1994). A 30 November 1993 cable signed by Col. Cussac recommended that the remaining DAMI Panda personnel should be repatriated along with the Noroit soldiers in mid-December 1993, but that one non-commissioned officer from DAMI Panda should remain in Rwanda on a temporary assignment to work with the Rwandan Army intelligence unit. Notes on Cable from French Embassy in Kigali (30 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Réorganisation du dispositif AMT au Rwanda”).

402 Letter from Augustin Bizimana, Rwandan Minister of Defense, to Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Rwandan Prime Minister (23 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Coopération Militaire avec la France”).


406 Position of RPF on Negotiations Concerning Putting an End to Massacres and Guarantees that Massacres Won’t Re-occur 5 (22 Jan. 1993) (“The [French] troops have relieved, in particular the Presidential Guard of some of their duties in Kigali. A fact which has allowed the Presidential Guard alongside other forces, to participate directly in massacres. The French troops therefore offer moral support and indirectly reinforce the forces which are carrying out the massacres.”).


412 Memorandum from Augustin Bizimana to Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation 7 (25 June 1993) (Subject: “Candidature de l’Adjudant De Pinho José”).

413 Report from Bernard Cussac, Compte rendu semestrial de fonctionnement (2 Oct. 1993) (noting that two CRAP soldiers had been captured in the occupied zone in June 1993).


419 Meeting Notes (18 Aug. 1993) (signed Edouard Hakizemana and Innocent Nday’senga).

420 Meeting Notes (18 Aug. 1993) (signed Edouard Hakizemana and Innocent Nday’senga).

421 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (16 July 1993) (Subject: “French Views on Peacekeeping Operations in Rwanda”) (citing a French diplomat as saying that “French troops would probably not be able to participate in a UN-led NIF, given the RPF’s strong objection to French presence in Rwanda”).

422 See Letter from Augustin Bizimana, Rwandan Minister of Defense, to Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Rwandan Prime Minister (23 Aug. 1993) (Subject: “Coopération Militaire avec la France”) (featuring, beside a statement about possible French participation in the NIF, a handwritten note asserting, “the RPF would not agree”).

423 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Kigali (14 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “President Habyarimana and Secretary Christopher Discuss Peace Process and Challenges Ahead”).

424 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (8 October 1993) (Subject: “Entretien du Président de la République avec le Général Habyarimana, Président du Rwanda le lundi 11 octobre à 18 h 30”) (advising Mitterrand before the meeting that Habyarimana “will probably request from you that we supply some blue helmets”) (emphasis in the original).


427 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (18 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Élysée Africa Watcher Offers Tour d’Horizon to Ambassador Glaspie”) (emphasis added).


434 Memorandum from Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jean-Michael Marlaud (5 Oct. 1993).

435 Memorandum from Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jean-Michael Marlaud (5 Oct. 1993).

436 Memorandum from Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Jean-Michael Marlaud (5 Oct. 1993).

437 See Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (11 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Habyarimana du Rwanda – Lundi 11 octobre 1993 à 08h30 – Questions de défense”); Restricted Council Meeting Notes (2 Mar. 1993) (“Vis-à-vis the rest of Africa, if France pulls out, which would be wise, everyone will feel threatened.”).


Memorandum from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (7 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Entretien du Président de la République avec Général Juvenal Habyarimana, Président du Rwanda”); see also Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (11 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Habyarimana du Rwanda – Lundi 11 octobre 1993 à 08h30 – Questions de défense”). General Quesnot articulated the same point in a briefing document a few days later, writing, “Our military cooperation should . . . be maintained at the same level as before the events of 1990; that is to say, some twenty military assistants whose focus will center on the [training] of the Gendarmerie” (emphasis in the original).


Cable from Jean-Bernard Mérimée (5 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Rwanda-Resolution 872”).

Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (5 Oct. 1993) (Subject: “Contingency Demarche to the French on Rwanda and Somalia”).


Letter Dated 2 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, S/255366 (6 April 1993).


Memorandum from Claver Kanyarushoki to James Gasana (17 Nov. 1993).

Memorandum from Claver Kanyarushoki to James Gasana (17 Nov. 1993).

Memorandum from Claver Kanyarushoki to James Gasana (17 Nov. 1993).

ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 95 (2003).

ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 95 (2003).

Bernard Cussac, Speech on the Occasion of the Taking Up of Arms in Kanombe During the Farewell Ceremony to the French Troops, in LE JOURNAL DES FORCES ARMÉES RWANDAISES 1 (Dec. 1993) (referring to the RPF as “the enemy”).

ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 84 (2003).

ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 101 (2003); see also GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 199 (1997); Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (15 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 15 novembre à 17H00”). General Quesnot recognized the threat, too, warning Mitterrand in this 15 November note: “The [imminent] arrival of Belgian troops, in particular, is being taken very badly by those in the governmental forces who openly denounce the links between Brussels and the Tutsi aristocrats.”

ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 96-97 (2003); see also GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 199 (1997).


LEVY, FIRESTONE, MUSE
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466 JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR 215 (2020).


468 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (1 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)”).

469 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (1 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)”).

470 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (1 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)”).


472 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (18 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Civilians Killed in DMZ”).

473 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Calm Still Prevails After Civilians Killed in DMZ”).

474 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Calm Still Prevails After Civilians Killed in DMZ”).

475 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Calm Still Prevails After Civilians Killed in DMZ”) (alteration in original); see also Meeting Notes (23 Oct. 1993) (signed Isidore Bwanakweli and Augustin Bizimana).

476 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Calm Still Prevails After Civilians Killed in DMZ”); see also Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Government to Resume Joint Sessions with RPF”).

477 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Government to Resume Joint Sessions with RPF”); see also Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (29 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Prime Minister Solicits Diplomatic Help”).


479 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 112 (2003); see also Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Calm Still Prevails After Civilians Killed in DMZ”).

480 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 121-22 (2003); see also JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR 231 (2020). Certain details about the November attacks struck US Deputy Chief of Mission Joyce Leader as curious. In her 2020 book, Leader recalled that the state-run radio station announced these killings on the morning of 18 November. In the announcement, the radio named all thirty-five victims and all of the four communes affected, despite the fact that “the attacks had occurred in remote, widely dispersed areas only the night before. . . . Rwandans and diplomats alike wondered how the journalists or their local sources could have gathered this information so quickly. Many suspected possible government or hard-line political party involvement.”

481 Memorandum from Jean Vidal, Bruno Delaye, and Christian Quesnot, to François Mitterrand (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Points chauds – Situation”).

482 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye (23 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Point Hebdomadaire de situation sur l’Afrique”); see also Memorandum from Jean Vidal, Bruno Delaye, and Christian Quesnot, to François Mitterrand (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Points chauds – Situation”).

483 Memorandum from Jean Vidal, Bruno Delaye, and Christian Quesnot, to François Mitterrand (24 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Points chauds – Situation”) (“Given the risks associated with the events in Burundi and the threatening attitude of the F.P.R. and the Hutu extremists (hostile to the Belgian deployment) and to avoid our troops being drawn
into new domestic conflicts, the government is of the opinion that the Noroît detachment should be withdrawn in the first days of December, without waiting for the Bengalis to arrive.”).

484 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye (23 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Point Hebdomadaire de situation sur l’Afrique”).

485 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (20 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Military Attack Reported Near Gisenyi”); see also Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (1 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “UN Operations in Rwanda”).

486 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (20 Nov. 1993) (Subject: “Military Attack Reported Near Gisenyi”).

487 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (1 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “UN Operations in Rwanda”).

488 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (7 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “UNAMIR Update”).


493 Cable from Jean-Michel Marlaud (14 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “Retrait du détachement Noroît”).


495 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (10 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “UNAMIR Initiates Kigali Security Patrols”).
509 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
510 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
511 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
512 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga; Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.
513 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga; Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.
515 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
516 Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.
517 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 130 (2003).
518 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 130 (2003).
523 Duclert Commission Report 825.
525 See Duclert Commission Report 825, 897.
526 Duclert Commission Report 825.
528 Account taken from interview by LFM with Chantal Ingabire.
534 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ARMING RWANDA: THE ARMS TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE RWANDAN WAR 32 (Jan. 1994). Indeed, Belgium halted all transfers of lethal weaponry to the Rwandan government after the war started. Id. at 23. The report stated, though, that in 1992, Belgium contributed 88 million Belgian francs in military assistance to Rwanda, which covered costs associated with delivering “non-lethal military equipment” such as uniforms as well as training soldiers, officers, and medical personnel. Id. at 32.
535 Bernard Cussac, Speech on the Occasion of the Taking Up of Arms in Kanombe During the Farewell Ceremony to the French Troops, in LE JOURNAL DES FORCES ARMÉES RWANDAISES 1 (Dec. 1993); see also Fiche recapitulative COOP/MMC en date du 23 mars (23 March 1994).
536 Fiche recapitulative COOP/MMC en date du 23 mars (23 March 1994). Nsabimana was promoted from Colonel to Major General in December 1993. See Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (30 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Names High Command Members”).

537 Fiche recapitulative COOP/MMC en date du 23 mars (23 March 1994).

538 Fiche recapitulative COOP/MMC en date du 23 mars (23 March 1994).


541 Cable from Robert Flaten to US Secretary of State (11 June 1992) (Subject: “Council of Ministers Retires Top Military Officers”).

542 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (30 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “GOR Names High Command Members”).


544 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”) (“According to UNAMIR’s informant, 1,700 ‘Interahamwe’ supposedly received military training and weapons for that, with the complicity of FAR chief of staff.”).

545 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 142 (2003); see also Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 291 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 17 May 2011).

546 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).

547 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”); see also ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 142 (2003).

548 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).

549 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).

550 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”); ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 142 (2003); see also, Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”).

551 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 143 (2003).

552 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 141 (2003).

553 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 141 (2003).

554 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).

555 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).

556 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).

557 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”).

558 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”).

559 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”); see also ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 148 (2003).


561 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”).

562 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”).

563 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”); see also ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 143 (2003).

564 Cable from William Bunel (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Menaces de guerre civile”).

565 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).
566 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 143-44 (2003).
569 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (11 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Request for Protection for Informant”).
570 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 147 (2003).
571 Cable from Paul Noterdaeme to Willy Claes (20 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: évaluation de la situation par le Secrétariat de l’ONU”).
572 Cable from Paul Noterdaeme to Willy Claes (20 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: évaluation de la situation par le Secrétariat de l’ONU”).
573 Cable from Paul Noterdaeme to Willy Claes (20 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: évaluation de la situation par le Secrétariat de l’ONU”).
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577 Cable from Paul Noterdaeme to Willy Claes (20 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: évaluation de la situation par le Secrétariat de l’ONU”).
578 Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (14 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Transition Institutions: No Movement Yet”); see also Cable from Johan Swinnen (15 Jan 1994).
579 Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (14 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Transition Institutions: No Movement Yet”).
580 Cable from Johan Swinnen (17 Jan. 1994).
581 THE NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL DECISION-MAKING IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE: RWANDA 1990-1994, Annotated Transcript 1-123 (2 June 2014) (quoting US Deputy Chief of Mission Joyce Leader saying that, when diplomats pressed Habyarimana about the weapons-distribution issue, “[i]t was rather sloughed off by the President who said, ‘Well, we had these arms distributed, but we aren’t doing this anymore.’ To hear that they are asking them to go and talk to the President again was spinning wheels in ways that were rather unproductive.”).
582 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 148 (2003).
583 Fiche recapitulative COOP/MMC en date du 23 mars (23 March 1994); see also Meeting Notes (28 Aug. 1992) (signed Augustin Ndindiliyimama and Jean-Baptise Iradukunda).
584 Fiche recapitulative COOP/MMC en date du 23 mars (23 March 1994).
585 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 149 (2003).
586 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 149 (2003).
587 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 150 (2003); Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Further Information from Informant”).
588 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Further Information from Informant”); see also Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 290 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 17 May 2011).
589 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (12 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Further Information from Informant”); see also Prosecutor v. Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Case No. ICTR-00-56-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 290 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 17 May 2011).
590 Rémy Ourdan, Les yeux fermés de l’Occident [The Shut Eyes of the West], LE MONDE, 1 Apr. 1998.
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Memorandum from Sébastien Ntahobari to Augustin Bizimana (8 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “Rapport de visite”).


Notes on Cable from French Embassy in Kigali (15 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “Fourniture de munitions à l’armée rwandaise”).

Memorandum from Fruchard (16 Feb. 1993) (Subject: “Besoins en munitions des Forces armées rwandaises”).

Memorandum from Sébastien Ntahobari to Augustin Bizimana (8 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “Rapport de visite”).


Report from M. Nees to S3 (22 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Report on the Investigation of 21 January on Suspect Cargo of an Aircraft Which Landed at Kigali International Airport”). The KIBAT report notes that the shipment contained 900 mortar rounds; however, the Thomson-Brandt packing list reflects 1,000 mortar rounds. *See* Thomson-Brandt packing list (21 Jan. 1994).

Notes on Cable from French Embassy in Kigali (15 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “Fourniture de munitions à l’armée rwandaise”).

Memorandum from Sébastien Ntahobari to Augustin Bizimana (8 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “Rapport de visite”).

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Memorandum from Sébastien Ntahobari to Augustin Bizimana (8 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “Rapport de visite”).


Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (7 March 1994) (Subject: “Resupply of Ammunition for Government Army”).


Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (7 March 1994) (Subject: “Resupply of Ammunition for Government Army”); *see also*, ROMÉO DALLAIRE, *SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL* 202 (2003).

Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (7 March 1994) (Subject: “Resupply of Ammunition for Government Army”); Cable from Kofi Annan to Roméo Dallaire et al. (7 March 1994) (Subject: “Ammunition shipment for the RGF”).
See Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (7 March 1994) (Subject: “Resupply of Ammunition for Government Army”); see also, ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 202 (2003).


Cable from US Secretary of State to David Rawson (7 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Official – Informal”).

Cable from US Secretary of State to David Rawson (7 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Official – Informal”).

Cable from US Secretary of State to David Rawson (7 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Official – Informal”).

Cable from US Secretary of State to David Rawson (7 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Official – Informal”).

Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs (10 Feb. 1994).

Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs (10 Feb. 1994).

Cable from Johan Swinnen to Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs (10 Feb. 1994).


Memorandum from David Jensen (7 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “My Visit to Rwanda, February 1-4, 1994”); Memorandum from Seth Sendashonga (23 Feb. 1994). Bruno Delaye raised this possibility in a February 1994 meeting in Paris with a colleague and with an RPF minister, Seth Sendashonga. According to Sendashonga’s notes of the meeting, Delaye said Habyarimana may be afraid of impeachment, “but that kind of fear goes away when there are some guarantees.” Delaye’s meaning was not subtle. “[W]e felt like he was pressuring [us] to give amnesty and give Habyarimana guarantees that nothing will happen to him during the transition,” Sendashonga wrote.


Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (17 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “The Military and the Transition to Peace”).

Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (17 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “The Military and the Transition to Peace”).

Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (17 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “The Military and the Transition to Peace”).

Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (17 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “The Military and the Transition to Peace”).

JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR 245 (2020).

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Memorandum from Bruno Delaye (29 Mar. 1994) (Subject: “Point Hebdomadaire de Situation sur l’Afrique”).


Memorandum from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh to Kofi Annan and Marrack Goulding (28 Mar. 1994) (Subject: “Efforts to Install the Transitional Institutions”) (listing Ambassador Marlaud among the signatories of a declaration urging that “all political parties authorized in Rwanda at the date of signature of this protocole and the RPF should be represented at the transitional National Assembly when it is in place, under the condition that they respect the peace agreement”); U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3358th mtg. at 6, S/PV.3358 (5 Apr. 1994).


Chapter VII

April 1993 – 5 April 1994

648 Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary State (28 Mar. 1994) (Subject: “CDR Issue Proves Intractable”).
652 Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (22 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “Minister/Politician Assassinated”).
653 Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (22 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “Minister/Politician Assassinated”).
654 JOYCE E. LEADER, FROM HOPE TO HORROR 249 (2020); Memorandum from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh to Kofi Annan and James Jonah (23 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “The Current Situation in Rwanda”).
655 Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (23 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “Insecurity Escalates, a Kigali and Elsewhere”).
656 MIP Tome I 220.
657 Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (23 Feb. 1994) (Subject: “Insecurity Escalates, a Kigali and Elsewhere”).
658 Cable from Jean-Bernard Mérimée to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2 Mar. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
659 Cable from Jean-Bernard Mérimée to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2 Mar. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
660 Cable from Jean-Bernard Mérimée to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2 Mar. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
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664 Cable from Jean-Bernard Mérimée to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2 Mar. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
667 Cable from Edward Walker to US Secretary of State (4 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Perm-5 Discussions on Rwanda Mandate Extension”).
669 RPF Memorandum (5 April 1994); Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (5 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Demarche to the French on UNSC Resolution”).
671 RPF Memorandum (5 April 1994).
672 RPF Memorandum (5 April 1994).
673 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (5 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Situation”).
675 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (5 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Situation”).
A. *French Cooperants Accompanied a FAR Officer, Major Aloys Ntabakuze, to Inspect the Wreckage of President Habyarimana’s Plane, Not Long before Troops under Ntabakuze’s Command Slaughtered Tutsi.*

At approximately 8:30 p.m. on 6 April 1994, French Warrant Officer José de Pinho, like many people in Rwanda, was watching the African Cup of Nations soccer championship semi-finals on television with his son in their temporary home in Kanombe military barracks, on the outskirts of Kigali, when he heard two explosions in succession.¹

De Pinho was one of five French military cooperants who, along with their families, lived in Kanombe while they trained an elite group of FAR para-commandos in sky diving, intelligence gathering and transmission, camouflage, and weapons techniques.² The Rwandan para-commando leader was Major Aloys Ntabakuze, who was de Pinho’s neighbor (their houses separated by only a small path) and worked in the office across from his.³

As de Pinho left his house to meet his immediate superior, Commander Grégoire de Saint Quentin, he ran into Ntabakuze, and the three soon gathered in Ntabakuze’s office.⁴ Ntabakuze said that he had not been able to obtain precise information on the explosions, but he could confirm that the presidential plane had taken off safely from Dar es Salam. All present understood the implication.⁵

Around 10 p.m., de Pinho, de Saint Quentin, and one or two more French cooperants drove with Ntabakuze toward the President’s residence, exited their vehicle, and proceeded on foot through a field outside the residence.⁶ After about 50 meters, they came across the tail of a plane. De Pinho recognized the call sign of the Falcon 50, gifted by France to Rwanda, that served as the President’s plane.⁷

By that point, the Rwandan military had already recovered the bodies of President Habyarimana, the three French crew members (the pilot, the copilot, and a mechanic), and others.⁸ Also amongst the dead were the President of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, and Habyarimana’s personal secretary and Akazu boss, Elie Sagatwa.⁹ (Later that night, the Presidential Guard would deny access to Belgian UNAMIR soldiers dispatched to secure the crash site.)¹⁰

While sorting through the wreckage, Ntabakuze identified the corpse of the FAR Chief of Staff Déogratias Nsabimana.¹¹ Ntabakuze then approached his French compatriots. “This time it’s over,” he said.¹²

Ntabakuze would play a pivotal role in the horror that followed. According to multiple eye-witnesses who testified in Ntabakuze’s trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Ntabakuze would soon (either the night of 6 April or the morning of 7 April) order his para-commandos to “avenge” the president’s death by killing Tutsi in nearby areas.¹³ One witness
said that “Ntabakuze ordered the deployment of each of the companies. The First Company was to be sent to a neighborhood near [Kanombe] known as ‘Akajagali,’ the Third Company to Kabeza and the Fourth Company to Remera.” The troops sent to those neighborhoods would carry out some of the first killings of the Genocide.

Due to inconsistencies in the details of the witness testimony—for example, the eight witnesses placed Ntabakuze’s order to the troops at different times on 7 April, ranging from the early morning to the afternoon, while four other witnesses said that Ntabakuze gave the order earlier in the evening of 6 April—the ICTR concluded that there was not enough evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Ntabakuze had ordered his men to kill Tutsi on that particular occasion. He would nonetheless be convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other crimes, in part for his actions only four days later. The court found that, on 11 April, Ntabakuze exercised command over para-commandos who marched Tutsi men, women, and children from their shelter at the ETO [École technique officielle] in Kigali to a killing field on Nyanza Hill. Some estimates of the number killed there are as high as 4,000.

The killings across Kigali began in the early morning after the attack on President Habyarimana’s plane. As the ICTR put it, “As the plane fell to the earth, Rwanda descended into violence.”

B. Executing a Clear Plan during the First Day of the Genocide, the French-Trained Presidential Guard Assassinated Moderate Politicians, Murdered Belgian Peacekeepers, Attacked the RPF Residing in the CND Building, and Erected Roadblocks throughout Kigali Where Many Tutsi Were Butchered.

The crime of genocide, like the crime against humanity, requires, according to the provisions of the French Penal Code, that they be committed in execution of a concerted plan. . . . In the present case, the Court considers that this concerted plan can be inferred from the speed with which the massacres were carried out, as early as the day after the attack on President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane, the existence of barricades throughout Rwanda, including in Kigali, the development of media propaganda calling for inter-ethnic hatred, the distribution of arms and the scale of the massacres, all of which necessarily fall within the competence of a collective organization.

– Judgment of the Cour d’Assises of Seine-Saint-Denis

Less than 50 minutes after the attack on the presidential plane, roadblocks began to emerge throughout the streets of Kigali. Some of these roadblocks were maintained by members of the Presidential Guard, who appeared “nervous and dangerous,” as they fired shots in the presence of UN peacekeepers. Others were maintained by other Rwandan Army units, while still others were maintained by the Interahamwe and other civilians wielding machetes and clubs. While military checkpoints had been common in certain areas of Kigali, those that emerged in the late hours of 6 April and into 7 April were far more restrictive and, in many cases, lethal. According to findings by the MIP, Rwandans arriving at checkpoints late that night and into the morning were ordered
to produce identity cards to the militias that greeted them. Tutsi and any other Rwandans lacking Hutu identity cards were detained and often summarily executed. The ICTR would later find that assailants manning these roadblocks intentionally murdered Tutsi, and that the roadblocks hosted scenes of “open and notorious slaughter and sexual assault.” Several witnesses noted that the roadblocks throughout Kigali would come to feature piles of dead bodies, including men, women, and children, many of which were mutilated.

In addition to providing a staging ground for the unspeakable horror that would come to characterize the months that followed, the roadblocks also severely limited the mobility of UN peacekeepers on 7 April and ultimately provided cover for the Presidential Guard to kidnap and murder its political opponents. UNAMIR forces lacked both the military authority and force capacity to neutralize the government troops and militia obstructing their path around the city. UNAMIR Commander General Romeo Dallaire requested authority to use force and was expressly forbidden from doing so unless first fired upon, thereby leaving UN troops unable to send reinforcements when designated members of the interim government called General Dallaire and his men fearing for their lives and begging for enhanced protection.

Around 2:30 a.m. on April 7, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana told UNAMIR that she planned to address the nation later that morning. UNAMIR quickly agreed to escort her to Radio Rwanda, so that she could attempt to calm the nation. Within an hour, however, multiple units of Belgian troops dispatched from UNAMIR headquarters found themselves overwhelmed by roadblocks and unable to reach Uwilingiyimana. FAR officers at one of the roadblocks informed the UN peacekeepers that only the minister of defense could authorize Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana’s appearance on Radio Rwanda. Finally, at 5:35 a.m., after several hours of trying, four UN jeeps with security reinforcements came under fire as they overcame a roadblock on the way to the prime minister’s home. Two of the jeeps were successful in entering the property, while the others were left on the side of the road and soon rendered unusable amid the shooting. Peacekeepers from all four vehicles made their way into the compound to make contact with the prime minister.

By 6 a.m., the prime minister had cancelled her speech, at which point General Dallaire had unsuccessfully tried to negotiate with Radio Rwanda to allow her to address the nation via telephone. The Presidential Guard was blocking the entrances to the station, while technicians inside had been warned against broadcasting an address of any kind. Instead, the station played classical music.

By 8:20 a.m., after hours of explosions and gunshots on the streets surrounding her residence, the prime minister and her family decided to flee, leaving behind the UN peacekeepers at her residence. In the end, there was no escape. After hiding at the home of a UN volunteer within the nearby UNDP housing compound, she was captured by Presidential Guard elements who overran the compound and broke down the door. While her children hid behind clothes and furniture, and were miraculously spared, Uwilingiyimana and her husband were abducted, returned to their home, and brutally murdered. Soldiers sexually assaulted the prime minister, whose body was found with a bottle lodged in her vagina.
Compounding the tragedy of the morning, 10 of the Belgian troops dispatched to protect the prime minister ultimately became casualties themselves.\textsuperscript{42} At 8:30 a.m., shortly after the prime minister fled, FAR soldiers wielding grenades and rifles entered her property and offered to escort the peacekeepers back to UN headquarters.\textsuperscript{43} “If you do not do what is asked of you,” one soldier threatened, “that means you want to die.”\textsuperscript{44} From there, the situation became frantic as the troops negotiated terms of surrender.\textsuperscript{45} Amid the chaos, the Belgians were disarmed and beaten before being transported to Camp Kigali, the FAR outpost from which forces had been mobilizing throughout the morning.\textsuperscript{46} There, FAR troops killed four of the disarmed Belgian soldiers, attacking them with rifles, crutches, stones, rakes and rifle bayonets.\textsuperscript{47} Six others managed an escape to an empty UNAMIR office within the camp, where they came under heavy fire from FAR troops, and where the survivors among them at one point used one of their deceased colleagues as a shield from further attacks. Within hours, they, too, were murdered.\textsuperscript{48}

Similar horrors, befalling politically moderate Rwandan dignitaries and overwhelming UN peacekeeping forces, were repeated throughout the morning of 7 April. As Dallaire remembers, “I can’t bear to think of how many Rwandans were told that help was forthcoming that day and were then slaughtered.”\textsuperscript{49} In one instance, Dallaire was on the line with Hélène Pinsky, a Canadian national married to Landoald Ndasingwa, the minister of labor and social affairs.\textsuperscript{50} Minister Ndasingwa and his wife ran the popular Chez Lando hotel and restaurant, and only weeks earlier grenade attacks had damaged their property after a political opponent declared that Ndasingwa was a Tutsi and therefore in league with the RPF.\textsuperscript{51} As Ms. Pinsky spoke to Dallaire that morning, he reassured her that UN forces would arrange safe transport for her family of four as soon as possible, only to hear her voice become “indescribably calm” as she heard troops outside her home and became resigned to her family’s fate before hanging up the phone.\textsuperscript{52} At that moment, however, Ndasingwa called Colonel Luc Marchal, commander of the Belgian UNAMIR battalion, who remained on the phone, listening, as the entire family, including their children, were murdered on the other end of the line.\textsuperscript{53}

In the course of the first 24 hours after the president’s plane crash, the Presidential Guard murdered Ndasingwa and his family, along with the prime minister and her husband, the president of the Constitutional Court, the minister of information, the minister of labor and community affairs, and the minister of agriculture—all moderate politicians.\textsuperscript{54} In that same span, Dallaire estimated that at least 35 of the UN peacekeepers, many of whom had been guarding political officials, had either gone missing or been captured.\textsuperscript{55} As he would later write, “In just a few hours the Presidential Guard had conducted an obviously well-organized and well-executed plan—by noon on April 7 the moderate political leadership of Rwanda was dead or in hiding, the potential for a future moderate government utterly lost.”\textsuperscript{56}

But the atrocities of those early hours were not confined to the homes of politicians. The attacks following the plane crash “undoubtedly caused not hundreds, but thousands of dead,” in the words of a delegate for the International Committee of the Red Cross who spoke from Kigali only two days later.\textsuperscript{57} The people of Kigali bore witness to what UNAMIR’s political head, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, described in an 8 April cable as a “very well planned, organized, deliberate and conducted campaign of terror initiated by the Presidential Guard,”\textsuperscript{58} and what a French court of appeals would later find to be “a concerted plan to destroy the Tutsi ethnic group completely.”\textsuperscript{59} Indeed, the scale of the inhumanity, as well as its efficiency, suggested efforts that
were both carefully considered and utterly diabolical. Jean-Hervé Bradol, who oversaw the French
division of Doctors Without Borders in Rwanda at the time, would later testify before the MIP and
observe, “[I]t was not a question of massacres or some mass rage following the death of a president,
but much more of an organized systematic process. It was not an angry mob that carried out the
killings, but militias acting with order and method.”

In one horrifying scene, at 7 a.m. on 7 April, a group of soldiers descended on Centre
Christus church and ordered all its occupants to produce identification cards. When the
congregants explained they were unable to do so because none of them had brought their
identification cards into the chapel, the soldiers separated the congregation into two areas,
grouping foreign nationals in one room, and locking Rwandans in another. When the expatriates
were released at 2:20 p.m. later that afternoon, they found 17 dead bodies—eight young women,
four diocesan priests, a visiting social worker, three Jesuit priests, and the cook. Almost everyone
murdered was a Tutsi. One of the victims, Father Chrysologue Mahame, was a prominent Tutsi
personality in Rwanda and the president of an organization called Volontaires de la Paix, whose
purpose was to work for peace and reconciliation. The ICTR would later determine that his name
had likely been included on a list of alleged RPF sympathizers who were to be targeted for arrest
or execution.

Similar targeted attacks would unfold across Kigali and all of Rwanda. Three hundred Hutu
and Tutsi refugees gathered at the Kibagabaga Mosque due to increasing instability on the morning
of 7 April, and more than 20 Tutsi would later be executed there. In Busogo Parish in Ruhengeri,
Interahamwe killed almost 300 Tutsi on 7 April; in Mukingo the same. In Kiyovu, as in so
many other locations, FAR soldiers detained Tutsi at a roadblock and killed them. In Gisenyi,
144 kilometers outside Kigali, civilians supported by FAR soldiers from the local military camp
attacked and killed Tutsi and Hutu viewed as sympathetic to the RPF, including two priests at
Nyundo seminary, before returning later that evening to kill a number of Tutsi who had sought
refuge in the seminary’s chapel. And when Tutsi were not targeted in groups or at roadblocks,
members of the military targeted Tutsi neighborhoods, traveling from house to house, demanding
identification cards, and executing Tutsi in their homes. As one witness later estimated in
testimony before the ICTR, by 4 p.m. on 7 April, there were between 1,000 and 1,500 dead.

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**Odette Mupenzi**

*Odette was born in 1975 and grew up in Nyamirambo, a suburb of Kigali. She had four sisters. When the Genocide started, she and her family hid in a nearby seminary school.*

The killers kept banging on the classroom door, but no one would open it. Eventually, they said, “If you don’t open this door, we’ll destroy it.” When my Dad heard this, he told us to hide under mattresses because people thought that a bullet couldn’t hurt you after going through a mattress. From my hiding place, I could see...
two soldiers and some of our neighbours who had become Interahamwe . . . They were the ones who ordered my father to open the door.

The killers grabbed Dad as soon as he opened the door and started hacking him with machetes. When my Mum saw this happening, she acted with great courage. She rushed to take hold of the soldier’s gun, but he pushed her away. Then the Interahamwe hacked her with their machetes till she lay unconscious.

I was hiding under a mattress just below the window. Suddenly I heard the glass smash. I was in such a panic that I hadn’t heard the gunshots outside. As I raised my head to see what was happening, a soldier outside saw me and showered me with bullets. He hit me on my jaws, on my arms and chest. My injuries were terrible. I felt so weak that I lay down. I could hear other people near me praying, then suddenly it all went quiet. The other people were dead.

Finally, the Interahamwe came into the classroom to check if there were any survivors. I was breathing heavily, but trying hard not to make a noise. They still saw me. They hacked me with their machetes—I still have the scars on my head. I must have fallen unconscious then because I can’t remember what happened next. When I woke up, I found myself lying amongst dead bodies.

The following morning, one of the religious brothers came. He looked at me in the light of his torch, lifted me back on the mattress, then left. He came back later with people to give us medicine, and we spent the whole night and following day there. The Interahamwe didn’t come back because they thought we were all dead. Those who could still walk left the school and went to hide somewhere else. I couldn’t do that—I couldn’t move at all.

Three days later, the Red Cross came and took us by car to Kigali hospital (Centre Hospitalier de Kigali). On the way there, we were stopped at a roadblock in Gitega. They were looking for Tutsis, but I looked like a corpse, and the other wounded were in a very bad state. The Interahamwe got angry with the Red Cross staff and shouted at them, “We’re killing Inyenzis and you dare to take them to hospital?” But after a short argument, they let us go on to the hospital.

When we arrived there, the doctors couldn’t do much to help me because of my terrible injuries. They called for a specialist surgeon, but he didn’t come that night. In the meantime, my wounds had started to go bad. I could see maggots moving in the wounds on my chest and armpit. Thank God, they weren’t in my
mouth—the acid in saliva stops that happening. The next day, they took me to the operating room, washed and treated my wounds, then covered them.

We felt safer in the hospital, but the following day, the soldiers came back, "Why are you healing ‘cockroaches’ when we’re destroying them?” they asked. They ordered us to leave immediately, and the doctors said there was nothing they could do. They put us outside in a tent.

Luckily for me, one of the nurses working there was Jeanne, my uncle’s wife. She came and looked after my wounds outside—until someone reported her for helping an Inyenzi, and she had to stop. It was the rainy season, and water ran through our tent. Our wounds really began to stink, but the doctors had been warned not to look after those ‘cockroaches’.

Some soldiers from Kanombe had taken refuge in the hospital, so the Interahamwe and Inkotanyi . . . were both firing towards us. The soldiers started blaming us, saying the ‘cockroaches’ had probably revealed where they were. Every night the killers abducted people from our group, but they left me alone because I looked almost dead, and my face was really swollen. My younger sister was taken, but she was saved by a soldier who knew her. He just told the others to let her go. Some of the doctors even handed patients over to the killers.\textsuperscript{76}

Among those in Kigali that day, there was little doubt that much of the violence was being orchestrated by Théoneste Bagosora, the politically connected director of the cabinet and graduate of the French War School,\textsuperscript{77} whom many consider to have been the mastermind of the Genocide Against the Tutsi.\textsuperscript{78} Dallaire met with Bagosora just two hours after the president’s plane was shot down, at 10:50 p.m., at Army headquarters, where he presided over a so-called “crisis committee” comprised of senior military leadership, including Lieutenant Colonel Cyprien Kayumba, Lieutenant Colonel Ephrem Rwabalinda, and General Augustin Ndindiliyimana.\textsuperscript{79} While Bagosora expressed a desire to restore peace, reassure the nation, and continue to fulfill the promise of the Arusha Accords, he and members of the Presidential Guard balked when Dallaire suggested that the prime minister (still alive at the time) should be the one to lead that process, in accordance with the law of succession placing her in charge.\textsuperscript{80} “Even with the death of the President,” Dallaire told them, “there is still a government under Prime Minister Agathe.” At this, Bagosora stood from his seat “and leaned toward [Dallaire], his knuckles pressed hard on the table. He vehemently insisted that Prime Minister Agathe had no authority.”\textsuperscript{81} One of his men, smelling of alcohol, “muttered an insult in French at the mention of Madame Agathe’s name.”\textsuperscript{82} “She and her group are not a government,” Bagosora announced in defiance.\textsuperscript{83}

During the day on the 7 April, Gen. Dallaire “harangued Bagosora and Ndindiliyimana over the violence that was breaking loose throughout the city, over the release of [the UNAMIR
soldiers] and over their seeming detachment from the whole catastrophe.” Bagosora largely ignored Dallaire as he shuffled papers, and “Ndindiliyimana was nearly asleep,” when “out of the blue, Bagosora suddenly volunteered that . . . it might be best to get the Belgians out of UNAMIR and out of Rwanda.” Bagosora clearly wanted the best trained and equipped UNAMIR battalion out of Kigali, and the murder of 10 of their number was part of the plan to drive them away—successful, it turned out, as Belgium soon called its remaining soldiers home.

Nothing about the horror of 7 April appeared spontaneous. The forces wreaking havoc were well-armed, some with assault rifles so new that UN troops noticed they still had packing grease on the barrels. The missions were carefully coordinated, and while Kigali’s roadblocks were in some cases manned by civilians, “militiamen were working in close coordination with military personnel at the roadblocks.” As the ICTR found and upheld on appeal in Bagosora’s case, “civilian and military authorities exercised some degree of control or influence over the militia groups manning the roadblocks,” and they were all “part of an extensive network [of roadblocks] in an area of strategic importance to the Rwandan Army in its battle for Kigali.” The militants manning checkpoints, the court concluded, were clearly Bagosora’s subordinates, and “the only reasonable inference from the evidence was that he knew that his subordinates were committing crimes at Kigali area roadblocks on 7, 8, and 9 April 1994.” The court also found that Bagosora was in command of the FAR units, including the Presidential Guard, that assassinated Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana; Joseph Kavaruganda, the president of the Constitutional Court; Frédéric Nzamurambaho, the chairman of the PSD and minister of agriculture; Landoald Ndasingwa, the vice-chairman of the Parti Libéral and minister of labor and community affairs; and Faustin Rucogoza, the minister of information.

In addition to its strikes against Tutsi and moderate members of the government, around 5 a.m. on 7 April (if not earlier), the Presidential Guard began firing upon the RPF, who, in December 1993, had taken residence at the Parliament building, the CND, in accordance with the Arusha Accords. By this point, UN forces were hearing rocket and grenade fire throughout the city. Inside the CND, the RPF secretary general, Tito Rutaremara, sought refuge in the canteen on the first floor. From there, he eventually reached General Dallaire by telephone. “What is happening?” Rutaremara asked. “What is being done now that the situation is getting worse?” Dallaire said that Bagosora and other FAR officers—with whom Dallaire, Booh-Booh, and French, German, Tanzanian, and American diplomats had met prior to Rutaremara’s call—were assembling a committee to run the country during the crisis. Rutaremara exploded. The Broad-Based Transitional Government set forth in the Arusha Accords—the swearing in of which had been repeatedly delayed by opponents of the peace agreements, was the appropriate authority to take charge of the country—Bagosora’s plan was in violation of that.

Rutaremara next called Ndindiliyimana, head of the Rwandan Gendarmerie, to ask him if he was capable of stopping the massacres. Ndindiliyimana told Rutaremara that only Bagosora was able to stop the massacres and urged him to call Bagosora. “If you don’t stop the killings,” Rutaremara told Bagosora, “we will leave the CND. We will fight.” To that, Bagosora replied, “Don’t do anything. We are trying to stop them.” Soon afterward, as the sounds of violence continued to envelop the city, Rutaremara tried to reach Bagosora again and found that phone lines in the CND had been disconnected. As Paul Kagame would warn Dallaire in a message later that day, regardless of their stated intentions, the Presidential Guard and other murderous FAR
units were leaving the RPF with no choice but to engage. “I have just learned many homes of our supporters are surrounded by [FAR] soldiers,” Kagame said. “The intention is certainly clear. Informs you that our forces have to react to protect ours [sic].” Kagame gave Dallaire until last light on 7 April to secure the situation, or his forces would move on Kigali. 

Kagame offered two of its battalions to assist the FAR in getting the murderous, supposedly rogue units—especially the Presidential Guard—under control. When Dallaire relayed this offer to Bagosora, like the mention of the prime minister the night before, the possibility of working with rival factions struck a nerve. Bagosora stood from his seat and glowered at the General before composing himself. “He told me to pass on his thanks to the RPF for the offer,” Dallaire remembers, “but he couldn’t accept. It was his problem to solve.” Without the possibility of the RPF and the FAR working together to stop the killings, Dallaire pivoted and asked Bagosora to get his supposedly “rogue” units back to their barracks and to remove the roadblocks. Bagosora pleaded for time and exuded “no sense of urgency,” as he signed papers at his desk “looking every inch the bored bureaucrat.”

Sunlight was pouring through the window onto the freshly painted walls, no phones were ringing, there were few visitors. He waved me over to the sofa where Ndindilyimana was sitting, apparently relaxed, but I didn’t want to sit. He offered me tea or coffee, as if this were an ordinary visit on a slow day at the office.

C. French Officials at the Highest Levels Quickly Became Aware That the French-Trained Presidential Guard Was Murdering Tutsi Civilians and Moderate Politicians.

The French ambassador to Rwanda, Jean-Michel Marlaud, learned of the attack on the presidential plane soon after it occurred, having received a call from Habyarimana’s chief of staff. Marlaud “immediately informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris” and left for the embassy. Though the embassy was not far from his residence, he “had some difficulty” getting there because of “the roadblocks that had been erected rapidly in various parts of Kigali.”

Around 7 a.m. on 7 April, Marlaud received two phone calls from the prime minister designated by the Arusha Accords, Faustin Twagiramungu, who “reported, firstly, that men of the Presidential Guard were rounding up, kidnapping or assassinating ministers appointed to form the future Government; then, a few moments later, announced that his life was threatened . . . by the Presidential Guard who wanted to kill him.” Later that morning, Marlaud informed Paris that “the Presidential Guard was killing a number of personalities; UNAMIR appeared totally helpless, failing, in particular, to cross the roadblocks erected in the city by the Rwandan Armed Forces; finally, Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana, the Prime Minister, had been murdered.”

Ambassador Marlaud knew that the Presidential Guard was not only murdering political opposition, but also slaughtering Tutsi. “At the same time,” Marlaud would recall, “other murders were committed. A French family saw the presidential guard kill those who had taken refuge in their home. The killings affected both members of the opposition parties and Tutsis. They were both political and ethnic killings.” A 7 April French military cable reported similar observations: “Since this morning, armed units, particularly from the Presidential Guard, have been carrying out...
arrests, kidnappings, and, without doubt, murders. . . . Beyond the opposition political leaders, the round-ups extend to all Tutsis.”

The same day, 7 April, in Paris, Bruno Delaye, the head of the Africa Cell, reported to President Mitterrand:

[T]he presidential guard began the hunt for opponents. Not yet confirmed information reports arrests of ministers and public figures, Hutu or Tutsi, [who were] political adversaries of President Habyarimana. . . . [With] [t]he transitional institutions having not yet been put in place, the death of the President leaves the country with no recognized authority (the government and parliament have not been established). We fear a military coup d’état.

François Mitterrand understood what was taking place in Rwanda. When he learned about the 6 April plane crash, he said to the Élysée’s secretary-general, Hubert Védrine, “It is going to be terrible.” Mitterrand’s top military adviser, General Christian Quesnot, was equally alert to the coming horror, telling the MIP: “[W]hen President Habyarimana had been assassinated, . . . both politicians and the military had immediately understood that the trend was towards massacres that were incomparable to what had happened before.” Védrine told the MIP that for years “the risk of a resumption of the massacres was known to all.”

D. Without Evidence, and Contradicted by French Intelligence, Mitterrand’s Advisors in the Élysée Reflexively Blamed the RPF for Habyarimana’s Assassination.

The attack is attributed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).


[The] probable hypothesis of an RPF attack will have to be confirmed by investigation.


The assumption that these rockets could have been fired by armed elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is not satisfactory.

– DGSE Report

Despite the ethnic killings and systematic elimination of moderate politicians that began on 7 April as well as France’s keen awareness of the rise in extremist violence over the previous months, politicians at the highest levels of the Élysée thought they knew whom to blame for bringing down President Habyarimana’s plane: the RPF. On 7 April 1994, Bruno Delaye wrote to Mitterrand, without any substantiation, that “[t]he attack is attributed to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).” General Quesnot, writing to Mitterrand the same day, posited the “probable hypothesis of an RPF attack will have to be confirmed by investigation.”
Chapter VIII

New Zealand’s ambassador to the United Nations, Colin Keating, who had begun a rotation as the new president of the UN Security Council on 1 April 1994 by reading intelligence reports on Rwanda, quickly came to a different conclusion. The idea that the RPF was responsible did not make sense. “They had everything to gain from the process that was in place, and the extremists—by contrast—had everything to lose from it. They wanted to destroy that process, and they wanted to kill all the Tutsi, and I had seen that from reviewing a morning’s worth of reports. It should have been clear to everyone.”

The DGSE, the French intelligence service, agreed with this conclusion in an 11 April note: “The assumption that these rockets could have been fired by armed elements of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) is not satisfactory” because the perpetrator had to pass several government and UNAMIR barriers, and therefore had to be “well trained personnel already in the security perimeter of the airport.”

By 12 July 1994, the DGSE reported a theory advanced by an unnamed “moderate Rwandan Hutu” that Col. Bagosora and Col. Serubuga had been the main sponsors of the 6 April 1994 attack, the two having harbored resentments against Habyarimana since their forced retirements in 1992 before having attained the rank of General and its attendant privileges. More than two months later, on 22 September, the DGSE would reaffirm this theory as still “the most plausible,” stating: “This operation would have been premeditated for a long time by Hutu extremists.” Officials in the Élysée appear never even to have considered whatever evidence the DGSE had before it. Throughout the Genocide, and since, they would blame the RPF for the downing of the plane—seemingly in an effort to minimize their own responsibility for having supported and trained the forces instigating and executing the Genocide. And, years later, a French magistrate, with the backing of political officials, would bring an indictment—that would be dismissed years later for lack of evidence—against several RPF officials for bringing down the plane (see infra Chapter 11).

The downing of Habyarimana’s plane caught Charles Kayonga, who led the 600 RPF soldiers stationed at the CND to protect the RPF politicians living and working there, completely by surprise. He did not hear the sound of the plane crash. When the announcement was heard over the radio, he put all RPF soldiers on “stand-by,” then immediately started to gather information. “We stayed put,” recounted Kayonga, even though bullets fired by the Presidential Guard were raining down on the CND.

After reports on BBC and other radio stations confirmed the crash, Kayonga spoke to James Kabarebe at RPF military headquarters in Mulindi (about 50 miles north of Kigali), who had also heard the news on the radio. Kabarebe asked Kayonga, who was the most senior ranking RPF military officer in Kigali at the time, to track down what happened and find out who shot down the plane. While Kayonga did not have intelligence assets to reveal who was behind the assassination, he did learn, and reported back to Kabarebe, about attacks on politicians and civilians in their homes, and that shots were being fired in the direction of the CND. Kayonga’s men were fielding calls from civilians begging for rescue, some while they were being attacked in their homes. Paul Kagame, who was also in Mulindi, received reports describing targeted killings not only in Kigali but also in other parts of the country. He urged General Dallaire to
use his forces on the ground “to give Rwandans security” and determine “who has killed Habyarimana and why.”

E. French Officials Evacuated Their Citizens and Extremist Allies from Rwanda, Reportedly Delivering Ammunition for Those Allies Who Were Presiding over a Genocide.

Despite the Élysée blaming the RPF for the downing of Habyarimana’s plane, French officials had little appetite to deploy a Noroit-like deterrence force to ward off the feared renewal of an RPF offensive—and it was inconceivable that the French government would help the RPF end the murderous rampage of the French-trained Presidential Guard and their masters in the crisis committee. Mitterrand, who removed the Noroit companies from Rwanda in late 1993, received a 7 April 1994 message through Bruno Delaye from Prime Minister Balladur (who was in China at the time) and Foreign Minister Alain Juppé: “Matignon and the Quai d’Orsay would like France, in this new Rwandan crisis that risks being extremely deadly, not to be on the front line, and to limit our actions to UN interventions.” Delaye’s note relayed that the cohabitation government wanted UNAMIR to perform its security mission in Kigali, but Delaye derisively opined that to that point UNAMIR had “not really” fulfilled its mission. At the same time, the French ambassador to the United Nations, Bernard Mérinée, called for the UN Security Council to adopt a formal declaration calling on Rwanda’s armed forces to cooperate with the UN mission, but said that reinforcing UNAMIR was not necessary.

The Élysée, however, was not entirely passive. Delaye emphasized two priority items to President Mitterrand: protecting French expatriates in Rwanda and protecting President Habyarimana’s family. On the latter, Delaye reported that Habyarimana’s family members were, “for the time being,” under the protection of the Presidential Guard, adding “if they wish, they will be welcomed at our Ambassador’s residence, in accordance with your instructions.” The night before, Mitterrand had reportedly called Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana to present his condolences. He followed up with a letter alerting the widow that “in these dramatic circumstances, France remembers the eminent qualities of this head of state who wished, with courage and determination, to lead his country toward national reconciliation.”

On the subject of protecting French nationals, Quesnot reported on 7 April that the armed forces staff had placed on alert military units stationed on French bases in Africa: “special force elements could be transported to the city in less than 24 hours.” The next day, 8 April, Quesnot reported to the president that “[f]ollowing your decision to ensure immediately the security of our citizens in Rwanda,” four military transport planes would fly from the French base in Bangui to Kigali, landing at 5 a.m. on 9 April with one company of paratroopers and special operations soldiers to gain control of the airport. Each of the planes could carry “about fifty women and children traumatized by the events, including the widow of one of the pilots of the presidential Falcon and the wife and children of President Habyarimana.” In a comment that would further reflect the tone for interactions between the French military and UNAMIR, Quesnot said they would inform the UN secretary-general of the situation on the ground, but would only inform him of the operation during its execution, not beforehand, “in order not to compromise security.” Quesnot noted, however, that the United States, the Central African Republic, and the Belgian military would be informed.
On 8 April, news of the planned operation reached Commandant Grégoire de Saint Quentin and Warrant Officer José de Pinho, two of the French military cooperants. According to de Pinho, a French lieutenant-colonel (likely Lt. Col. Jean-Jacques Maurin, the deputy defense attaché and counselor to the FAR état-major) asked de Saint Quentin and de Pinho to “[l]isten carefully to what I’m going to tell you, the Rwandan Army, and especially the Kanombe paratroopers in your case, must not learn of our intentions. They may think we are letting them down and oppose the evacuation of our nationals.” The lieutenant-colonel ordered them to be present in the control tower at all times and to report to him everything that happens.

Leaving from the meeting and heading toward Kanombe, they passed the position of a para-commando battalion where, de Pinho claims, either RPF or UNAMIR peacekeepers shot at their vehicle. In de Pinho’s recollection, as he and de Saint Quentin sped away from the shots, they “saw a whole crowd of soldiers, including peacekeepers at the back of a small square. . . . We left, dumbfounded by what we have just experienced, the UN peacekeepers firing at the French cooperants and the regular Rwandan Army.” That UNAMIR soldiers strictly avoided shooting so as not to become targets throws doubt on de Pinho’s recollection, which, accurate or not, reflects the sour relationship between UNAMIR and French soldiers that would persist throughout the Genocide.

Further reflecting the tension between UNAMIR and France, General Dallaire had to be roused from his bed in the middle of the night to be told that the first French planes, to be followed by Belgian planes, would be landing in 45 minutes. As he recounted in his book, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, “I was livid, and not only because of the short notice. . . . I no longer controlled the airport. What if the RGF [the Rwandan government forces] (or as they had threatened, the RPF) shot down the aircraft?” Dallaire asked his staff to contact the RPF and urge restraint.

It was the RPF military high command at Mulindi who informed the CND that the planes landing in Kigali were “the French,” who were coming to Rwanda to evacuate “their people.” Despite that, “we always took French statements with a grain of salt,” recounted Charles Kayonga, who led the RPF security forces at the CND. Kayonga said he was informed by RPF intelligence that the French planes brought arms and ammunition with them for delivery to the FAR. “My concern with Amaryllis was the fact that the French came and saw the Genocide happening in the raw,” Kayonga lamented. “They took away their people and left Rwandans being killed by the Interahamwe.”

Meanwhile, de Saint Quentin and de Pinho had managed to talk their way into the airport control tower. As de Pinho waited in the control tower, de Saint Quentin left to convince Aloys Ntabakuze, the para-commando commander and Genocide leader, to remove the vehicles blocking the runway. De Saint Quentin returned to the control tower and instructed de Pinho not to tell Ntabakuze that the planes were coming for an evacuation. Once the vehicles were removed, Ntabakuze returned to the control tower, apparently under the impression that French forces were on their way to support the FAR, as they had done in years past. When a reconnaissance plane landed and immediately took off again without unloading on the evening of 8 April, Ntabakuze was perplexed. But upon hearing the pilot on the radio say, “OK, see you tomorrow morning,” Ntabakuze “in a gesture of euphoria, threw his arms around our necks and said: ‘Thank you France, you are going to save us.’”
The first French military transport plane arrived shortly after 3 a.m. Kigali-time on the morning of 9 April 1994 to begin a mission dubbed Operation Amaryllis. The mission for the French soldiers on board was to take control of the airport before dawn, to welcome French and Belgian reinforcements, and to participate in the evacuation of foreign nationals. The mission orders called for Ambassador Marlaud to choose about 60 French nationals for evacuation on the first plane out, with more evacuations to occur on subsequent planes.

Within a quarter of an hour, 151 French soldiers unloaded from four C160 planes to set up near the runway. By the afternoon of 9 April, the number of Amaryllis soldiers would increase to 359, and by 10 April, it would be 464. Within less than an hour and a half of the first arrival, French soldiers had taken control of the airport.

Ntabakuze’s hope for French assistance was not entirely in vain. According to Colonel Luc Marchal, the commander of UNAMIR’s Belgian contingent, one of the first French planes to arrive for Operation Amaryllis delivered ammunition to FAR soldiers: “Two of those three planes were carrying personnel. And one was carrying ammunition . . . for the Rwandan Army . . . [T]hey just remained a few minutes in the airfield, and immediately after [the ammunition] was loaded in the vehicles they moved to the Kanombe camp.” Asked about Marchal’s statement by the rapporteurs of the French MIP, the Belgian Ministry sent them the following written response:

Colonel Marchal confirmed that one of the UN observers under him at the Kigali airport, a Senegalese officer, orally reported to him in the course of the night of April 8 to 9, that mortar ammunition boxes had been unloaded from one of three French military aircraft that landed in Kigali that night, and that they had been loaded onto Rwandan Army vehicles.

Paul Rwarakabije, the operational commander of the Rwandan Gendarmerie, similarly received a report over the radio from a Gendarmerie detachment stationed at the airport that the French Army had delivered ammunition.

Responding, in 1995, to Marchal’s account, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied the delivery of ammunition during Amaryllis. However, President Mitterrand’s top advisor, Hubert Védrine, would later acknowledge that French weapons deliveries to the FAR continued a “few days” into the Genocide.

Marchal, for his part, rationalized the ammunition delivery he reported: “It is absurd to blame [the French] for the genocide because of these boxes of ammunition. These were intended for combat.” This, of course, tries to excuse French officials for their continuing support of allies with a history of sponsoring ethnic massacres. That aside, sending ammunition into a situation that a Le Monde editorial, printed the day before the ammunition delivery, dubbed a “powder keg” irresponsibly risked an explosion.

On 9 April 1994, the same day the ammunition reportedly arrived from France, Jean Kambanda, who would later plead guilty to genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide, among other crimes, gave a speech at the investiture ceremony of the new interim Rwandan government
(IRG) in which he would serve as prime minister. The speech, broadcast over the radio, urged Hutu civilians to arm themselves: “Each and every person can have his own gun. . . . These young Tutsi who have joined the ranks of the RPF, what more do they have than you? Strength? Intelligence? What they have more than you are guns. . . . Take the gun and practice shooting.”

A first shipment of weapons, he assured listeners, had just arrived, but these would go to trained soldiers: “Yesterday, the first shipment [of weapons] arrived. I don’t believe that is a secret (applause). The weapons that came yesterday will be given to those who have trained and fought with the armed forces.”

**F. French Officials Were Willing to Exceed the Mission of Operation Amaryllis to Evacuate Some Rwandans, Including Some Later Charged with Genocide, but When Asked about Their Failure to Aid the Victims, Their Answer Was: That Was Not Our Job.**

Laurent Larcher (journalist): . . . I’ll take the concrete example of Amaryllis, where you have French soldiers crossing the roadblocks to fetch Europeans from the schools, the gathering places, they see what happens at these roadblocks. They see that there are people who are slaughtered.

Juppé: Yes! I always come back to the same answer and will not give you another: it wasn’t our mission.

Larcher: But wasn’t it our duty?

Juppé: (Silence.) Yes—maybe. But—in politics, duty and mission do not always coincide . . . . I have no other answer to give you: France wasn’t there to lead a war operation at the time.


The first meeting between General Dallaire and Colonel Henri Poncet, the commander of the Amaryllis troops, would foreshadow the tone for relations between UNAMIR and the French military during Amaryllis and throughout the Genocide. Dallaire described the conversation as “curt” and wrote that Poncet had “showed no interest in co-operating with us.” Dallaire observed that, in the wake of President Habyarimana’s death and the ensuing chaos, “[t]he peacekeepers remained helpless and passive.”

In fact, Dallaire and many of his troops were concerned with how to protect Rwandan civilians from the orgy of violence that had been systematically unleashed, while simultaneously cajoling its perpetrators to rein in their excesses. They were also responding to calls for help from targeted moderate politicians and other civilians, primarily Tutsi, while pleading with superiors at the United Nations in New York to provide them with the means and authority to address the catastrophic situation. In fact, on the day Col. Poncet arrived, Maj. Brent Beardsley, Dallaire’s
aide-de-camp and co-author of *Shake Hands with the Devil,* encountered “the first evidence of wholesale massacre.” Beardsley responded to a desperate plea for help from the Gikondo Parish Church, which was run by Polish priests. Beardsley and a Polish officer billeted in the church responded to the plea, which had come in over UNAMIR’s open radio system. They made their way through Kigali, passing through the “ever-increasing and chaotic militia roadblocks,” where they saw “the bodies of men, women and children,” to the church, where across the street from the church was “an entire alleyway . . . littered with the bodies of women and children . . . .” Inside the church, the scene was even more horrific, “the first such scene UNAMIR witnessed” but not the last:

In the aisles and on the pews were the bodies of hundreds of men, women and children. At least fifteen of them were still alive but in a terrible state. The priests were applying first aid to the survivors. A baby cried as it tried to feed on the breast of its dead mother, a sight Brent has never forgotten.

The night before, the Rwandan Army had cordoned off the area, and the Gendarmerie had gone door to door checking identity cards and ordering Tutsi into the church before welcoming in militia armed with machetes to murder everyone. Dallaire and Beardsley described the scene as “evidence of the genocide, though we didn’t yet know to call it that. . . . The massacre was not a spontaneous act. It was a well-executed operation involving the Army, Gendarmerie, Interahamwe and civil service.”

Scenes like this were irrelevant to Amaryllis’ mission of protecting expatriates. Father Richard Kalka, a military chaplain accompanying the French forces, has described how French soldiers remained passive in the face of the butchery of Tutsi:

The driver of one of the commandos charged with the evacuation [from the French school in Kigali] . . . took a road that bypassed the capital from the west, avoiding the most lively axis of the city. Suddenly, a Tutsi woman, chased by a group of Hutu armed with batons and knives, threw herself against the hood of the first vehicle hoping, in her tragic despair, to find refuge there. The driver braked harshly. The two occupants did not move, dazed by the event’s complexity. What to do? How to react? These few moments of hesitation were enough for the Hutu torturers to understand that the French soldiers would not defend the woman. On the way back, the vehicle’s passengers were able to see her corpse, stomach open, lying on the side of the road. The assassins, with a smile and a friendly wave, kindly acknowledged them.

The soldiers had followed orders.

Reporter Catherine Bond experienced a similar scene as she traveled with a convoy of French soldiers and Belgian evacuees on 11 April. On their way from the Kigali airport, Bond later wrote, the convoy witnessed on the side of the road “the bleeding corpses of two people—a man and a woman, the woman with her legs cut off.” On their return to the airport about an hour later, the “French paratroopers halted the convoy . . . for perhaps 10 minutes” near that location “to wait for gangs carrying kitchen knives, machetes, hammers and clubs to finish killing a number
of adults on the road ahead.”\textsuperscript{205} By the time the vehicles proceeded, “four more women had been butchered just ahead of our convoy in the same place outside a mud hut. Four men had also been killed with machetes and their bodies were lying in grassy ditches by the road.”\textsuperscript{206} Bond wrote:

The scene produced in me a mixture of nausea and tears. Seemingly unmoved, however, the French paratroopers I was travelling with turned up the volume of the disco music on their car cassette. The attackers lined the road, cheering the French troops and heckling the Belgians.\textsuperscript{207}

Stopping the killings “was not their responsibility,” French soldiers later explained to her.\textsuperscript{208}

Col. Poncet in his after-action report praised the Amaryllis soldiers for their “sangfroid”—literally translated as “blood cold” and meaning composure under pressure.\textsuperscript{209} Those soldiers had been chilled by the decisionmakers in Paris, who chose not to act—not just militarily, but in any meaningful way to protect Tutsi civilians from the génocidaires’ non-stop violence against them.

While the operation order for Operation Amaryllis did not call for assisting Rwandan civilians,\textsuperscript{210} President Mitterrand had personally instructed the evacuation of President Habyarimana’s family.\textsuperscript{211} Accordingly, the first French evacuation plane left Kigali at 5 p.m. on 9 April carrying, as General Quesnot and Dominique Pin (Bruno Delaye’s deputy at the Africa Cell) reported to Mitterrand, “about forty French and, according to your instructions, twelve members of the close family of the President HABYARIMANA.”\textsuperscript{212} Father Kalka described how the deference shown Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana cost the lives of Tutsi employees at the French embassy:

Used to giving the orders that allowed not even the slightest refusal, [Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana] demanded her immediate evacuation as well as that of all the members of her family. The 4X4 vehicles filled in record time. The [Amaryllis] paratroopers sorted the baggage in order to leave room for the half-dozen [French] Embassy employees, all Tutsi. “It’s out of the question to leave our bags behind!” roared Mrs. Habyarimana. The paratroopers complied, unloaded the employees and promised them to come back and get them. An hour later, the Tutsi employees were laying with their throats slit on the same tiled floor of the Embassy.\textsuperscript{213}

Following their evacuation from Rwanda to the French military base in the Central African Republic, Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana — the notorious head of the Akazu — and her family would make their way to Paris on business class paid for by the French government.\textsuperscript{214}

In 2019, General Quesnot defended France’s evacuation of Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana and tried to minimize her “behavior”:

Heads of State . . . get to this position after overcoming many obstacles, and there is a sort of . . . informal solidarity. So, it seemed normal that the President wanted to save the family of President Habyarimana even if the behavior of Mrs. Habyarimana could raise questions.\textsuperscript{215}
Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana was not the only extremist to benefit from French protection at the outset of the Genocide. On 8 April, just two days after the killing began, French Cooperation Minister Roussin confirmed that roughly 50 senior Rwandan officials and their families were taking shelter at the French embassy in Kigali. The group included at least seven ministers in the coalition government, of whom six were members of the MRND. The French government would include most of these men, and some of their family members, on a list of “at-risk individuals” who were deemed eligible to be evacuated abroad (though, in fact, the ministers themselves would ultimately opt to remain in Rwanda).

All seven of the ministers who are known to have taken refuge at the embassy during this time—Daniel Mbangura, Prosper Mugiraneza, Justin Mugenzi, Augustin Ngirabatware, Casimir Bizimungu, André Ntagerura, and Callixte Nzabonimana—would go on to serve in the interim Rwandan government (IRG), the provisional authority that presided over the Genocide. Two of these men—Ngirabatware and Nzabonimana—have since been convicted for their role in the Genocide.

Among the other notables who took refuge at the French embassy in the opening days of the Genocide was Ferdinand Nahimana, the head of RTLM, who would also be convicted in the ICTR and whom the French government had received in Paris after he incited the Bugesera massacres in 1992. Ambassador Marlaud would later confirm that Nahimana was among the Rwandans evacuated during Amaryllis.

All told, between 9 and 12 April 1994, Operation Amaryllis evacuated 1238 people, including 454 French citizens and 394 Rwandans (with the remainder coming from other countries). While the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs categorized the Rwandan evacuees as “40% Tutsi, 60% Hutu,” in a document it provided to the MIP, there is no discussion of how the ethnicity of the evacuees was ascertained. French officials have denied that they had a premeditated policy to choose which Rwandans would leave with French nationals. Foreign Minister Alain Juppé, for example, told French journalist Laurent Larcher in 2019 that if relatives of génocidaires were evacuated, it was only due to “the chaos” in which the French military was operating. However, Michel Cuignet, head of the French Civil Cooperation Mission in Kigali when the Genocide began, told French documentarian Jean-Christophe Klotz in a recent interview that he warned Ambassador Marlaud of the danger his primarily Tutsi employees faced. Marlaud had replied, “The French soldiers are going to come defend them.” But instead, Marlaud evacuated “Rwandan officials . . . the people responsible for the genocide.” Most of Cuignet’s employees died in the Genocide, some before his eyes. (Marlaud told the MIP that he was never notified of the presence of Cuignet’s employees at the French Cultural Center.)

Marlaud also told the MIP that “it was monstrous to imply that a screening would have been carried out among the embassy’s staff, or that evacuation would have been knowingly refused.” As for anyone taking refuge at the French embassy, Marlaud “considered it inconceivable to expel them . . . . The choice was simple: either to evacuate all those who wished it, or to carry out a triage. The decision was made . . . to evacuate all those who were refugees at the embassy and who wished to leave.” Marlaud insisted that “[a]ll who came were welcomed. It is true that the vast majority of them . . . . were supporters of President Habyarimana.” But that should have surprised no one. Supporters of President Habyarimana, of course, took refuge in the
embassy of France, because the French government had been a stalwart friend to the Habyarimana regime since the beginning of the war.

**G. As Operation Amaryllis Came to an End, Advisors in the Élysée and Soldiers on the Ground Mourned What They Saw as the Abandonment of Their Allies and Even Began a Short-Lived Secret Operation Meant to Oppose the RPF.**

The departure of the French from Rwanda is fraught with consequences for this unfortunate country where, after very bloody battles, the RPF will control the power by force and a period of guerrilla warfare will follow. The Hutu majority will never accept this undivided power. This state of affairs will have destabilizing consequences in Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania.234


If, in sheltering and evacuating senior Rwandan leaders and their families, the French government was showcasing its enduring fidelity to the ancien régime, it was also signaling its interest in what was to come next. Both in Paris and in Kigali, French officials were keeping an eye on the maneuverings some hardliners had undertaken to fill the political vacuum that had formed following the downing of the president’s plane and the ensuing assassinations of Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana and other opposition leaders.

On the morning of 8 April, Ambassador Marlaud called various Rwandan ministers into his office for a meeting.235 According to testimony given to the ICTR by Justin Mugenzi, one of the ministers present, Marlaud updated the ministers on the violence and confirmed that some of their colleagues in the coalition government had been assassinated.236 Marlaud also “urged the ministers . . . to try and do something to get the country out of the chaos into which it was sinking.”237

Marlaud has personally attested that a meeting of Rwandan ministers did, in fact, take place at the French embassy that morning and has said that one of the aims of the meeting was to discuss the need “to replace dead or missing ministers or officials.”238 (Other goals, according to Marlaud, were “to try to regain control of the Presidential Guard in order to stop the massacres and, ultimately, to reaffirm their commitment to the Arusha Accords.”239)

While some writers have asserted that the IRG was formed at the French embassy, the ICTR has credited testimony indicating that the talks were held exclusively at the Rwandan Ministry of Defense, where Colonel Bagosora gathered leaders from the extremist wings of several major political parties to work out the distribution of seats in the new government.240 Mugenzi has testified that Bagosora gave the opening remarks, telling the assembled party leaders that he had invited them to the Ministry “to discuss . . . ways and means of providing the country with a government which could get the country out of the chaos in which it was plunging.”241

The talks at the Ministry culminated in the IRG’s inauguration on 9 April,242 with the presidency awarded to Théodore Sindikubwabo, who had been president of Rwanda’s parliament.
In an address to the nation, Sindikubwabo pledged to “continue negotiations with the RPF so as to enable organs of the Broad-based Transitional Government to be set up within six weeks as the United Nations had asked the Government of Rwanda.”243 His rhetoric would quickly prove hollow. The new authorities were unreservedly hostile to the country’s Tutsi minority,244 whose sufferings would only worsen under the new government’s leadership.

After the negotiations had ended, Marlaud called Johan Swinnen, the Belgian ambassador to Rwanda, to inform him of the composition of the new rump government. “He gave me the impression of being quite happy, quite satisfied with this result,” Swinnen told the French documentarian Jean-Christophe Klotz.245 “And I told him no, really . . . I’m not sure these people are going to do everything they can to stop the massacres.”246 Swinnen underlined that IRG Minister of Foreign Affairs Jéréme Bicamumpaka was not received by Willy Claes, Belgium’s minister of foreign affairs, because “we didn’t trust this government.”247 (As discussed in Chapter 9, Paris would, at the end of April 1994, receive Bicamumpaka and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, who was the most influential leader in the extremist anti-Tutsi CDR party.)

Marlaud apparently allowed himself to be taken in by the superficial fact that “the distribution of ministries and ministerial portfolios between political parties remains identical to what it was before in the context of power-sharing, which had been envisaged by the Arusha Accords,” as he told a reporter for Jeune Afrique on 11 April 1994.248 He conceded, however, that “[n]ow in regards to the evaluation of the relationship between political forces within this government, there anyone can have a different assessment.”249

In Paris, Dominique Pin and General Christian Quesnot offered a similar take, writing in a 9 April note to President Mitterrand: “Politically, an interim government was established by the various Rwandan political parties in accordance with the proportions provided for in the Arusha agreements. Only the RPF refused to participate, broke the cease-fire and began an offensive towards Kigali.”250 (In fact, the RPF would not begin its offensive until the next day.251)

Within the French government, only the DGSE appears to have expressed strong reservations concerning the IRG: “The main leaders of the opposition, in favor of the political integration of the RPF were either already assassinated (1) or ignored (2). The government thus formed is characterized by neither its openness, nor its balance.”252 The DGSE then reported the obvious: “Some Hutu personalities close to power admit in private that the reactionary nature of the interim government is not of a nature to arouse a conciliatory attitude on the part of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF).”253

The DGSE was right: The RPF, for its part, saw the formation of the IRG and its announcement of ministers as “an overt declaration of war,” in the words of General Dallaire.254 In a 9 April interview with Dr. Emile Rwamasirabo, the former RPF Commissioner of Supply and Logistics255 and later Commissioner for Rehabilitation,256 French historian Dominique de Courcelles posed questions that presumed the RPF should have recognized the rump Rwandan government presiding over the Genocide and laid down its arms:
de Courcelles: *Was there no hope from the [interim] government that maybe the massacres could stop?*

Rwamasirabo: *We would have expected the international community to vigorously denounce the government as well as the Army, the presidential guards who perpetrated the massacres of innocent people. I do not think that anyone should condemn us for resuming the war. We resumed the war. The government is absolutely not an interlocutor for us.*

decourcelles: *For you, right now the only solution is to resume the war, there is no possible negotiations?*

Rwamasirabo: *There is no possibility of negotiation because we have to deal with savage gangs who are currently systematically massacring the people.*

The RPF had, at first, observed what the DGSE described on 8 April as “an ostensible neutrality.” To be sure, no reports during this time blamed the RPF for the violence against civilians. General Dallaire would later recall the night of 8 April into the early morning of 9 April, when the RPF (which had left the CND to fight the Presidential Guard) took control of the area where UNAMIR had its headquarters:

By dawn there were no crowds, no mobs, no militia, only disciplined and co-operative RPF soldiers who had secured our area either to protect us... or more likely, to safeguard the thousands of terrified people in [Amahoro] stadium [where civilians had taken refuge and many UNAMIR troops were garrisoned—ed.].

While the RPF focused on stopping the Genocide, officials in the Élysée remained focused on the RPF. Pin and Quesnot told President Mitterrand in an 11 April note that they feared RPF control of Rwanda would destabilize the region: “The departure of the French from Rwanda is fraught with consequences for this unfortunate country where, after very bloody battles, the RPF will control the power by force and a period of guerrilla warfare will follow. The Hutu majority will never accept this undivided power. This state of affairs will have destabilizing consequences in Burundi, Zaire and Tanzania.”

While the note mentioned ongoing massacres in passing, the authors’ concern was clear: the RPF.

The 600 RPF soldiers at the CND fanned out in five companies to take Kigali and protect its civilians from further bloodshed. By 11 April, the RPF took Mount Rebero, which, according to the 600’s commander, Charles Kayonga, was “the turning point in the war” because of Mt. Rebero’s strategic location:

If the RPA had not taken and maintained Rebero, they would not have held the Amahoro stadium or the CND because Rebero was on the high ground, from which they could see and control the field of battle, and advance to take, defend and hold additional locations. From Rebero, the RPA could also launch rescue operations in Nyamirambo and Kiyovu (neighborhoods within Kigali).
French officials knew Rebero’s significance as well. The French Ambassador was said to have been so disappointed with the FAR, once he saw the RPF had captured Mount Rebero, that he concluded Kigali would fall to the RPA,” Kayonga said. The next day, 12 April, Ambassador Marlaud left Rwanda and returned to France.

The RPF, speaking through RPF Second Vice President Denis Polisi, warned the French government “not to interfere” in Rwanda and to ‘limit its action to evacuating its nationals.” Recent history was on Polisi’s mind: “We do not want France to support the presidential guard, this gang of criminals who wanted to form a bogus government. It is a shame for France to have armed and trained this presidential guard.”

The RPF was right to suspect that France might extend military support to the Rwandan government. Not only did French troops reportedly deliver ammunition on an Amaryllis plane, but, by 13 April 1994, French officials had decided to leave a special operations unit in Kigali after the final evacuations of expatriates, the diplomatic corps, and MAM cooperants, as well as the withdrawal of the other Amaryllis troops. Lt. Col. Maurin, the deputy defense attaché and counselor to the FAR état-major, led the detachment, with 33 COS (special operations) soldiers and two AMTs placed under his command. He reported directly to Admiral Lanxade. According to the MIP, their mission was:

- To extract citizens who do not consent to it as of yet and who may later want to, or any other new case;
- To try to locate the missing aid workers;
- To learn about the local situation;
- To propose attitudes or modes of action depending on the evolution of events;
- To guide any air support operation;
- To exfiltrate themselves if necessary.

The mission lasted less than a day before Maurin called it off on 14 April because of a “situation that continued to deteriorate.”

Placing Maurin, counselor to the FAR état-major, in charge of a secret mission that included guiding air support strongly suggests the mission was aimed at stopping the RPF. Even the MIP hinted at this in its brief analysis:

[Had the mission not ended on 14 April], one could legitimately question the idea of maintaining the COS in Kigali while we had no more diplomatic representation. One must in particular question the mission of guiding any air support operation, when it is not clear whom it may benefit, if not the FAR.

Few documents are available detailing the mission, and Maurin’s interview with the MIP is not publicly available, but an after-action report claimed the purpose of the air support was to protect the departure of the last aircraft against a possible RPF attack. Whoever initiated the mission was focused on the RPF as a threat.
At a 13 April 1994 Restricted Council meeting, Admiral Lanxade, who as chief of defense staff ultimately oversaw the special forces, went a step further by suggesting the RPF posed a threat not only to French forces, but also to Rwandan civilians. When President Mitterrand asked whether “the massacres [will] spread,” Admiral Lanxade responded, “They are already significant. But now, it is Tutsis who will massacre Hutus in Kigali.”

Looking back at this time, some French soldiers have gone so far as to suggest French military advisors should have stayed in Rwanda and helped the FAR continue to fight the RPF, even in the midst of a genocide. Colonel Jacques Balch, for example, who in December 1993 (then a Lieutenant Colonel) had received the highest honor from Rwanda for French military assistants, The National Order of the 1,000 Hills, offered his “personal analysis” to the MIP. “[T]here was nothing that would foreshadow an RPF victory,” he wrote. “[T]he FAR were resisting the push of the Inkotanyi quite well. It would have taken very little (some French military advisers) to turn the situation around. June 1992 and February 1993 could very well have been ‘reenacted’ in April 1994.” In other words, France should have reinforced the FAR, the way it did to help the FAR counter RPF offensives in June 1992 and February 1993.

Warrant Officer José de Pinho struck a similarly mournful tone when writing about his 12 April departure:

During the whole flight [from Kigali to Bangui], an enormous amount of things would go through my head. The feeling of having saved my family and my skin was dominated by the immense sadness of having abandoned these unfortunate Rwandan people, so endearing, and who absolutely did not deserve the tragedy that was happening.

Inside the plane, there was total silence; my colleagues and I looked at each other without saying a word. I was completely paralyzed, a gun between my legs. When I looked at the gun, I regretted not having thrown it away before getting on the plane, even though by doing so, I would not have followed instructions. I thought, “What did you do there, that gun belongs to the Para Battalion and it was useful to them.” On top of all the other worries, I felt like I stole that gun. It’s a horror!

After returning to France, de Pinho was told that he must “be ready to leave for Rwanda in less than 48 hours by a simple phone call.” He did not explain (if he was even told) why his superiors anticipated that possibility, which never came to pass. “The next three months,” he wrote, “waiting for a hypothetical phone call, would seem like an eternity.”

Mitterrand, however, remained phlegmatic. During his 13 April Restricted Council meeting, Minister of Cooperation Michel Roussin reported the RPF had reached out to signal that “France still had its place in Rwanda.” Mitterrand replied, “This is a situation that we’ve known elsewhere. France still appears essential, once the crisis has passed. We knew that in Chad. Here, it’s a bit particular because Rwanda is a former Belgian colony. But we’ve already been signaled.”
Mitterrand’s thoughts on Rwanda, as they had been since October 1990, were grounded in a vision of France’s place in Africa, in general. His policy in Rwanda, even at the start of the Genocide, was Françafrique.
Notes to Chapter VIII


3 JOSÉ DE PINHO, COMPRENDRE LE GÉNOCIDE RWANDAIS [UNDERSTANDING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE] 81 (2014). De Pinho did not name his neighbor, referring instead to “the Rwandan Lieutenant-Colonel in command of the Para-Commando Battalion.” While Ntabakuze was a Major, and not a Lieutenant-Colonel, he was the commander of the Para-Commandos, see Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 59, 61 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008). Other testimonies corroborate that it was Major Ntabakuze who was with the French cooperants that morning. See e.g., Interview by LFM of Gonzangue Habimana, Ex-FAR (22 Sept. 2017). It seems likely that Pinho simply misidentified Ntabakuze’s rank in his book published 20 years after these events.


8 JOSÉ DE PINHO, COMPRENDRE LE GÉNOCIDE RWANDAIS [UNDERSTANDING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE] 82 (2014); Trois Français parmi les victimes de l’avion qui s’est écrasé à Kigali [Three French People Among the Victims of the Plane that Crashed in Kigali], AFP, 6 Apr. 1994.


10 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 225 (2003).

11 See JOSÉ DE PINHO, COMPRENDRE LE GÉNOCIDE RWANDAIS [UNDERSTANDING THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE] 82-83 (2014). Although de Pinho could not specify whether Ntabakuze identified the body of the “Chief of the Defense Staff or the Minister of Defense,” it could only have been the chief of defense staff because the minister of defense was not on board the plane.


15 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 802 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008) (summarizing the testimony of a paracommando who described going door to door with Interahamwe in Akajagali at approximately 6 a.m. on 7 April, raping women and killing anyone who was a Tutsi).

16 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 858-67 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008) (concluding in paragraph 866, “The lack of coherence in the Prosecution evidence about the sequence of events at Camp Kanombe after the death of President Habyarimana coupled with the evidence presented by the Ntabakuze Defence leave the Chamber with doubt about what actually transpired. That said, the Chamber is also not fully convinced by the Defence evidence, in particular that the entire battalion remained on the tarmac for nearly 18 hours after the death of the President awaiting orders for deployment.”).
Chapter VIII

6 April 1994 – 14 April 1994


18 Reports differ on the exact time the killings began. Various witnesses who testified at Bagosora’s ICTR trial indicated that large-scale killings of civilian Tutsi began shortly after either 4 a.m., 6 a.m., or 7 a.m. on 7 April. Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶¶ 802, 824, 826 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008). Linda Melvern reports a witness seeing the Interahamwe “killing people in the open” by 6 a.m. LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 199 (1st ed. 2000). Belgian soldiers reported “ethnic cleansing operations” by 11:43 a.m. KIBAT Chronique 06 Avr – 19 Avr 1994 [KIBAT Calendar of Events 6 April – 19 April 1994] 18 (1995). An Africa Rights report from May 1994 suggests that the first people killed, beginning at approximately 5 a.m. before she was murdered later that day. Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 701 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008).


20 Appeal Ruling by La Cour d’Assises de la Seine-Saint-Denis of Pascal Senyumuhuara Safari, a.k.a. Pascal Simbakangwa, Former Rwandan Intelligence Chief, Seine-Saint-Denis (3 Dec. 2016). This opinion upheld on appeal the conviction of Pascal Simbakangwa for genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity.

21 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (“At 2118 hours a platoon of Presidential Guard established a roadblock at the Meridien traffic circle and blocked traffic. Several shots were fired. No reported casualties.”). (Note that this document skips from paragraph number 17 to 19, which appears to be a typographical error.)

22 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”) (“At 2118 hours a platoon of Presidential Guard established a roadblock at the Meridien traffic circle and blocked traffic. Several shots were fired. No reported casualties.”).


24 KIBAT Chronique 06 Avr – 19 Avr 1994 [KIBAT Calendar of Events 6 April – 19 April 1994] 12 (1995) (“The whole ‘presidential’ neighbourhood of the city centre, which in normal times was protected by many FAR checkpoints, was then completely closed with roadblocks reinforced with AML (light tank of the FAR).”); MIP Tome I 294; Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 2124-25 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008) (“The assailants checked the identity cards of the victims and targeted mainly Tutsis along with Hutus suspected of being sympathetic to the RPF.”).

25 MIP Tome I 294.

26 MIP Tome I 294.


29 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 229 (2003) (Iqbal Riza, chief of staff to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan: “UNAMIR is not, repeat not, to fire unless fired upon”).


Chapter VIII

6 April 1994 – 14 April 1994


36 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”).

37 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil 230 (2003); Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”).

38 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil 230 (2003); Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”).


40 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil 245 (2003); Belgian Senate Report 404 (1997) (“Ms. Agathe fled with the gendarmes assigned to her security, who hid her in the house of a neighbor, Mr. Daff, a United Nations volunteer. She is discovered there by members of the presidential guard who take her back to her home, where she and her husband are killed around 11:45 am.”).


50 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil 232 (2003); African Rights, Rwanda: Who is Killing; Who is Dying; What is to be Done 11 (1994).

51 Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil 232 (2003); Cable from David Rawson to US Secretary of State (24 Mar. 1994) (Subject: DAS Bushnell and AF/C Director Render Push for Transition to Begin”).


54 Cable from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh to Kofi Annan (8 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “An Update on the Current Situation in Rwanda and Military Aspects of the Mission”); African Rights, Rwanda: Who is Killing; Who is Dying; What is to be Done 10-11 (1994).


57 Des milliers de morts à Kigali selon le délégué du CICR [Thousands of Dead People in Kigali According to ICRC Delegate], AFP, 8 Apr. 1994.

58 Cable from Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh to Kofi Annan (8 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “An Update on the Current Situation in Rwanda and Military Aspects of the Mission”).
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59 Appeal Ruling by La Cour d’Assises de la Seine-Saint-Denis of Pascal Senyamuhuara Safari, a.k.a. Pascal Simbikangwa, Former Rwandan Intelligence Chief, Seine-Saint-Denis (3 Dec. 2016).

60 MIP Tome I 295.


63 AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: WHO IS KILLING; WHO IS DYING; WHAT IS TO BE DONE 14 (1994).

64 AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: WHO IS KILLING; WHO IS DYING; WHAT IS TO BE DONE 14 (1994).


73 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 926 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008) (“The Chamber finds beyond reasonable doubt that, on 7 and 8 April, members of the Para Commando Battalion were going from house to house in the Kabeza area and killing civilians. . . . Kabeza was predominately Tutsi and viewed as sympathetic to the RPF.”); Id. at ¶ 2140-41 (“On 7 April 1994, militiamen supported by plainclothes soldiers from the Gisenyi military camp conducted targeted killings in the vicinity of the camp, and primarily in Bugoyi cellule. Soldiers accompanied militiamen to the house of a Tutsi teacher, where both groups participated in killing him and his daughter. Hutus suspected of being accomplices, such as Rwabijongo and Kajanja, were also killed by militiamen, as was Rwabijongo’s Tutsi wife. These attacks were followed by the killings of Gilbert, a Tutsi, and another Tutsi man hiding in a compound with him. Mukabutare, a Tutsi, and her daughter were also singled out and killed. The Chamber finds that these assailants intentionally killed members of the Tutsi ethnic group.”).


76 WENDY WHITWORTH, WE SURVIVED: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA (2006).


78 Théoneste Bagosora et. al v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-98-41-A, Appeal Judgement (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 14 Nov. 2011) (affirming trial court’s convictions for extermination and persecution in relation to the killings of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, Joseph Kavaruganda, Frédéric Nzumurambaho, Landoadl Ndasingwa, and Faustin Rucogoza, as well as the killings at Centre Christus); Id. ¶ 647 (affirming trial court’s finding that Bagosora had actual
knowledge that his subordinates were about to commit the crimes at Centre Christus, Kabeza, Kibagabaga Mosque, the Saint Josephite Centre, Karama Hill, Kibagabaga Catholic Church, and Gikondo Parish).

79 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”); ANDRÉ GUICHAOUA, FROM WAR TO GENOCIDE: CRIMINAL POLITICS IN RWANDA, 1990-1994, Box 11 (2015) (Notes on the Crisis Committee of 6-7 April 1994). The so-called “crisis committee” would be reconstituted more formally the following day, at which point members would include Bagosora, Ndindiliyimana, Joseph Murasampongo, Tharcisse Renzaho, Léonidas Rusatira, and Balthazar Ndengeyinka, among others. The committee held two formal meetings before the interim government was installed on the evening of 8 April, when Ndindiliyimana announced the mission of the committee had ended.

80 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”); AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: WHO IS KILLING; WHO IS DYING; WHAT IS TO BE DONE 10-11 (1994).

81 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 224 (2003).

82 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 224 (2003).

83 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”).

84 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 250-51 (2003).

85 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 251 (2003).

86 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 294 (2003); see also MIP Tome I 299 (“The Belgian government’s decision, announced on April 12, to withdraw its contingent (with an effective withdrawal starting on the 13th) following the assassination on April 7 of ten Belgian peacekeepers in charge of protecting Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, had the further effect of completely destabilizing UNAMIR’s organization.”).

87 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 226 (2003).


92 Compte-Rendu du Colonel Cussac et Lieutenant-Colonel Maurin (19 Apr. 1994) in MIP Tome II, Annex 8.2 (Subject: “Action des AMT lors de l’opération d’évacuation des ressortissants français à Kigali du 8 au 14 avril 1994” [AMT action during the operation to evacuate French nationals in Kigali from April 8 to 14, 1994]); AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA: WHO IS KILLING; WHO IS DYING; WHAT IS TO BE DONE 10 (1994) (“The first people to be killed, starting at about 5:00 a.m. on 7 April were the leaders of the political parties opposed to the hard-line Hutus of the MRND and CDR.”); Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba (recalling that the attacks on the CND began earlier in the morning than 5 a.m.).

93 Cable from Roméo Dallaire to United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Significant Incident Report – Reported Death of President of Rwanda”).

94 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

95 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

96 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

97 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

98 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

99 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

100 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

102 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara; see also Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., No. ICTR-98-41-T, Cross-Examination of Alison Des Forges, 78 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 25 Sept. 2002) (citing statement by Augustin Ndindilyimana). According to Ndindilyimana, he told Rutaremara that the crisis committee was going to do everything possible to restore order and called Bagosora to see if he could convince Rutaremara that the RPF at the CND should not fight.


104 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

105 Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

106 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 244-45 (2003); see also COLIN WAUGH, PAUL KAGAME AND RWANDA 65-67 (2004).

107 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 247 (2003); see also COLIN WAUGH, PAUL KAGAME AND RWANDA 65-67 (2004).


111 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 248 (2003).


113 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 248 (2003).


119 Notes on TD Kigali (7 April 1994) (Subject: “Escalation of violence in Kigali”). A DGSE report on 11 April 1994 elaborated: “Equipped with pre-established lists, the soldiers of the Presidential Guard undertook to massacre all the Tutsis, as well as the Hutus from the south or those supporting the opposition parties. Most often, these liquidations did not spare women or children.” Duclert Commission Report 701 (quoting DGSE/Diffusion, fiche no. 18502/N of 11 April 1994).

120 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Attentat contre les President du Rwanda et du Burundi”) (emphasis in original).

121 MIP Audition of Hubert Védrine, Tome III, Vol. 1, 204.


124 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Attentat contre les President du Rwanda et du Burundi”).

125 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda-Burundi – Situation après la mort des deux présidents”).


127 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye, Head of the Élysée Africa Cell, to President François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Attentat contre les Présidents du Rwanda et du Burundi”).
Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda-Burundi – Situation après la mort des deux présidents”).

Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.


Fiche Particulière, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (22 Sept. 1994) (Subject: “Hypothèse du service sur les responsabilités de l’attentat contre l’avion du Président Habyarimana”). The note relied on the testimony of a former FAR officer who said that the transfer of unusually large quantities of fuel, arms, and ammunition had been authorized for transfer to the Presidential Guard on 1 August 1994. The officer also claimed that about 300 paratroopers had been transferred out of Kanombe camp shortly before the attack to allow the Presidential Guard to “perform its work on April 6.”

Note from Bruno Delaye to President François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994); Note from General Christian Quesnot to President François Mitterrand, President of France (7 Apr. 1994).

MIP, Audition de George Martres, French Ambassador in Kigali, 154, Tome III, Vol. 1; See, e.g., GABRIEL PÉRIÈS & DAVID SERVENAY, UNE GUERRE NOIRE: ENQUÊTE SUR LES ORIGINES DU GÉNOCIDE RWANDAIS [A DARK WAR: INVESTIGATING THE ORIGINS OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE] 10 (2007) (arguing that attention given the downing of the plane was intended to “avoid asking the right questions by drawing the attention of public opinion”).

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga. Kayonga explained that they had gotten to know many people during their stay at the CND and that there were fixed telephones.


Les Forces françaises se retireront dès que tous les Français seront évacués [The French Forces Will Withdraw as Soon as All French People Are Evacuated], AFP, 10 Apr. 1994.

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Attentat contre les Président du Rwanda et du Burundi”). Minister of Cooperation Michel Roussin sought to limit France’s role at the outset of the Genocide and deferred to the UN in public comments. See, e.g., Combats à Kigali entre les forces gouvernementales et le FPR, selon le ministre de la Coopération [Fighting in Kigali Between Government Forces and the RPF, According to the Minister of Cooperation], AFP, 8 Apr. 1994 (citing an interview with Roussin, in which he “ruled out any French military intervention, such as what took place between October 1990 and December 1993”); Les Forces françaises se retireront dès que tous les Français seront évacués [The French Forces Will Withdraw as Soon as All French People Are Evacuated], AFP, 10 Apr. 1994 (‘‘As soon as the French are evacuated our forces will leave,’ he [Roussin] said, stressing that it was up to the UN to assume its responsibilities and that the French forces were not going to be involved in clashes between Rwandans.’’).

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Attentat contre les Présidents du Rwanda et du Burundi”).
La France souhaite que le Conseil de sécurité demande aux forces armées de coopérer avec l’ONU [France Wants the Security Council to Ask the Armed Forces to Cooperate with the UN], AFP, 7 Apr. 1994.

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Attentat contre les Présidents du Rwanda et du Burundi”).

Deposition of Jean Birara, Auditorat Militaire Bruxelles (26 May 1994).


Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda-Burundi – Situation après la mort des deux présidents”).

Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterand (8 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Sécurité de nos ressortissants”).

Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterand (8 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Sécurité de nos ressortissants”).

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Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterand (8 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Sécurité de nos ressortissants”).


José de Pinho, Comprendre le génocide rwandais [Understanding the Rwandan Genocide] 92 (2014); see also Compte-Rendu du Colonel Cussac et Lieutenant-Colonel Maurin (19 Apr. 1994) in MIP Tome II, Annex 8.2 (Subject: “Action des AMT lors de l’opération d’évacuation des ressortissants français à Kigali du 8 au 14 avril 1994”) (stating that an AMT team was put in place at the airport to assure control of the tower and to clear the runway).


José de Pinho, Comprendre le génocide rwandais [Understanding the Rwandan Genocide] 93 (2014).

José de Pinho, Comprendre le génocide rwandais [Understanding the Rwandan Genocide] 93 (2014).


Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil 275 (2003). Dallaire wrote that he was roused “around 0330,” but it was likely closer to 2:30 a.m., since the first plane landed at 3:10 a.m.

Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil 275 (2003).

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

José de Pinho, Comprendre le génocide rwandais [Understanding the Rwandan Genocide] 94 (2014).

José de Pinho, Comprendre le génocide rwandais [Understanding the Rwandan Genocide] 96 (2014).


José de Pinho, Comprendre le génocide rwandais [Understanding the Rwandan Genocide] 98 (2014).

Report from Henri Poncet to Jacques Lanxade (27 Apr. 1994). The document lists the time as 01:10 UT, which was 3:10 a.m. in Kigali.


Cable from ARMEE CENTOPS Paris to MILFRANCE Kigali and COMELEF Bangui (8 Apr. 1994) in MIP Tome II, Annex 8.1 (Subject: “Operation Amarillys” [sic]).

MIP Tome I 270.
179 MIP Tome I 270.
180 MIP Tome I 270.

181 The Bloody Tricolour (BBC 1995) (including interview with Col. Luc Marchal); Jean de la Gueriviere, Un officier belge maintient ses déclarations sur l’attitude de la France lors du génocide rwandais [Belgian Officer Maintains His Statements on France’s Attitude During the Rwandan Genocide], LE MONDE, 23 Aug. 1995.

182 MIP Tome I 278.
183 Interview by LFM of Paul Rwarakabije.


185 Hubert Védrine, Rwanda: les faits [Rwanda: The Facts], INSTITUT FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND (15 June 2004).

186 Jean de la Gueriviere, Un officier belge maintient ses déclarations sur l’attitude de la France lors du génocide rwandais [Belgian Officer Maintains His Statements on France’s Attitude During the Rwandan Genocide], LE MONDE, 23 Aug. 1995.


189 Jean Kambanda, Speech announcing composition of the interim government (9 Apr. 1994) (transcribed by the ICTR).

190 Jean Kambanda, Speech announcing composition of the interim government (9 Apr. 1994) (transcribed by the ICTR).


196 See generally ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 221-327 (2003) (Chapters 10 & 11).

197 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 279 (2003).

198 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 279 (2003).

199 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 279 (2003).


201 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 281 (2003).

202 RICHARD KALKA, DIEU DÉSARMÉ [GOD, UNARMED] 71-72 (2013). During his 35 years as a military chaplain to French forces deployed around the world, Father Kalka earned many decorations, “including the rank of Knight of the Legion of Honor, the Croix de guerre des théâtres d'opérations extérieurs with distinction, the Croix de la valeur militaire with distinction[,] and on May 8, he was elevated to the rank of Commander of the National Order of Merit, for which he was awarded the medal by Major General Frédéric Thuet.” Mazères, Le Père Kalka commandeur de l'ordre national du Mérite [Father Kalka, Commander of the National Order of Merit], LA DÉPÊCHE DU MIDI, 5 May 2018.

203 Catherine Bond, Listening Carefully, Looking Harder, in THE MEDIA AND MASS ATROCITY 60 (Allan Thompson ed. 2019). See also LFM Interview with Catherine Bond.


208 LFM Interview with Catherine Bond.


210 Cable from ARMEES CENTOPS Paris to MILFRANCE Kigali and COMELEF Bangui (8 Apr. 1994) in MIP Tome II, Annex 8.1 (Subject: “Operation Amarillys” [sic]).

211 Note from Christian Quesnot and Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (9 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Situation”) (reporting back to President Mitterrand that his instructions to evacuation the close family of President Habyarimana had been followed) (emphasis in original).

212 Note from Christian Quesnot and Dominique Pin to François Mitterrand (9 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Situation”) (emphasis in original); MIP Tome I 270 (indicating that the first transport aircraft took off at 5 p.m.).


214 Memorandum from Christine Butel (14 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Prise en charge du voyage de la famille présidentielle rwandaise”) (requesting that the Ministry of Cooperation pay for the plane tickets used to transport the Habyarimana family to Paris in business class). The Habyarimana family spent several days in the Central African Republic (CAR). On 13 April, French Foreign Minister Juppé informed Mitterrand that CAR President Ange-Félix Patassé “wants to get rid of them.” Duclert Commission Report 369 (quoting AN/PR-BD, AG/5(4)/BD/60; File 2, Restricted Council of Wednesday, 13 April, “Situation au Rwanda”). The options, Juppé said, were to take the family to Zaire or to France. “If they want to come to France, France will naturally welcome them,” Mitterrand said. Id. (quoting AN/PR-BD, AG/5(4)/BD/60; File 2, Restricted Council of Wednesday, 13 April, “Situation au Rwanda”).

215 Jean-Christophe Klotz, *Retour à Kigali: une affaire française [Return to Kigali: A French Affair]* (2019 (containing interview with General Christian Quesnot at approximately 0:42:00).

216 *Officials Take Refuge in French Embassy as Clashes Continue*, AFP, 8 Apr. 1994.


218 ANDRÉ GUICHAOUA, *FROM WAR TO GENOCIDE: CRIMINAL POLITICS IN RWANDA, 1990-1994*, Annex 83.2 (2015) (“liste des personnes à risque”). The list included six ministers in the coalition government: Minister of Health Casimir Bizimungu; Minister of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture Daniel Mbangura; Minister of Planning Augustin Ngorabatware; Minister of Transportation and Communications André Ntagerura; Minister of Youth and Associations Callixte Nzabonimana; and Minister of Commerce, Industry and Crafts Justin Mugenzi. Id. These ministers were not, ultimately, among the Rwandans evacuated during Operation Amaryllis. Ambassador Marlaud told the MIP in 1998 that a number of Rwandan ministers preferred to stay in Rwanda while their families left the country. MIP Audition of Jean-Michel Marlaud, Tome III, Vol. 1, 300.


220 See Augustin Ngorabatware v. Prosecutor, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, Appeal Judgement Summary (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2014) (Trial Chamber Case No. ICTR-99-54-T) (showing that the appeals chamber reduced Ngorabatware’s sentence from 35 years to 30 years while affirming his convictions for committing direct and public incitement to commit genocide and for instigating and aiding and abetting genocide); Callixte Nzabonimana v.


223 MIP Audition of Jean-Michel Marlaud, Tome III, Vol. 1, 300. Addressing the MIP in 1998, Marlaud justified France’s decision to include Nahimana among the evacuees, noting that Nahimana had been designated to serve as minister of higher education and scientific research in the Broad-Based Transitional Government that was supposed to take office before the Genocide. “In that role, he had been accepted by the RPF,” Marlaud asserted. Id.


226 LAURENT LARCHER, RWANDA : ILS PARLENT [RWANDA: SPEAKING UP] 808 (2019); see also MIP Audition of Alain Juppé, Tome III, 99. Before the MIP, Minister of Defense Leotard also claimed to be unaware of any ethnic discrimination on the ground. See MIP Hearing of François Léotard, Tome III, Vol. 1, 98.


229 Jean-Christophe Klotz, Retour à Kigali: une affaire française [Return to Kigali: A French Affair] (2019) (containing interview with Michel Cuingnet at approximately 0:39:50); MIP Audition of Michel Cuingnet, Tome III, Vol. 1, 175. The MIP, however, noted that Venuste Kayimahe, a Tutsi employee at the French cultural center, had testified that after French military had refused to evacuate him, Cuingnet told him, “[W]e are not charged with saving Rwandans.” MIP Tome I 284. Kayimahe said in a recent interview, however, that the soldiers, not Cuingnet, had told him that Ambassador Marlaud had given the order not to evacuate Rwandans. Interview by LFM with Venuste Kayimahe.

230 MIP Tome I 284 (also noting that Jean Marc Rochereau de la Sablière had said that “the ambassador would have evacuated the local staff that was absent from the embassy, if they could have been reached”).


232 MIP Audition of Jean-Michel Marlaud, Tome III, Vol. 1, 299; see also Officials Take Refuge in French Embassy as Clashes Continue, AFP, 8 Apr. 1994.


234 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Dominique Pin (11 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

235 See Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Trial Transcript 59 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 8 Nov. 2005). The number and identity of the ministers in attendance remains unclear. However, one of the ministers present has testified that the attendees included several ministers who ultimately retained their positions in the soon-to-be-formed interim Rwandan government (IRG).


Chapter VIII

6 April 1994 – 14 April 1994

240 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence ¶¶ 1291, 1308-09 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008). Justin Mugenzi also has testified that shortly after the ministers’ meeting in Ambassador Marlaud’s office on 8 April, a Rwandan Army convoy picked him up and took him to the Ministry of Defense. Mugenzi said he was summoned to the Ministry because of his position as leader of the Parti libéral; the other ministers who had been with him at the French embassy that morning did not follow. See Prosecutor v. Casimir Bizimungu et al., Case No. ICTR-99-50-T, Trial Transcript 51 & 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 8 Nov. 2005).
242 MIP Tome I 339.
244 See Duclert Commission Report 355 (referring to the interim government’s “reactionary nature” (quoting DGSE/Diffusion, fiche n°18499N, 9 Apr. 1994, Rwanda éléments sur le gouvernement intérimaire.)); Memorandum from Arlene Render to George Moose, 11 Apr. 1994 (Subject: “Political Strategy for Rwanda”) (describing the newly formed interim Rwandan government as having a “rightist bent”).
249 Interview with Jean-Michel Marlaud by Christophe Boisbouvier, JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Apr. 1994. Marlaud would say much the same to the MIP. See MIP Audition of Jean-Michel Marlaud, Tome III, Vol. 1 297 (“The composition of this government was apparently in line with the Arusha Accords, as it provided for the allocation of portfolios between political parties. However, one could question [the IRG’s] real representativeness. With each party divided, the nominees represented rather a shift in favor of the most extreme trend.”).
250 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Dominique Pin (9 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Situation”).
251 MIP Tome I 271 (“An April 10 message from the defense attaché says: ‘On the 10th, in the provinces, the RPF implemented its threat and advanced in the afternoon, the equivalent of two battalions to 10 and 15km north of Kigali, while attempting to cut off the road going South from Kagitumba.’ This information given by French soldiers and confirmed in Kigali by Rwandan authorities during the rapporteurs’ visit, definitively rejects the argument that the RPF would have proceeded, starting on the morning of April 6th, with troop movements in order to reach Kigali by 6 p.m. that evening, which could have led to believe that they knew of the planned attack against the presidential plane.”).
252 Fiche Particulière, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (9 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Elements sur le Gouvernement Interimaire”).
253 Fiche Particulière, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (9 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Elements sur le Gouvernement Interimaire”).
255 Memorandum from Alex Kanyarengwe (24 May 1992) (Subject: “Appointments - Executive Committee”).
256 Memorandum from the RPF (28 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “Abagize Gouvernement Y’inzibacyuho Muri FPR”).
257 Fiche Particulière, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (8 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Analyse de la situation a 12 heures”).
259 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Dominique Pin (11 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Dominique Pin (11 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (“On the military side, the situation is very worrying. In Kigali heavy fighting and massacres continue. The RPF increases its pressure on the capital. He managed to inflict 400 men about ten kilometers from Kigali, could quickly threaten the security of the airport and control a portion of the access routes.”).

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

Interview by LFM with Charles Kayonga.

During the Genocide, Polisi acted as a spokesperson for the RPF, often writing RPF press releases and interacting with Western media, international bodies, and international NGOs. A teacher in Burundi, Polisi moved to Rwanda and, in 1993, was part of the team assigned to conduct political mass mobilization in areas controlled by the RPF. Memorandum from the PMM Commission (9 Sept. 1993) (Subject: “Report of the Commission on Social Welfare and Labor Policy for 3 months (6 June – 9 September 1993 in the DMZ”). Tactical strategies of youth mobilization became the focus of his training sessions. Memorandum from Angelo Semwaga (8 Sept. 1993) (Subject: “Ubuyobozi Bw’Urubyirko No Gushaka Abatabazi”). In December 1993, the RPF officially announced its new leadership and participants in the transitional government and parliament. Polisi was announced as “Second Vice President” of the RPF. Memorandum from Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe, RPF President (27 Dec. 1993) (Subject: “Leaders Du FPR-Inkotanyi”); see also Cable from American Embassy in Kigali (Signed by David Rawson, US Ambassador to Rwanda) to US Secretary of State (28 Jan. 1994) (Subject: “Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) New Leadership”).


*Le FPR demande à la France de rester neutre* [The RPF Asks France to Remain Neutral], AFP, 9 Apr. 1994.

MIP Tome I 271-72, 277. There is some indication, too, that 2 DGSE officers remained in Kigali after Amaryllis ended to continue providing intelligence on developments in Rwanda during the Genocide. See Duclert Commission Report 897 (citing SHD, GR 203 17 1, Fiche 20 Mar. 1998).


Cable from ARMEES CENTOPS Paris to COMELEF Bangui and COMOPS Kigali (12 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Operation Amaryllis”).

MIP Tome I 278.

MIP Tome I 278.

End of Operation Report for Amaryllis, état-major des armées, (15 Apr. 1994) (“[T]he RPF having consolidated its positions around the capital and the airport, the possibility of a fire support to protect the departure of the last aircraft is envisaged. To this end, the C 135 put in place on April 10 in N’Djamena is positioned in Bangui where with two Jaguars armed with rockets, it will be on alert on April 14 at 04:00Z.”).

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (13 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).


MIP Tome I 277.


Restricted Council Meeting Notes (13 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).
A. As Genocidal Massacres Continued in April and May of 1994, French Officials Blamed the RPF—the Only Force in the World Trying to Stop the Genocide—and Insisted That the RPF Lay Down Its Arms and Negotiate with the Génocidaires.

The RPF is the most fascist party I have encountered in Africa. It can be equated to the ‘khmers noirs.’


As days passed and the casualties mounted, French decision-makers continued to treat the situation in Rwanda not as the Genocide that it was, but as a war between two armies. Their position, in short, was that Rwanda’s problems could be solved if only the two sides would stop fighting each other on the battlefield and reconvene at the negotiating table. “In general, for a certain time after the shoot down of the Habyarimana plane, we felt we had to do everything to save Arusha,” Hubert Védrine would recall during a 2014 symposium. “This may seem naïve and unrealistic today, but that is the way we saw it at the time.”

It was a worthy enough goal, in the abstract. Indeed, RPF leaders said they, too, hoped to see the Arusha Accords restored, believing the accords could yet “form the basis of a new government” once the fighting had concluded. There was a reason, though, why the fighting remained ongoing: it was because the leaders of Rwanda’s self-proclaimed government were orchestrating the extermination of the Tutsi. To RPF leaders, there was no imperative more pressing than ending the slaughter of civilians. “The most important thing now,” the RPF declared in a 10 April press release, “is to stop the gang [i.e., the interim government—ed.] from killing and to neutralise them.”

French officials were of an entirely different mindset. As Defense Minister François Léotard told reporters on 14 April 1994, the French government’s view was that there could be “no military solution” to the conflict—only a “resumption of political dialogue.” To that end, Léotard said, “We are currently trying to converse with everyone to prevent a bloodbath from developing.”

It was, of course, already too late to “prevent a bloodbath.” French officials, nevertheless, felt it was incumbent on the RPF—the only force in the world trying to stop the génocidaires—to lay down its arms. On 15 April, according to a US cable, officials from the Quai d’Orsay met with an unnamed RPF representative in Paris and “urged an end to the RPF offensive as the only way to end ethnic strife.” By that point, as noted in Chapter 8, Section C, French officials knew of the Presidential Guard’s leading role in the massacres. And, by 19 April, a French army intelligence assessment acknowledged the participation of the FAR in the killings: “the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR), the Presidential Guard and the Hutu militias, with the help of the population, massacre many Tutsis.”
While much of the world was ready to condemn the perpetrators of the Genocide, French officials had no doubt that the international community had it backward. As Jean-Michel Marlaud, the French ambassador to Rwanda, elaborated to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 25 April 1994:

The argument that [the RPF] will stop the fighting only when the [abuses] and the massacres are interrupted reverses the chain of causalities. If it is true that at the time the President’s death was announced, the [abuses] immediately began and provided a foundation for the armed intervention of the RPF, today the situation is quite the opposite: The Hutu, as long as they have the feeling that the RPF is trying to seize power, will react by ethnic massacres. Only a stop to the fighting could allow a progressive recovery of the situation in hand.9

Few senior French officials offered as inverted a perspective, and were as outspoken in private, as General Christian Quesnot, President Mitterrand’s top military adviser. In the three years since Quesnot had advised Mitterrand to withdraw Noroît troops, Quesnot had become convinced that “the RPF is the most fascist party I have encountered in Africa,” as he would put it to Bruno Delaye on 29 April 1994. “It can be equated to ‘khmers noirs’” (a reference to Cambodia’s totalitarian, Communist, genocidal Khmer Rouge regime10).

In the same meeting, Quesnot seemed to accept the targeted murder of political opponents and the genocidal massacre of Tutsi as the understandable reaction to the loss of one of its leaders by the Presidential Guard.11 (The Guard’s second-in-command, Major Thaddée Bagaragaza, had been traveling in Habyarimana’s plane when it was shot down.)12 “It was mercenaries, recruited by the RPF or from it, who shot down the airplane,”13 Quesnot alleged without detail or evidence (and despite the DGSE’s rejection of this theory more than two weeks earlier),14 recasting an accusation he had made, also without evidence, less than 24 hours after the plane went down.15 “And so, the Presidential Guard, whose head had been killed along with the President and which is not composed of choirboys, began to massacre: their President had been killed.”16

For Quesnot, France’s involvement in Rwanda from 1990 to 1993 had kept the peace instead of enabling government massacres, and what was happening now was a byproduct of the withdrawal of French troops. “As long as we had about a company of parachutists on the ground to train the Rwandan soldiers, there were no massacres,” Quesnot said, a flagrant falsehood ignoring the thousands of civilians who had been killed by, and at the direction of, elements of the Rwandan government. “Our military presence prevented the RPF from seizing power by force and allowed the two parties to come to the negotiation table and sign the Arusha Accords. Our military presence would have stopped the massacres.”17 The implication was clear and the logic twisted: if French troops had stayed in Rwanda, they would have remained a deterrent to the RPF advance (just as they had done in October 1990, June 1992, and February 1993) and in so doing, would have removed the impetus for the FAR and militias to respond by massacring civilians.18

The DGSE, the main French intelligence service, often had a more accurate read of the situation. As an intelligence report from 2 May would put it:
Any specific action in Rwanda faces a real dilemma: how to help Rwanda—especially politically—when the only truly representative interlocutor of the majority ethnic group, the interim government, bears obvious responsibility for the current massacres? In order to be truly effective, France’s action could perhaps begin with an irrevocable condemnation of the actions of the [Presidential Guard] and more specifically of Colonel Bagosora, the director of the cabinet of the minister of defense, who is considered to be the main instigator of the murders—very “targeted”—at the beginning of the crisis.19

But the French government did not issue these condemnations, certainly not in a way that would have made a difference. As discussed below, they urged IRG leaders to exercise restraint while sending signals of support and, according to some reports, sending military assistance. As it had been with Habyarimana when his government massacred Tutsi, the French government’s ultimate fidelity was clear.

B. France Must Clarify How Senior French Officials Responded to the IRG’s Regular Requests for Arms and Other Support during the Genocide.

On 7 April 1994, according to the MIP interview of Michel Roussin, the French minister of cooperation from 1993 to 1995, the Rwandan government “made an important request . . . which concerned seventeen different ammunition or equipment delivery sites.”20 Roussin told the MIP that France’s Secretary-General of National Defense, to whom the request was made, “refused the delivery,” with all French arms exports to Rwanda suspended as of 8 April 1994.21

France has not made documents available to support this claim, and there is evidence that arms support may have continued. For instance, on 15 April 1994—one day after Operation Amaryllis concluded—Colonel Christian Luc Vaganay, the head of the situation office in the Directorate of Military Intelligence (Direction du Renseignement Militaire, or DRM), France’s army intelligence bureau, met with Col. Sébastien Ntahobari, the IRG’s defense attaché in Paris, at the latter’s request.22 Ntahobari asked Col. Vaganay to make the “French government” aware of the IRG army’s “urgent need of ammunitions,” particularly 60mm mortar shells and ammunition for South African-made R4 assault rifles and Belgian-made FAL battle rifles.23 The IRG was also seeking “transport assistance” for 5,000 60mm mortar shells stuck in Tel Aviv, Israel and grenades awaiting shipment from Warsaw, Poland.24

On 15 April, Col. Vaganay relayed the requests to General Jean Heinrich, the head of the DRM,25 who reportedly forwarded them to Philippe Jehanne, a former DGSE officer and defense advisor to the French minister of cooperation, who in April 1993 had traveled to Rwanda to assess the FAR’s military assistance needs.26 Heinrich wrote to Jehanne, “This note is addressed to you for assignment with respect to paragraphs 2 and 3 (for all purposes)”; paragraphs 2 and 3 concerned the IRG’s requests for ammunition and transportation of ammunition.27

The available paper trail as to what actions Jehanne took, if any, ends there.28 Just over a month later, however, on 19 May—two days after the United Nations had placed an embargo on arms deliveries to Rwanda—Jehanne reportedly told the historian Gérard Prunier: “We are busy delivering ammunition to the FAR through Goma, [Zaire]. But of course, I will deny it if you quote
me in the press.” 29 (Though Prunier published this recollection in 1995, he was not questioned about it when he testified before the MIP in 1998. 30 Jehanne was never called before the MIP. 31) As this report details below, some French officials have suggested that covert arms deliveries may have continued even further into the Genocide.

C. Due to International Condemnation of the Genocide, the French Government’s Assistance to the Génocidaires May Have Been Covert.

The French government was under tremendous international pressure, particularly from the media, to disavow its allies in Rwanda. To cite just one example, in a 14 April opinion piece in the New York Times titled “French Guns, Rwandan Blood,” journalist Frank Smyth excoriated France’s history of arming the Habyarimana regime despite its participation in the murder of “thousands of Tutsi” in the years since 1990, and concluded that “in propping up the Rwandan regime for so long, [France] bears part of the blame for the current bloodbath.” 32 This read of the conflict outraged senior French officials like Élysée Africa Cell chief Bruno Delaye, who lamented in a 28 April note to President Mitterrand that “international and [French] national public opinion” generally portrayed the RPF as “liberators” and the Rwandan government as “extremists.” 33 In particular, he regretted that France “continue[d] to be accused of having supported the ‘dictator Habyarimana.’” 34

A pair of early-May notes from Gen. Quesnot to President Mitterrand illustrate the bind in which the Élysée found itself. “[T]he Quai d’Orsay, noting public opinion and the necessity not to fuel the conflict, believes it necessary to support the American proposal of an embargo on weapons and ammunition destined for Rwanda,” Quesnot wrote on 3 May. 35 Three days later, Quesnot proposed a workaround: an “indirect strategy . . . that could restore a certain balance,” avoiding “a direct strategy in the region that could seem politically difficult to establish.” 36

In 2019, the French journalist Jean-Christophe Klotz asked Quesnot what exactly he had been proposing. 37 After a long pause, Quesnot said: “I was not proposing anything concrete . . . at this stage. It’s true that I felt—well, we were a little frustrated by the RPF’s victory in this campaign. We could not try to restore a form of balance to get back to Arusha.” 38 When asked if indirect strategy meant clandestine—or, at least, discreet—Quesnot replied, “Discreet, not necessarily clandestine.” 39

That assistance may have included French military advisors who, there is reason to believe, remained in Rwanda after Operation Amaryllis concluded. Olivier Lanotte, a central Africa scholar, has written that three French “political and military personalities who held significant positions at the time of the events” confirmed to him that French military advisors stayed in Rwanda after Amaryllis before being removed during Turquoise. 40 Lanotte, who acknowledged that several military officers had denied this, wrote that the sources confirming their presence had been constrained by their duty of confidentiality from providing details. 41 Lanotte also wrote that during a 2006 interview General Quesnot had confirmed to Lanotte the retention of “about ten” soldiers between mid-April and the end of June 1994 without providing any detail on their mission or activities. 42 This decision would have required political input: Quesnot told Lanotte that retaining these forces would have required a consensus between the Élysée and the cohabitation government. 43
General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, who would lead Operation Turquoise, told the political scientist Gabriel Périès and the journalist David Servenay that there were French people “locked up in Kigali” after 14 April. Périès and Servenay reported that intelligence operations specialists would have referred to these people, who may have been mercenaries, as “sonnettes,” in the French military vernacular (meaning “doorbells,” in reference to their mission to sound alarm in response to events on the ground). The sonnettes were “able to stay days, even weeks, in one place to observe a situation and report on it daily.” This explanation aligns with a June 1994 story in RAIDS, a French military magazine, which reported that “a few elements of the special forces would stay in ‘bells’ [after April 14] to report on events to the Army Staff [état-major].”

If, indeed, French soldiers or spies did remain in Rwanda after 14 April, the French government should clarify their mission. Since French forces had served primarily to support and embolden the Rwandan government before the Genocide, it seems unlikely that the French government would have left assets in Rwanda to moderate the IRG’s forces from within, a charitable hypothesis considered by Olivier Lanotte, and, in substance, advanced by Quesnot himself in his 29 April meeting with Delaye. Lanotte, however, remarked that “the defenders of unfailing support for the FAR—those who constitute what [the journalist and Rwanda specialist] Patrick de Saint-Exupéry calls ‘the French Africanist military lobby’—continued their cooperation with the FAR throughout the spring of 1994. And they did so without too much fuss.” It stands to reason that any continuing French presence in Rwanda would have served, at least in part, to benefit the IRG and the FAR.

**D. As Massacres Took Hundreds of Thousands of Lives in Full View of the International Community, the French Government Helped Shape a Portrayal of the Crisis as a Sudden Outbreak of Mindless Violence, as Opposed to a Genocide Orchestrated by Members of the Interim Rwandan Government.**

The 7 April 1994 murder of 10 Belgian UN peacekeepers by members of Rwanda’s Presidential Guard, and the consequent decision by Belgium—the lone NATO country to volunteer troops for UNAMIR—to withdraw its remaining contingent from Rwanda, was a moment of reckoning for the international community. In effect, the United Nations had to choose among three options: 1) “massive and immediate” reinforcement of the UNAMIR mission, including a revised mandate that would authorize the use of force to restore law and order and end the killings; 2) the full withdrawal of UNAMIR troops; or 3) a compromise option that reduced UNAMIR’s presence to essential personnel, from 2,500 to 270 Kigali-based peacekeepers meant to serve as intermediaries between the IRG and the RPF.

On 13 April, Foreign Minister Juppé let Mitterrand know that he favored the third option—that is, to suspend UNAMIR while possibly retaining a “symbolic contingent” in its stead. “The Belgians are in favor of a suspension, and that’s my opinion too,” he told Mitterrand at the restricted council meeting that day. Mitterrand said he agreed.

The French government’s position evolved in the days that followed, with French Ambassador to the United Nations Jean-Bernard Mérimée eventually expressing support for an
increase in troops; Mérimée emphasized, however, that responses from any UN force should focus on the RPF’s role. A British diplomatic cable reported that, according to Mérimée:

The key was to exert political pressure, particularly on the RPF who seemed to be rejecting a cease-fire. They should be made to realize that any military victory would be only provisional. This would be important both within the country and with respect to the Governments of neighboring countries, for example Uganda. Uganda did have influence on the RPF. The international community should persuade them to put pressure on the RPF to agree to a cease-fire.

These sentiments aligned with those of Jean-Damascène Bizimana, the Habyarimana-appointed Rwandan ambassador to the United Nations, who said that “the Council should persuade the Rwandese Patriotic Front to agree to a comprehensive cease-fire, it being understood that it is futile to think that the crisis in Rwanda can be settled by military means.”

In these efforts, France had the backing of a powerful ally: UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. In his first formal report on the situation on 20 April 1994, Boutros-Ghali seemed to absolve the interim authorities of any responsibility for the targeted assassinations and ethnic massacres that followed the attack on Habyarimana’s plane. Employing terms that, according to Human Rights Watch, “seem[ed] to reflect the point of view of the interim government, as reinforced no doubt by France,” Boutros-Ghali claimed that authority in Rwanda had “collapsed” and attributed the violence to “unruly members of the Presidential Guard.”

Neither the United States nor the United Kingdom distinguished itself by prioritizing humanitarian considerations. UK Ambassador David Hannay insisted that even a vastly increased UNAMIR would find it difficult to adequately protect civilians. And though RPF Commander Kagame had spoken bluntly with a US diplomat, reminding her on at least one occasion, “Madame, they’re killing my people,” US officials remained worried about “the lessons of past operations” (the United States had lost 18 servicemen in a peacekeeping mission in Somalia the previous year) and advocated a “skeletal presence.” “I think it had a lot to do with the indifference, total ignorance of what was happening, or lack of sensitivity to what was happening,” Kagame would later tell an interviewer. “I, as a Rwandan, deep in what was happening and deeply being affected—my preoccupation was totally different.”

Ultimately, on 21 April, the Security Council adopted Resolution 912, which framed the Genocide much as the French and Boutros Ghali did, as a spontaneous outbreak of “mindless violence and carnage” in the wake of the presidential plane crash. The resolution prioritized a cease-fire, failed to condemn the IRG, and drastically drew down Gen. Romeo Dallaire’s UNAMIR troops. General Dallaire had pleaded with his superiors for a different decision. By this point in the Genocide, UNAMIR had evacuated approximately 4,000 people and was sheltering an additional 14,000 refugees in its camps. Most international relief organizations had fled Rwanda, violence continued unabated, and the UN’s troops were facing shortages of water, food, medical supplies, and sanitation facilities. But on 22 April, Dallaire watched about 1,000 of his troops ordered to Nairobi before being repatriated to their home countries.
On 28 April, Bruno Delaye would describe the UN, in a note to President Mitterrand, as “silent, humiliated and overwhelmed.”\(^{70}\) This time, he was right. Resolution 912 was an immediate failure. While tasking UNAMIR with continuing to serve as an intermediary, the resolution had removed the international backing that maintained its credibility and authority to do so. In its first test, a cease-fire conference between the IRG and the FAR scheduled for 23 April,\(^{71}\) an RPF representative appeared, but the IRG representatives never arrived.\(^{72}\)

More disastrously, that same weekend, FAR troops in the government-controlled region of Butare, in the south, stormed a hospital administered by Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders).\(^{73}\) Before the Genocide, MSF had drawn the ire of extremists for addressing its staffing shortages by hiring local Tutsi rendered unemployable by discrimination.\(^{74}\) As the violence grew worse, MSF lost over a hundred Tutsi staff while militias preyed on MSF ambulances, in some cases intercepting the wounded before they could reach hospitals.\(^{75}\) Finally, on 22 April, FAR troops rounded up and murdered the entire local staff of MSF’s Butare hospital, promising to return the next day to execute the patients.\(^{76}\) And they did, executing all 170.\(^{77}\)

These massacres were an inflection point in the world’s acceptance of the magnitude and barbarity of the crisis. (In its report, the French daily \textit{Libération} added that, according to the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, who had just returned from Rwanda, in Kigali, “there are decomposing bodies, devoured by dogs, rats and birds.”\(^{78}\)) In a 25 April call with the Security Council, MSF’s Belgian Secretary General, Alain Destexhe, said that in its 20-year-history, MSF had never experienced something similar, and that the IRG was executing a “clear policy of genocide” that would leave no Tutsi alive in the government-controlled South “within weeks.”\(^{79}\)

Some members of the Security Council had no trouble recognizing the Genocide for the very uncomplicated moral situation it was. In a meeting following Destexhe’s presentation, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Spain, and Pakistan all noted that by this point the Council was receiving information on Rwanda’s horrors in every meeting, and it was time for the United Nations to take action.\(^{80}\) In his notes on the discussion, Karel Kovanda, the Czech ambassador, was clear-eyed about both what was happening in Rwanda and why a cease-fire was not the solution: “A clear genocide is taking place, of the government and Presidential Guard Hutu units against the Tutsi.”\(^{81}\) While the United Nations continued to advocate “a cease-fire that puts both parties on the same level,” he wrote, “Is this not as though we wanted Hitler to reach a cease-fire with the Jews?”\(^{82}\)

French politicians, however, continued to advocate for just that, with Alain Juppé the latest to call for a return to Arusha in a press conference on 28 April.\(^{83}\) (Having undermined and destroyed any hope Arusha had of surviving, the IRG now wanted to observe one aspect of it very closely—the return of both combatants to their pre-6 April positions, as if the Genocide had never begun.\(^{84}\)) Paul Kagame, however, pointed out the obvious to US diplomats: a cease-fire would not bring an end to the Genocide.\(^{85}\)
E. French Officials Welcomed IRG Representatives to Paris, Bestowing Legitimacy on a Genocidal Government as They Discussed How the French Government Might Support the IRG.

It was a mistake to receive [them]. That’s a mistake we made that shocks me.86


Representatives of the genocidal interim Rwandan government (IRG) continued to press French officials for support. On 27 April 1994, the French government welcomed two senior IRG officials to the Élysée, Matignon (the prime minister’s office), and the Quai d’Orsay.87 Jérôme Bicamumpaka, whom the ICTR would later acquit of various charges of genocide and crimes against humanity,88 was the IRG’s minister of foreign affairs. His companion, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, was the Ministry’s political director. But it was Barayagwiza who wielded the real power between the two. The most influential leader of the CDR, Rwanda’s extremist anti-Tutsi party, Barayagwiza directed the CDR’s youth militia, the Impuzamugambi, to murder Tutsi at roadblocks before and during the Genocide, for which the ICTR would sentence him to 32 years.89

The day the pair arrived in Paris, the RPF issued a press release urging the international community not to recognize the “self-proclaimed” IRG, given “the active part in the massacres of the civilian population by the Presidential Guard, the militias and some elements of the army.”90 (While in Paris, Bicamumpaka and Barayagwiza sought visas to the United States at the US Embassy, and were denied.91 Belgium also turned them away.92)

“It was a mistake to receive [them],” French Defense Minister François Léotard would concede 25 years later, referring to Bicamumpka and Barayagwiza’s reception in Paris. “That’s a mistake we made that shocks me.”93 Asked by the MIP in 1998 about the visit, Hubert Védrine attempted to put it in context, saying that “contacts between France and all the protagonists [presumably meaning the RPF, the IRG, Uganda, and other African countries—ed.] had continued for several weeks after the start of the fighting, as long as there was still hope of a cease-fire,”94 which does not explain why the IRG guests were honored with an audience of high-ranking French officials. Moreover, according to historian and Élysée advisor Gérard Prunier, the RPF was having a difficult time getting meetings with senior decision-makers in the French government.95

If Foreign Minister Alain Juppé and Prime Minister Edouard Balladur met with Bicamumpaka and Barayagwiza, Prunier told the MIP, “it was because there was a perception problem within the French government,” meaning that senior French officials failed to accept that they were dealing with génocidaires.96 Bruno Delaye, however, when asked about the visit years later, implicitly acknowledged having known just whom he had welcomed to France: “I must have received 400 assassins and 2,000 drug traffickers in my office. With Africa, it’s impossible not to get your hands dirty.”97 (Delaye had previously contacted CDR leader Barayagwiza in 1992, when Delaye had warmly acknowledged a petition signed by Rwandan citizens and sent by Barayagwiza to Mitterrand thanking France for its involvement in Rwanda.98 Delaye sent his acknowledgement less than a month after CDR demonstrations in Kigali left several dead and just days after extremists massacred Tutsi in Kibuye, in western Rwanda.99)
French officials told US embassy representatives that they used the meeting with Bicamumpaka and Barayagwiza to urge an end to the violence. The IRG officials, however, had something else on their minds. According to a US cable, Barayagwiza and Bicamumpaka wanted arms. “[N]ow that the massacres have stopped,” they reportedly said, in gross contradiction of the truth, “there is no reason not to provide the government with arms to enable it to defend itself against the RPF.” According to the cable, “[t]he request was turned down flat.”

The question of how senior French officials responded to these requests, however, remains open. In a 2013 report on the Genocide, Philippe Biberson, the president of Médecins sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders), recounted a meeting at Foreign Minister Juppé’s home a few days before the launch of Operation Turquoise, the French intervention in Rwanda that would begin in June 1994. Biberson pressed Juppé: “They say there are arms deliveries to the Rwandan government . . . is it true that France is continuing to deliver arms to Goma?” Juppé responded: “Look, it’s all very confusing, there were indeed cooperation or defense agreements with the government, there may have been leftovers. But as far as my services are concerned, I can tell you that since the end of May there have certainly been no more arms deliveries to the Habyarimana regime.” “But,” he added, looking across the Seine towards the Élysée Palace, “what may be happening there, I don’t know.” Juppé later claimed that “over there” meant “in Rwanda” and not “at the Élysée.” Either way, according to Biberson’s account, Juppé himself acknowledged that the provision of arms continued at least until the end of May, a month and a half into the Genocide, and at least some time after the 17 May UN embargo was announced.

Mitterrand himself was vague on the issue of covert support. Bernard Debré, the minister of cooperation from November 1994 to May 1995, told the MIP that he had asked Mitterrand (Debré did not say when) if France had continued to deliver weapons to Rwanda after the Genocide began on 6 April 1994. Mitterrand responded cryptically. “You believe,” Mitterrand said, “that the world woke up on the morning of 7 April and said, ‘Today the genocide begins?’” Debré took this as “a possible confirmation that ammunition aid continued after 6 April 1994.”

These statements raise critical questions about whether the Government of France continued to arm its allies in Rwanda as many of them committed genocide. The Government of Rwanda has made repeated requests for documents that clarify the issue. The Government of France has not responded to these requests.

Whether or not the French government supplied weapons to the FAR in late April or early May 1994, French officials continued to consider what the DGSE referred to in a 2 May 1994 memorandum as “[a]ppropriate action” against the RPF. The DGSE memorandum employed the same ethnically deterministic logic adopted by French officials in the past (see discussion in Chapter 2) to argue that if the RPF’s military took control of Rwanda, the country would be “governed by an ethnic group (the Tutsi) that represents barely 14 percent of the population. In this context, ignoring the 85 percent Hutu [population] would be tantamount to endorsing a regime whose influence and credibility could not be expected to last long term.” Nor had the DGSE lost sight of the geopolitical costs of failing to oppose RPF military control of Rwanda:
After wiping out four years of Franco-Rwandan cooperation, how will it be possible to guarantee that similar situations will not provoke identical withdrawal reactions in other African countries in the future? Throughout the Rwandan tragedy, the credibility of France’s specific action in Africa could be called into question.\textsuperscript{109}

French officials continued to explore ways of avoiding this outcome. In a 11 May memo, advisors to Prime Minister Balladur assessed a range of options, including the possibility of dispatching an “interposition” force to separate the two armies.\textsuperscript{110} The advisors concluded this last option was “inconceivable because of the total overlapping of the opposing communities.”\textsuperscript{111} The advisors could not so easily dismiss an alternative option, which was, simply, to offer “support for the Rwandan interim authorities.”\textsuperscript{112} This, they acknowledged, “could certainly prolong the conflict.”\textsuperscript{113} On the other hand, they wrote, it “would be the only chance to give the Hutu majority the means to guard against the RPF’s complete control of power.”\textsuperscript{114}

Of all the officials in Paris who remained determined to prevent an RPF takeover, few, outside of General Quesnot, were as vocally hostile to the RPF as his former deputy, General Jean-Pierre Huchon. Promoted in mid-1993 to head the Military Cooperation Mission (MMC),\textsuperscript{115} Huchon would go to great lengths to refute allegations that the IRG and government forces were to blame for massacres during the Genocide.\textsuperscript{116} He would maintain, as the Genocide was nearing its end, that France should continue to view the RPF as its adversary.\textsuperscript{117}

Huchon had a penchant for secrecy, as evidenced early in the French government’s intervention in Rwanda, when he regularly faxed private messages to the French defense attaché in Kigali, often with instructions to destroy the message once read.\textsuperscript{118} He showed traces of the same instinct on 9 May 1994, when he received two guests at the MMC offices: Col. Sébastien Ntahobari, the IRG’s Defense Attaché in Paris, and Lt. Col. Ephrem Rwabalinda, an advisor to the IRG army’s Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{119} Rwabalinda, according to his account of the meeting, asked for French diplomatic support, the return of the French military to Rwanda “or at the very least a contingent of instructors to lend a hand in the framework of cooperation,” as well as ammunition and equipment.\textsuperscript{120} Huchon responded by providing his interlocutors with a “secure telephone allowing Gen. [Augustin] Bizimungu [the head of the IRG’s armed forces] and Gen. Huchon to talk without being listened to (cryptophony) by a third party . . . .”\textsuperscript{121} It thus appears that Huchon—whom Admiral Jacques Lanxade, President Mitterrand’s top military adviser until April 1991, had designated as the primary contact for President Habyarimana during Lanxade’s tenure—was setting up a direct communication link with the FAR’s chief of staff during the Genocide.

Years later, Gen. Huchon admitted to having provided the telephone, but said his intention was “to try to limit the consequences of phone tapping by extremist elements in control of telephone switchboards in Rwanda,” as if Gen. Bizimungu was not himself an extremist.\textsuperscript{122} But Huchon insisted that he “never had protected telephone connections with any Rwandan military authority” and further had “no idea of what became of that telephone set.”\textsuperscript{123}

For other IRG requests, Huchon explained to his guests that “French soldiers have their hands and feet tied [with regard to] carry[ing] out an intervention in [the IRG’s] favor because of the opinion of the media that only the RPF seems to be leading.”\textsuperscript{124} He entreated the IRG to “provide without delay all the evidence proving the legitimacy of the war waged by Rwanda so
that international opinion can be turned in Rwanda’s favor and bilateral cooperation can be resumed.”125 “The French government,” Huchon continued along these lines during subsequent meetings, according to Rwabalinda’s account, “will not accept being accused of supporting people whom international opinion condemns and who do not defend themselves. The media fight is an emergency.”126 Huchon would, years later, suggest that he had urged Rwabalinda and Ntahobari during the 9 May 1994 meeting to tell Kigali to stop the massacres,127 but Rwabalinda understood Huchon’s concern to be the media not the massacres.

Huchon may have made other assurances to Rwabalinda. Rwabalinda’s 16 May report on the meeting mentions, cryptically, that “the military cooperation mission is preparing relief actions to be carried out in our favor.”128 The next day, 17 May—the day the United Nations passed the arms embargo and decided to supplement UNAMIR troops (see discussion below)—an RTLM hate media announcer crowed that he had received the “good news” that France would send troops with the United Nations and “once again” provide “substantial assistance,” which it had “promised to increase.”129 To “continue to receive this kind of good news,” the announcer admonished, “they request that it should no longer be possible to see a dead body in the street or that no one else starts killing while others observe the scene laughing, instead of handing it over to the authorities.”130 It would seem that this is how IRG authorities interpreted Huchon’s message of support: stop the massacres—or, at least, hide them from the media—and the French government would resume assistance.

The French government knew that the IRG bore “obvious responsibility for the current massacres,” as the DGSE had put it on 2 May 1994.131 Continuing to communicate with its emissaries allowed French officials, according to Huchon and Védrine, to apply pressure to end the Genocide. But the French government continued to offer a carrot—the return of its support—but no stick. There is no evidence that French officials threatened any diplomatic or military consequences for failing to stop the Genocide. Without such a threat, any anti-genocidal message was muted by signals that the French government continued to favor its historical allies in Rwanda, despite their involvement in the Genocide. And if, in fact, the French government continued to provide “discreet” military aid during this period, any message of restraint was meaningless.

Veneranda132

Veneranda was 26 years old and had two children at the time of the Genocide.

During the genocide, they wanted to kill people from the Tutsi ethnic group. My husband was a Tutsi, and so was my Dad. My mother is Hutu. There was no way my husband could have escaped. They came and killed him, and I remained with the children.

...
I could have chosen to be on my mother’s side and be called a Hutu since the Hutus were not threatened. I chose instead to remain with my children because I couldn’t imagine life without them afterwards.

My husband’s entire family—his mother, brothers and sisters—were all killed. Nobody survived in his family. I was one of a family of five, and today only my older sister and I survive from my Dad’s family. My mother is also still alive, but we have no one else left.

About five minutes after my husband was taken away, a young man called John came. He found me crying. He told me he had heard that they were going to come and kill the children and me. He said they wanted to wipe out my husband’s entire family, and he wanted to protect us. I left with him.

It was getting dark when we got to his house. He hid me in the bedroom so that no one could see me. He left for a while, but then came back at around seven in the evening. He told me that I was going to agree to anything he asked me to do, since he had agreed to hide me. I asked him what I might be able to do since I was hiding at his place.

He replied that there was something he wanted me to do, and I would just have to agree. I was scared. As an adult, I was starting to understand what he meant. He told me to lie down on the bed. I refused and said that I wasn’t going to, that he could kill me just as they had killed my husband. He had a knife, and he threw it at me here on the knee, where I have a scar. He said he was going to do what he wanted to do—with or without my permission—since he was stronger than me. And that’s when he made me do everything he wanted.

For three weeks, he used to come and rape me as he wished. He told me I shouldn’t try leaving the house because there was a roadblock outside his gate. If I tried to leave, they would kill me very painfully. He said that he’d kill me himself if I tried to escape. He used to stand with other people at that roadblock and said I shouldn’t make the mistake of trying to run away. The people outside would kill me.
F. During the Genocide, French Mercenaries Paul Barril and Bob Denard Allegedly Provided Training and Ammunition to the FAR, with the Knowledge of the French Government.

France’s “discreet” support to the IRG may have included not only possible clandestine provision of ammunition and military cooperants, but tacit facilitation of, or at least deliberate indifference to, the assistance offered to the IRG by French mercenaries Paul Barril and Bob Denard. Eyewitness accounts and documents show each of them had significant involvement in Rwanda during the Genocide and suggest they did so with the knowledge of, and perhaps at the behest of, the French government.

1. Paul Barril

A third-generation gendarme, Barril co-founded two seminal French law enforcement organizations: in 1974, the Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN), an elite tactical unit in the Gendarmerie that he commanded from 1982 to 1984; and, in 1982, the Élysée’s anti-terrorist cell. Barril would later leave both organizations and become the subject of much controversy, after GIGN officers under his authority planted evidence on three members of the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) to frame them for an August 1982 terrorist attack in Paris. Barril escaped prosecution, but a central figure in the plot claimed that the framing was Barril’s idea, an account that has been widely accepted in the French media.

In a 2004 interview with documentarian Raphaël Glucksmann, Barril said that after leaving the French government, his status became “ambiguous,” but he was still “paid by the defense ministry.” He went on to say that his involvement in Rwanda was “parallel diplomacy.” Barril also asserted that President Mitterrand was aware of his activities because he provided memoranda for the president through his advisor, François de Grossouvre.

Barril also worked for the Habyarimana family. The MIP, which reportedly allowed Barril to dodge its requests for testimony with the excuse that he was out of the country, concluded that Barril traveled to Rwanda during the Genocide with President Habyarimana’s son and son-in-law at the behest of Habyarimana’s widow, Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, to investigate the late president’s assassination. While such an investigation may have been part of his undertaking, Barril’s mission to Rwanda appears to have been broader. During the Genocide itself, Barril was heavily engaged in supporting the genocidal IRG; he received money for a variety of services, and the French government was aware of his actions.

On 27 April 1994, IRG Minister of Defense Augustin Bizimana wrote directly to Barril urgently requesting 1,000 men to fight alongside the IRG’s army. On or about 6 May, Barril traveled to Rwanda. According to internal IRG documents, the IRG paid Barril $130,000 for a “survey team” to fly to the country.

Eleven days after the United Nations issued its 17 May 1994 arms embargo that would “prohibit the sale or delivery to Rwanda, by or through their nationals, … of armaments and related materiel of any kind including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and refill pieces,” Barril signed an “Assistance Contract” with IRG Prime Minister Jean Kambanda to provide small arms, ammunition, mortars, shells, grenades,
and rifle grenades. The contract also committed Barril to providing 20 specialists to train and supervise men “in the field,” which in itself does not appear to have violated the UN arms embargo, but the stipulation that these specialists were to come outfitted with equipment likely would have. The total value of the contract for the weapons, ammunition, and mercenary trainers was $3.1 million. Although Barril appears to have been paid a little more than one-third of that amount on 15 June, he does not appear to have delivered what he promised; a 13 September 1994 letter from IRG Defense Minister Augustin Bizimana to IRG Prime Minister Jean Kambanda recommended seeking reimbursement from Barril for the advance paid on the 28 May 1994 contract.

Beyond contracting to supply the IRG with weapons, Barril was involved in training FAR soldiers. A member of the Rwandan Gendarmerie’s état-major at the time of the Genocide has said that the goal of Barril and his associates was to train an elite group of more than 30 FAR soldiers to penetrate behind enemy lines. The mission was announced sometime between mid-April and early June 1994 and was ominously dubbed “Operation Insecticide,” a reference to the anti-Tutsi slur “inyenzi” or “cockroach.” In a 2 June 1994 “situation report,” Barril described how he “set up four commando elements with a strength of 80 men” at Camp Bigogwe in the northwest. These units were “tasked with harassment and destruction in the enemy’s rear.”

How long this training lasted and whether Barril and his men continued to support the mission beyond the training is unclear. IRG Prime Minister Jean Kambanda told ICTR investigators that in June 1994 he met one of Barril’s men, who was training teams in the Gishwati region in northwest Rwanda, near Camp Bigogwe. Kambanda said the technician “stayed with us for a week in Gisenyi before disappearing.”

Whatever the full extent of Barril’s services to the IRG, French officials were at least aware of some of his activities in real time. As early as 2 June 1994, a DGSE report acknowledged that “it seems that Captain Barril . . . in liaison with the Habyarimana family taking refuge in Paris, is engaged in a noteworthy activity with a view to supplying ammunition and the armament with the governmental forces.” Mitterrand himself revealed some degree of awareness of Barril’s exploits, when he pointedly distanced the Élysée from Barril’s actions during a 1 July 1994 meeting with Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. “Captain Barril is a rogue,” Mitterrand told Museveni. “I do not trust him. He is retired from the French army, he is in the private sector, he is a mercenary. He never worked here at the Élysée, I have never seen him.”

Whether the French government eventually took steps to reign in Barril is unclear. To the extent that a French court now investigating Barril could clarify this and other questions surrounding Barril’s services to the IRG, it has been exceedingly slow to take action. On 24 June 2013, three French human rights organizations lodged a complaint against Barril on grounds of complicity in genocide. Since then, however, the case has languished. In January 2019, one of the human rights groups, Survie, took issue with the delay: “The investigation is progressing slowly, while Barril is now old and ill. . . . It has been almost 7 years.” The court ignored the criticism. By April 2020, nothing had changed. Survie released a public statement condemning this miscarriage of justice:
Chapter IX

15 April 1994 – 21 June 1994

[L]egal cases involving French civilians or soldiers such as the complaint against Paul Barril . . . have not seen any significant progress in the past year: at best, they are not a priority for the investigation division against crimes against humanity and crimes of genocide . . . ; at worst, they are instructed in a mode of self-censorship where the justice system refrains from going into the role of certain people who have been influential . . . . At this rate, there is no doubt that Paul Barril and the other accused of complicity in genocide will be able to end their days without ever being worried.”

2. Bob Denard

Paul Barril was not the only French mercenary active in Rwanda with the knowledge of the French government. The IRG also tried to enlist the assistance of Bob Denard, known in France as the “chien de guerre” [war dog] or “l’affreux” [the dreadful]. Denard had served in the French navy in Indochina and Algeria before becoming a mercenary involved in several civil wars and coups d’état in Africa and the Middle East. As a mercenary, Denard continued to work in the interest of and with tacit approval from the French state:

[Denard] has always acted with the green or yellow light from the French political authorities. But in doing so, he first sought to enrich himself. This is the principle of privateers who always served the same master. Robert Denard has always served the policy of France, “Françafrique.”

Documentation analyzed by Survie demonstrates that the IRG paid Denard under his alias Robert B. Martin, with Denard acting through a company called Martin & Co. While a contract is not available, it was likely signed around 17 June 1994, when IRG Defense Minister Bizimana ordered funds transferred for the benefit of a “Mr. B Martin,” pursuant to “a technical assistance contract with” the IRG’s Ministry of Defense. On the same day, Minister Bizimana wrote to Col. Ntahobari (defense attaché at the Rwandan embassy in France) authorizing the payment of $40,000 for a reconnaissance mission previously conducted by Denard. On 5 July 1994, the day after the RPF took Kigali, the IRG made another payment to Denard for 1,086,000 French francs (equivalent to about $200,000).

According to a 13 September 1994 letter from IRG Defense Minister Bizimana to IRG Prime Minister Kambanda, Denard’s company was “to train our people on the gathering and analyzing of intelligence within the ranks of the enemy.” Denard was “prepared to deploy 8 expatriate cadres for this activity.” That is to say, months after the Genocide had ended and the genocidal IRG was driven into exile, Denard was prepared to aid them. However, Denard had not followed through by 29 September, when the ex-FAR’s chief-of-staff, Gen. Augustin Bizimungu, concluded that a “contract for training in military intelligence for an amount of US $40,000 . . . was not executed. The amount is to be recovered.”

Certainly, the DGSE, the French intelligence agency, was aware that Denard was working on behalf of the IRG six weeks into the Genocide, as a 25 May 1994 DGSE note on “Attempts by the presidential clan to retain power” confirms:
Seeing its room to maneuver shrink as the rebel troops advance, the family of the former Rwandan president is ready to use any means to retain power.

At the same time, Mr. Bob Denard is continuing his preparations for an operation that could be linked to the recovery of the Kigali International Airport and the delivery of ammunition resupply. He intends to return to Rwanda (1) as early as Thursday, May 26, 1994.

(1) A team of Mr. Bob Denard is reportedly stationed in Kenya with equipment and plans to proceed to Rwanda shortly.174

In a February 2018 report on Denard, Survie alleged that his activities were “tolerated,” if not “encouraged” by the French state.175 At the very least, the DGSE was aware of Denard’s exploits in Rwanda.176 “But of course,” the report pointed out, “[Denard] has never been pursued for these activities.”177

G. At the United Nations, French Officials Continued to Obstruct Attempts to Hold the Génocidaires Responsible for the Slaughter in Rwanda.

Even as some members of the UN Security Council moved toward using the word “genocide,” French officials in late April 1994 continued to push for moral equivalence between the RPF and the IRG while obstructing attempts to lay blame where it belonged. In this effort, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued to be an ally. While Boutros-Ghali wrote a 29 April letter to the Security Council urging the United Nations to re-examine its decision to withdraw UNAMIR forces and consider “forceful action” in Rwanda, he once again described the massacres as orchestrated by “uncontrolled military” and “armed groups of civilians,” not the IRG.178 The distinction later prompted historian Alison Des Forges to observe that “[Boutros-Ghali] continued to obscure the government directed nature of the genocide and lent his credibility to the deliberately inaccurate depiction of the slaughter being disseminated by some representatives of France and by the genocidal government itself.”179 Even at the time, Council Members responded to Boutros-Ghali with “irritation” and saw his letter, at least in part, “as an exercise in blame shifting,” according to a cable by Colin Keating, the New Zealand ambassador.180

The French government’s efforts on behalf of the IRG scuttled even a symbolic Security Council statement drafted by Czech Ambassador Karel Kovanda that used the word “genocide” and blamed the IRG for failing to rein in the Presidential Guard and other genocidal elements of its army, warning the IRG to do so “immediately.”181 But the French delegation and the Rwandan delegation, which, held a rotating seat on the Security Council in 1994,182 were opposed to assigning responsibility to the IRG.183 (Unlike his French counterparts, Kovanda also did not prevaricate about the IRG: “The legitimacy of the current so-called interim government . . . is not at all clear and many people here consider it a bunch of self-selected people. . . . France, by contrast, is receiving members of the interim government in Paris.”184)

The deliberations lasted two days, including one “acrimonious debate that lasted eight hours.”185 At one point, French Ambassador Mérimée suggested introducing a reference to NGO
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reporting that claimed the RPF was also committing civilian massacres. 186 However, “when directly asked . . . which NGOs have reported about RPF massacres,” as Amb. Kovanda cabled to Prague, “[Ambassador Mérimée] didn’t respond (and judging from all we know about Rwanda, he couldn’t respond.)” 187 (Indeed, as French Ambassador to Rwanda Jean-Michel Marlaud cabled home on 13 May, after meetings in the Great Lakes region, “[m]any of my interlocutors mentioned the massacres in government zone, which some people have described as genocide. There is no evidence of such acts on a comparable scale in the RPF zone.” 188) Eventually, the deadlock was broken when the Council’s President, Ambassador Keating of New Zealand, threatened to declare the meeting an open session, with each country’s objections made public. 189 According to the US delegation, this likely would have shamed the French government into supporting the original letter. 190 The members managed to come to resolution: the final statement assigned blame to both the IRG and RPF and omitted the word “genocide.” 191

Hopes in the international community that the French government would at least condemn those responsible for the Genocide foundered. 192 For instance, in 9 and 10 May meetings between US and French diplomats meant to persuade France to support a possible investigation by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees into the Genocide, the French officials resisted or watered down the initiative, for instance requesting assurances that no investigation would impose a “collective guilt” on those responsible. 193

No country had more influence in Rwanda, but French officials proved unwilling to use it. French officials could, at the very least, have followed US diplomats’ lead and implored the IRG to put a stop to the incendiary broadcasts of RTLM and other Rwandan hate media, 194 which were widely known to have incited listeners to murder Tutsi. 195 Available records, though, indicate it took until early July 1994, nearly three months after the Genocide began, before a French diplomat finally urged the IRG to halt the broadcasts. 196 The French government could, in addition, have attempted to jam the broadcasts, as US officials considered but ultimately declined to do in early May 1994. 197 France would, eventually, explore this option, 198 but even after deciding to ship the necessary equipment to the region in July 1994, it never jammed the broadcasts. 199

NGOs hoped France would intervene as only it could, the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross arguing on 9 May that France had a “special role” to play in resolving the crisis. 200 MSF also stepped up pressure, as Dr. Jean-Hervé Bradol, the director of MSF’s Rwanda programs, recounted in 2014:

I returned to Paris in early May 1994. . . . [W]e still had some hope that the French government would intervene with its friends to reduce the massacres and create sanctuaries for those who were being pursued. At this point, the French government had not condemned the Genocide in Rwanda a single time. In order to get them involved, we started an aggressive media campaign on the theme of the responsibility of France, both on local TV and radio stations, and the first channel of French TV, which has several million viewers a night. 201

Mitterrand was not predisposed to accept the idea that France had a responsibility to help the people of Rwanda. “France, being a Francophone country, was constantly called for help, and we sent soldiers over there,” he remarked in a 10 May television interview. “But we did not send
an army to fight. We are not destined to go to war everywhere, even when it is horror that strikes
us in the face.”

There had long been a strain of fatalism in Mitterrand’s views on ethnic conflict and ethnic
slaughter. Jacques Attali, who had served as an advisor to Mitterrand between 1981 and 1991,
once wrote that Mitterrand had adopted a pragmatic, if cold, mindset in the face of an earlier
genocide: the mass killing of Jews during the Holocaust.203 In Attali’s telling, Mitterrand, though
“furiously anti-Hitlerian,” had viewed genocide as “only an act of war, not a human
monstrosity.”204 Mitterrand’s outlook on the ethnic violence in Rwanda appears to have been
similarly dispassionate, as though he considered the bloodletting inevitable. One journalist would
report in 1998 that Mitterrand, referring to the Genocide in Rwanda, remarked to family members
in the summer of 1994: “In such countries, genocide is not too important.”

On 11 May 1994, Foreign Minister Alain Juppé struck a note similar in tone to Mitterrand’s
sounding in his 10 May television interview. When asked why the world was so quick to respond
to ethnic cleansing in Bosnia but not in Rwanda, Juppé responded, “I do not believe that the
international community can go and police everywhere on the planet and send intervention forces
wherever people are fighting.” Then he again called for “a new cease-fire, a political
agreement.”207

On 16 May, however, Juppé finally changed his position on at least one aspect of the
conflict. That day, the European Union convened to recommend the dispatch to Rwanda of 5,500
additional UN peacekeeping troops, also calling for an arms embargo on what it referred to as a
“genocide.” Juppé concurred with its language: “What is currently being perpetrated in Rwanda
deserves the name genocide. The massacres are appalling, mainly in the area held by government
forces.” Olivier Lanotte, the central Africa specialist, has speculated that Juppé wanted to
pressure France to end military support to the FAR.210 Lanotte wrote as if in Juppé’s voice, “I
recognized that this is genocide. You can no longer ignore the genocidal reality of the Interim
Government. If you don’t want France to be accused of complicity one day, cut the bridges!”
However, as Lanotte added in a footnote, “According to a source close to the Élysée Palace, Alain
Juppé’s outburst about the ‘genocide’ was more aimed at breaking Matignon’s ‘lock’—Édouard
Balladur was extremely reticent about any idea of intervention in Rwanda—than at putting an end
to any French military presence in Rwanda.”

The next day, on 17 May, the United Nations passed Resolution 918, with French
support.213 It reversed the disastrous 21 April resolution by expanding UNAMIR’s mandate, which
would now include securing and protecting “civilians at risk” and supporting humanitarian relief
operations; by empowering UNAMIR to use force not only in self-defense, but in protection of
others; and, not least of all, by authorizing the United Nations to boost UNAMIR’s force level to
as many as 5500 troops. The 17 May resolution also imposed an arms embargo, banning the
sale of weapons, ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, and police equipment to
Rwanda.

Juppé’s acknowledgement that what was happening in Rwanda was, indeed, a “genocide”
came roughly six weeks into the killings; by that time, as the historian Gérard Prunier would later
point out in his testimony before the MIP, “at least 600,000 people were dead.” For many
countries, though, even those, such as France and the United States, that had been reluctant to apply the word “genocide” to the events in Rwanda, the inadequacy of all other terms was becoming manifest. A 19 May report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso, following his high-profile visit to Rwanda the previous week, confirmed that “extremely serious violations of human rights” were continuing to take place and took particular note of massacres in IRG-controlled territory. Though he omitted the detail from his official report, Lasso told diplomats that FAR Chief of Staff Bizimungu warned him that “[i]f the RPF continues the war, ... ‘We’ll exterminate all Tutsis.’”

On 25 May, just a few days after Lasso released his report, the UN Commission on Human Rights approved a resolution acknowledging “that genocidal acts may have occurred in Rwanda” and calling for a special rapporteur to investigate all such “breaches of international humanitarian law and crimes against humanity.” During the debate over the resolution, which was notably mild, French Minister Delegate for Humanitarian Action Lucette Michaux-Chevry unequivocally asserted that a genocide had occurred in Rwanda and said the world was waiting for those responsible “to be judged and condemned.”

Michaux-Chevry purported to be articulating the “French position.” Juppé, though, would later acknowledge that some French officials thought in May 1994 that, in using the word “genocide,” he (that is, Juppé) had gone “a little too far.” It was, however, around this same time, as Juppé would note, that French officials were increasingly recognizing that a military intervention might be required in Rwanda. But not only because the 5,500 UN troops (in what would be known as “UNAMIR II”) would be very slow in arriving: By the time Juppé made his 16 May announcement, Mitterrand’s Élysée advisors were convinced that the RPF, if left unchecked, was going to win the war.

**H. Despite Intensified Public Criticism of French Inaction in Late May and Early June, the French Government Continued to Insist It Had No Obligations in Rwanda.**

I have sometimes heard that France has failed in its duties; this is incorrect. The first duty of a country is to only dispose of the lives of its soldiers to defend its independence or to preserve its integrity. ... what is this divine decree that made France the soldier of all just causes in the world.


In the weeks following Alain Juppé’s recognition of the Genocide and the United Nations’ renewed promises to intervene, French policy was animated by severe media criticism of its inaction and the antiquated understanding of Rwanda that had informed French policy since 1990. The French media had given “accolades to the [French] government for the evacuation of French nationals,” when the Genocide had begun, but by mid-May the tone of the coverage shifted dramatically. On 17 May, Reuters reported that the French government stood accused of abetting the Genocide that Juppé had just acknowledged: “The French government has been accused by diplomats and humanitarian organizations, since the beginning of the massacres five weeks ago, of continuing to support the Rwandan government, made up of Hutus, despite the involvement of regular army soldiers in the massacres of Tutsis and opponents.”
To French officials like Dominique Pin, Bruno Delaye’s deputy at the Élysée’s Africa Cell, what these dispatches demonstrated was bias. “At the initiative of certain non-governmental organizations like MSF . . . a polemic on France’s policy towards Rwanda is developing . . . in which France is accused of ‘having an enormous responsibility in the current massacres in Rwanda’,” he wrote in a 17 May situation update, quoting an open letter from MSF to President Mitterrand.

The next day, an article in *Libération* “cut very close to the bone” in the upper ranks of French government, as a US cable reported. The article aired criticisms of France’s history of supporting the FAR, its indifference to human rights violations, and its longstanding policy of emphasizing the peace process in public while supporting the IRG and opposing the RPF behind the scenes. The piece also reported that Bruno Delaye had personally intervened with Rwandan military leaders in early May to prevent a massacre of Tutsi and opposition Hutu seeking refuge at Kigali’s Hotel Milles Collines, which prompted a source at the Quai d’Orsay to break ranks and observe that it was “a one-time effort, and it shows how much Paris can still influence the course of events.”

The article prompted the usual denials. As Dominique Pin told Françoise Carle, Mitterrand’s assistant:

> As in Bosnia, France is the only country that tries to avoid these massacres. We tried a political settlement, and we are accused of arming and financing the murderers. The “Liberation” article this morning is a collection of false confidences and innuendos, which maintain the idea that French policy is responsible.

But France’s policy was shifting in response. On the day *Libération* ran its exposé, in a meeting of Mitterrand’s Restricted Council, which included the president, key cabinet members, and military leaders, Alain Juppé floated the idea of contributing French troops to UNAMIR: “So far the Secretary General has not asked for French participation with the exception of logistical aid to the Senegalese contingent, mainly trucks. . . . Should we go further [than that]? The question is asked.” Juppé noted that any French involvement would be met with “very strong objections” from the RPF, and that French soldiers would be directly threatened.

In another ministerial meeting the same day, Prime Minister Édouard Balladur and Minister of Cooperation Michel Roussin made their own arguments, however modest, for a stepped-up French response—Balladur worried that it was not enough to provide logistical support for the 5,500 new UNAMIR II troops, as France had committed; Roussin proposed increasing humanitarian aid. Perception continued to worry them no less than substance: responding to another excoriation from MSF, Balladur requested a list of talking points about France’s history in Rwanda, and Roussin advocated for a “publicized visit” to refugee camps by France’s minister of health. But Balladur supported Roussin’s suggestions and made the argument that in Rwanda’s case, “France cannot be absent.” Their position, however, did not resonate with Mitterrand, who said: “I have sometimes heard that France has failed in its duties; this is incorrect. The first duty of a country is to only dispose of the lives of its soldiers to defend its independence.
or to preserve its integrity. . . . what is this divine decree that made France the soldier of all just causes in the world.”

Few organizations were as critical of France, and as authoritative in that criticism, as MSF, whose representatives had declared on French television that France bore “overwhelming responsibility” for what was happening in Rwanda. Jean-Hervé Bradol, MSF’s director of Rwanda programs, had particularly severe words for the superficiality of Roussin’s proposals:

Mr. Roussin, minister of cooperation, hopes to restore France’s image in Rwanda through the French non-governmental organizations present in the field. Despite his insistent requests, NGOs are more than reluctant to participate in this farce. The political nature of the conflict is obvious, while Western observers most often limit themselves to watching events in Rwanda through the prism of interethnic or tribal wars. This is the latest affront to the victims.

Two days earlier, Bradol had appeared on the French news television program TV1 and declared, “The people who are massacring today, who are implementing this planned and systematic policy of extermination, are financed, trained and armed by France.”

On 19 May, Bruno Delaye and Dominique Pin summoned Bradol and Philippe Biberson (MSF’s president) to the Élysée. The participants had very different recollections of the meeting. As always, in his report to Mitterrand, Delaye was reassuring: “I explained to them at length the French policy in Rwanda since 1990. . . . They recognized the positive role played by France from 1990 to 1994 and seemed to share, at least in part, our analysis of each other’s responsibilities, including the RPF, in this drama.” But as Bradol recounted in 2014, the meeting broke down as it became clear the French were focused on rhetoric, not action:

Bruno Delaye gave us the usual runaround about Arusha, explaining the diplomacy that France was conducting. Philippe [Biberson] stressed the need to do something to help the victims in Rwanda. Bruno Delaye told us that he was unable to reach his Rwandan correspondents on the telephone. Since he saw that we were highly annoyed with this type of answer, he said, “Don’t get excited, and don’t go to the media. If Médecins Sans Frontières still has problems, you should speak directly to the French President, François Mitterrand.” At this point, Philippe Biberson said, “No, we do not want to meet the president just to hear more talk about the Arusha Accords and the same French policies.”

Catherine Choquet, project manager for the French human-rights group Fédération internationale pour les droits humains (FIDH), recalled several meetings with Delaye and Pin around the same time MSF met with Delaye (between April and July 1994). She and Human Rights Watch activist Alison Des Forges tried to convince them to use France’s influence to pressure the IRG to stop the massacres, but “[i]t felt like screaming in a void,” Choquet told journalists. She continued, “I still remember what Bruno Delaye immediately told us during our first meeting, when the genocide had just begun: ‘You see we were right to support Habyarimana, you see what happens as soon as he’s no longer there!’ We were stunned.”
In another example of the twisted thinking that continued to guide French officials nearly two months into the Genocide, President Mitterrand, in a 31 May 1994 breakfast meeting with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, implied that France had not been partisan in supporting Habyarimana and suggested that France was ill-positioned to solve the present crisis (a position he would reverse in two weeks).250 “[I]t’s up to the UN to do something,” Mitterrand insisted, absolving his own government of any duty to act.251 He grumbled, as an aside, that the commonly held perception of what was taking place in Rwanda—a genocide against the Tutsi—was all wrong. “We have been accused of supporting the previous regime,” he lamented. But, he said, “we have a one-sided account of the massacre. The reality is that ‘everyone is killing everyone.’”252 This was Mitterrand’s defense for having aided the extremists who were now perpetrating a genocide: to paint the killing in Rwanda as all but indiscriminate, and to insinuate that France’s former allies, however evil their actions might be, were no worse than the RPF.

For Mitterrand, the RPF was the problem: three days after meeting with Kohl, he would tell Bernard Granjon, the head of the medical-relief organization Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World), “[W]e have supported the legitimate government against an external aggression. We have secured the Arusha accords, organizing a shared exercise of power. After the assassination of President Habyarimana, the RPF will come to power: for the abuses, we will see what will happen then!”253

On 7 June, Le Monde joined the chorus of voices reproaching the fecklessness of the French position:

Marked by its recent “pro-Hutu” past . . . France today seems unable to exert any influence in the region. This is undoubtedly the reason why it prides itself on doing the maximum in humanitarian matters, by granting unprecedented funding to non-governmental organizations . . . As if the government, for lack of political means, was passing the baton to these organizations.254

The article made another indispensable point: all of this was foreseeable. For years, the French media and NGOs had “preached in the desert” about the dangers of French policy in Rwanda, but “the presence of French military forces alongside the Rwandan government army from October 1990 to December 1993 had aroused nothing but indifference” in French public opinion.255 Not much had changed, according to one unnamed French official, who told Le Monde that “[t]here are two schools of thought in France. . . On the one hand, there are those who still want us to re-arm the Rwandan government forces. On the other hand, there are all those who think that nothing could be settled without the RPF.”256

Neither camp, unsurprisingly, seems to have considered siding with the RPF in its efforts against the perpetrators of the ongoing genocide. Certainly, some French officials, such as General Huchon, the head of the Military Cooperation Mission, would have found the very notion unthinkable. Huchon’s antipathy to the RPF ran so deep that he even advocated for cutting ties with UNAMIR, which he perceived as having a pro-RPF bent.257 “Can we still support and subsidize the destabilizing actions of General Dallaire in this French-speaking subregion?” he asked, rhetorically, in an 8 June 1994 note. “We will soon officially reach the 500,000th death. At what number will we stop?”258 Incredible as it may seem, Huchon’s qualm with UNAMIR was
not that it had been impotent in the face of mass murder, but that it was biased against the IRG. Huchon did not see why France should support the launch of UNAMIR II, which, he argued, would only “serve the RPF strategy.” His note hinted at a growing desire, among some French officials, to circumvent UNAMIR and mount a French-led intervention in Rwanda.

I. France’s African Allies Pressured the French Government to Act in Rwanda.

The pressure for France to take action in Rwanda was coming, as well, from France’s African partners. As a Foreign Ministry source told Libération, “If we fail to keep our word”—ostensibly referring to the 1975 Franco-Rwandan military technical assistance agreement—“our credibility vis-à-vis other African states would be seriously damaged, and we might see these states turn toward other support.” This was also the logic expressed by General Quesnot in a 24 June 1994 memo to Mitterrand: “Our interventions including in Rwanda were based on the principle always respected since 1960 of non-acceptance by France of an aggression against a friendly African country, bound by defense or cooperation agreements, coming from a neighboring country.” For Quesnot, “the immediate and unreserved support of all the French-speaking heads of state” for French intervention was “the best proof” that this geopolitical philosophy was sound. “If France were to renounce this course of action today,” Quesnot continued, “the domestic instability of states would increase even more and all of our cooperation and defense agreements would be discredited.”

As early as April 1994, French officials met with Zairean President Mobutu to reportedly seek safe passage for French troops into Rwanda through Zaire in exchange for recognition of Mobutu’s regime amid increasing international isolation. The following month, Zaire’s prime minister secretly visited Paris, where Rwanda was “central to discussions” and French officials reportedly sought his political support for a unilateral intervention mission led by the French. By June, Zaire would approve France’s intervention plans and offer logistical assistance on the ground; in the words of French intelligence at the time, this was done “in the obvious hope of regaining international credibility” that came with France’s re-embrace of Mobutu. Similar support would arrive from long-standing French allies in the Republic of Congo, Senegal, and Gabon.

President Omar Bongo of Gabon, whose nation was an invaluable partner to France’s state-sponsored conglomerate, Elf Aquitaine, met with Alain Juppé on 3 June. Only a few years prior, the French government had sent hundreds of soldiers to Gabon to help Bongo fend off demonstrators. Unsurprisingly, “the problem of Rwanda was at the center of the meeting” with Juppé, and was likely central to discussions that Bongo had with other French officials he met in Paris throughout the week. Finally, Bongo met President Mitterrand on 8 June.

Although no reports of the meeting are available, on 17 June President Bongo would tell Libération that “[w]e need an intervention force.” Days before that, at an Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit in Tunis, “the GOF delegation came in for persistent criticism by its African partners.” As recounted in a diplomatic cable from the US embassy in Paris, the French delegation was
taken aback by the insistence of their normally docile Francophone partners that France, despite its desire to reduce its entanglement in Africa, needed to act if it was going to retain any credibility in the region—especially after its decision to “cut and run” following the evacuation of foreign nationals in April, leaving Africans to be slaughtered while Europeans [were] saved.274

Adding to the pressure from Francophone allies was Nelson Mandela’s 13 June remarks at the summit. When Mandela warned that “[t]he Rwandese situation is a rebuke to Africa . . . . We must change all that; we must in action assert our will to do so,”275 it became a “clarion call” in Paris, according to historian Gérard Prunier. France had to act first.276

J. Under Considerable Pressure, and for a Range of Reasons, Mitterrand and Other High-Ranking French Officials Decided to Send French Troops Back to Rwanda.

The Tutsis will establish a military dictatorship to impose themselves permanently. . . . A dictatorship based on ten percent of the population will govern with new massacres.277


Beginning on the night of 12 June 1994, the RPF army laid siege to Gitarama, the city in central Rwanda where the IRG had established its headquarters after fleeing Kigali in April.278 By the afternoon of 13 June, the RPF attacks had forced the IRG to flee north toward Gisenyi and west toward Cyangugu.279 Surveying the aftermath, General Dallaire told the United Nations that “after losing Gitarama, [the FAR] may find it difficult to hold Kigali. Their morale seem[s] to be absolutely shattered.”280 FAR para-commando commander Aloys Ntabakuze lamented that France had “abandoned” them, while the international community “does nothing” against the RPF’s advances, adding, “An army cannot defeat such a guerrilla on its own.”281

Whether in response to the IRG’s crippling losses, the appeals from President Bongo and other Francophone African allies, or the increasing severity of the criticism by French NGOs and media—or all of the above—Mitterrand announced his intentions for France to lead an intervention in Rwanda. As he told a meeting of his cabinet on 15 June, “We absolutely have to do something[]. I assume full responsibility for it.”282

At the meeting, Foreign Minister Juppé emerged as a particularly aggressive advocate for intervention in service of humanitarian concerns. Having proposed to Balladur that the government “study the possibility of a Franco-European and African air-land intervention in order to save the massacred children and stop the fighting,”283 he asked: “Should we go further and consider an intervention to exfiltrate the population?” He added: “We must consider a more beefed-up intervention if UNAMIR is slow to deploy. I am in favor of that, without denying the difficulty.”284 The next morning in Libération, he would argue that “[i]t is a real duty to intervene that we have in Rwanda. It is no longer the time to deplore the massacres, standing idly by, but the time to take initiatives.”285

Only one month before, Juppé had declared, “I do not believe that the international community can act as police and send peacekeeping forces every place where people fight.”286 It
is unclear what accounted for his reversal, other than, perhaps, the tens of thousands of Rwandans who had died in the intervening period.\textsuperscript{287} One account suggested that Juppé’s change of heart came in response to “public pressure” following recent reports of killings of children and religious figures.\textsuperscript{288} Whatever the cause of his turnabout, it was conspicuously late in coming. As a “source in Paris” told the United Kingdom’s \textit{The Independent}, “We said nothing during the massacres and we voted for the UN force in Rwanda to be reduced when the killings started, but now the killing is mostly over, we suddenly find a burning desire to save lives.”\textsuperscript{289}

Prime Minister Balladur was more cautious than Juppé, but agreed that France had to intervene: “We cannot, whatever the risks, remain inactive. For moral reasons, not because of the media. In such dreadful cases, you have to take risks.”\textsuperscript{290} However, he argued that the operation must be “limited in time”\textsuperscript{291} and, as he specified in a letter to Mitterrand on 21 June, confined to humanitarian actions such as sheltering children, the sick, or terrorized populations.\textsuperscript{292} His careful position may have been, in part, self-serving. As a US cable put it, “[t]he Rwanda affair could leave an impression of incompetence and callousness that would have a negative effect for the government in the upcoming Presidential elections,”\textsuperscript{293} in which Balladur was planning to stand.

Defense Minister François Léotard, on the other hand, was “very reluctant,” warning that such an intervention was unlikely to receive any support from the RPF, without which France would only be able to intervene in “Hutu[-controlled] zones,” opening itself to criticism from the media.\textsuperscript{294} It was in reply to Léotard’s concern that Mitterrand said he would take responsibility for the decision to intervene.\textsuperscript{295}

What explained Mitterrand’s turnaround? Several considerations appear to have influenced his thinking. The most charitable explanation, which Mitterrand reportedly hinted at in a 14 June 1994 meeting with MSF leadership, was that he was genuinely repulsed by what the IRG had done to its country. As MSF Rwanda Director Bradol would later tell the MIP, Mitterrand, when asked about “his feelings toward the interim government,” replied “that he considered it to be a gang of assassins.”\textsuperscript{296} According to Bradol, Mitterrand also made a surprising comment about President Habyarimana’s widow, Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, saying, “She is possessed by the devil, if she could, she would continue to call out for massacres from French radios. She is very difficult to control.”\textsuperscript{297}

Perhaps Mitterrand was merely placating his audience. Some commenters and observers have suggested that Mitterrand’s decision to launch Operation Turquoise was born of other motivations. As one French expert on African affairs, Antoine Glaser, would observe after the operation’s launch, the decision to send 2,500 French troops to Zaire “is showing other Presidents that [France] still has an Africa policy.”\textsuperscript{298} Mitterrand may also have had something else in mind: his own legacy. As one unnamed French official reportedly remarked, Mitterrand “was thinking of history. If he wanted to come out at the top, he could not let it be said that, faced with genocide, he stood idly by.”\textsuperscript{299}

Already at the time, as the US ambassador to France, Pamela Harriman, wrote to Washington, “The GOF’s [Government of France’s] sudden decision to intervene . . . has left many in France and abroad wondering why France has chosen to act at this late date and what it hopes to accomplish.”\textsuperscript{300} As she elaborated on the French rationale:
Our discussions with a broad range of GOF Africanists have not revealed a well-
reasoned plan for stabilizing the country; rather the GOF policy seems to spring
largely from an emotional reaction from the continued scenes of slaughter and a
steady drum-beat of criticism by the media and normally apolitical NGOs . . . . Our
strong impression that the GOF has yet to define its political goals or develop a plan
on stabilizing Rwanda . . . remains unchanged.”

Senior French officials represented their about-face as an expression of courage, but all
the sudden talk of moral duty concealed a terrible liability even apart from the dissonance in
motivations between the Élysée and other power centers: their views of the conflict remained
unreformed. For instance, Juppé continued to see an ethno-state as the RPF’s goal, declaring to the
French Senate on 16 June that “20% of Tutsis, even if they are armed by certain countries in the
region, will not be able to impose their law to 80% of Hutus, and vice versa.” The reaction, at
least from the Socialist Party, was not positive: “The Socialist Party is deeply concerned about the
latest French proposals announced by Alain Juppé, which, under the guise of humanitarian action,
give a blank cheque to the perpetrators of the massacres.”

Mitterrand, who had predicated France’s entanglement in Rwanda (“[w]e cannot limit our
presence”) on the idea, expressed in January 1991, that “it’s not normal that the Tutsi minority
wants to impose its rule over the Hutu majority,” continued to maintain the same views three and
a half years later. More than two months into a genocide that had claimed hundreds of thousands
of lives under the watch, and at the hands, of French allies in the IRG, Mitterrand remained
convinced that the prospect of a Tutsi government posed a greater threat to the long-term stability
of Rwanda: “The Tutsis will establish a military dictatorship to impose themselves permanently,”
he warned at a 22 June Restricted Council meeting. “Madness [had] seized” the “Hutu”
murderers after President Habyarimana’s assassination, Mitterrand continued to insist,
contradicting evidence of an organized and pre-conceived plan. And “the Tutsis,” he warned,
recycling his prior reasoning, would “establish a military dictatorship . . . based on ten percent of
the population [that] will govern with new massacres.” As Chapter 10 will detail, such
assumptions would permeate French decision-making throughout the ensuing operation,
compromising execution by the French troops tasked with carrying it out, not to mention
Rwandans’ hope for survival.

K. As French Officials Devised Turquoise, Planning Was Rushed, Specifics Were Scarce, and
Several Officials Advocated Operations to Prevent an RPF Takeover of Kigali and to Allow
the Establishment of a “Hutu Country” in Western Rwanda.

The French government would take pains to deny that it intended Turquoise troops to serve
as a buffer force meant to arrest the RPF’s advance. “This is not a political intervention operation
to separate the two camps,” Juppé told an interviewer on 16 June. “[I]t is a humanitarian operation
to protect the population.” Prime Minister Balladur similarly told the National Assembly the
following week, “This is an operation where force can be used but used with a solely humanitarian
aim. This force—I repeat clearly—is not a buffer force, but a force to protect civilians.”
Turquoise, though, was “obviously political,” as an anonymous French official acknowledged in the 20 June 1994 issue of *Libération*. Through this operation, French forces would be returning to a theater they knew well, where their longtime allies in the FAR were once again locked in an intense battle with their mutual foe, the RPF. While it was generally agreed in Paris that Turquoise should have what Admiral Lanxade described as a “humanitarian aspect,” it was equally clear that the operation would offer France yet another opportunity to influence the outcome of the FAR’s war against the RPF. France’s ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bernard Mérimée, conceded as much to New Zealand Ambassador Colin Keating, acknowledging that aiding the FAR was “an inevitable outcome” of French intervention. While Mérimée emphasized that contact with the RPF would be limited, and that any intervention “would prioritize operations in [FAR] territory where massacres were the worst,” the New Zealand delegation noted that this “would in practice serve as a deterrent against RPF advances.”

French officials were not, initially, all of one mind about how Operation Turquoise ought to proceed. Prime Minister Balladur, for one, fretted about “getting bogged down” in Rwanda. While Balladur has maintained, in the years since Turquoise, that he personally advocated for “a strictly humanitarian operation, intended to save the lives of men regardless of their community affiliation,” he has noted that other senior French officials had different ambitions. In a memoir, Balladur wrote that “high-ranking military personnel” (likely a reference to General Quesnot and Admiral Lanxade) considered dropping French paratroopers into Kigali with “the happy effect of making the rebels retreat.” “I could not believe it,” he wrote. “[T]he planned intervention would quickly take on the meaning of a colonial operation that we did not have the means to carry out, and I absolutely refused to do so.”

Records confirm that Quesnot and Lanxade were, in fact, in favor of sending French troops to Kigali. Lanxade—to whom Mitterrand had entrusted the logistics of Turquoise, telling him, on 15 June, “You are master of the methods, Admiral”—recognized quickly that it would not be possible to send French forces straight to the capital, where fighting between the FAR and RPF was under way. “Too dangerous, too risky,” Lanxade remarked at a 16 June meeting with various representatives of the Élysée, Defense Ministry, and Foreign Ministry. He and Quesnot agreed, though, that wherever the French forces landed, they would, in time, have to make their way to Kigali.

Hubert Védrine, the president’s top advisor, would later assert that France had humanitarian reasons for wanting Turquoise troops to fan out widely (and even, perhaps, as far as Kigali), telling documentarian Raphaël Glucksmann in 2004’s “Tuez-les tous!” (“Kill Them All”): “We told ourselves that if we were going, we might as well secure as much as possible. So we might as well intervene in an area as large as possible to try to stop the massacres. . . . We could maybe even have gone to Kigali, if that had been necessary, useful.”

Balladur, for his part, needed convincing. In a 17 June strategy meeting, his diplomatic advisor, Bernard de Montferrand, said he was particularly concerned that sending troops to Kigali would all but guarantee a direct confrontation with RPF forces. “What frightens me,” Montferrand said, “is that once we arrive in Kigali, we are on a front line and we can’t get out of it.” Quesnot’s response, according to a transcript of notes from the meeting, was simply to say
that France must “be practical.” He proposed that French forces launch their operations in Cyangugu, in western Rwanda. After that, he said, “we’ll see.”

Quesnot proceeded, on 18 June, to lay out two options for Mitterrand: The first was “specific actions”—evacuations, the organization of humanitarian convoys, targeted protection of populations—“coming from two bases in Zaire... without permanent presence on the ground.” The second was more ambitious: “A progressive action of securement and cessation of the massacres,” starting “in Cyangugu to immediately save 8,000 threatened Tutsis (Operation to be highly publicized).” Notably, Quesnot wrote, this approach “could make it possible to reach the Kigali region and possibly extend to the RPF zone.”

In his analysis of the options, Quesnot emphasized that the second plan “would make it possible to extend control of threatened sites toward the east, including up to Kigali.” In advocating for the second approach, the Quai d’Orsay (under Juppé), the defense staff (under Admiral Jacques Lanxade), and Quesnot’s office felt that only a more permanent, progressive presence on the ground would help stop massacres and assure a minimum of security for French forces.

Balladur reportedly “favor[ed] the first option,” not wanting France to maintain a permanent presence in Rwanda. Quesnot and Delaye were aware of Balladur’s concerns, noting for President Mitterrand that Balladur “made the operation conditional on the participation of at least one European country, so as not to be accused by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which would once again see its military victory slip away, of coming to the aid of the government and those responsible for the massacres.” Their language is instructive. Quesnot and Delaye understood that French soldiers would hardly have to engage with the RPF to achieve a deterrent effect. The RPF would not dare threaten its reputation in the international community by confronting an ostensibly humanitarian mission. Operation Turquoise could be Operation Noroit by other means. The main thing was to get troops in Rwanda.

Two days later, Admiral Lanxade’s deputy, General Raymond Germanos, asked the military commander in charge of operational planning for the joint staff of the armed forces to develop a plan that in its initial stages would launch from Zaire and possibly Burundi and achieve “gradually control the expanse of Hutu country toward Kigali.” Western Rwanda was not “Hutu country.” It was Rwandan country. But French officials continued to view the conflict through an ethnically determinist lens.

This was not the only misconception to compromise the planning process. French officials continued to maintain, reiterating the IRG’s line since the start of the Genocide, that the massacres were the work of “gangs made up of uncontrolled Hutu civilians or soldiers,” as Admiral Jacques Lanxade put it in a 15 June letter to Defense Minister Léotard. The DRM also held “militias and uncontrolled soldiers” responsible. “Often they do not obey their superiors,” the DRM cable, also dated 15 June, concluded. “They respond only to the call of blood.”

The following day, a DRM memo absolved members of the FAR altogether. Asking “Who Are The Murderers?”, the memo insisted: “It is not the part of the Rwandan army busy fighting against [the RPF]. It is: the disbanded and uncontrolled units (presidential guard); [and] the anti-
Tutsi militias (Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi), acting on their own accord or following calls for ‘civil defense.’” In late April, US diplomats had “confronted [Col. Theoneste Bagosora] with eyewitness accounts of Rwandan army complicity in the killings, and said the world did not believe their (the IRG’s) party line.” Undoubtedly, French officials had access to the same evidence, as, in June, President Mitterrand had privately denounced the IRG as a “gang of assassins.” But an entirely different understanding guided the planning of Turquoise. In this context, it is not difficult to see why French troops would arrive in Rwanda with the misconception that the violence was perpetrated by rogue units.

Other than this, French officials appeared to have few concrete plans for what could not help but be a complex operation. Questioned by US representatives on 20 June regarding “what instructions the French troops would have for dealing with those identified as leading or being responsible for massacres, Alain Girma, the Africa specialist at the French embassy in Washington, “acknowledged that a policy ha[d] not yet been worked out,” and that it would be good to have one.

But French officials wanted to move quickly. (Quesnot wrote Mitterrand on 20 June, while the mission did not yet have a UN mandate and the plans were still developing, that the Defense Ministry was about to position 2,500 French troops in Goma and Bukavu, at the northern and southern ends of Lake Kivu, respectively, on Zaire’s border with Rwanda. The urgency had less to do with saving Genocide victims than another matter: getting to Rwanda before the RPF took Kigali. On 20 June, as Quesnot wrote Mitterrand, “on the ground, the RPF has launched a general offensive supported by considerable resources in Kigali and towards the [West] (Kibuye) and the South (Butare),” which the DRM, the army’s intelligence agency, evaluated as an attempt “to precede, in order to prevent, the arrival of the forces of a possible intervention dominated by France.”

This concern had humanitarian camouflage—“the risk of Hutu retaliation on Tutsi minorities in the government zone,” if the RPF were “to take Kigali before the deployment of French forces.” (Lanxade made this argument to Mitterrand as well.) But, of course, Tutsi had been murdered en masse in the government zone since 6 April. Conquest of the capital held great value, symbolic and otherwise, which may have led the génocidaires to “amplify the massacres,” as Lanxade wrote, but considering the aspirations Quesnot and Lanxade’s office had shared about taking control of “Hutu country” up to the capital, another interpretation seems at least as persuasive.

Quesnot wrote Mitterrand a second time on 21 June. He urged the President to intervene before “General Kagame, RPF military leader, intelligent and determined . . . declar[ed] a cease-fire and announc[ed] that the French presence or even that of UNAMIR was henceforth useless. . . . Time and delaying tactics at all levels increasingly play against the success of our initiative.”
L. As Plans for Turquoise Took Shape, French Officials Encountered Enthusiastic Support from the IRG, Staunch Opposition from the RPF, and Unusually Direct Skepticism from the International Community.

France took sides [in the Rwandan conflict] . . . and that’s why the initiative of France should be looked at with the necessary caution.351


Given France’s history in the region, French officials understood that the international community would be skeptical of Turquoise. The participation of European allies was initially, at least for Prime Minister Balladur and Defense Minister Léotard, a precondition of French intervention,352 and in the third week of June 1994 French officials worked to procure diplomatic and military “cover”353 that would insulate France against accusations of pro-IRG bias.

At the United Nations, Sec. Gen. Boutros Boutros-Ghali continued to offer the “active support” that had helped push through the disastrous Resolution 912 in April,354 but almost everyone else was in opposition. On 16 June, New Zealand’s UN Ambassador Colin Keating urged the New Zealand embassy in Paris to express “grave reservations” to the French government about this “extremely dangerous development.”355 As the ambassador explained:

Unilateral intervention could only complicate enormously the UN mission. It has all the potential to follow exactly the disastrous pattern of the US intervention in Somalia leaving an impossible aftermath for the UN to manage. In this case it would be even worse.

In practice it is impossible to see how a French intervention force could avoid being drawn into the conflict between [the FAR] and [the] RPF. At best they would be drawn into the kind of ‘buffer’ which the UN definitely does not want to happen. At worst they would become part of the problem by being identified as protecting the [FAR].

The most useful thing the French could do if they want to make ‘a grand gesture’ would be to send a significant fleet of transport aircraft to Africa in order to uplift the UNAMIR contingents… 356

Speaking more directly to the matter, Keating has said more recently that he did not believe the French government’s stated motivations for undertaking Operation Turquoise because it was “manifestly not going to succeed.”357 The French thinking, he said, was: “Let’s protect as much of the rump regime as we can.”358 For Keating, France’s intervention proposal made for a remarkable turnaround from its preceding passivity regarding the Genocide, when France’s permanent representative to the United Nations Security Council, Jean-Bernard Merimée, had been “quiet” and Hervé Ladsous, Merimée’s deputy, “chastened” through the initial weeks of the Genocide.359 But when it came to Turquoise, the French delegation was suddenly “guns blazing.”360
French officials, hoping to “find[] another European country to go in with them,” sought to mitigate such concerns, with Ambassador Mérimée assuring other countries’ delegations at a 17 June Security Council meeting that France was “ready to fight [H]utu militias in order to protect Tutsis.” But General Raymond Germanos, Admiral Lanxade’s deputy, told the MIP that France was actually hoping to delegate the entire humanitarian portion of the mission to Italy, maintaining for France “operational” duties (meaning, military). French officials apparently viewed the maintenance of French soldiers in Rwanda as critical and French humanitarian assistance as fungible, despite repeated claims by French officials that humanitarian activities were France’s only motivation for the entire operation.

In private, France was ready to go it alone. In a 16 June note, French diplomats at the United Nations told their counterparts in the French Foreign Ministry that Sec. Gen. Boutros-Ghali’s “less formal cover” would be sufficient in the absence of official UN authorization. Under “Entry of the force on the Rwandan territory,” the note’s authors indicated that “Operation units would enter Rwanda by the road from neighboring countries with the objective to reach Kigali.” Then someone crossed out the words “with the objective to reach Kigali.”

Initially, France’s advocacy at the United Nations made no inroads. According to New Zealand Ambassador Keating’s contemporaneous notes, the US delegation initially described the French strategy as a “disastrous policy.” The UK ambassador to the United Nations, David Hannay, told Keating that “his view and that of their experts in London is that the proposal is crazy,” and that Belgium, Spain, and Germany had also been critical at a meeting of EU countries. The Nigerian delegate, Ibrahim Gambari, told Keating that Nigeria was opposed, and the Brazilian, Argentine, and Spanish delegations expressed “strong reservations.” The Canadians told the French privately that they were “absolutely opposed” to Turquoise, and that France’s efforts would be better directed toward deploying an expanded UNAMIR mission as soon as possible. Indeed, though he was forbidden from saying so publicly, General Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander, would report to Canadian officials that plans for French intervention would have negative repercussions on the ground in Kigali. In an interview with Reuters, Belgian Defense Minister Leo Delcroix spoke bluntly: “France took sides [in the Rwandan conflict] . . . and that’s why the initiative of France should be looked at with the necessary caution.”

The RPF saw things similarly. “The RPF condemns the proposed French intervention unreservedly,” RPF Vice Chairman Patrick Mazimhaka wrote on 20 June to the President of the Security Council, pointing to the French government’s “direct responsibility” for Rwanda’s descent into violence. As Mazimhaka wrote:

In view of this very detrimental role of France in Rwanda in the recent past, her apparent good faith should not be taken for granted when the issue of the proposed French intervention is up for discussion. The intervention is, in our view, intended to assist the authors of the genocide in Rwanda to prosecute the war, to protect them from being brought to justice for their war crimes, and to preserve a role for them in the future politics of the country.
As Kagame told *Libération* on 20 June, “The French are the least well placed to intervene, given their scandalous support for the old regime.” He added: “It is up to us to save our people.”

On the same day that Mazimhaka wrote the Security Council—20 June—Gérard Prunier, the historian and Turquoise advisor, phoned Jacques Bihozagara, the RPF’s representative in Brussels. Prunier was surprised to learn from Bihozagara that “the Foreign Affairs Ministry… had had no contact whatsoever with the party most likely to shoot at [France’s troops], namely the RPF.” Prunier’s attempts to intercede would illustrate just how dismissively senior French officials dealt with the RPF compared to the reception the Élysée, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Quai d’Orsay offered IRG officials Jérôme Bicamumpaka and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza in late April.

“When I called Bihozagara again to learn the result of my efforts,” Prunier writes, “I thought he would choke on the phone.” Bihozagara had received a fax asking him to go see Catherine Boivineau, the deputy director for East Africa at the Foreign Ministry, “a nice lady of genuine goodwill [whose] capacity for political decision-making was equal to zero,” in Prunier’s words. Bihozagara was furious: He had seen Boivineau a half-dozen times in three years, to no value: “This is ridiculous. It is an insult. I won’t go.” Prunier tried again and was pleased to learn through the next day’s press that the foreign minister appeared to be in regular contact with the RPF, but on reaching out to Bihozagara, Prunier learned that his efforts had advanced the issue by only one rung: A new fax had arrived requesting Bihozagara to meet with Boivineau’s superior Jean-Marc de La Sablière as well as the Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs. “We are not asking for any bloody humanitarian aid, this is a political problem for God’s sake!” Bihozagara fumed. “And as for M. de La Sablière, he can’t decide anything! Either I see the Minister or else I won’t waste my time.”

According to Prunier, news of this led to not a little “irritation” at the French Defense Ministry, the lives of whose soldiers all this was placing at greater risk. Prunier did not know what kind of message passed between Defense and the Quai d’Orsay, but on 22 June, Alain Juppé received Bihozagara and Théogène Rudasingwa, the RPF’s Secretary General, who tried to make the same points the RPF’s representatives had to the Security Council:

You speak about change of policy of France in Africa, but obviously, in the case of Rwanda, nothing has changed. . . . You want to establish a permanent link with us, but you put the cart before the horse. . . . France’s objectives are not humanitarian. If they were, she would have intervened earlier because the massacres are not a new phenomenon in Rwanda. They began several years ago, the international community and France in particular knew it. Nobody reacted when weapons were distributed to the militia who then organized themselves into a parallel army.

According to Bruno Delaye’s report on the meeting to President Mitterrand, a representative from Matignon (the Prime Minister’s Office), also present, attempted to convince the RPF representatives that over the past year, since Balladur had assumed the head of the government, France had changed its policy, and that its present intervention in Rwanda was humanitarian in nature. Mitterrand was apparently irked by the suggestion that Balladur’s elevation could be credited with a supposed improvement in Mitterrand’s Rwanda policy: “unacceptable! tell Matignon,” the president scrawled across Delaye’s report.
On 16 June, what remained of Rwanda’s opposition political parties wrote an open letter to Mitterrand echoing the RPF’s sentiments: “[T]he French military intervention in 1990 has not prevented the arbitrary imprisonment of over 10,000 people and the beginning of the genocide against Tutsi in Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Kibuye and Bugerese. . . . France is the only country in the world that recognized the self-proclaimed bloodthirsty government in Kigali on April 9th and continues to support it in international fora, claiming there was no genocide in Rwanda.”

In the end, French allies in Africa were among the only nations to offer Turquoise unqualified approval. “France’s initiative is to be welcomed,” declared Gabonese President Omar Bongo. Shortly thereafter, an open letter signed by Bongo and leaders from Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Cameroon, and Congo welcomed the “courageous and humanitarian” French mission.

If the IRG had any opposition to France’s plan, it was that it did not go far enough to help the génocidaires. In a 16 June meeting with General Jean Heinrich, the head of the DRM (the army’s intelligence arm), Col. Sebastian Ntahobari, the IRG defense attaché in Paris, delivered a plea from General Augustin Bizimana, the minister of defense, for France to “intervene militarily to save the populations threatened to be massacred.” (Bizimana meant massacred by the RPF.) The following week, continuing to promote the falsehood that a “double-genocide” was taking place in Rwanda, the IRG asked France to “conduct the operation on the entire Rwandan territory because, according to [the IRG], killings are perpetrated with the same intensity on both sides.”

For all the skepticism at the United Nations, it was one thing for the Security Council members to object in principle and another to formalize that principle through a vote against or an abstention, especially when the United Nations was so moribund in standing up UNAMIR II. The French proposal is a “political trap for other countries as there was pressure from the public to see something done,” as New Zealand’s embassy in Canada put it on 20 June. Ultimately, none of France’s European partners would agree to supply troops, with Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and the United States agreeing to provide logistical support, the lattermost on the condition “that the French forces must not intervene in the fighting or support the government or its forces.” But as Delaye and Quesnot relayed in a joint note to President Mitterrand, “The French text [for resolution on intervention] could be adopted on 21 or 22 June. No major reservations from the main members of the Council.”

Recently, Colin Keating, the New Zealand UN ambassador, said that among the non-aligned nations [the Non-Aligned Movement is a 120-member organization of developing states unaligned with any major power bloc], there was a “misplaced internal loyalty” toward the Rwandan regime, with the feeling among those nations that they “couldn’t desert their brother.” With New Zealand, France virtually resorted to pleading, as the New Zealand embassy in Paris noted on 20 June: “New Zealand is asked not to express its reservations publicly. . . . It is more than ever a matter of national pride. France’s African policy would be in complete disarray if it does not intervene.”

The “UK Mission [to the United Nations] lost the battle and was instructed for bilateral reasons to support the French proposal,” Keating reported to Wellington. Spain, Keating said, often based its UN decisions on its European relations rather than the needs of the situation. And
though the United States was under no illusions about whom it was about to support—a 20 June US intelligence cable noted that the French government had trained and armed the people perpetrating the Genocide; that it was allegedly continuing to supply arms to the génocidaires; and that its claims of neutrality were risible considering it had evacuated members of Habyarimana’s family in April\textsuperscript{395}—the Americans eventually offered their support as well.

Despite the concerns of his staff in Kigali,\textsuperscript{396} Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was instrumental in supporting the intervention. “[The UN SecGen] indicated that in his view the French initiative offered the [positive] opportunity . . . to get a great power actively involved,” Keating reported to Wellington on 20 June. “We still think it is a bad initiative,” Keating wrote. But he seemed resigned to the inevitability that France would win the “support of the Council.”\textsuperscript{397} The previous day, Boutros-Ghali had written a letter to the Security Council explaining that UNAMIR II could take three months more to deploy.\textsuperscript{398} The New Zealand delegation called that timeline illogical,\textsuperscript{399} while The Guardian reported shortly afterward that African countries, including Ghana and Zimbabwe, had pledged 4,000 troops and required only logistical support from Western countries before UNAMIR II could proceed.\textsuperscript{400} Nevertheless, Boutros-Ghali emphasized the potential for delay and concluded: “In these circumstances, the Security Council may wish to consider the offer of the Government of France. . . .”\textsuperscript{401}

In the end, France, Rwanda, Spain, the United States, the United Kingdom, Argentina, the Czech Republic, Djibouti, Oman, and Russia voted in favor of Resolution 929.\textsuperscript{402} Argentina nearly abstained, and in fact called Buenos Aires to encourage abstention.\textsuperscript{403} If the Argentinian delegation had followed through on its hesitations (in addition to Nigeria, Brazil, China, Pakistan, and New Zealand), “the French would have been in the most uncomfortable situation of having the bare minimum of 9 positive votes (and reliant on that of Rwanda) to get the resolution through.”\textsuperscript{404}

In Rwanda, as on many previous occasions, General Dallaire was as clear on what was about to happen as he was powerless to subvert the will of his UN superiors. “By now French flags draped every street corner in the capital,” he would write. “Vive la France was heard more often in Kigali than it was in Paris. RTLM was continuing to tell the population that the French were on the way to join them to fight the RPF.”\textsuperscript{405} Even the DGSE was clear-eyed about the problem with Turquoise, as a 22 June cable soberly acknowledged: “The danger is great for France to be accused, at best of not having been able to fulfill the mission that had been entrusted to it, at worst of being considered an accomplice of the current Rwandan government.”\textsuperscript{406}

Tellingly, in Paris, Mitterrand announced the deployment of Turquoise to his ministers by citing the same crude, ethnically reductive motivations that had guided his understanding of the conflict since the beginning:

The President of the Republic noted that Rwanda, like Burundi, is mainly populated by Hutu. The majority of the inhabitants therefore naturally supported President Habyarimana’s government. If this country were to come under Tutsi domination, a small ethnic minority based in Uganda where some favor the creation of a ‘Tutsiland’ encompassing not only that country but also Rwanda and Burundi, it is certain that the democratization process would be interrupted.\textsuperscript{407}
Other remarks by Mitterrand would prove prescient: “The Prime Minister and I, and all the ministers, share the same analysis: an intervention, yes, but a brief one . . . . Our intervention does not appeal to anyone, even those we want to save.” Operation Turquoise commenced on 22 June 1994, and, in the 60 days that followed, the events and consequences of the mission fully vindicated the skepticism levelled by the international community.
Notes to Chapter IX

1 Transcript of meeting between Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot (29 Apr. 1994).
3 Cable from US Embassy in Kampala to US Secretary of State (14 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “TFRWOL: RPF Launches Diplomatic Offensive”). In a 13 April 1994 meeting, RPF representatives told the US ambassador in Kampala that, in due course, RPF leaders “intend[ed] to start with the accord” and to work with other Rwandan political parties to form a new government.
5 M. Léotard confirme le départ des derniers militaires français [Mr. Léotard Confirms the Departure of the Last French Soldiers], AFP, 14 Apr. 1994. As discussed below, the public focus on negotiations would continue.
6 M. Léotard confirme le départ des derniers militaires français [Mr. Léotard Confirms the Departure of the Last French Soldiers], AFP, 14 Apr. 1994.
7 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (21 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “French Pessimism on Rwanda”).
9 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (25 Apr. 1994) (“It is the RPF that refuses a cease-fire, as did UNITA in Angola. The argument that it will stop the fighting only when the exactions and the massacres are interrupted reverses the chain of causalities. If it is true that at the time the President’s death was announced, the exactions immediately began and provided a foundation for the armed intervention of the RPF, today the situation is quite the opposite: The Hutu, as long as they have the feeling that the RPF is trying to seize power, will react by ethnic massacres. Only a stop to the fighting could allow a progressive recovery of the situation in hand.”).
10 Transcript of meeting between Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot (29 Apr. 1994).
11 Transcript of meeting between Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot (29 Apr. 1994).
13 Transcript of meeting between Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot (29 Apr. 1994).
15 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to President Mitterrand (7 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “RWANDA-BURUNDI - Situation après la mort des deux présidents”).
16 Transcript of meeting between Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot (29 Apr. 1994).
17 Transcript of meeting between Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot (29 Apr. 1994).
18 Memorandum from Dominique Pin (5 May 1994) (Subject: “La situation au Rwanda”). Dominique Pin would echo Quesnot’s words on 5 May 1994, in a conversation with Françoise Carle, who seems to have served as a sounding board for frustrations with the Second Cohabitation government’s Rwanda policy by many in Mitterrand’s circle of Élysée hardliners: “If the French and the Belgians had stayed one more month on the ground, the massacres would not have happened. . . . We were in a situation of cohabitation, we had to take into account the government’s position. I am personally convinced that if there had not been a cohabitation, we would have acted otherwise and avoided the massacres.” Pin was under no illusions about the perpetrators of the massacres, telling Carle: “The northern Hutus, supporters of the assassinated President, killed the moderate Hutu and then turned against the Tutsi.” Despite that, French deterrence to the RPF was the answer.
19 Notes on Fiche No. 18591/N, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (2 May 1994).
22 Memorandum from Christian Luc Vaganay to Jean Heinrich (15 Apr. 1994) in COMMISSION D’ENQUÊTE CITOYENNE, L’HORREUR QUI NOUS PREND AU VISAGE: L’ÉTAT FRANÇAIS ET LE GÉNOCIDE AU RWANDA [THE HORROR THAT STRIKES US IN THE FACE: THE FRENCH STATE AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA] 490 (2005); see also Transcript of Interview with Jean Kambanda, 77 JK – Side B 14 (22 May 1998) (stating that arms deals around Europe went through Ntahobari as the IRG did not have specialists in each country).


28 The Duclert Commission noted that while the DRM forwarded the requests, if and how the requests were responded to is “not known.” Duclert Commission Report 802. The Commission also observed that the 8 April 1994 embargo that the French government placed on arms deliveries to Rwanda “does not seem to have been communicated to DRM’s officers, or at least it was not conveyed to the DRM officer who met, ‘at his request [. . .] Colonel Ntahobari, Rwanda’s military and air attaché in Paris’ on 15 April.” Id. at 906 (quoting SHD/SITU, Fiche de la DRM n°1243, 15 April 1994).

29 GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 278 n.136 (1995). The same footnote in Prunier’s book also included a citation to a May 1995 Human Rights Watch (HRW) report: “Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming With Impunity.” However, when reviewed against the available records, including the documents of the United Kingdom-based arms supplier, Mil-Tec, the HRW report does not hold up. The Mil-Tec documents have been in the public domain since November 1996. The weapons deliveries recounted by HRW align with deliveries from Mil-Tec. That these were Mil-Tec deliveries is also supported by IRG banking records from the embassy in Cairo related to those specific transactions.


31 See MIP, Tome II, General Annexes 15-23 (list of people heard by MIP (both in public and in camera), does not include Jehanne).


33 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

34 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (emphasis omitted).

35 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (3 May 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier ministre le mercredi 4 Mai 1994”).
Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (6 May 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Chef de l’État intérimaire du Rwanda”).


Gervais Charlier, Le sauvetage des ressortissants occidentaux au Rwanda [The Rescue of Western Expats in Rwanda], in RAIDS MAGAZINE No. 97, 1 June 1994. Lanxade, in an interview with the journalist Benoît Collombat, denied the use of French soldiers as “sonnettes.” But he would not speak to the activities of DGSE (the French intelligence service) agents, who, he admitted, were authorized to serve in this role. Benoît Collombat, Génocide au Rwanda: la “faute” de la France, Radio France, 14 Mar. 2019 (interview with Jacques Lanxade).


Cable from David Hannay (14 Apr. 1994) (“[I]n the current circumstances UNAMIR was not capable of performing the tasks under its mandate.”).


Duclet Commission Report 393 (quoting AN/PR-BD, AG5(4)/BD/60 ; dossier 2, Conseil restreint, mercredi 13 avril, « situation au Rwanda »).

Duclet Commission Report 393 (quoting AN/PR-BD, AG5(4)/BD/60 ; dossier 2, Conseil restreint, mercredi 13 avril, « situation au Rwanda »).
54 Duclert Commission Report 393 (citing AN/PR-BD, AG5(4)/BD/60 ; dossier 2, Conseil restreint, mercredi 13 avril, « situation au Rwanda »).
55 Cable from David Hannay (14 Apr. 1994).
56 Cable from David Hannay (14 Apr. 1994).
58 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 479 (1999).
60 Cable from David Hannay (14 Apr. 1994).
62 Cable from David Hannay (14 Apr. 1994). Note that, regarding “past operations,” six months before these deliberations, the United States led a peacekeeping mission in Mogadishu, Somalia that ended with 19 American casualties and 73 soldiers wounded. DAVID HANNAY, NEW WORLD DISORDER 138 (2009) (“As for the Mogadishu line, no one contested the fact that serious mistakes were made in Somalia and that it had been unwise to be drawn into a direct military confrontation with one of the factions, even when that faction had precipitated the confrontation; but to derive from that experience a general and extremely restrictive doctrine governing the use of force in peacekeeping operations was, yet again, an invitation to the spoilers to push their luck and also ignored the fact that the circumstances under which a peacekeeping operation needed to be judged as impossible to carry on were likely to differ quite a lot from operation to operation. The ghost of the Mogadishu line was to come to haunt the UN operation in Bosnia.”).
63 Interview by PBS Frontline with Paul Kagame (30 Jan. 2004).
67 Cable from Roméo Dallaire (18 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “SITREP on Rescue Missions”).
68 Cable from Roméo Dallaire (18 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “SITREP on Rescue Missions”).
69 ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 322-23 (2003).
70 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).
71 Memorandum from iliya [last name unknown] (23 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Daily SITREP for the Period 220600B to 230600B Apr 1994”).
78 Les HUTUS poursuivent leurs massacres au sud du Rwanda [Hutus Continue Massacring in the South of Rwanda], LIBERATION & AFP, 26 Apr. 1994.
81 Notes from Karel Kovanda (25 Apr. 1994).
82 Notes from Karel Kovanda (25 Apr. 1994).
84 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 338 (2003)
85 Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy in Addis Ababa (3 May 1994) (Subject: “RPF General Kagame Sees UNHCR Team Visit as Fastest Way to End Massacres”).
87 See Le ministre rwandais des affaires étrangères à Paris pour plaider la cause de son gouvernement [Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris to Plead His Government's Case], AFP, 27 Apr. 1994 (stating that the IRG representatives were received at the Quai d’Orsay, Matignon, and the Élysée); Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Discussions in Paris at the Quai, the Élysée, MSF/France and with Rwandan Ambassador”); but see MIP, Tome I 316 (referring to meetings at the Élysée and Matignon but not the Quai d’Orsay).
91 Memorandum from George Moose to Strobe Talbott (25 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Update on U.S. Response to the Crisis”).
92 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (26 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Proposed Visit to the U.S. By Rwanda Interim Government Foreign Minister Jérôme Bicamumpaka”); Cable from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Le porte-parole a poursuivi comme suit”).
98 Letter from Bruno Delaye to Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza (1 Sept. 1992).
99 Cable from Joyce Leader to US Secretary of State (4 Aug. 1992) (Subject: “Party youth riot; 4 reported killed”). See additional discussion in Chapter 5.
100 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Discussions in Paris at the Quai, the Élysée, MSF/France and with Rwandan Ambassador”). Because France has not made public the document related to its contact with the IRG, we must rely on US Government documents that have been made public.
101 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Discussions in Paris at the Quai, the Élysée, MSF/France and with Rwandan Ambassador”).
102 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (28 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Discussions in Paris at the Quai, the Élysée, MSF/France and with Rwandan Ambassador”). Because France has not released documents, we must rely on the documents made public by the US Government.


106 The Duclert Commission has similarly commented, “Given the absence of significant records in the collections consulted in France, it is impossible to account with certainty for the existence of arms flows from France to Rwanda after the start of the genocide of the Tutsi.” Duclert Commission Report 810. The Duclert Commission has raised additional questions by citing to handwritten notes prepared by Colonel Armel Le Port during the course of the investigation he conducted for the purpose of responding to inquiries from the MIP on behalf of the “Rwanda cell” in the Ministry of Defense. The note, which appears in a collection with the subject heading “Rwanda meeting: update on investigations,” reads, “At least 1 FAR GOMA arms delivery on 6 or 7/7 (B707 cargo from KIN. It is on the other hand inaccurate for 18/7.” Id. at 896-97 (quoting SHD, GR 203 17 1, Fiche, 20 March 1998). The note does not say if the delivery on “6 or 7/7” (presumably 1994) refers to arms deliveries by France or some other provider. The Duclert Commission found Col. Le Port’s notes in the archives of the French Army’s état-major. Id. at 896. Perhaps further clarification could be found in the archives kept by the MIP, but the Bureau of the National Assembly “refused to allow [the Commission] to consult the archives of the 1998 Parliamentary Information Mission (MIP),” Id. at 33.

107 Notes on Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (2 May 1994) (Subject: “Éléments de situation”).

108 Notes on Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (2 May 1994) (Subject: “Éléments de situation”).

109 Notes on Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (2 May 1994) (Subject: “Éléments de situation”).

110 Notes on Memorandum from Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (11 May 1994) (Subject: “Région des grands lacs africains risque d’extension régionale du conflit rwandais”).

111 Notes on Memorandum from Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (11 May 1994) (Subject: “Région des grands lacs africains risque d’extension régionale du conflit rwandais”). The advisors further assessed that partitioning the country “into homogeneous community zones” would be impossible for the same reason. “For this reason, the idea of creating a ‘Tutsiland’ is utopian,” they wrote.

112 Notes on Memorandum from Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (11 May 1994) (Subject: “Région des grands lacs africains risque d’extension régionale du conflit rwandais”).

113 Notes on Memorandum from Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (11 May 1994) (Subject: “Région des grands lacs africains risque d’extension régionale du conflit rwandais”).

114 Notes on Memorandum from Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale (11 May 1994) (Subject: “Région des grands lacs africains risque d’extension régionale du conflit rwandais”).

115 Huchon was a recipient of the Légion d’honneur (Legion of Honor), the highest French order of merit, See Décret du 5 juillet 1993 portant promotion et nomination, Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise n°154 9546 (July 6, 1993). A graduate of the prestigious Saint-Cyr military academy, he served from 1979 to 1981 in Zaire, on the heels of a period of heavy French military involvement in the country which served to keep President Mobutu in power. See Jean-Pierre Huchon, Académie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, http://www.academieoutremer.fr/academiciens/?ald=20&section=2 (last visited 5 Mar. 2021). From 1984 to 1986, Huchon commanded the 1st Paratrooper Regiment of Marine Infantry (RIPMa), a special-forces unit later commanded by Jacques Rosier (1990-1992) and then Didier Tauzin (1992-1994), who oversaw its participation in Operation Chimère and Operation Turquoise. During the period of Huchon’s command, the 1st RIPMa also served in Chad, as part of an operation to defend the sitting dictator from Libya-backed rebels. See Jean-Pierre Husson, Encyclopédie des forces spéciales du monde [Encyclopedia of the Special Forces of the World] (2016). Huchon’s predecessor at the MMC, General Jean Varret, would later describe him as highly intelligent, recalling that Huchon had been “the brightest” colonel in a class of 12 colonels at the Center for Advanced Military Studies, where Varret, in the late 1980s, was the director. Laurent Larcher, Rwanda: Ils parlent [Rwanda: Speaking Up] 558-59 (2019). It was Varret who recommend Huchon, then a colonel, to serve as deputy to President Mitterrand’s main military advisor, in 1989. See id.; Huchon Jean-Pierre, Académie des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, http://www.academieoutremer.fr/academiciens/?ald=20&section=2 (last visited 5 Mar. 2021).
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117 Duclert Commission Report 881 (citing ADIPLO, 415COOP/1194, Note « sous couvert de Monsieur le Directeur de Cabinet »), « Réévaluation de notre stratégie »).
118 Duclert Commission Report 74-75, 752.
119 Letter from Jean-Pierre Huchon to Jacques Mourgeon (10 Dec. 1998); Memorandum from Ephrem Rwabalinda to Augustin Bizimana (16 May 1994) (Subject: “Rapport de mission”).

Rwabalinda and Ntahobari asked Huchon to fulfill the FAR’s “[u]rgent needs” for “Ammunition for the Bie 105 mm (at least 2,000 rounds) [referring to artillery rounds for the howitzers France supplied in 1992—ed.]; Supplement the ammunition for individual weapons as necessary by passing indirectly through the neighboring countries that are friends of Rwanda; Clothing; Transmission equipment” (punctuation added for clarity).

122 Letter from Jean-Pierre Huchon to Jacques Mourgeon (10 Dec. 1998). Huchon said it was “regrettable that we did not have such a connection, as it would have certainly permitted [us] . . . to reinforce the message of moderation that French authorities put forward.” Although Huchon also wrote that he had discussed the protected telephone during his 27 May 1998 hearing before the MIP, no summary or transcript of that hearing is publicly available.

123 Letter from Jean-Pierre Huchon to Jacques Mourgeon (10 Dec. 1998). Huchon’s testimony on his entreaties to stop the massacres were cryptic. He noted that Ntahobari’s letter to the MIP “mentions statements I allegedly made, with another French officer, requesting to ‘tell Kigali to stop the massacres.’ That is in effect a very simplified, but basically exact summary of the messages that the French government authorities tried at the time to send to all the Rwandan parties to the conflict, by using any opportunity to contact them. The visit that the Rwandan attaché made to see me in PARIS was one of these opportunities.” This suggests Huchon asked Rwabalinda and Ntahobari to urge Kigali to stop the massacres, but it does not say that outright.

124 Memorandum from Ephrem Rwabalinda to Augustin Bizimana (16 May 1994) (Subject: “Rapport de mission”).

125 Letter from Jean-Pierre Huchon to Jacques Mourgeon (10 Dec. 1998). Huchon’s testimony on his entreaties to stop the massacres were cryptic. He noted that Ntahobari’s letter to the MIP “mentions statements I allegedly made, with another French officer, requesting to ‘tell Kigali to stop the massacres.’ That is in effect a very simplified, but basically exact summary of the messages that the French government authorities tried at the time to send to all the Rwandan parties to the conflict, by using any opportunity to contact them. The visit that the Rwandan attaché made to see me in PARIS was one of these opportunities.” This suggests Huchon asked Rwabalinda and Ntahobari to urge Kigali to stop the massacres, but it does not say that outright.

126 Memorandum from Ephrem Rwabalinda to Augustin Bizimana (16 May 1994) (Subject: “Rapport de mission”).

127 Transcript of RTLM broadcast (17 May 1994).

128 Memorandum from Ephrem Rwabalinda to Augustin Bizimana (16 May 1994) (Subject: “Rapport de mission”).

129 Transcript of RTLM broadcast (17 May 1994).

130 Notes on Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (2 May 1994) (Subject: “Éléments de situation”).

131 This account is taken from WENDY WHITWORTH, WE SURVIVED: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 22 – 23 (2006).

132 See Edouard de Mareschal, Le cofondateur du GIGN, Paul Barril, se retranche brièvement à son domicile [The Co-Founder of the GIGN, Paul Barril, Hides out Briefly in His Home], LE FIGARO, 30 June 2014; L’Arrestation de Paul Barril, comment un malentendu a abouti à un “tsunami policier” [Paul Barril’s Arrest: How a Misunderstanding Led to a “Police Tsunami”], LE MONDE, 30 June 2014; Christian Chatillon, Capitaine Barril [Captain Barril], in PLAYBOY 12 (1995); Melanie Godey, Qui est Paul Barril, ex-du GIGN? [Who is Paul Barril, Formerly of the GIGN?].
BFMTV, 30 June 2014; L’Ex-patron du GIGN Paul Barril s’est rendu après s’être retranché chez lui [The Ex-Head of the GIGN Paul Barril Surrendered after Hiding in his House], LE PARISIEN, 30 June 2014.

134 See L’Arrestation de Paul Barril, comment un malentendu a abouti à un “tsunami policier” [Paul Barril’s Arrest: How a Misunderstanding Led to a “Police Tsunami”], LE MONDE, 30 June 2014; Edouard de Mareschal, Le cofondateur du GIGN, Paul Barril, se retranche brièvement à son domicile [The Co-Founder of the GIGN, Paul Barril, Hides Out Briefly in His Home], LE FIGARO, 30 June 2014.

135 When Barril brought a defamation suit against Le Monde for reporting that “the operation was from beginning to end a frame-up carried out by Capt. Barril, who tricked the political and judiciary authorities and public opinion, and who provoked . . . the imprisonment of three innocent people,” the French Supreme Court ruled that Le Monde’s reporting was correct. See Irish Citizens Became Victims of a French Frame-up, THE IRISH TIMES, 6 Feb. 2002.

136 BENOIT COLLOMBAT AND DAVID SEVERNAY, AU NOM DE LA FRANCE: GUERRES SECRETES AU RWANDA [IN THE NAME OF FRANCE: SECRET WARS IN RWANDA] 182 (2014) (describing Barril’s departure from the Élysée antiterrorist cell); L’Arrestation de Paul Barril, comment un malentendu a abouti à un “tsunami policier” [Paul Barril’s Arrest: How a Misunderstanding Led to a “Police Tsunami”], LE MONDE, 30 June 2014 (Barril’s departure from the GIGN); BENOIT COLLOMBAT AND DAVID SEVERNAY, AU NOM DE LA FRANCE: GUERRES SECRETES AU RWANDA [IN THE NAME OF FRANCE: SECRET WARS IN RWANDA] 56 (2014).


139 Interview by Raphaël Glucksman with Paul Barril (2004).

140 Interview by Raphaël Glucksman with Paul Barril (2004). He said further: “In all governments, there are several pathways. There is the official pathway, everything we know in the newspapers. There is diplomacy, which is particular in its uses. And what I told you, there is parallel diplomacy, or ‘secret action’ diplomacy, which is unconventional.”

141 Interview by Raphaël Glucksman with Paul Barril (2004) (“I never spoke to President Mitterrand about these matters. However, I did speak with Mr. de Grossouvre, I gave him memos, which he [then] delivered to President Mitterrand the next morning during breakfast, or in the evening. You can believe me, less than 24 hours passed between [issuing] the report [to de Grossouvre] and its delivery to the head of state.”).


144 Jean Damascène Bizimana, L’implication de Paul Barril dans le génocide et le négationnisme [Paul Barril’s Involvement in Genocide and Denialism], CNLG, 3 Dec. 2014.


146 Memorandum from Augustin Bizimungu to Théodore Sindikubwabo (29 Sept. 1994) (Subject: “Compte rendu de reunion”) (“[A] reconnaissance team from [Barril’s] mission received $130,000 in Kigali[,]”); Letter from Augustin Bizimana to Jean Kambanda (13 Sept. 1994) (stating that Barril spent $130,000 of the money that the IRG later paid him “for hiring the plane used by his team in May 1994”).

147 S.C. Res. 918, ¶ 13, S/RES/918 (17 May 1994).

148 Contrat d’ Assistance (28 May 1994).
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149 Contrat d’Assistance (28 May 1994); see also Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (15 June 1994); Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (2 June 1994) (“Finally, Captain Barril, leader of the company ‘Secret’, in liaison with the Habyarimana family taking refuge in Paris, is engaged in a noteworthy activity with a view to supplying ammunition and armament to government forces.”).

150 Contrat d’Assistance (28 May 1994).


152 Letter from Augustin Bizimana to Jean Kambanda (13 September 1994) (“A former captain of the French Gendarmerie named Barril signed a service contract with the Rwandan government in June 1994 that paid him an advance of 1,200,000 dollars through our military and air Attaché in Paris. Of that amount, the captain returned US $200,000 to the military Attaché, which was used for the equipment loan. It is therefore necessary to recover the balance after settling Captain Barril’s bills, which include US $130,000 for the rental of a plane used by his team in May 1994.

153 Interview by LFM with former member of Rwandan Gendarmerie état-major.

154 Interview by LFM with former member of Rwandan Gendarmerie état-major. This was announced by Augustin Ndindiliyimana at an état-major meeting.


158 Fiche 18722/N, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (15 June 1994); Fiche 18681/N, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (2 June 1994); see also Transcript of Interview by Raphaël Glucksman with Paul Barril 7 (2004). Barril implied in the interview that Colonel Bernard Cussac, the head of the Military Assistance Mission in Rwanda and Defense Attaché to the French embassy in Kigali from 1991 to 1994, was aware of his activities on behalf of the IRG.

159 Meeting Notes from Bruno Delaye 10 (1 July 1994). Delaye’s handwritten notes do not detail who brought up Barril in the conversation or why.


161 Nos actions judiciaires concernant le génocide des Tutsis au Rwanda, SURVIE, 3 July 2017.


165 Xavier Renou, *Bob Denard a toujours agi pour le compte de l’état français*, [Bob Denard Always Acted on Behalf of the French State], *Le Monde*, 15 Oct. 2007; *Bob Denard échappe à la prison ferme* [Bob Denard Escapes a Long Prison Sentence], *Le Figaro*, 20 June 2006; see also, Robert Denard, Judgment, 6 (June 2006). In 1988, Denard was sentenced to five years in prison in absentia for his role in a failed coup d’état in Benin. However, in 1993, the sentence was suspended after a retrial following his voluntary return from exile. In 2006, he was sentenced to another five years in prison for his role in the 1995 coup d’état in the Comoros, an island nation between northeastern Mozambique and northwestern Madagascar. The trial judgment stressed the relationship between Denard and the French state, naming the French minister of cooperation during the Genocide, Michel Roussin: “The testimonies, notably of the former Ministers Maurice Robert [head of African section at the SCECE [French intelligence, now DGSE] and Michel Roussin [French minister of cooperation from 1993-1994], show that Robert Denard had in the past been continuously “manipulated” by the secret services to which, moreover, without being a real agent, since he was determined to maintain his autonomy, he had always shown himself loyal and disinterested, acting mainly for reasons connected with the defense of the interests of the West.”

166 *Le crapuleux destin de Robert-Bernard Martin: Bob Denard et le Rwanda* [The Villainous Destiny of Robert-Bernard Martin: Bob Denard and Rwanda], *Survie*, 18 Feb. 2018. In February 2018, Survie, the French human rights group, published evidence that the “Robert B. Martin” paid by the IRG was, in fact, Denard, citing, amongst other sources, false passports Denard kept under that name with a signature matching the one on a receipt of payment from the IRG.

167 Letter from Augustin Bizimana to Jean Baptiste Zikama (17 June 1994).

168 Letter from Augustin Bizimana to Rwandan Embassy in Paris (17 June 1994); Letter from Augustin Bizimana to Jean Kambanda 1 (13 Sept. 1994). Since both Barril and Denard appear to have conducted reconnaissance missions around the same time, it is possible that Jean-Marie Dessalles was working for Denard, and not Barril (as posited above), on his missions to Rwanda. This seems unlikely, however, since Dessalles said he first went to Rwanda on 6 May 1994, the same date that Barril’s group left for Rwanda. Also, Dessalles’ description of his second trip mentioned training in explosives and not intelligence gathering, the purpose of the Denard contract. Further, it appears that Denard’s group never returned to Rwanda after its initial reconnaissance, but Dessalles did return.

169 The “interim Rwandan government,” or “IRG,” was formally superseded as the governing authority in Rwanda on 19 July 1994, upon the swearing-in of the new Rwandan government. Though, at that point, it would have been accurate to characterize the ousted government as the “former IRG” (or, perhaps, “government in exile”), this report persists, for the sake of simplicity, in using the term “IRG” even when referring to events after 19 July 1994.

170 Receipt from Sébastien Ntabobari, signed by Robert Bernard Martin (5 Jul. 2017). This receipt is for 1,086,000 French francs written on a BNP check, signed for by Martin Robert Bernard. Denard appears to have provided the receipt to Ntabobari, whose name is type-written on the receipt).

171 Letter from Augustin Bizimana to Jean Kambanda 1 (13 Sept. 1994).

172 Letter from Augustin Bizimana to Jean Kambanda 1 (13 Sept. 1994).

173 Memorandum from Augustin Bizimungu to Théodore Sindikubwabo 44 (29 Sept. 1994) in *Prosecutor v. Bagosora et al.* (Military I), Case No. ICTR-98-41 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 12 Dec. 2006). Bizimungu may not have been aware of the additional $200,000 payment. Bizimungu’s report lists Bizimana’s name next to the heading “Training in military intelligence,” suggesting that Bizimana was in charge of the contract with Martin & Cie (as is reflected in prior correspondence).


180 Cable from Colin Keating (2 May 1994).
181 Cable from Kofi Annan to Jacques Booh-Booh 3 (28 Apr. 1994).
183 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 494 (1999) ("[Karel Kovanda] had prepared a draft statement for the council that called the slaughter in Rwanda by its rightful name, genocide, and that warned the interim government of its responsibility for halting it. This attempt to lead the council to confront the genocide produced an acrimonious debate that lasted for eight hours. Rwanda profited from its seat on the council to delay proceedings and to attempt to weaken the statement. It was supported by its ally Djibouti, whose ambassador explained afterwards that some members of the council had not wanted to ‘sensationalize’ the situation in Rwanda. China, generally opposed to dealing with human rights issues in the Security Council, reportedly opposed the use of the term ‘genocide,’ as did Nigeria, a leader among the nonaligned members of the council. France continued its campaign to minimize the responsibility of the interim government for the slaughter. The delegate from United Kingdom, who initially derided the draft statement as ‘laughable’ or words to that effect, opposed strong action by the council. As had been clear in the discussion of protection for displaced persons, his government wanted to keep commitments of the UN limited, apparently fearing the organization might collapse under the strain of trying anything more ambitious than its usual role of diplomacy.” (internal footnote omitted)). Hannay also argued against an explicit condemnation of the IRG on the grounds that it would jeopardize the safety of the UNAMIR personnel in Rwanda. See Cable from David Hannay to United Kingdom concerning Security Council Consultations (29 Apr. 1994) (“I do not think we should point the finger specifically at the RGF, despite evidence . . . [d]oing so might have serious consequences for the safety of UNAMIR personnel on the ground.”). The US delegation supported a fairly strong statement but one without the word “genocide” in it.
185 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 494 (1999).
188 Notes on Memorandum from the French Embassy in Kinshasa (13 May 1994).
189 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY 494 (1999).
190 Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State ¶ 5 (30 Apr. 1994).
191 Declaration of the UN Security Council President (30 Apr. 1994) (“Attacks on defenseless civilians were launched throughout the country, especially in areas under the control of members or supporters of the armed forces of the Interim Government of Rwanda. The Security Council demands that the Interim Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front take effective measures to prevent any new attacks on civilians in areas under their control. . . . In this context, the Security Council recalls that the killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying that group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under international law.”).
192 Memorandum from Joyce Leader (22 Apr. 1994) (“Shattuck was favorable to the idea of asking [Bernard Kouchner] to ask Bruno Delaye to “put pressure on France to rein in ‘bad guys’ in Rwandan military.”); see also Letter from US Committee for Refugees to US Secretary of Defense 4 (3 May 1994) (The head of US Committee for Refugees warns the US Secretary of Defense: “France is heavily enmeshed in Rwanda’s internal politics. France has tended to support the political and economic status quo in Rwanda . . . France cannot be relied upon as a neutral mediator.”).
193 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State ¶ 5 (10 May 1994). The meetings included US Ambassador to Rwanda David Rawson, Dominique Pin (Delaye’s deputy at the Africa Cell), Catherine Boivineau (head of East and Central African Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay) and Yannick Gérard (the former ambassador to Uganda and now the Quai d’Orsay’s director for African affairs).
See, e.g., Cable from Prudence Bushell to US Embassy in Addis Ababa (1 May 1994) (Subject: “GOR Chief of State Bizimungu to Respect Cease-Fire and Stop Massacres if RPF Does Same”) (reporting that a US Department of State official called Bizimungu to urge him to accept a cease-fire and to take other measures to stop the massacres, including putting a halt to “hate messages over the radio”); Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy Bujumbura et al. (17 May 1994) (Subject: “Department Reminds Rwandan Ambassador of [Responsibility] for Civilians; Calls for Immediate End to Massacres”) (memorializing a meeting between US Department of State officials and the Rwandan ambassador in Washington, DC, during which a US official “deplored the GOR’s use of the radio to incite further killing”).

See Le FPR prive les forces armées d’une radio de propagande [RPF Deprives Armed Forces of Propaganda Radio], AFP, 17 Apr. 1994 (“A UN officer had recently indicated that the radio broadcast over the airwaves the addresses of the houses where refugees were hiding. The objective, according to him, was to allow militiamen hunt them out and kill them.”); see also Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (17 Apr. 1994) (Subject: “The Military Assessment of the Situation as of 17 April 1994”) (“RTLM radio broadcasts inflammatory speeches and songs exhorting the population to destroy all Tutsis.”); Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (22 Apr. 1994) (reporting that, during a 21 April 1994 meeting with US Ambassador Albright and another US official, an activist from Human Rights Watch “went on to charge that the systematic campaign by the Rwandan Armed Forces to eliminate the Tutsi constitutes genocide, citing radio broadcasts urging Hutus to take up arms so that ‘your children will not even know what a Tutsi is’”).

Memorandum from Frank Wisner to the National Security Council (5 May 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts”) (“We have looked at options to stop the broadcasts within the Pentagon, discussed them interagency and concluded jamming is an ineffective and expensive mechanism that will not accomplish the objective the NSC Advisor seeks.”).

Notes on TD Diplomatie (Subject: “Rwanda—Emission de la radio ‘mille collines’”) (30 June 1994); Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Brouillage RTLM”) (exploring the possibility of jamming RTLM’s broadcasts).


Transcript, Interview of François Mitterrand, TF1 et France 2 (10 May 1994).


Transcript of Alain Juppé’s speech at Johns Hopkins (11 May 1994).

Transcript of Alain Juppé’s speech at Johns Hopkins (11 May 1994).
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213 S.C. Res. 918, UN S/RES/918 (17 May 1994); UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3377 mtg. at 10-11, S/PV.3377 (16 May 1994).

214 S.C. Res. 918, UN S/RES/918 (17 May 1994).


216 MIP Audition of Gérard Prunier, Tome III, Vol. 2 191 (30 June 1998). The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, José Ayala Lasso, wrote in a mid-May 1994 report that, according to some estimates, “more than 200,000 people” had been killed, but that “well-informed sources” indicated “the numbers may be considerably higher and may exceed 500,000.” UN High Commissioner for Human Rights José Ayala Lasso, Report on Mission to Rwanda 11-12 (19 May 1994). Privately, Lasso told diplomats “he feared that more than 600,000 were probably dead in Rwanda.” Cable from Strobe Talbott to US Embassy Bujumbura et al. (19 May 1994) (Subject: “Official – Informal”).

217 See Cable from US Secretary of State to US mission in Geneva (24 May 1994) (Subject: “UN Human Rights Commission: Genocide’ at Special Session on Rwanda”) (authorizing the US delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission special session on Rwanda to push for language in a forthcoming resolution “which acknowledges that genocide or acts of genocide may have taken place in Rwanda,” explaining: “Our intent in doing so is to make the resolution a credible one: talk[ing] about Rwanda without use of the word genocide could be criticized as artificial”).


219 Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy Bujumbura et al. (19 May 1994) (Subject: “Official – Informal”).


221 Cable from US Mission in Geneva to US Secretary of State (24 May 1994) (Subject: “Human Rights Commission Rwanda Special Session Day One Ends with No Surprises, Resolution Drafting Surprisingly Smooth”).

222 United Nations, Press Release, Human Rights Commission Begins Special Session to Consider Rwanda (24 May 1994) (stating that Michaux-Chevry “said the word genocide was not too strong to classify events in Rwanda”; see Note from John Crook addressed to “People Concerned About Genocide” (24 May 1994) (“France made a strong statement that genocide had occurred.”)).

223 Notes on TD Diplomatie (Subject: “Télégramme d’actualité : Rwanda 2/2”) (26 May 1994).


226 Meeting Notes from Dominique Pin (11 May 1994). (“The RPF is well placed to win. It refuses to negotiate a cease-fire with the interim government, and it refuses to establish an international force.”); see also Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (2 May 1994) (“Fighting continues throughout the territory, and RPF rebels, presumably benefitting from Ugandan army support, are making progress in the east and south of the country. . . . The only technically viable solution is a military intervention of the countries concerned (France and Belgium?) limited to space and time to allow for the distribution of humanitarian aid (. . .) and force parties to a balanced agreement.”); Situation report from Bruno Delaye (10 May 1994) (“With the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) refusing to negotiate a cease-fire with the interim government, the fighting and massacres continue. The RPF, which is now concentrating its efforts today on the capture of Kigali, already controls half of the country.”).

227 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (18 May 1994).

228 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (18 May 1994) (Subject: Building a case against French policy in Rwanda: “Liberation on the offensive”).


230 Situation report from Bruno Delaye (signed by Dominique Pin) (17 May 1994).

231 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (18 May 1994) (Subject: “Building a case against French policy in Rwanda: ‘Liberation on the offensive’”).

232 Alain Frilet, La France prise au piège de ses accords [France, Ensnared in Its Own Agreements], LIBÉRATION, 18 May 1994.

233 Alain Frilet, La France prise au piège de ses accords [France, Ensnared in Its Own Agreements], LIBÉRATION, 18 May 1994.

234 Meeting Notes from Françoise Carle (18 May 1994).

235 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (18 May 1994).

236 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (18 May 1994).


238 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 May 1994).

239 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 May 1994).

240 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 May 1994).

241 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (18 May 1994); see also Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 May 1994) (Quoting Balladur: “[W]e cannot remain absent from Rwanda”).

242 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (18 May 1994).

243 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (19 May 1994).


246 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (19 May 1994).


250 Petit Dejeuner entre H. Kohl, F. Mitterrand, Sommet Franco-Allemand a Mulhouse [Breakfast Meeting between H. Kohl, German Chancellor and President F. Mitterrand, Franco-German Summit at Mulhouse] (31 May 1994).
251 Petit Dejeuner entre H. Kohl, F. Mitterrand, Sommet Franco-Allemand a Mulhouse [Breakfast Meeting between H. Kohl, German Chancellor and President F. Mitterrand, Franco-German Summit at Mulhouse] (31 May 1994).

252 Petit Dejeuner entre H. Kohl, F. Mitterrand, Sommet Franco-Allemand a Mulhouse [Breakfast Meeting between H. Kohl, German Chancellor and President F. Mitterrand, Franco-German Summit at Mulhouse] (31 May 1994).

253 Meeting Notes from Françoise Carle (8 June 1994).


257 Duclert Commission Report 883 (citing SHD, GR 2004 Z 169 9, « RWANDA - Concept d’emploi de la MINUAR 2 »).

258 Duclert Commission Report 883 (quoting SHD, GR 2004 Z 169 9, « RWANDA - Concept d’emploi de la MINUAR 2 »).

259 Duclert Commission Report 883 (quoting SHD, GR 2004 Z 169 9, « RWANDA - Concept d’emploi de la MINUAR 2 »).

260 Alain Frilet, *La France prise au piège de ses accords* [France, Ensnared in Its Own Agreements], *LIBÉRATION* (18 May 1994). The 1975 France-Rwanda technical agreement did not require France to do anything beyond provide training. It was used, however, by French officials to justify its sending of troops.

261 Letter from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda-Assistance militaire Française”) (emphasis in original omitted).

262 Letter from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda-Assistance militaire Française”).

263 Letter from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda-Assistance militaire Française”).


266 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (23 June 1994). (Subject: “L’opération Turquoise vue du Zaïre”).

267 Cable from US Ambassador to Senegal to US Secretary of State (24 June 1994) (“Alain Juppé arrived Saturday, June 18 for discussions with President Diouf . . . on Senegal’s contribution of troops to French PKO initiative in Rwanda. French and Senegalese officials lauded and applauded the deep character of Franco-Senegalese cooperation and friendship.”); Cable from US Ambassador to the Republic of Congo to US Secretary of State (24 June 1994) (“At one point we were led to believe that the Congo would support UNAMIR II, but not the French initiative. Now that the [UN Security Council] has given a green light to the French. . . the Congolose have apparently dropped their reticence.”).

268 *Le Rwanda au centre des entretiens d’Alain Juppé avec le président Omar Bongo* [Rwanda at the Center of the Discussions between Alain Juppé and President Omar Bongo], AFP, 3 June 1994; Jon Henley, *France Pursues Bigger Picture in Elf Scandal*, *THE GUARDIAN*, 2 June 2001. In Gabon, Elf was a veritable state within the state, mixing business, politics, and diplomacy. France accounts for three-quarters of the foreign investment in Gabon, and Gabon sometimes provided three-quarters of Elf’s profits.


270 *Le Rwanda au centre des entretiens d’Alain Juppé avec le président Omar Bongo* [Rwanda at the Center of the Discussions between Alain Juppé and President Omar Bongo], AFP Général (3 June 1994). Bongo met with Roussin,
Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua, Minister of the Budget (and France’s future President) Nicolas Sarkozy, and the presidents of the Senate René Monory and the National Assembly Philippe Seguin.

271 Le Président Bongo pour la mise sous contrôle de l’ONU du Rwanda [President Omar Bongo for Rwanda to Be under UN Control], AFP, 8 June 1994.


273 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda and France: Why now? The OAU, Media, NGOs and Presidential Elections”).

274 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda and France: Why now? The OAU, Media, NGOs and Presidential Elections”).


277 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 22 juin – Situation au Rwanda”).

278 Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy in Bujumbura (13 June 1994) (“RPF forces launched a major attack on Gitarama Sunday night, June 12, and routed GOR forces”).

279 Report from Bruno Delaye (Subject: Point hebdomadaire de situation sur l’Afrique) (14 June 1994) (noting that the IRG had fled its headquarters in Gitarama); Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy in Bujumbura (13 June 1994) (“UN Officials report that self-declared interim President Sindikubwabo and several of his ministers fled Gitarama three to four days earlier for Gisenyi”); Cable from US Secretary of State to All US African posts, (13 June 1994) (Subject: “Press Guidance—Monday June 13, 1994”) (“RPF forces took control of Gitarama, forcing interim government political leaders and their military protectors to flee westward toward Zaire”).


281 Serge Arnold, Le Rwanda du camp gouvernemental livré aux milices [Rwanda’s Governmental Side Taken Over by Militia], AFP, 13 June 1994.

282 François Soudan, Rwanda pourquoi la France s’en mêle? JEUNE AFRIQUE, 30 June 1994; see also Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 15 juin—Situation au Rwanda”) (Pres. Mitterrand: “This is a decision I take responsibility for.”).


284 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 15 juin—Situation au Rwanda”).

285 Alain Juppé, Intervenir au Rwanda [Intervening in Rwanda], LIBÉRATION, 16 June 1994.

286 Jacques Amalric, Les Raisons d’un revirement français [Reasons for a French About-Face], LIBÉRATION (22 June 1994).

287 MIP Audition of M. Gerard Prunier, Tome III, Vol. 2, 191 (30 June 1998) (Prunier: “[D]uring this five-week period, between the beginning of the Genocide and 11 May, at least 600,000 people had died.”); Memorandum from French Delegation for Strategic Affairs (16 June 1994) (“It should be made aware that the operation in question will provoke the following criticism: Too late: the massacres have already caused the death of several hundred thousand people and the exodus of a greater number.”).

288 Cable from New Zealand Embassy in Paris to New Zealand Mission to the United Nations (20 June 1994) (“Juppé had decided to act last week in response to public pressure in the wake of the massacres of children and bishops the week before.”).

290 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 15 juin—Situation au Rwanda”).
291 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (22 June 1994).
292 Letter from Edouard Balladur to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994).
293 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 15 juin—Situation au Rwanda”).
294 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 15 juin—Situation au Rwanda”).
300 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda and France: Why now? The OAU, Media, NGOs and Presidential Elections”).
301 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda and France: Why now? The OAU, Media, NGOs and Presidential Elections”).
302 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 15 juin—Situation au Rwanda”) (Mitterrand: “If the others fail, we must go alone with the Africans. We take the risk of less effectiveness but our action is urgent and limited. France’s honor is at stake.”).
303 Alain Juppé, Réponse du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, M. Alain Juppé à une question orale au Senat [Response from Alain Juppé, French Foreign Affairs Minister to French Senate] (16 June 1994). Several days later, on a trip to the Ivory Coast to secure Ivorian participation in France’s intervention, he repeated the argument to the Associated Press. David Crary, Mitterrand Readies French troops for Rwanda, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 18 June 1994 (“Even if the rebels won the war, Juppe said, they could not govern Rwanda on their own.”).
304 Weekly News Report from Département International du Parti Socialiste, Communiqué de Pervenche Berès, NOUVELLES INTERNATIONALES 8 (June 16, 1994).
306 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (22 June 1994).
307 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (22 June 1994).
308 Interview du ministre des affaires étrangères, M. Alain Juppé [Interview of the Foreign Minister, Mr. Alain Juppé], FRANCE 2 (16 June 1994).
310 Stephen Smith, L’Armée française malvenue au Rwanda [French Army is Unwelcome in Rwanda], LIBÉRATION (20 June 1994) (“By securing, through our intervention in the west of Rwanda, the government area where a good part of the population has taken refuge, we will create a kind of Hutuland that would otherwise be condemned by the military. It is obviously political and, in the aftermath of the Tutsi genocide, completely unacceptable to the RPF.”).
311 Notes on Crisis cell meeting transcript (16 June 1994) (Subject: “Intervention au Rwanda”).
312 Cable from Colin Keating 3 (17 June 1994).
313 Cable from Colin Keating 3 (17 June 1994).
314 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994).
315 EDOUARD BALLADUR, LE POUVOIR NE SE PARTAGE PAS: CONVERSATIONS AVEC FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND [Power Cannot Be Shared: Conversations with François Mitterrand] 244-245 (2009); see also HUBERT VÉDRINE, LES MONDES DE FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND: A L’ÉLYSÉE 1981-1995 701-702 (1996) (noting that Lanxade and Leotard had considered a solitary intervention by France “very risky” with Mitterrand’s chief of staff, Dominique de Villepin, and General Quesnot “already preparing the practical arrangements” but that Mitterrand thought that “a military deployment in Kigali and in the very center of the country was extremely dangerous”).


318 Restricted Council Meeting Notes 5 (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 15 juin—Situation au Rwanda”).

319 Notes on Crisis cell meeting transcript (16 June 1994) (Subject: “Intervention au Rwanda”).

320 Fiche 18722/N, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (15 June 1994). (“[T]he RPF has not released its pressure on Kigali and the Nyamirambo neighborhood, one of the few that is not yet under its control, which is subject to daily bombing.” (emphasis omitted)); Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (19 June 1994) (“Despite a semblance of a truce applied yesterday in Kigali to allow humanitarian operations, the belligerents continue fighting. . . . In the morning, the clashes were violent, especially in the city center, south-west and north of the capital.”).

321 Notes on Crisis cell meeting transcript (16 June 1994) (Subject: intervention au Rwanda”).

322 Notes on Crisis cell meeting transcript (16 June 1994) (Subject: intervention au Rwanda”).


324 Notes on Crisis cell meeting transcript (17 June 1994).

325 Notes on Crisis cell meeting transcript (17 June 1994).

326 Notes on Crisis cell meeting transcript (17 June 1994).

327 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994).

328 Note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994) (emphasis omitted).

329 Note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994).

330 Report regarding options for intervention in Rwanda appended to note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994) (emphasis added).

331 Note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994).

332 Note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994).

333 Note from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot (16 June 1994).

334 Cable from Raymond Germanos to François Léotard (17 June 1994).

335 Turquoise operational orders would use the same ethnically essentialist terminology used by Jacques Lanxade. See, e.g., MIP Tome I, 323 (“First, it was a question of “being ready later on to gradually control the extent of Hutu country towards Kigali.””) (emphasis added).

336 Note from Jacques Lanxade to François Léotard (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Présentation générale de l’opération française au Rwanda”).

337 Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Qui sont les massacreurs”).

338 Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Qui sont les massacreurs”).

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340 Cable from Strobe Talbott to US Embassy in Bujumbura (28 Apr. 1994) While the IRG continued to maintain that ethnic massacres were a spontaneous response to the RPF’s continued offensive, the US State Department’s Prudence Bushnell confronted the IRG’s Théoneste Bagosora “with eyewitness accounts of Rwandan army complicity in the killings” stating that “the world did not believe their party line.”

341 MIP Audition of Jean-Herve Bradol, Tome III, Vol. 1, 395 (June 2, 1998); Cable from Madeleine Albright to US Secretary of State (20 June 1994) (containing contemporaneous notes from the US Embassy relaying Dr. Bradol’s account that Mitterrand called the Rwandan government a “gang of murderers” in a private meeting).

342 Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy in Addis Ababa (20 June 1994) (Subject: “Update on French initiative on Rwanda”).

343 Note from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1994).

344 Note from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (20 June 1994).


346 Note from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994).

347 Note from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994).

348 Cable from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994).

349 Cable from Jacques Lanxade to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994).

350 Note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994) (emphasis omitted).

351 Minister: Belgium Not Interested in New Rwanda Mission, REUTERS, 16 June 1994. Notably, Belgium had not cut off military training assistance to the FAR, even after it withdrew its ground troops in November 1990. In early 1994, the Belgian military still had more FAR soldiers enrolled in their military schools than did France.

352 Note from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (16 June 1994) (reporting that Prime Minister Balladur “has made it a condition of this operation that at least one European country participate alongside us”); Partial Transcript, François Léotard, TF-1 (18 June 1994) (Subject: “Leotard Comments on Intervention Prerequisites”) (“Two things are ruled out: First and foremost, for us to go there on our own, and second, for us to be there for a long time.”); see also Note from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 June 1994) (“It seems indispensable to obtain troops, if only symbolically, from at least one European country.”).

353 Cable from Jacques Lapouge to various French Embassies in Africa, Europe, and Asia (16 June 1994). The word “cover,” though not used in the document, is explained: “6 / == PARTICIPATION IN THE OPERATION === . . . France does not plan to intervene alone. In the local context, it would be immediately accused of wanting to prevent the RPF military victory; The association of European countries is necessary. To record our action in the framework of WEU provides a useful label for the acceptance of our action, as the image of Europe. Participation of African countries, if possible not exclusively francophones, would also be very desirable.; 7 / == LEGITIMATION OF OUR ACTION BY THE UN = Naturally, it should obtain a coverage of our action by the United Nations.”

354 MIP Audition of Alain Juppé, Tome III, Vol. 2 (21 Apr. 1998). In his MIP hearing, Juppé confirmed that France had enjoyed the Secretary-General’s “active support” in pushing for the adoption of resolution 929, which authorized Operation Turquoise.

355 Cable from Colin Keating (16 June 1994).

356 Cable from Colin Keating (16 June 1994). While Keating’s intent is understood, France does not appear to have had a “significant fleet of transport aircraft,” and itself had to turn to Ukrainian “arms brokers” to lease former Soviet aircraft for Operation Turquoise.

357 Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.

358 Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.

359 Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.

360 Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.
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361 Cable from Madeleine Albright to American Embassy in Paris (17 June 1994).
362 MIP Tome I 312 (“This lack of [international] support was also emphasized by General Raymond Germanos, who recalled that France had in particular proposed to Italy that the operational part of Turquoise be led by the French, who would engage their troops, and that humanitarian support be taken over by the WEU [Western European Union] under Italian command; but at the last minute, Italy refused to take part.”).
363 Cable from Jacques Lapouge to various French Embassies in Africa, Europe, and Asia (16 June 1994).
364 Cable from Jacques Lapouge to various French Embassies in Africa, Europe, and Asia (16 June 1994).
365 Cable from Jacques Lapouge to various French Embassies in Africa, Europe, and Asia (16 June 1994).
366 Cable from Colin Keating (17 June 1994).
367 Cable from Ambassador Colin Keating (17 June 1994).
368 Cable from Ambassador Colin Keating (17 June 1994).
369 Cable from Ambassador Colin Keating (17 June 1994).
370 Cable from New Zealand Embassy in Ottawa to New Zealand Mission at the United Nations (20 June 1994) (“Dallaire believed [the French proposal] would make the situation unmanageable, but was unable to comment publicly as the Secretariat had received instructions from the SecGen to be both supportive of the French proposal and the reinforcement of UNAMIR.”).
372 Letter from Patrick Mazimhaka to H.E Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaidby 8 (20 June 1994) (Subject: “French military intervention in Rwanda”).
379 Note from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Entretien à Paris avec des representants du FPR”).
380 Note from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Entretien à Paris avec des representants du FPR”).
381 Handwritten note by Francois Mitterrand on Note from Bruno Delaye to President François Mitterrand (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Entretien à Paris avec des representants du FPR”).
382 Letter from Democratic Forces of Change (MDR, PSD, PDC, PL) to François Mitterrand (16 June 1994) (Subject “Refus d’une nouvelle intervention militaire Francaise au Rwanda”).
384 Declaration of Central African heads of state on Rwanda (27 June 1994).
386 Cable from New Zealand Embassy in Ottawa to UN Security Council Representative office in Wellington, New Zealand (20 June 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”).
387 Note from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994) (Subject: “Conseil restraint du 22 juin. RWANDA”) (noting that Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium have announced they will provide logistical support but will not send troops).

388 Cable from Colin Keating (20 June 1994).

389 Note from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994) (Subject: “Conseil restraint du 22 juin. RWANDA”).


391 Interview by LFM with Colin Keating.


393 Cable from New Zealand Embassy in Paris to UN Security Council Representative office in Wellington, New Zealand (20 June 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”).

394 Note from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (21 June 1994) (Subject: “Conseil restraint du 22 juin. RWANDA”).

395 US Intelligence Cable, sender redacted (20 June 1994) (Subject: “France-Rwanda: Possibility of Intervention”).


397 Cable from Colin Keating (20 June 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”).


399 Cable from Colin Keating (20 June 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”).


401 Letter from Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Salim Bin Mohammed Al-Khussaiby (19 June 1994).


403 Cable from Colin Keating (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”).

404 Cable from Colin Keating (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”).

405 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 437 (2003).

406 Fiche Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (22 June 1994).


408 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Mercredi 22 juin—Situation au Rwanda”).
A. **While Operation Turquoise Carried a Humanitarian Mandate, French Forces Deployed with a Massive Display of Firepower and Some Officers Who Had Previously Supported the FAR in its War against the RPF.**

I was surprised by . . . how deeply [the Turquoise troops, when they first arrived,] believed that they were there to try to protect the innocent Hutu population.1

—— Charles Petrie, Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator for the UN

First, France needed planes. Pressed, suddenly, with an urgent need to ferry large numbers of soldiers, trucks, weapons, and helicopters to the Rwandan-Zaïrean border, and knowing that France’s own fleet was inadequate to the task,2 French officials set their sights on American military planes—in particular, the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy, a wide-bodied, high-winged military transport aircraft the US Department of Defense had been using to shuttle soldiers and equipment all over the world since the Vietnam war.3 The C-5 had already made an appearance in the region: in April 1994, the United States dispatched C-5s to airlift Belgian soldiers, vehicles, and supplies to help Belgium evacuate its nationals from Rwanda.4 This time, though, when France sought a loan of C-5s from the United States for the launch of Operation Turquoise, the Americans demurred.5 With nowhere else to turn, the French government struck a deal with Ukrainian arms dealers,6 known for charging steep prices for surplus military equipment from former Eastern Bloc nations.7 It was for this reason that General Jean-Claude Lafourcade, the newly designated commander of the Turquoise forces, found himself on the morning of 24 June 1994 aboard an Antonov An-124, a massive, four-engine military transport plane first produced behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War.8 The questionable reliability of the plane and the chartered pilots and crew that came with it made Lafourcade nervous.9

Lafourcade had never been to Rwanda.10 Yet on 17 June, after being summoned to Paris from the southwest of France, he found himself sitting in Admiral Jacques Lanxade’s office, receiving less than an hour’s worth of instructions on his new mission.11 That mission was to oversee a two-month military operation that, in the words of the UN resolution that authorized it, would strive to “contribut[e], in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda.”12 The admiral was characteristically direct. As Lafourcade would later write, Admiral Lanxade did not hesitate to state that a genocide was being perpetrated against the Tutsi, but he cautioned Lafourcade that “the boundaries are blurred.”13 The killers, in many cases, were ordinary Rwandans—neighbors murdering neighbors.14 There were militias, but they wore no uniforms and would be difficult to distinguish from ordinary street gangs.15 French troops would, of course, recognize FAR soldiers—“[t]hey have been our allies,” Lafourcade wrote—but, according to Lanxade, only some of the Rwandan troops “were guilty of participating in this business of death.”16 Others, he posited, were “fighting loyally” against the RPF.17
Turning to the RPF, Lanxade warned: “They see us as enemies and explicitly threaten us with fighting if we intervene.”18 Lanxade characterized the RPF as both highly disciplined and capable of “merciless violence”—at bottom, “a rebel force with unconventional methods whose objective is the conquest of power.”19 “We will not go and fight against them. But we will do what we have to do if necessary,” General Lafourcade would write.20

The Antonov An-124 that Lafourcade boarded on 24 June was headed to Goma, Zaire, on the northern bank of Lake Kivu.21 France had selected Goma as the main operating base for Turquoise, a decision it made “[f]or lack of a choice but not without hesitation.”22 Goma had a serviceable, modern airport and was conveniently located beside Rwanda’s northwestern border town of Gisenyi, the new seat of the IRG.23 General Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander, deeply suspicious of France’s intentions, had feared that French forces might concentrate their efforts in that part of Rwanda.24 “[T]hat would confirm that they were really coming in to support the [FAR]. If so, I could expect them to enter combat operations against the RPF, which by default would drive a direct reprisal against UNAMIR and force our withdrawal,” he later wrote.25

In fact, according to French historian and Socialist party stalwart Gérard Prunier, who had been asked by the Defense Ministry to help plan Turquoise, French officials had initially planned to enter Rwanda through Gisenyi.26 Prunier found the early plan objectionable on several grounds, not the least of which was that it was at odds with French claims that Turquoise’s aims were solely humanitarian, as there were few surviving Tutsi in need of saving in that part of Rwanda. “The French forces would find absolutely no one left alive to be paraded in front of TV cameras as a justification for the intervention,” Prunier would later remark.27 Prunier persuaded French authorities to scrap that plan.28 The French government ultimately settled on a two-pronged approach: while Turquoise’s primary base would be situated in Goma (near the IRG stronghold of Gisenyi), the French military would set up a second base farther south in Bukavu, Zaire, on the Lake Kivu’s southern shore, from which Turquoise troops could cross the border into Cyangugu.29 “[M]y impression,” Prunier would write, “was that the part of my argument which finally won the day was that at the Nyarushishi [refugee] camp near Cyangugu we could find the large stock of surviving Tutsi whom we needed for displaying to the TV cameras.”30

En route to Goma, the Antonov An-124 cruised southward over northern Africa for several hours without incident.31 Lafourcade and his compatriots, though, remained uneasy about the aircraft to the point that one of the officers got up to check in with the pilots.32 What he learned horrified the French military passengers: the plane needed to make a brief stopover, and because the landing conditions were favorable there, the pilots were proposing to land in the Ugandan city of Entebbe.33 “Uganda, the country that most actively supports Kagame’s RPF!” Lafourcade would later exclaim.34

In fact, since the start of the Genocide, Entebbe had been a way station for much of the international community’s efforts to evacuate foreign nationals and bring humanitarian relief to Rwanda.35 Its airport, considered to be among the best in the region, was linked to Rwanda by 325 miles of road that could be traversed in any weather.36 Dallaire had traveled to Entebbe just a few weeks earlier and had, in fact, chosen the city as his main staging base for UNAMIR’s planned relaunch.37 Lafourcade, though, who may well have known none of this, continued to believe years afterward that a brief pitstop in Entebbe would have constituted “an unprecedented diplomatic
blunder.”38 The French officers ordered the pilots to land instead 1,500 miles to the west of Entebbe in Libreville, Gabon (home of President Omar Bongo, a steadfast French ally who supported the operation).39 Looking back, Lafourcade considered it fortunate that he and the other French officers had indulged their concerns about the chartered aircraft and its pilots. “Our mistrust,” he wrote, “would save us.”40

The French government had presented Operation Turquoise as a new beginning of sorts by insisting that, after years of support for the Habyarimana government and its Army, French troops would return to Rwanda as a neutral provider of humanitarian aid.41 What was abundantly clear, though, as Lafourcade’s plane veered away from Ugandan airspace on 24 June 1994, was that French officials were still laboring under the same preconceptions that infused the French government’s interventions on behalf of the Habyarimana regime before the Genocide. They still viewed the RPF as Ugandan-backed usurpers, still saw the RPF’s leaders as would-be tyrants, and still believed in the power of the French military to forestall the RPF’s victory. The “mistrust” that Lafourcade and his fellow officers brought to their mission did not evaporate when their plane, at last, reached its final destination in Goma, Zaire.42 They carried it with them every day, from the start of the operation until the last French soldiers left Rwanda two months later, and even years after the mission’s completion.

Turquoise was not neutral, and never could be, because the French government was not neutral. Its leaders remained hostile to the RPF, appearing to see no virtue in its campaign to defeat the génocidaires. The RPF, having driven the IRG and its Army from several of its most vital strongholds over the preceding two and a half months, was unquestionably winning that fight, and, before Operation Turquoise, its path to victory and putting an end to the Genocide had seemed clear.43 Turquoise obstructed that path. It gave comfort to the IRG and the FAR at a moment when their fortunes looked grim, while warning RPF forces to think twice before venturing too deep into interim government-controlled territory.

This was by design. As the MIP would later recognize, the French government’s insistence that Operation Turquoise had solely humanitarian aims was never true, strictly speaking.44 There was, in fact, a second, generally unspoken goal behind the operation: “preserving the conditions for political negotiation based on power-sharing.”45 According to the MIP: “France, even as it launched Operation Turquoise, had not given up the idea that only a political solution accepted by the parties and based on power sharing would put an end to the violence and ethnic clashes.”46 To this way of thinking, it was not acceptable to stand by and wait for RPF forces to defeat the interim government’s Army, as this, in the French government’s view, could not produce a durable peace. The old assumptions had not lost their purchase in the French imagination: officials in Paris remained convinced, despite all evidence to the contrary, that an RPF military victory would usher in a new era of ethnic violence and instability.

What French officials hoped was that if the Turquoise forces could stabilize what remained of the interim government-controlled territory in western Rwanda and end the massacres there, there might still be a chance of coaxing the two sides to return to the negotiating table and, as General Lafourcade would later write, achieve a “reimplementation of the Arusha Accords.”47 One can only speculate as to what a negotiated truce might have looked like, had France succeeded in wrangling the two sides to accept one. There is, however, reason to suspect that some members of
the French government had a radical vision in mind: the partitioning of Rwanda.\textsuperscript{48} President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Alain Juppé had always viewed the Rwandan conflict in ethnic terms, insisting that the RPF was a Tutsi organization, and so could never wield power legitimately in a country with an overwhelming Hutu majority.\textsuperscript{49} One former French diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Juppé was genuinely convinced that a territorial division of Rwanda into separate Hutu and Tutsi states was the best solution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{50}

General Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander, sensed that this was the French government’s vision when he sat down to speak with General Lafourcade at his office in Goma in late June 1994.\textsuperscript{51} On the wall, he would later note, was a map of Rwanda with a line down the middle—a line that appeared to denote the position that RPF units had held in May 1994, reflecting none of the territorial gains that RPF forces had made over the previous month.\textsuperscript{52} He inferred that the French government was angling to push back the RPF forces and reestablish that line, giving the IRG and its Army additional leverage in prospective negotiations with their adversary.\textsuperscript{53}

The MIP’s quarrel with the French government’s renewed push for Arusha-style negotiations in June 1994 was not that it threatened to tear the country in half, but that it assumed, too optimistically, that a peaceful resolution to the conflict was still possible.\textsuperscript{54} Without an intervention to “hold up [the] situation,” the MIP summarized, French officials viewed the RPF as unlikely to resume peace talks while its forces were routing the FAR from its last remaining strongholds.\textsuperscript{55} The truth, though, is that there were many reasons why a cease-fire had failed to materialize that summer, and why neither side was likely to agree to one anytime soon.\textsuperscript{56} One of those reasons, as French officials well knew, had nothing to do with the balance of power in the war. It was, rather, that the RPF leadership had decided it would not recognize the legitimacy of a government that was slaughtering its own people.\textsuperscript{57}

Having resolved to stop the RPF’s advance, the French government had no difficulty summoning the brute strength it apparently believed its mission required.\textsuperscript{58} Its troops, as one French soldier would put it, came “‘armed like aircraft carriers,’”\textsuperscript{59} arriving with an arsenal that included “more than 100 armored vehicles, a battery of heavy 120mm marine mortars, two light Gazelle and eight heavy Super Puma helicopters and air cover provided by four Jaguar fighter-bombers, four Mirage F1CT ground-attack planes, and four Mirage F1CRs for reconnaissance.”\textsuperscript{60} “This reassures the men!” Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Hogard, who led the southern Turquoise detachment, would later write.\textsuperscript{61} Reflecting on his tour in a 2005 memoir, Hogard would note that, before departing for Rwanda, he made a point of requesting mortars, machine guns, sniper rifles, and night-vision goggles expressly because of his concerns that the RPF forces would take up arms against the Turquoise troops.\textsuperscript{62}

The extent of French firepower would be on full display in the early days of the operation. As a magazine devoted to the French military would later report, special forces teams performing reconnaissance patrols in late June 1994 traveled in packs of four jeeps and one VLRA light-tactical vehicle equipped with 12.7 and 7.62 mm machine guns, Belgian-made 5.56mm light machine guns, LRAC anti-tank rocket launchers, M79 and M203 grenade launchers, and FR F2 and Barrett sniper rifles—“a truly dissuasive amount of firepower!” the magazine exclaimed.\textsuperscript{63} All this weaponry, in a country where many militias were brutalizing their victims with clubs and
machetes, struck some observers as surprising and contributed to a perception that Turquoise was more of a military operation than a humanitarian endeavor.64

According to General Lafourcade, the thinking among Turquoise’s planners was that an “impressive” display of French weaponry would deter any potential challenges to the French forces.65 “[S]oldiers know that the best way to avoid the use of force is to rely on dissuasion before,” he would later write.66 This, to be sure, was not an unreasonable view. While RPF officials have long maintained that they never had any intention of confronting French troops,67 it is understandable that the French government would not want to take any chances. The mere fact, though, that French authorities could not feel confident that the RPF would believe them when they averred that Turquoise would be neutral only serves to prove that the French government—due to its history of support for the FAR—was uniquely ill suited to launch a humanitarian operation in Rwanda.

Settling into his role as commander of the new operation, Lafourcade had little time to cultivate a perspective on the complexities of Rwandan society and the rapidly unfolding crisis into which his troops were inserting themselves. It was not until 15 June 1994—more than two months into the Genocide—that President Mitterrand had even made the decision to send troops to Rwanda, and from there it was up to the Rapid Action Force to make the necessary preparations, and to do it quickly.68 On 17 June, the French Ministry of Defense ordered a select group of special forces units to “gather their equipment and prepare to leave for an African destination.”69 Three days later, a French special forces reconnaissance team led by Colonel Jacques Rosier landed in Goma to make contact with the Zairean Armed Forces and scout out the city’s airport.70

The rapid-fire turnaround had critical implications for the ensuing operation. First, it left the French government with only a small window to assemble an international coalition in support of the mission. French officials were eager to counter suspicions71—held by some in the UN Security Council and popular in the international media72—that the French government, with its long history of supporting the Hutu regime, was going to support the interim government forces.73 Hoping to present Turquoise as a multinational operation, the administration enlisted Foreign Minister Juppé and Cooperation Minister Roussin to persuade friendly francophone governments in Africa to contribute troops, or at least logistical support.74 Their effort, though, had limited success.75 Operation Turquoise ended up being an overwhelmingly French affair, with no more than a few dozen foreign troops (chiefly from Senegal) during the first few critical weeks of its existence,76 and ultimately just 510 foreign troops (still primarily from Senegal, but also from other francophone African countries, including Niger, Chad, and Mauritania) serving alongside France’s contingent of 2,924 soldiers.77

Even more critically, perhaps, the rush to launch the operation meant French defense officials had little time to iron out the particulars of the French troops’ mission.78 The first order General Lafourcade would issue as commander of Operation Turquoise, on 25 June 1994, identified two goals for the operation: first, “to put an end to the massacres wherever possible, potentially by using force,” and, second, “to be able to hand over” authority to UNAMIR II “when the time comes.”79 But rather than specify exactly how the Turquoise forces would achieve these goals, French authorities chose to keep their plans vague, giving the commanders on the ground wide latitude to respond to events as they saw fit.80 The ambiguity left senior French officers...
unsure about the scope of their authority. For example, in his end-of-mission report, Colonel Patrice Sartre, the commander of the operation’s northern group, based in Goma, wrote that it was clear to him that his troops could use deadly force against “any individual threatening the life of another.” What was less clear, he wrote, was what to do if the French troops were able to apprehend the person without shooting him. “Did we have the right to detain [him]? For how long? And how to keep [him]?”

A related question was how French troops ought to deal with known génocidaires. When US officials posed this question to a French diplomat in Washington on 20 June, two days before the UN Security Council vote authorizing the operation, the diplomat “acknowledged that a policy has not been worked out.”

The discretion left to Turquoise troops was particularly problematic because some were veterans of previous French military operations in support of the FAR. These men, whose presence could not help but undermine French claims that Turquoise was an unequivocally “neutral” force, had worked alongside Rwandan Army commanders who, in numerous cases, were personally responsible for the murder of Tutsi civilians. The returning French troops had relationships with FAR leaders, understood their ways of thinking, and often appeared sympathetic to their cause. To the French government, these were not reasons to disqualify an officer or soldier from participating in Turquoise; rather, as one French gendarme, Thierry Prungnaud, discovered, the French troops’ familiarity with the terrain and the dynamics of the conflict were among the reasons they were chosen for the mission.

Prungnaud had served in Rwanda for four months in 1992, training the Rwandan Presidential Guard (members of which would go on to participate in massacres). Two years later, in mid-June 1994, a French Gendarmerie commander summoned Prungnaud to his office outside of Versailles. “There is a planned departure for Burundi, following the events taking place in Rwanda,” the commander told him. The commander, as Prungnaud would later recall, had a skewed understanding of just what was happening in Rwanda. “You know that Ugandan rebels are invading the country and killing people,” he told Prungnaud, having apparently taken no notice of the Genocide the IRG had orchestrated against the Tutsi. “As you have already been there, two years ago, I thought of you.”

Other officers marking their return to Rwanda in the summer of 1994 could be found among the special forces who arrived at the very outset of Turquoise to perform some of the initial reconnaissance missions and security patrols. The most prominent of these officers was Colonel Rosier, who, as chief of the Special Operations Command detachment, supervised more than 200 special forces troops. Rwandan defense officials had hailed Rosier as a hero two years earlier for his role in deterring the RPF military, during his five-month stint, from June to November 1992, as head of the Operation Noroit forces. Arriving at a low point for the FAR, following the RPF army’s June 1992 blitz in Byumba, Rosier oversaw efforts to introduce a new weapon, the 105 mm mortar, to the Rwandan arsenal. The large and powerful cannons reinvigorated the FAR troops.

Two years later, the RPF forces were on the verge of encircling Kigali. On 19 June 1994, the day before Rosier’s arrival in Goma, the RPF military captured Mount Kigali, a strategically
vital hill overlooking the western part of city. The FAR were overmatched, and their defeat had begun to look inevitable.

The operations base that Rosier had come to help set up in Goma was 100 miles away by road from the fighting in Kigali. The French military took note, though, of the growing number of Tutsi refugees pouring into Goma to escape the ongoing massacres in Rwanda, and, correctly or not, believed that some of them had taken up arms to “protect [themselves] from acts of violence from the local population.” Rosier, thinking it would be best to keep the French presence “discreet,” stayed at a hotel outside the city, with guards posted outside his room. Rosier wrote in a 20 June note to his supervising officer that one Zairean security official advised him and his staff “not to touch the dishes and drinks that would be offered to us due to poisoning risks (Tutsi).”

Rosier was joined in Goma on 22 June by Colonel Didier Tauzin, a veteran of prior French exploits in Rwanda. Tauzin’s last visit to the country in early 1993 had been brief but exceptionally eventful. As the head of Operation Chimère, the French government’s secret effort to help the FAR drive back the RPF army following the breakdown of the July 1992 cease-fire, he was the de facto commander of Rwanda’s Armed Forces. He worked closely with some of the Rwandan military’s most virulent hardliners, including Chief of Staff Déogratias Nsabimana, General Gratien Kabiligi, and Lieutenant Colonel Augustin Bizimungu, and for years afterward would continue to speak of them in tones of profound respect.

Tauzin’s assignment in June 1994, as head of the 1st Marine Infantry Paratroopers Regiment, or 1st RPIMa, was to lead the first wave of French special forces in southwestern Rwanda. Other French soldiers with prior experience in Rwanda would serve by his side. Among them: Lieutenant Colonel Etienne Joubert, who commanded DAMI Panda (French military trainers) in 1992 and 1993; and Chief Warrant Officer Marc Bourdarias, who served in DAMI Panda in 1993.

Other French officers with ties to the Habyarimana regime and its Army would follow. One of the decisions made during the planning phase of Operation Turquoise was to establish a network of “liaison detachments”—officers who would serve as General Lafourcade’s links to each of the various stakeholders in the region, including the FAR, the RPF, UNAMIR, NGOs, and neighboring countries. To head this group, the French government chose Colonel Gilbert Canovas, who, from 1990 to 1991, had secretly worked in the FAR’s état-major as advisor to the Rwandan Army’s then chief of staff, Laurent Serubuga. Now, as head of the liaison detachments, Canovas was leading a staff of 31 people, five of whom had previously worked with the FAR under the auspices of the French Military Assistance Mission, in some cases right up until the moment the Genocide began. In his end-of-mission report, Colonel Canovas singled out these officers for their “very strong knowledge of Rwanda” and their “invaluable contribution” to the operation.

“Liaisons” with the FAR and IRG began “as soon as the Turquoise contingent arrived” in Rwanda, according to Canovas. These initial communications were much anticipated among the Rwandan military and political authorities. As French officials were well aware, some members
of the FAR and the IRG believed the true purpose of Turquoise was not to deliver humanitarian aid, but to “prop up the remnants of the Hutu leadership and perhaps even give covert aid.”

Canovas’ report said the liaison detachment responsible for these contacts enabled General Lafourcade “to be permanently informed of the government’s intentions and the attitude of the FAR toward the advance of the RPF.” The report noted that the contacts continued even after the RPF routed the IRG from Gisenyi in mid-July 1994, stating that, at that point, the detachment’s “main purpose was to temper the Rwandans’ zeal and encourage them to adopt a low profile on Zairean territory.”

Early attempts to reach out to the RPF did not fare nearly as well. According to Canovas’ report, the French government positioned a liaison detachment at UNAMIR headquarters “in order to potentially establish contact with the RPF. This could not be achieved in the desired form.”

To many observers, it seemed clear that the Genocide had done little to change the French government’s perception of the Rwandan conflict. Many of its troops, according to these accounts, had returned to Rwanda in June 1994 with the same preconceptions and biases French troops had exhibited in their prior missions, and without a clear understanding of what was now transpiring: a genocide, orchestrated by Hutu authorities against the country’s Tutsi minority. Charles Petrie, then the United Nations deputy humanitarian coordinator, recalled that French soldiers he met in Goma in late June were “very angry,” when he used the word “genocide”; they insisted that a double genocide was taking place, and that he was “completely wrong” to say the Tutsi were the victims. “[I was] surprised by how uniform their discourse was and how deeply they believed [when they first arrived] that they were there to try to protect the innocent Hutu population,” he said.

It would take some time for the truth of the matter to sink in—longer for some French soldiers than for others. One senior French officer who spoke on condition of anonymity said there was a noticeable difference between the Turquoise troops who had previously served in Rwanda and those who had not. The officer, who belonged to the latter camp, said those who, like him, had never been to Rwanda before and had no ties to the FAR had an easier time recognizing the grim reality of what they were witnessing on the ground in the summer of 1994. Those, by contrast, who had trained the FAR to fight the RPF forces were comparatively slow to adjust their “mental scheme.” Some of those men, he said, did not truly understand what they had seen even as they left Rwanda two months later, in August 1994.

**B. The Turquoise Forces’ First Foray into Rwandan Territory Was Calculated to Allay Suspicions That the French Government Was Still Backing the FAR.**

From the beginning, few, if any, of the stakeholders in Rwanda were prepared to credit the French government’s claims that its mission was simply to save lives. The RPF, certainly, had made no secret of its skepticism. “We have no doubt whatsoever that their intentions are far from being humanitarian,” the RPF secretary general told journalists in Paris on 23 June. “I couldn’t imagine it being purely humanitarian, given their past relationship with the Habyarimana government and the FAR,” Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, then head of operations for the RPA, has said. The timing of the operation only added to the RPF’s suspicions. “When the Genocide
began, France came back to evacuate their nationals. If they were interested in a humanitarian intervention, that was the time—not in late June when the FAR was being defeated,” said Charles Karamba, who commanded the RPF at the CND (Centre Nationale de Développement) during the Genocide.124

FAR leaders were similarly convinced that French forces had come to support their fight against the RPF military.125 Noting this, a French intelligence agency memorandum questioned whether, under the circumstances, the operation would indeed facilitate a peaceful resolution to the fighting between the RPF army and the FAR or whether, perhaps, it would just make the two sides dig in further.126

NGOs, including those based in France, also needed some convincing. “In general, the humanitarian organizations are still hesitant to integrate with Operation Turquoise, in the aims of avoiding what the majority of them consider ‘a compromise’ [of their principles],” France’s military intelligence agency, the DRM, wrote on 25 June.127 One French charity, Médecins du Monde (MDM, or Doctors of the World), made clear that it “vehemently reject[ed] the legitimacy of the initiative in Rwanda and categorically refuse[d] to be associated with it.”128 MDM’s chairman, Bernard Granjon, held a press conference on 21 June to announce the formation of a committee of more than 20 French charities and development assistance groups opposed to the operation.129 “The French government cannot intervene directly in Rwanda, its past in that country is already too weighty and its activities have been too pronounced,” Granjon said.130

The Turquoise forces’ first operation in Rwandan territory was designed to erase doubts about the French government’s intentions.131 French officials recognized that their troops’ first foray over the Zairean-Rwandan border would shape perceptions about the operation, perhaps permanently.132 They also knew, as a DGSE memo put it on 22 June, that an operation in the northwest, near the IRG headquarters in Gisenyi, “could only be interpreted as an obvious sign of support for a regime considered by the RPF as illegitimate. Under such conditions, a radicalization of the RPF attitude toward the French forces would be likely.”133 “In the north, because the seat of the Rwandan government is in Gisenyi, there are too many problems for us,” one French soldier explained to Stephen Smith, a reporter for the French newspaper Libération.134 “They are trying to get us back at any cost, but we will not compromise ourselves. We will push forward here [in the south] first to prove our good faith.”135

UN Security Council Resolution 929 (authorizing Operation Turquoise) was 24 hours old when, in the mid-afternoon on 23 June 1994, Colonel Tauzin and his team of roughly 42 French special forces troops from the 1st RPIMa crossed the wooden bridge from Bukavu to Cyangugu.136 A cheering crowd awaited them. “Of course, we knew we wouldn’t be greeted by gunfire! But neither did we expect the triumphant welcome we received,” Tauzin wrote in his memoir. “We were greeted like saviors!”137 (Scenes such as these did not, in all likelihood, come together organically. As the author and human rights advocate Alison Des Forges noted, Radio Rwanda and hate media station RTLM had each aired broadcasts hailing the French troops’ arrival and “giv[ing] instructions on how to welcome the troops warmly.”138)

Stephen Smith, the Libération reporter, took note of a sign posted about 500 yards inland from the border: “Long live France, long live Mitterrand, long live France in Rwanda. We thank
France for its intervention.” The special forces’ destination was Nyarushishi, a tea plantation outside of Cyangugu that, since late April 1994, had been functioning as a refugee camp. As many as 8,000 Tutsi were known to be taking refuge at the camp, where they were tended to by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The refugees—impoverished, ragged, and foul-smelling, in Tauzin’s recollection—were very nearly all that was left of the Cyangugu prefecture’s once-thriving Tutsi population.

In contrast with the jubilant crowd that welcomed the French paratroopers near the bridge from Bukavu, the refugees at Nyarushishi did not greet Tauzin and his men as saviors. Many believed the French soldiers had come to kill them. “I gathered their leaders, we sat down in the grass,” Tauzin later told a reporter. “I explained that our only job was to protect them.” In his memoir, Tauzin inveighed against the supposedly unknowable source of these “infamous” accusations that the French forces had come “to help the FAR finish slaughtering” the Tutsi, asking, “What bastard could have told them that? Of course, I will never know.” In fact, a New York Times reporter, Raymond Bonner, uncovered the answer simply by speaking with the refugees at the camp. They told him that RTLM, the hate radio station, had reported, upon the announcement of the French forces’ imminent arrival in June 1994, “that the [French] troops were coming to help the Hutu kill the Tutsi.”

The refugees, speaking to Bonner within the first few days of the French paratroopers’ arrival, talked about their fears of the FAR soldiers and militia members roving the hills outside the camp. On several occasions, they said, Hutu militia men had stolen into the camp, kidnapped refugees, and killed them. Bonner reported that a French lieutenant colonel said his troops were prepared to respond to such threats with lethal force: “Now, if any militia tried to enter the refugee camp, we will kill them; it is very clear.” This threat to kill intruders did not apply to the Rwandan interim government forces. As Bonner reported, armed FAR soldiers continued to mill freely through the refugee camp, a fact the French troops had resigned themselves to accept. “It’s their country,” the same French lieutenant colonel told Bonner. (A group of FAR soldiers had, in fact, gathered to greet Tauzin and his team as they parked their jeeps outside the camp on 23 June. In his memoir, Tauzin recalled that the FAR soldiers were “smiling and clearly pleased to see us arrive!”)

The French troops had not been in Rwandan territory for even 24 hours when they encountered their first mass graves. One near the Nyarushishi camp’s guard post held about 80 bodies, all appearing to be in a state of “advanced decomposition.” More mass graves—one 65-feet long and nearly 100-feet wide with bones on the surface—were found in the area of Kamarampake stadium, just outside the southwestern city of Cyangugu. French troops observed a large number of militia members, armed with sticks, training nearby.

Col. Tauzin would later write that, in the course of his team’s patrols over the days that followed, when he would encounter FAR units and local authorities, he would “make it clear to them that all Tutsi civilians were now under our protection, and that we would not tolerate any
slippage.”159 His team, though, was small—just 45 men—and the territory they were responsible for covering was vast. (Tauzin described it as “the size of half a French department,”160 which is roughly the size of the state of Rhode Island.) “Despite everything,” he wrote, “we were so few in number that it is not impossible that some Interahamwe managed to murder a few refugees.”161

C. Turquoise Officers Met with FAR Leaders, Despite Their Knowledge of the FAR’s Complicity in the Genocide.

Against all my feelings for these people who were my brothers in arms, against my intimate convictions that the RPF was the main culprit of this entire tragedy, . . . I would [become] . . . one of those who would deal the final blow to this heroic resistance, because the mission I received obliged me to do so. Sometimes it is crucifying to be a soldier.162


Among the messages Colonel Rosier received within the first few days of his arrival in Zaire on 20 June 1994 was a note from Brigadier General François Regnault, chief of the Joint Operations Center.163 The note said: “As soon as possible, you will contact the FAR in the most discreet manner possible and without any publicity in order to search for information.”164

It is not clear just what sort of information Brig. Gen. Regnault was hoping to glean from the FAR. What is clear is that Rosier obeyed the order.165 On 23 June, he reached out to someone he very likely would have met two years earlier, when Rosier commanded Noroit: Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, formerly the FAR’s head of intelligence, now its commander in Gisenyi.166 (As with so many of the FAR officers who collaborated with the French during the war, Nsengiyumva would later be convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other crimes, serving 15 years in prison.167)

If useful intelligence was what the French government was after, Nsengiyumva was not an ideal conduit. As much as anyone in the Rwandan military, Nsengiyumva understood the value of spin; in October 1990, at the very outset of the war, he lobbied President Habyarimana to use the media to paint the conflict as an act of Ugandan aggression against Rwanda and to counter the narrative that Rwanda’s Hutu majority was waging a war to “eliminate the Tutsi.”168 Nsengiyumva knew the French military, and almost certainly knew what its officers would want to hear. This, it seems, is exactly what he delivered. According to a handwritten note Rosier scrawled following the 23 June 1994 call, the Rwandan colonel had assured Rosier “that the FAR and the people were waiting for [French soldiers] with great hope, and that everything would be done to facilitate [the French] mission.”169 The note continued: “His version of the massacres is not the one we read in our newspapers—especially in the eastern part of the country where, under the pretext of liberation, the RPF has not been idle-handed.”170

This was part of the calculation the French government made in staffing Turquoise with officers like Colonel Rosier, Colonel Tauzin, and others who had preexisting relationships with FAR commanders. These returning officers were uniquely positioned to leverage their contacts in the country.171 Those contacts, however, were almost exclusively on one side of the conflict—a
side that, as the French government well knew, bore significant responsibility for the mass killings that had ostensibly spurred the redeployment of French troops to Rwanda that summer.\textsuperscript{172}

If French officials ever grappled with the moral implications of liaising with \textit{génocidaires}, there is no evidence of it in the documents reviewed during this investigation. For his part, General Lafourcade, the Operation Turquoise force commander, drew a theoretical distinction between those units that sought only to defend their country from the RPF and those with more nefarious aims (while lamenting that French soldiers on the ground would have difficulty telling one from the other).\textsuperscript{173} His 25 June 1994 order acknowledged that there had been, in Rwanda, a “genocide,” but assigned blame for it only to the militias and to “some units of the Rwandan military.”\textsuperscript{174}

There was, by contrast, no ambiguity in French assessments of the militias’ role in the killings. Lafourcade’s 25 June order asserted, “The militias continue the killings of Tutsi and have attacked moderate Hutu (in Butare).”\textsuperscript{175} A DRM report earlier that week had similarly observed that the militias were expanding their targets, writing: “the massacres are continuing, the Hutu militias are starting to kill the moderate Hutus as well as the Hutu who were originally Tutsi (1 or 2 generations).”\textsuperscript{176}

In truth, though, the line between the FAR and the militias was not nearly as stark as such reports would seem to suggest—and French officials knew it. The DRM, in a 25 June situation report, observed that the FAR had “launched its militias” to commit atrocities in various localities in northern Rwanda, along the edge of RPF-held territory.\textsuperscript{177} A DRM situation report two days later characterized the well-armed militias in the north as “doubtless auxiliary to the FAR.”\textsuperscript{178} In reporting, for example, that 100 armed militiamen had staged an attack on Tutsi civilians in the Gisovu region, about 25 kilometers south of Kibuye, the DRM noted that the militiamen were “flanked by soldiers.”\textsuperscript{179} On 7 July 1994, Lafourcade himself would acknowledge that FAR Chief of Staff Augustin Bizimungu “retains some authority over the militias.”\textsuperscript{180}

French defense officials, in any event, appear to have had no compunction about reaching out to the FAR as Operation Turquoise was getting under way. Nor did they hesitate to take meetings with Rwandan interim government and military leaders when they came calling. Cols. Rosier and Tauzin were among those who took part in such communications—conversations their Rwandan interlocutors used to plead for the French government to resume its military support for their side in the conflict against the RPF.\textsuperscript{181}

Not long after reaching out to Nsengiyumva, Col. Rosier accepted Rwandan Defense Minister Augustin Bizimana’s invitation to meet at a “discreet” location north of Cyangugu.\textsuperscript{182} (Bizimana was later indicted in the ICTR on charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. He died before he could be taken into custody.)\textsuperscript{183} In a handwritten memorandum following the 24 June meeting, Rosier noted that Bizimana and Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs Jérôme Bicamumpaka, also in attendance, “did not deny” there had been massacres since 6 April 1994, but they spoke of it in a way that insinuated, falsely, the killings had not been planned.\textsuperscript{184}

Bizimana and Bicamumpaka had an agenda, and they were building up to something: a request. The Rwandan Army, they said, was “determined to fight to the end,” but the current military situation was “grave.”\textsuperscript{185} They explained that the RPF—“still supplied by Uganda,” they
insisted—had more men and a more powerful and well stocked artillery. That’s when,” Rosier wrote, “all while praising the indispensable aspect of [France’s] intervention, they asked me for help of another nature (‘discreet’ of course!).” While Rosier was the highest ranking French officer in the area, there may have been another reason why Bizimana and Bicamumpaka had addressed their request to Rosier, specifically. “Your 105 [mm] cannons are still there,” they said, alluding to the heavy artillery France had delivered to the FAR while he commanded Noroît in mid-1992, “but they are silent for lack of shells.”

“I replied that it seemed unrealistic to me to hope for such help in the current context. They seemed disappointed by my answer,” Rosier wrote. His memo, though, betrayed some sympathy for Bizimana and Bicamumpaka. “The general impression that I drew from this short interview,” he wrote, “is that I was dealing with two officials in positions of real responsibility . . . , [who were] aware of their country’s precarious military, but extremely determined due to the complete support of the population.” (That Rosier could have believed these two IRG officials enjoyed “the complete support of the population” is remarkable. One can only assume that, in speaking of “the population,” he was not including the people the IRG’s leadership had targeted for death.)

The FAR did not give up, and the French continued to display an inexplicable sympathy toward military leaders who had been committing a genocide for the past two and a half months. In late June, General Augustin Bizimungu, the chief of staff of the Rwandan Army during the Genocide, made a similar request for help in a secret meeting with General Lafourcade. Bizimungu was more forthright than Bizimana had been. “Very quickly, General Bizimungu conceded to me that certain units of the FAR had participated in the massacres! I was flabbergasted by his frankness,” Lafourcade later wrote. “At that moment, I still saw him as a soldier, not as a war criminal.” (Bizimungu is serving a 30-year sentence after receiving multiple convictions in the ICTR for his role in the Genocide.)

In Lafourcade’s account of the conversation, Bizimungu readily conceded that the FAR was on the cusp of defeat. “Without ammunition, [the FAR’s] end is inevitable,” Lafourcade wrote of Bizimungu. Lafourcade said there was nothing he could do to help. Upon hearing this, he wrote, “[t]he man in front of me was despondent, humiliated. The memory of this scene still makes me uncomfortable today.”

Contacts between the FAR and French officers persisted with a bizarre tone of reverence for the Rwandan military officers who were fighting on behalf of an interim government that was overseeing the slaughter of innocent Rwandans. On 29 June 1994, Brig. General Gratien Kabiligi, the head of the FAR’s operations bureau, flew in from Kigali via helicopter for a private meeting with Col. Tauzin near the Nyarushishi refugee camp. It was a reunion for the two officers, who had known each other when Tauzin commanded the Chimère forces in March 1993. (Tauzin wrote admiringly of Kabiligi, calling him “one of the four or five Rwandan officers of that time who would have found a very honorable place in the 1st RPIMa.”) As Tauzin recalled in his memoir:

I welcomed him with a Primus, one of the two local brands of beer. He was very serious, very tired, obviously undernourished, his face was extremely tense, but his eyes still showed a fierce will, an exceptional strength of character. Against the
evidence of the impending defeat, he ‘still believed in it,’ he would go all the way
. . . I recognized the magnificent man and soldier that I had met the previous year
in the trenches of Byumba.\textsuperscript{200}

Tauzin’s memoir did not specify exactly what sort of help Kabiligi was hoping the French
government would provide the FAR at that moment, with the interim government forces on the
verge of losing their last toehold in Kigali—just that it pained Tauzin to have to deny the help the
FAR was requesting.\textsuperscript{201} “Against all my feelings for these people who were my brothers in arms,”
Tauzin wrote, “against my intimate convictions that the RPF was the main culprit of this entire
tragedy, . . . I would [become] . . . one of those who would deal the final blow to this heroic
resistance, because the mission I received obliged me to do so. Sometimes it is crucifying to be a
soldier.”\textsuperscript{202}

D. Following Their First Operation in Cyangugu, French Troops Proceeded to the IRG
Stronghold of Gisenyi and Continued to Fan Out Eastward in the Direction of Kigali.
 Everywhere, Their Patrols Revealed “an Empty Countryside,” with Few Tutsi Left to Save.

In the following days, several reconnaissance measures were carried out, to
the north by the RICM towards Gisenyi, and to the south by the COS.
According to the reports, they were very limited within Rwanda—a 15-
kilometer strip—but, according to witnesses, [the measures] proved to be
much more substantial in the direction of Kigali, the capital . . . . Colonel
Rozier is pushing his teams to “radiate” ever further toward the Rwandan
capital.\textsuperscript{203}

– RAIDS (a magazine covering the French military)

This all comes too late. Where were you in April? This is a Hutu region
now. Every house has been burnt, everyone killed, every septic tank full of
bodies.\textsuperscript{204}

– Tutsi priest

The conception of Operation Turquoise that President Mitterrand first articulated on 15
June, about a week before its launch, was that it would “be limited to the protection of certain Tutsi
assembly sites, such as hospitals, stadiums or schools.”\textsuperscript{205} That, however, would not come to
represent the operation’s sole mission. Almost as soon as the effort to rescue Tutsi refugees at the
Nyarushishi camp in Cyangugu was under way, French officials returned to the question—rejected
earlier in June\textsuperscript{206}—of whether to set their sights further north, to Gisenyi, the IRG’s \textit{de facto}
capital, where most Tutsi had already been killed.\textsuperscript{207}

The stated reason for sending troops to Gisenyi, as articulated by Mitterrand’s Africa
advisor, Bruno Delaye, in a 24 June 1994 note to the French president, was to enable French troops
to render aid to the many displaced Hutus known to be taking refuge there.\textsuperscript{208} This, Delaye argued,
would “keep the balance between the two Rwandan communities” and “avoid a hostile reaction
toward us by the Hutu community.”\textsuperscript{209} Delaye noted that the Quai d’Orsay was “very hesitant”
about the proposal. Mitterrand, though, did not share the Foreign Ministry’s reservations: below
the question that closed Delaye’s note—“Do you agree to an action in the Gisenyi region?”—the
Élysée’s secretary-general, Hubert Védrine, wrote on Mitterrand’s behalf: “yes.”

Turquoise troops made their first venture into Gisenyi at noon the next day, 25 June. A
French Ministry of Defense cable reported that the team of about 30 French soldiers sought to
clear roadblocks the militias had set up in the area. “This was done without incident,” the cable
reported. The following day, French soldiers from the Marine Infantry Tank Regiment (known
by its French acronym, the RICM), joined by newly arrived troops from Senegal, left Goma to
launch their first reconnaissance operations in the Gisenyi area.

The reception in Gisenyi was every bit as effusive as it had been in Cyangugu. As Western
journalists dutifully reported, throngs of Hutus—some civilians, some soldiers—lined the streets
to cheer the French troops and garland their jeeps with flowers, in what one American reporter
described as “an embarrassing reminder of France’s long, supportive relationship with the Hutu-
dominated government.” At one point, some Hutu soldiers drove by waving the French tricolor
flag. The driver said they planned to present the flag to the French troops as a gift from the IRG.

There was, at this same time, a broader effort under way for French troops to fan out over
a larger swath of Rwanda. This both expanded Turquoise’s foothold in the country and enabled
French troops to gather more intelligence on the state of play on the war front. The DRM
reported that, since the announcement of the French government’s plans to launch Operation
Turquoise, the RPF military had stepped up its efforts to push the FAR back to the west. A
French military intelligence analysis assessed that the RPF appeared to have two goals: to cut off
the FAR troops in Kigali from their “rear bases” in the west, and to conquer the road between
Gitarama and Kibuye, effectively splitting the IRG-controlled zone in two. To achieve this last
objective, the RPF troops would have to penetrate deep into IRG-controlled territory.

RPA Head of Operations Emmanuel Karenzi Karake has explained that the RPA was
focused on stopping the Genocide, not taking territory. He did not know of any “specific plan for
controlling” the road between Gitarama and Kibuye; nor did he know of any RPA plan to split
the country into two. Instead, he explained:

We knew the FAR was without morale. In terms of capturing territory, it was a
matter of when, not if. Because we pursued them where they were killing Tutsi, it
necessarily had the bi-product of capturing territory, but, frankly speaking, where
the situation was at the time, there was nothing that was important in terms of
territory anymore because the FAR was on the run. We didn’t want them to have
the time to stay in a place for long because they would have time to kill.

Lafourcade had suspected, at the outset of the operation, that RPF units were hiding
somewhere in the interim government-controlled zone, and he had even contemplated the
possibility that RPF troops might stage a raid on the French operational base in Goma “by taking
advantage of the complicity of the Tutsi community . . . in North Kivu.” (This suspicion was
also incorrect, according to Karenzi Karake. As a general matter, he said, the RPF had no desire
to “drag the French further into the conflict.” “There was discussion of what would happen if we
were to get into a fight with the French, but there was also discussion about avoiding a fight with the French altogether,” he said. But France’s poor relations with the RPF leadership, combined with a lack of solid intelligence, left the Turquoise commanders guessing wrong about the RPF’s plans and fostered suspicions that the RPF might, as one French cable put it, take action “to neutralize us.” (This paranoia also proved unfounded, as the RPF never waged war on French forces.) What was needed, the Turquoise commanders felt, was more reconnaissance and better intelligence. “[I]t is normal for [the RPF] to carry out in-depth reconnaissance,” Col. Rosier told an interviewer on 25 June. “[P]erhaps it’s now up to us to make sure that this genuine fear is a reality.”

A magazine covering France’s military would later indicate that French special forces troops making reconnaissance patrols in western Rwanda in late June 1994 did not, as was widely reported, confine themselves to a narrow strip along the country’s western border. It reported that troops “proved to be much more substantial in the direction of Kigali, the capital. . . . Colonel Rozier is pushing his teams to ‘radiate’ ever further toward the Rwandan capital.”

As French troops traversed the countryside, they began to see that many, if not most, Tutsi were already dead or gone. In every direction they traveled—southward to Bugarama, or northward to Kirambo—the troops found only what the DRM described, on 25 June, as “an empty countryside whose population has taken refuge in the camps or has simply disappeared.” “This all comes too late. Where were you in April?,” a Tutsi priest in the prefecture of Cyangugu was quoted as saying in a 26 June news report. “This is a Hutu region now. Every house has been burnt, everyone killed, every septic tank full of bodies.”

A news program airing on French television on 25 June captured this dissonance. The segment first showed Commander Marin Gillier, head of the marine commandos, as he waved to a cheering crowd at the entrance to the refugee camp in Kirambo. “France decided to launch a humanitarian operation in Rwanda. I believe that the first objective has been achieved with, once again, all those smiles beaming on your faces,” Gillier declared. The reporter, though, noted that the refugees at the camp—while enduring unsanitary conditions, and lacking much-needed medicines—were not under immediate threat from the FAR or anti-Tutsi militia. “Only Hutu driven out by the war live there. No Tutsi. There are no Tutsi anymore in Kirambo,” the reporter observed.

To be clear, the countryside was not completely barren. There were still Rwandans in need of protection from génocidaires. It seemed, though, that some of them thought it best to hide—even from the French troops who had supposedly come to save them. In southwestern Rwanda, a New York Times reporter noted that even after several days of French patrols through the area, roadblocks—operated by armed militia members—remained ubiquitous, presenting a potentially fatal threat to any Tutsi who dared to travel without a military escort. Neither the French special forces guarding the Nyarushishi refugee camp nor anyone else, really, knew how many Tutsi were in hiding. The French forces did not go looking for them, and when the reporter asked Col. Tauzin about these unseen Tutsi, he responded, blithely, that “they should come to the camp.”
E. Alarmed by Recent RPF Military Successes and Suspicious of RPF Infiltration in the Interim Government-Controlled Zone, French Officials Debated Ways of Stopping the RPF Advance.

We cannot publicly take the initiative to achieve a cease-fire, because we would be suspected of attempting to halt the situation under the guise of humanitarian action.243


The sound of gunfire just outside of Kibuye on 27 June 1994 seemed to validate French suspicions that RPF troops had stealthily penetrated some of the westernmost reaches of the interim government-controlled zone.244 The French troops could not see what was happening; they could only hear it.245 By the sound of things, though, it appeared to them that RPF troops were clashing with anti-Tutsi militias about nine miles outside of Kibuye, a city on the eastern bank of Lake Kivu.246 “[T]hese skirmishes greatly surprised the French soldiers,” a French TV journalist reported that evening, after speaking with Col. Rosier.247 “There was a lot of talk about infiltration here without really knowing if it was an irrational fear or if it was a reality. . . . Well, these skirmishes, if they are confirmed, would first of all mean that the RPF has indeed infiltrated, has infiltrated very, very far into the territory of the Rwandan government.”248

The possibility that RPF troops were heading for Kibuye alarmed the French government for several reasons. For one thing, it raised the prospect that French and RPF forces, now separated by no more than a few miles, might soon come face to face—a development General Lafourcade, at least, had declared himself determined to avoid.249 Beyond that, French officials theorized that the east-west corridor between Gitarama and Kibuye held important strategic value in the RPF’s conflict with the FAR. Seizing control of this axis, French officials believed, would split the interim government-held territory in two, separating the IRG in the north from its forces in the south.250 At that point, there might be no stopping the RPF.

Publicly, of course, French officials insisted they had no intention of interfering in the ongoing conflict between the RPF and the FAR.251 There could be no doubt, however, that France’s former allies were in serious trouble. Kigali, by all indications, was likely to fall soon,252 and French officials were not sure what the RPF’s next move would be. Ambassador Marlaud, assessing the situation in a 27 June 1994 memo, did not rule out the possibility that the RPF army might opt, at that point, to lay down its arms and accept a cease-fire, but concluded that this was “far from inevitable.”253 He suggested that the more likely scenario was that the RPF forces would chase the FAR to other parts of the country still under interim government control—with varying ramifications, depending on which area the RPF targeted.254

Marlaud’s view was that any further offensives by the RPF forces—whether south toward Butare, west toward Kibuye, or north toward Ruhengeri—would all but guarantee a worsening of Rwanda’s humanitarian crisis.255 In any of these scenarios, he predicted, the consequence would be “massacres” and a wave of refugees or displaced persons.256 This was a typical projection for French officials during the Genocide; the assumption, frequently, was that RPF military advances
would necessarily precipitate massacres and drive people from their homes.\footnote{257} Few of these analyses bothered to explain that the likely perpetrators of any such massacres were not the RPF forces themselves, but the militias, who were known to have slaughtered Tutsi and others they viewed as would-be RPF accomplices in towns along the RPF forces’ path.\footnote{258} Nor did they note that RTLM, the hate media station, often helped to fuel the Hutu villagers’ exodus, with its alarmist rhetoric and its relentless demonization of the RPF.\footnote{259}

What Marlaud did note was that an RPF advance to the south (toward Butare) or to the north (toward Ruhengeri) would put French troops in a particularly “delicate” situation, as they “would very quickly risk being in contact with the RPF.”\footnote{260} In that case, he wrote:

We will then face a choice:
- to stay [in the interim government-held territory], to try to continue to protect threatened people, at the risk of a confrontation with the RPF,
- to retreat, knowing that the people we protect will be slaughtered, [or]
- to withdraw with these threatened people and settle them near the Zairean border, in safe humanitarian zones.\footnote{261}

Marlaud favored the third option: the creation of “safe humanitarian zones” for threatened populations.\footnote{262} This proposal—which, ultimately, the French government would adopt—represented a departure from the French government’s stated intentions at the outset of Turquoise,\footnote{263} and a controversial one at that. In placing portions of Rwandan territory under French military control, the Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ or “zones,” as Marlaud envisioned) threatened to put French troops in the RPF forces’ path, thwarting their campaign to save Tutsi lives and topple the genocidal regime in Gisenyi. It also raised questions about how the French government would, or should, deal with génocidaires who would surely seek sanctuary in the area under French control.

Marlaud acknowledged that the proposal posed “problems,” but for a different reason: “[I]t only delays the inevitable if the RPF continues its progression.”\footnote{264} It was a telling criticism. Marlaud’s view, shared by many French officials at the time, was that the solution to the Rwandan crisis was to halt the hostilities between the RPF and the FAR, ideally by reviving the Arusha Accords (if, perhaps, with some modifications).\footnote{265} The notion that French troops, by establishing bases on Rwandan soil, might impede the RPF’s military progress (as they had during the war that preceded the Genocide) did not give Marlaud pause. What troubled him, rather, was knowing that the French troops’ actions would not, ultimately, stop the RPF from winning the war.

As intelligence poured into the RPF about French plans to create a “Safe Humanitarian Zone,” RPF leaders suspected the French would use it “to evacuate and save those they wanted to save”—\textit{i.e.}, their friends in the FAR and other génocidaires.\footnote{266} The RPF knew this Zone would make it harder for their military to reach the areas where they wanted to halt the killing of Tutsi.\footnote{267}

With French military intelligence reports indicating that RPF forces on 27 June 1994 were advancing on multiple fronts—blasting the western districts of Kigali with mortar rounds while, at the same time, continuing the westward march toward Kibuye—officials in Paris were split about how Operation Turquoise ought to proceed.\footnote{268} Prime Minister Balladur preferred that France
remain cautious—that is, it should continue to run operations from the safety of the Zairean side of the border, forbidding its troops to spend more than 24 hours at a time on Rwandan soil and restricting patrols to the border region.269 This, he contended, would limit the risk of French troops coming into contact with the RPF army.270 Quesnot, perhaps unsurprisingly, was less concerned about that. In his view, Turquoise required “more than the coming and going of some men and some women from the Zairean border.”271 “The success of our intervention would be called into question if massacres resumed in sectors where our presence is very fleeting,” he wrote in a 27 June note to Mitterrand.272 Quesnot warned that the consequences would be even worse, if the RPF military succeeded in driving the FAR out of Kigali, as that, he claimed, would provoke “millions” of additional Rwandans to flee westward, worsening the refugee crisis.273

The solution Quesnot proposed was for French troops to “control a few key points” on Rwandan soil.274 His note was relatively light on particulars, save for one location in western Rwanda, near the city of Kibuye, that he considered especially vital for France to secure: the Ndaba pass.275 Ndaba, he posited, had strategic value for the RPF, as it controlled access from Gitarama to Kibuye.276 Its seizure, he wrote, would cut western Rwanda in two.277

As previously noted, such assumptions that the RPF army sought to control the Gitarama-Kibuye axis were just that: assumptions; RPF military leaders have since explained they had no plans to seize territory or to access the Gitarama-Kibuye corridor for any other purpose than to rescue Tutsi.278 And indeed, French officials had reason to doubt the imminency of an RPF offensive in the far west of Rwanda. As the DRM noted in a 28 June 1994 memo, the RPF forces, with only 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers, were ill equipped to launch new, large-scale offensives while simultaneously holding onto the vast territory they had already conquered.279 The DRM assessed that the path to Kibuye would be treacherous for the RPF forces because it ran through “hostile” territory, where the Hutu community, dismayed at the RPF’s military successes, was united “in a spirit of ethnic solidarity,” and where the FAR—“supported by the militias”—would be under intense pressure to put up a fierce fight.280 The DRM suggested the RPF military might also hesitate to proceed west knowing that “its offensive risks triggering a massacre of Tutsi refugees in the government zone.”281

Yet, to the French government, the consequences of a potential RPF sweep through western Rwanda was alarming enough to warrant what Quesnot and Delaye characterized as “an additional commitment of our forces . . . to control key points and protect the most threatened camps.”282 The two advisors further argued, in a 28 June 1994 memo, that France should work through diplomatic channels to persuade the RPF “to stop its westward advance.”283 This, they knew, was a complicated proposition. Having dedicated itself, for years, to propping up the Habyarimana government, the French government was, as Quesnot and Delaye put it, “not in the best position” to press the RPF to agree to a cease-fire.284 This was Ambassador Marlaud’s view, too: he argued France should prod others, including the United Nations, Uganda, and the United States, to lead the charge for them.285 “We cannot publicly take the initiative to achieve a cease-fire,” he wrote in his 27 June 1994 memo, “because we would be suspected of attempting to halt the situation under the guise of humanitarian action.”286
Jason Nshimye

Jason Nshimye was born 5 May 1979 in Kibuye, Rwanda. The Genocide began in his second year of high school.

After the invasion, the hate began to get worse. They’d say to Hutu that any Tutsi they saw was their enemy, even if it was their wife or husband. They were teaching that hatred. They were trying to make sure every Hutu was mobilized. They were trying to identify Tutsis. Hutus, even civilians, were allowed to ask you for your ID because they had the power. Every month was getting worse and worse. We didn’t know how big, but we could see that something was happening because of everything we could hear on the hate radio. The hatred, injustice, and criminal activity caused us to know that it was heading somewhere.

When the Genocide began, we were afraid of violence because we had experienced attacks after the 1990 invasion. My family abandoned our home when we saw Hutu burning buildings and screaming that they were going to kill Tutsi not far from our village. We ran to a nearby complex, where many people were taking refuge. This lasted until the 16th of April, when waves of killings began and left few alive. I saw many of my family members being killed. My mother, sister, a cousin and two or three of my extended family also survived the attack on the complex.

After that, I went to Bisesero where people formed resistance groups and survived by engaging in hand-to-hand combat with the militia members to avoid being shot or killed with grenades. This strategy worked until the génocidaires switched tactics to longer-ranged weapons like rockets, as well as trying to overcome those resisting by sheer numbers and attacking from all sides. Lack of food and increasing losses of people also eventually made the strategy of active resistance much more difficult. There was no organization of those at Bisesero. Each person would flee their own way when the Interahamwe would come. The survivors would generally congregate at night to see how many we had lost during the day. We used to chew sorghum; we did not have food or clean water. Sometimes we had to mash the sorghum and go down the hill for running water to make something with whatever we could find—fruits, whatever was in the bushes. We were so hungry and weak. Everybody seemed to lose half of the weight they had.

By June, the situation had worsened because we could not resist due to hunger. Many people were being killed each day, and I decided I could no longer
fight and went to hide in a bush, digging a small hole to sit in and wait. I was in the hills of Bisesero from April 16th until the Genocide ended in July.

I remember seeing people being cut and blown to pieces by machetes and grenades in one of the worst days of killing, on a hill called Muyila, in maybe the second or third week of May. When we were still fighting, I hid in a small bush, and there I met a small boy and his dad. When the killers came closer to that bush, the dad said he was going to run out of the bush because they were getting closer and saw us inside. So, he went out, they caught him and killed him with machetes. They were singing the songs they always did, “kill all the Tutsis,” and they hit him in the neck with a machete. Then they took a big stick and started hitting him more and more, cutting him on the legs and back.

It was not far from the bush I was in. I grabbed the boy and told him to come. I was holding him because he was scared and trying to run out. I kept my hands over his arms and mouth and spoke to him in a low voice. They finished killing his dad when they saw another group of Tutsis running trying to hide and followed them. Thank God they didn’t come back, I was so scared. I hid there for a long time, trying to make myself very small so no one would see me. I was holding on to the boy when the Hutu were closer, but after they left, he didn’t want to move anymore.

We came out of the bush at the end of the day. We saw his dad with his head off, and so many dead bodies all around. So many babies crying on the backs of their moms. He cried, and I cried, and I could not speak. There is no comfort you can give to someone like that. We did not even sit down. There is nothing you can say.

The boy was younger than ten. His father had run because the Hutu extremists had a practice of talking as though they had already seen whoever was hiding in the bushes, in an attempt to flush them out of hiding. The boy went to find someone he knew on another hill before night, and I never saw him again.

Thousands of people who took refuge in Bisesero were killed. In the last week of June, the French came along with a Hutu. One survivor had stopped the French convoy by running into the road and refusing to move. We knew it was the French because we had heard French troops were coming to Rwanda on the radio, and we saw white people speaking French. Those of us hiding in the bushes came out onto the road because we thought we were saved, despite avoiding roads previously because of the dangers of running into Interahamwe. I spoke some
French but could not make out the conversation between the one survivor who was speaking to the French, Eric Nzabihimana, and the French troops, except that he was asking them for help. The conversation was not long. The French were told that Hutu extremists were seeking those in the hills of Bisesero, and that aid was requested of them. Despite the fact that bodies were strewn along the road, the French left and did not give out any sort of supplies.

When we saw the Hutu, we knew that something bad was going to happen. Coming with a killer to see a victim, that is the worst thing you can do. Our emergence, drawn by the illusion of safety in the presence of the French, had given the Hutu with them a sense of how many of us were still alive and where we were hiding.

After the French left, I remember when I was hiding in an area near the water. Some Interahamwe were up on the hill and they came down to the creek where some of us were hiding. They shot one of the people, and he fell in the water in front of me. They did not see me. When he fell in the water, they started shooting at him more. So, I was very quiet because I knew they might hear me if they came to check his body. And then they left, because there were no other survivors. Once they left, before dark, I came out and saw his body lying face-down in the water, blood all over.

F. Confronted with Evidence of Massacres in Bisesero, French Troops Failed to Intervene for Three Days, Leaving Hundreds of Refugees to Be Slaughtered.

They hoped for our immediate protection or their transfer to a protected place. I could only promise them that we would come back to see them, and that humanitarian aid would arrive soon. There is an emergency situation that will lead to extermination if a humanitarian structure is not quickly put in place or at least the means to stop these man hunts.288

– Jean-Rémy Duval, Operation Turquoise Special Forces Officer

While officials in Paris were beginning to reassess France’s options in the face of an impending RPF military victory, a French special forces officer, Lieutenant Colonel Jean-Rémy Duval, was leading a reconnaissance mission in Kibuye, on the eastern shore of Lake Kivu.289 As Duval, the head of the air parachute commando unit, known as CPA10,290 would later tell the story, he and his troops had visited a school run by the Sisters of Sainte Marie of Namur on the evening of 26 June 1994, when one of the nuns alerted him to a horrific scene unfolding in the Bisesero,291 a nearby steep range of hills straddling the communes of Gisovu and Gishyita. The nun said that Hutu residents of Bisesero, with help from FAR soldiers and militia members, were slaughtering
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The nun introduced him to a man, the former driver of the prefect, who confirmed that it was true. “He himself was hiding Tutsi who were from the area. He showed me exactly [where] on the map the scene of the massacres [were],” Duval recalled in 2013.

Upon arriving in Bisesero the following day, 27 June 1994, Duval and his men found about 100 Tutsi refugees in the hills, living “in a state of utter destitution.” According to a DRM report, the refugees told the French soldiers there were 2,000 people just like them, “hidden in the woods and mines.” The soldiers, traveling in two vehicles, were not equipped to evacuate the refugees where they found them, but promised to return with additional resources.

It would be three days before any French troops would return to Bisesero, and when they did, they discovered between 500 and 800 Tutsis, whom they found to be “very physically exhausted,” with “a hundred of them wounded by bullets or blades.” More Tutsi had been massacred in the days since Duval’s first visit. A French military report would later note: “When the arrival of the French was announced, the bourgemestre of Gishyita intensified the actions, calling on the militias of Kibuye.” In other words, not only did the French humanitarian mission fail to prevent additional massacres, but the presence of French troops may, in fact, have compelled the anti-Tutsi militias to finish the job they had started in April.

Characterized by opaque and competing priorities, misleading intelligence supplied by partisan Rwandan authorities, and a pattern of obfuscation after the fact, the French humanitarian mission at Bisesero was ineffective at best, and negligent at worst. How, exactly, the tragedy happened has been the subject of considerable dispute among French leaders. What no one has denied is that a contingent of French soldiers discovered a large number of Tutsi refugees hiding in the woods, and by the time French forces could mobilize and undertake an evacuation, more of those same refugees had been massacred.

The reconnaissance team that Duval led on Monday, 27 June 1994 consisted of 12 men—10 air commandos and two gendarmes—armed with automatic rifles and pistols. Alerted by the nuns the prior evening of Tutsi being slaughtered in Bisesero, Duval and his men travelled through “wooded mountains about 30 kilometers southeast of the Kibuye, two hours from Misesero by barely passable trails” in a Toyota pickup truck and a Mitsubishi Pajero SUV borrowed from the mother superior in Kibuye. The story of what they found that day has been chronicled by the French writer Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, one of three reporters who accompanied the soldiers to the scene. According to Saint-Exupéry, on the way to Bisesero, traveling south down the road that connects Kibuye to Gishyita, Duval’s men came upon a Hutu policeman in the village of Nyagurati who matter-of-factly said, “[W]e killed a few Tutsis, no more than fifty at most.” He pointed to the houses in the surrounding hills. “You see that row of houses to the left?,” he said. “They lived there. We burned everything. There had to be nothing left.” A teacher, also Hutu, said the killings were necessary because “[e]very evening, these [Tutsi] criminals . . . come back to attack us.” “We defend ourselves,” he said. Both men admitted they had killed children.

“All this is the Tutsi’s fault,” the policeman said. “We killed them because they are accomplices of the RPF. We know it. That is why we kill them. Women and children too. It is normal. The children of accomplices are [also] accomplices. So we killed them.”
It was an organized manhunt, the policeman explained. “You know, the bourgmestre sent us here, into this village, to scare away criminals and their accomplices,” he said. “That is what we have done. We had orders.”310 He was referring to Charles Sikubwabo, the bourgmestre of Gishyita, who has since been indicted for genocide and remains at large.311 The policeman added that the prefect of Kibuye had at one point come to the village to “check how things were going” and had told the policeman he “was doing a good job.”312 The prefect, Clément Kayishema, has since been convicted of genocide and sentenced to life imprisonment.313

According to Saint-Exupéry, the confessions of the policeman and the teacher shocked the French commandos, who had expected to find legitimate authorities overwhelmed by a spontaneous upswell of reactionary violence. Instead, wrote Saint-Exupéry, “[The French troops] want[ed] to understand, to make sure they [were] not dreaming. How do you believe . . . a policeman who tells you of his own accord that he killed children? How he organized a man-hunt for the sake of racial purity.”314 Lt. Col. Duval was “astounded.”315 As the French troops prepared to depart, a voice rose up from a crowd of machete-wielding villagers that had assembled in the village square: “Tonight we are going to attack the criminals again.”316

In Mubuga, a village northwest of Bisesero, a French tricolor flag waved at a roadblock, and villagers greeted the soldiers with all of the enthusiasm to which the French troops had become accustomed.317 The soldiers, feeling uncomfortable, stopped to drink a beer—“[t]o drown our sorrow,” as Saint-Exupéry would write.318 “I am tired of seeing these murderers applauding us,” a French gendarme said.319

With a Hutu schoolteacher for a guide, the troops continued toward Bisesero, where the idyllic tableau of rolling green hills and deep crevasses offered places to hide for Tutsi survivors seeking refuge from the massacres. Duval has said that his unit encountered scenes of unspeakable tragedy upon arrival in Bisesero on 27 June: “Along the road leading there, we started to see many corpses. The corpses were either mutilated or burnt. I do not remember there being any corpse in a state of decomposition. So, it could have been fairly recent killings.”320 At a roadside near the top of a hill, a French-speaking Tutsi named Eric Nzabahimana told them that local Hutu—men from the village, supervised by militiamen, policemen, and soldiers—had been slaying Tutsi on the hill daily.321 “The Tutsi taking refuge on this hill were fleeing the massacres every day. Some of them were massacred, and the survivors would repeat the same thing every day. These massacres were said to have occurred with the uniformity of systematic, well-ordered, planned and supervised work,” Duval recalled in 2007.322

The refugees who came out of the woods to meet the French troops bore scars and bullet wounds.323 In a 28 June 1994 broadcast, an RFI reporter at the scene alongside the French troops reported:

[The Tutsi refugees] live like hunted beasts. By day, they hide in the forests that remain on top of the hills. And at night they descend along these hills to fetch some potatoes that the Hutu villagers left behind in their field after the harvest. In fact, they are always in motion, always on the lookout for the slightest noise.324
Nzabahimana, the Tutsi villager who had spoken earlier with Duval’s unit, told the RFI reporter that Rwandan soldiers and militiamen had shot at the Tutsi and hunted them with machetes. The Tutsi had “[s]ticks, a few spears and machetes” with which to defend themselves, but no firearms. The reporter’s questioning continued:

**Q:** And there are no RPF fighters among you?

**A:** No, no.

**Q:** What do you expect from the French military?

**A:** Peace, above all peace. Our wish is that we be led to a place where we will be protected from these killers who threaten us.

As the survivors massed around the French troops, one young man grew visibly agitated. As Saint-Exupéry would later write, the young man pointed at the Hutu teacher who was the French troops’ guide: “Him, I recognize him! His name is Jean-Baptiste Twagirayezu, and he is the leader of the militia! He was my teacher! I recognize him!”

The schoolteacher looked petrified. Duval pressed the young man, but he was certain: “He killed my sister and my brother! I recognize him! He was my teacher!” In the minibus, the schoolteacher shook with a wordless fury, or possibly it was fear. “He wants to deny, to accuse,” Saint-Exupéry would write, “but [he] can only manage to mutter a few words. ‘These people have committed terrible crimes,’ he says without the slightest conviction.”

The rising tension coupled with the approach of night—it would take between three and four hours to return to Kibuye—persuaded Duval to leave the scene. As Duval testified in 2013, “the orders were not to stay in night reconnaissance. Moreover, on site, we could not do anything, as 12 [people] with light armament. We could not ensure the protection of more than a hundred Tutsis who were there. We did not have any medicine or first aid kit.” However, Duval said he did intend to return the next day:

My decision was motivated by the fact that the killers were not active at night, and that this gave us time to get stronger and come back the next morning. I announced this to this man, Eric [Nzabihimana], who seemed to be the representative of the refugees. . . . I gave him my word as an officer that I would come back, “to get them out of there.”

This is what the Turquoise troops were supposedly sent to Rwanda to do: to prevent atrocities and save lives. As President Mitterrand had told the world only a week earlier, it was imperative that French forces intervene in Rwanda and do so as quickly as possible, because “every hour counts.” For the Tutsi of Bisesero, the clock was now ticking.

Duval has said that, upon returning to camp that night, he called Colonel Rosier, the head of the French special forces, via satellite phone “to report to him about the day, and what I thought should be done.” Rosier, he said, “replied that it was out of the question for me to go back to
Bisesero the next day”—first because Bisesero was technically outside of Duval’s patrol area, and second because the Turquoise commanders needed Duval to help prepare for Defense Minister Léotard’s visit to Rwanda, scheduled for 29 June. After hanging up, Duval says he compiled a report to fax to his superiors, including Col. Rosier. The handwritten report described the desperation of the estimated 2,000 Tutsi “hidden in the woods” in the Bisesero area. “They hoped for our immediate protection or their transfer to a protected place. I could only promise them that we would come back to see them, and that humanitarian aid would arrive soon,” Duval wrote. He warned: “There is an emergency situation that will lead to extermination if a humanitarian structure is not quickly put in place or at least the means to stop these man hunts.”

Duval’s fax has long been a source of dispute. Duval has insisted that he sent the fax “within minutes” of his phone conversation with Rosier on the night of 27 June. Col. Rosier, testifying in 2007, claimed he never received any reports from Duval about the situation in Bisesero, whether verbal or in writing, and was “stupefied” by Duval’s more recent claims to the contrary.

One would think that the MIP, one of two official French post-Genocide inquiries that have summoned Lt. Col. Duval to testify, would have presented an ideal forum to address these discrepancies. It appears, however, that the MIP wasted this opportunity, as no questions about Bisesero are included in the meager two pages of Duval’s MIP testimony. Duval’s MIP questioners seem to have been unaware that he was intimately involved in one of the most controversial episodes of Operation Turquoise. Indeed, the MIP report does not discuss Duval’s fax or his involvement in Bisesero.

Putting aside the dispute about Duval’s reports, it is at least clear that Col. Rosier knew no later than the morning of 28 June exactly what was happening in Bisesero. We know this because it is captured on video.

Col. Rosier had decided on 27 June that French forces would lead an evacuation of the same nuns who had alerted Duval to the horrors at Bisesero. The nuns had become something of a cause célèbre in the international community, as some of the nuns were Belgian or US citizens. Presumably because of the international interest, Rosier helicoptered into Kibuye readying for the evacuation, accompanied by a French military public relations unit with camera rolling.

It was that morning, on 28 June, that cameras captured the following exchange between Rosier and Chief Sergeant Eric Meynier, one of the para-commandos who served under Duval:

Meynier: [Y]esterday we were in I do not know which village there . . . . [T]here were beatings all day in the hills with houses that were blazing everywhere.

Roser: Mm-hmm.

Meynier: There were people walking around with pieces of torn flesh.

Roser: Yeah, yeah.
Meynier: It was . . . [pause] terrible. And then the problem is that I don’t know how they heal themselves. They are full of pus, purulent, everywhere . . .

Rosier: Yeah.

Meynier: We avoided a lynching, because . . . the guide who accompanied us, obviously it was . . . it was one of the guys who, how would I say this, who were guiding the militia in the preceding days.

Rosier: Yes.

Meynier: So when we found the groups of Tutsi who were fleeing in the hills, when they recognized him, phew, it was bad . . . it was necessary to raise the sound, the tone, because I thought they were going to stone him.349

Rosier heard the account above and took no action. In 2008, Sgt. Meynier was asked about Duval’s claims that he had briefed Rosier the night before. “I see no reason to question Duval’s professional integrity,” Meynier said.350 Of Rosier’s claims of ignorance, Meynier testified: “The only possible explanation, apart from forgetting, is that Rosier had been properly updated by Duval . . . but did not want us to deal with the case of Bisesero.”351 The Turquoise commanders, he noted, had other concerns at the time, including both the planned evacuation of the nuns and the upcoming visit of Defense Minister Léotard.352 “Regarding the case of Bisesero,” Meynier said at the conclusion of his 2008 testimony, “I cannot understand Rosier’s position.”353

Rosier, it bears repeating, was a veteran of the French government’s pre-Genocide intervention on behalf of the FAR, having headed Operation Noroit for a time in 1992.354 He, among many other Turquoise officers, had come to know Rwanda in the way French officials had framed it at the time: as a majority-Hutu nation under attack by a foreign-backed Tutsi enemy. Two years later, the reality of the situation on the ground was jarring. “This is not what we were led to believe,” one French noncommissioned officer told a reporter from the New York Times after the last survivors of Bisesero were rescued. “We were told that Tutsi were killing Hutu, and now this.”355

The troops’ misconceptions left them vulnerable to misinformation. On 27 June, the same day Duval’s CPA10 commandos journeyed to Bisesero, a team led by another French special forces officer, Commander Marin Gillier, was establishing a base in Gishyita, a community just northwest of Bisesero.356 Gillier, who, two days earlier (25 June), had appeared in a French television segment waving to a cheering crowd at the entrance to the refugee camp in Kirambo,357 reported to Col. Rosier on 27 June that his troops had spoken with Gishyita’s mayor and citizens, as well as IRG Minister of Information Eliézer Niyitegeka.358 On the basis of these conversations, Cdr. Gillier wrote: “A possible penetration of French troops into Bisesero must be done with force. Multiple sources have warned us. The Mayor is ready to provide us with ‘guides.’”359 Bisesero, he said, had been infiltrated by RPF forces, “to the point that local forces and political authorities avoid venturing there.”360
Turquoise officers were primed to believe that RPF forces had, indeed, infiltrated the Kibuye area. It was, in fact, that same day, 27 June 1994, that French troops heard gunfire about nine miles outside of Kibuye, which sits in the valley below the hills of Bisesero.361 As Col. Rosier explained to a reporter that night, his troops assumed the sound meant RPF soldiers and militia members were fighting in the area.362 This, however, was mere conjecture.363 And while Cdr. Gillier was reporting that the RPF had infiltrated Bisesero, he was relying upon the representations of the mayor of Gishyita, a man who had called on local anti-Tutsi militias to accelerate the massacres in the wake of France’s arrival in Rwanda.364 Duval, meanwhile, had spent time in Bisesero that very day and had taken no notice of any RPF infiltrators. On the contrary, when a reporter accompanying Duval asked a Tutsi man in Bisesero whether there were any “RPF fighters among you,” the man said no.365

At 10 p.m. on 27 June, General Lafourcade, the Turquoise force commander, reported to Admiral Lanxade, the chief of defense staff: “there was a fairly high number of armed men (1000?) dispersed” in the area of Bisesero.366 Lafourcade was “leaning towards the . . . hypothesis” that these were armed Tutsi civilians, “who fled the April massacres and sought to defend themselves.”367 Lafourcade did, at least, close with a clear understanding of the risk he was taking through inaction:

In this case the risks are as follows:

- Carry out reconnaissance with Hutu “guides” and be [accused] of collaboration with the FAR.
- Perform reconnaissance alone, with the risk of encountering RPF.
- **Do nothing and let massacres be committed behind our backs.**368

By 29 June 1994, French officials had publicly declared that RPF members had infiltrated the area around Gishyita and had “joined with local Tutsi to harass villages south of Kibuye.”369 A Reuters article that day, citing French military sources, reported that roughly 1,000 fighters, armed with machetes and grenades, were coming down at night from their hideaways in the hills and terrorizing the villages below. “If among its fighters are Tutsi villagers who fled massacres, the French believe that there are also many rebels,” the article stated.370 Reuters quoted Cdr. Gillier and relied on him for some of its assertions about the French troops’ observations in the area.371 The contrary observation in Duval’s fax—of terrorized Tutsi refugees, hiding in the hills to protect themselves from armed anti-Tutsi soldiers and militiamen—received no mention.

An AFP article that same day acknowledged that French intelligence about the possible presence of RPF fighters in the area was “still patchy.”372 The article reported that French marines in Gishyita had seen fighters with their own eyes, using night vision, and had followed their movements.373 “However,” the AFP stated, French marines “have not yet been able to acquire the ‘certainty’ that it is indeed the RPF.”374

In 2019, in an interview with the French journalist Laurent Larcher, Lafourcade was asked whether caution was the reason it took France three days to intervene in Bisesero.375 “Yes, that’s it,” Lafourcade replied. “I regret it a lot, but what do you want? … [I]f, from the first days, we had found ourselves in a fight with the RPF, it would have been a total political and diplomatic
catastrophe.”376 Larcher pressed: “So it was out of fear of the RPF that you did not intervene quickly in Bisesero?” To that inquiry, Lafourcade was both contrite and defiant:

We took some time. . . . It took a while to get the whole detachment there, it took eight, ten, fifteen days. . . . And that is the responsibility of the commander of the operation. That’s my responsibility. And I take it on. . . . And I take it on while regretting the deaths that there may have been in Bisesero . . . but . . . that’s that!377

Defense Minister Léotard visited both Gishyita and Kibuye on 29 June.378 Duval, we know, spoke with him in Kibuye, though there is some dispute about what he told the minister. Rosier has said that Duval “explained to the minister that he was convinced the massacres were continuing without giving more detail.”379 Duval has provided a different account, testifying:

When Minister Léotard visited us in Kibuye on the 29th at 3:30 pm, accompanied by General Lafourcade and Colonel Rosier . . . I reported on . . . Bisesero and the discovery of refugees. I explained what we saw, whom we met, the discovery of the mass graves, the wounded refugees including a child who had taken a bullet in the buttocks. It was explicit.380

Capt. Charpentier, who was also present for the briefing, has confirmed that information on Bisesero was conveyed to the French defense minister.381

Journalists covering Léotard’s visit pressed the minister about Bisesero but found him initially reluctant to commit troops there.382 “We do what we can, it’s a delicate operation. There is no question of interfering,” Léotard replied. “The soldiers are still only three hundred men in Rwanda, for hundreds of thousands of displaced or hidden people whose cases are highlighted by journalists every day.”383 The assembled journalists, though, did not let the matter drop there. As Le Monde would later report, a New York Times reporter pressed further, at which point Léotard, “who was leaving, stopped and turned around. . . . ‘Okay, he said, we’re going to go. Tomorrow we’re going to go.’”384

On 30 June, French troops at last set out to investigate the claims that Duval says he had relayed three days earlier.385 Once the survivors were discovered, according to a memo Gillier, the leader of the operation, submitted to the MIP inquiry,

the shock was grueling. An investigation on foot into the valley of Bisesero, which was not accessible to vehicles, revealed hundreds of corpses, victims of all ages. It was unbearable. I set off again towards Gishyita, about five kilometers away, and asked to be received by the mayor. . . . As soon as I saw him, I ordered him to tell me what happened in the territory he was responsible for. He finally explained to me that it was necessary to get rid of the scum.386

Three days earlier, the same mayor had convinced Gillier that the district of Bisesero was largely infiltrated by the RPF.387
When Gillier arrived at the scene, according to the testimony of one journalist, most of the French soldiers “were overwhelmed by the sight of the wounded, and some had tears in their eyes.” A situation report issued the night of 30 June described the scene: “500 Tutsi civilians were found to be very physically exhausted; a hundred of them wounded by bullets or blades. . . . Tutsi corpses, recently killed, were found (several dozens).”

As for the survivors, some broke into song “to thank the French soldiers,” according to RFI’s Christophe Boisbouvier. Boisbouvier, who had been with Duval’s unit on 27 June, found among the survivors the man he had interviewed three days before, Eric Nzabahimana, whose fluent French had made him a kind of spokesperson for the survivors on both occasions. According to Boisbouvier: “When I asked [Nzabahimana] if he preferred to be evacuated or protected on the spot, he replied that he preferred to be evacuated outside the country or to a place that was not this one.”

Undoubtedly, aiding survivors like those hidden in the Bisesero woods was the primary goal set forth by the French politicians who promoted Turquoise and lobbied for its UN authorization. That Turquoise commanders did not deploy forces to save those refugees for as many as three days, costing lives in the process, calls into question the French government’s commitment to that goal.

One explanation, cited by both Rosier and Duval, is that the French government was just being cautious, trying to avoid a confrontation with the RPF forces. An exchange of gunfire—or, worse, casualties—might have compromised the image French officials hoped to create of Turquoise as a neutral force. It also might have sapped the French public’s support for the operation, much as the deaths of 18 US servicemen in Somalia, just one year earlier, had eroded Americans’ support for that operation. These risks, to be sure, were legitimate concerns, but they also attached to every French mission in Rwanda, from guarding refugee camps to conducting reconnaissance in search of RPF positions. To hold French troops back and allow the killings to proceed, on the basis of these concerns, necessarily entailed a value judgment. It was a judgment that the image of Operation Turquoise, and the security of its French troops, was not worth risking for the sake of saving Rwandan lives. That judgment not to act called into question the purpose of the operation.

Duval has suggested that Turquoise officers had other priorities during the critical three-day period after Duval’s unit first drove out to Bisesero. One competing priority, he said, was the need to prepare for Defense Minister Léotard’s visit. Léotard’s stop in Rwanda was a high-profile event, guaranteed to attract the attention of the international press. One can imagine that French officers might have been especially risk-averse in the days leading up to the minister’s arrival, not wanting a possible dustup with RPF forces to taint the coverage of his visit. Turquoise, after all, had always had a relatively heavy media component, having been born amid concerns about the negative press coverage the Mitterrand administration received during the Genocide. Ironically, the French government’s failure in Bisesero would ultimately subject it to criticism far more blistering than any it might have received had it simply tried to save the Tutsi whose lives it knew to be in peril.
The French government’s history in Rwanda, and the preconceptions French officers brought to their mission, would seem to explain why French leaders were inclined to credit the local Hutu authorities’ accounts about potential RPF threats, even to the point of disregarding the reporting of a French reconnaissance team. As Duval testified in 2013:

It was not explicitly stated that the RPF was the enemy. But it happened that many of the officers . . . had served in Rwanda in various supervisory, consulting or training capacities . . . . And in the words that were exchanged, there was a widespread feeling that the RPF was still ‘the adversary’ with quotation marks, as if the FAR had legitimacy and the RPF were the rebels.397

Preoccupied with stopping the RPF foe that had stymied them for years, leaders in the Mitterrand administration, including the president, chose to deploy military officers to Rwanda who, in many cases, arrived with conflicting priorities, preexisting loyalties, and fundamental misperceptions of the realities on the ground and their mission. In that context, failures like that of Bisesero were inevitable, and particularly galling in light of the French government’s proud representations at the time. Indeed, according to the notes of Delaye and Quesnot, Léotard’s 30 June briefing in Paris concluded that “the operation is, for the moment, a success.”398 Turquoise, the defense minister had insisted, was accomplishing its goal of saving lives—and while he acknowledged that massacres were still occurring, he allowed only that this was happening “in areas where we are absent.”399 In saying this, Léotard was presumably referring to parts of western Rwanda where French troops had simply not yet established a presence. Only later would it become clear that there were other reasons why French troops, despite the risk of ethnic killings, were “absent” from an area. Sometimes, as in Bisesero, it was a choice.

G. With the RPF on the Verge of Victory, President Mitterrand Sought to Excuse France’s Role in the Lead-Up to the Genocide While Working behind the Scenes to Persuade the RPF to Stop Its Advance.

Before the assassination of President Habyarimana, I was not made aware of tragedies in the interior of the country.400


From President Mitterrand’s perspective, the news at a restricted council meeting in the Élysée on 29 June 1994 could not have seemed encouraging. “Kigali should fall in the coming days. Afterwards, the FAR will [either] withdraw in good order or collapse,” Admiral Lanxade, the chief of defense staff, reported at the meeting.401 When Mitterrand asked to know what was happening in “the Tutsi area” (i.e., RPF-controlled territory), Lanxade explained: “They have cleared out. The Hutu have fled toward Tanzania and Uganda. The Tutsi area is becoming a Tutsiland.”402

In the discussion that followed, Mitterrand took a moment to expound on how, from his perspective, things had gone so wrong in Rwanda. “Historically, the situation has always been dangerous,” he said.403 He complained that the press had a tendency to oversimplify what was happening in Rwanda. The truth, he insisted, was that the country’s problems were “complex.”404
Mitterrand was speaking defensively now. There was no denying the scale of the tragedy in Rwanda, but the story of how it had happened—and how the French President and his administration had played a role in it—was still being written. In Mitterrand’s telling, the wave of bloodletting that followed the 6 April 1994 plane crash was not planned and therefore not foreseeable. “[Habyarimana’s] assassination caused reactions of fear and unleashed the massacres,” Mitterrand said. “The extremist Hutu faction, some of whose leaders were on the president’s plane, engaged in inexcusable reprisals.”405 (This was essentially the same version of events that many génocidaires would peddle from the witness stand in the ICTR, while defending themselves against charges of genocide and crimes against humanity,406 a version that, during separate proceedings, would be rejected by a French court.407)

Mitterrand’s point was not merely that France could not have seen the Genocide coming, but that he, personally, had no way of foreseeing it. In what was perhaps the most revealing portion of his remarks at the meeting, Mitterrand declared: “Before the assassination of President Habyarimana, I was not made aware of tragedies in the interior of the country.”408 This claim warped reality, removing himself from the history of calamity in which he was one of the principal actors. For instance, on 10 March 1993, then Minister of Cooperation and Development Marcel Debarge, speaking at a restricted council meeting over which Mitterrand presided, drew the president’s attention to the newly released International Federal of Human Rights (FIDH) report, which, among other things, accused the Habyarimana administration of orchestrating killings of civilians, most of them Tutsi.409 Debarge noted then that the report discussed “abuses committed, on both sides, on the population” and that it was “harsh on the behavior of government troops.”410 (While the notes of the March 1993 meeting are short on detail, Debarge’s summary of the FIDH report’s findings was at least troubling enough that Mitterrand felt compelled to order the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to summon Rwanda’s ambassador in Paris “to provide explanations.”411)

Mitterrand struck a similarly defensive tone while meeting with Ugandan President Museveni in Paris two days later, on 1 July 1994. “France has no responsibility for this tragedy,” Mitterrand insisted in the course of their conversation, though his guest had not been so undiplomatic as to allege that it did.412 Mitterrand remarked that the RPF “is mad at” France because of Operation Noroit—an operation that he had, since its inception in October 1990, claimed was solely intended to protect French nationals, but that he now acknowledged had “served as a warning” to the RPF.413 Noroit, in any event, was over. Now, he said, “the French Army has come back for an altogether different purpose.”414

Bruno Delaye had prepped Mitterrand for the meeting with the Ugandan president.415 One day earlier, on 30 June, he and the director of the Quai d’Orsay’s Africa bureau spoke with Museveni for two hours in London, urging him to “put pressure on the RPF” to accept a cease-fire.416 Museveni agreed to do so, on two conditions: first, that steps be taken to “clearly establish[] that the assassins of the [IRG] will be prosecuted and punished,” and, second, that “the Arusha Accords be revised to exclude those who have been guilty of massacres” from serving in the new Rwandan government.417

Mitterrand told Museveni he had no objection to modifying the Arusha Accords.418 (He appears not to have commented on Museveni’s other condition: prosecuting and punishing IRG
assassins.) “You have to help us,” he pleaded, adding later: “I have always found you responsible. I treated you as a friend. You are the natural ally of the RPF with a Tutsi majority.”

Museveni was obliging. “I will talk to these RPF children,” he said.


With Operation Turquoise now entering into its second week, Mitterrand and other French officials found it useful to note that French troops, to that point, had yet to fire a single bullet. Tensions, though, were rising, and with French troops fanning farther out from the Rwandan-Zairean border, the potential for a confrontation between French soldiers and the RPF had rarely, if ever, been higher.

One French officer who participated in Operation Turquoise has alleged that France seriously contemplated a direct attack on the RPF at that moment and even issued an order to strike RPF troops from the air, only to back down at the last minute. Captain Guillaume Ancel was assigned to the 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment (REI), part of the “south group” operating out of Bukavu, under the command of Lt. Col. Jacques Hogard. In the years since the Genocide, Ancel has said that while in Nîmes on 22 June 1994, shortly before deploying to Rwanda, he received a copy of a “preparatory order” with instructions to prepare to “carry out a land raid on Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, to restore the government.” According to Ancel, his unit’s task would have been to “clear a corridor” for Turquoise troops to storm the city before the RPF could react. “Tactically, it made sense, since we had been practicing this type of operation for several years,” Ancel wrote in a 2018 memoir. “In practice, it was obviously risky [and] very violent.”

The plan, it seems, was momentarily scrapped. (Ancel said he did not know why a final order did not follow, but he speculated it might have been because the unit’s equipment failed to arrive in Zaire on time.) Ancel, however, has said that on 30 June 1994, roughly one week after receiving the preparatory order, his unit commander notified him that the mission was back on, saying they “received the order to stop the advance of RPF soldiers.” Kigali, at this time, was on the verge of falling to the RPF, and French officials had been contemplating what the RPF’s next move might be. They did not know which direction the RPF forces would choose to go, but suspected the rebel troops would not rest until they controlled Rwanda.

The operation, according to Ancel, called for 150 French troops to queue up on the eastern edge of the Nyungwe forest, southwest of Kigali, in the early morning hours of 1 July 1994. Ancel’s task was to identify targets for the fighter jets to hit; the jets, in turn, would drop bombs and rockets on the unsuspecting RPF columns. Ancel said that on the morning of the operation, he headed out to the Bukavu airport tarmac and boarded a helicopter. But, as the rotor spun, an officer came out to say that the operation had been cancelled. “We have an agreement with the RPF, we are not engaging in combat,” the officer said. As Ancel recalled, the officer explained that the RPF had agreed to stop its advance and allow the Turquoise forces to occupy a vast swath of western Rwanda—an area that would come to be known as the “Safe Humanitarian Zone.” (The RPF did not, in fact, stop its advance on 1 July 1994. However, the French government did
send word to RPF leadership in early July 1994 about its plans to create a safe humanitarian zone in southwestern Rwanda (discussed below).438)

Several of Ancel’s superior officers, including General Lafourcade, Col. Rosier, and Lt. Col. Hogard, have denied his claims.439 “You cannot be serious! I am amazed that a former artillery officer could seriously say such things,” Lt. Col. Hogard, the commander of the southern group, told an interviewer in 2014.440 While Hogard said it is possible that Ancel may at some point have flown on a Puma helicopter as part of a reconnaissance mission, he maintained that Ancel’s primary missions were not to provide air support, but to liaise with NGOs and recover Tutsi survivors of the Genocide.441 “On the other hand,” Hogard said:

it should be remembered that Kagame, for his part, had been claiming for months that, if he came to meet French units, it would be to shoot at them. We had therefore very logically taken precautionary and protective measures, in the face of the RPF who said they wanted to “break the French”!442

One member of the Rwandan military’s high command at the time, General Paul Rwarakabije,443 provides corroboration for Ancel’s assertion that French forces did at least contemplate an air strike on the RPF units.444 Rwarakabije said that at some point between 26 and 28 June 1994, a group of French and Rwandan officers met at a hotel in Gisenyi. The meeting was conceived as a tête-à-tête between General Augustin Bizimungu, the FAR chief of staff, and a French officer.445 (Rwarakabije, who waited outside while the two men spoke, could not recall the French officer’s name—only that it was not General Lafourcade, who Rwarakabije knew was in Goma at the time.446) While the meeting was under way, Rwarakabije loitered outside the hotel and spoke with some French soldiers.447 He recalled that the soldiers pressed him for information on where the RPF forces were presently positioned.448 They were asking, they said, so they could launch air attacks against the RPF troops.449

Contemporaneous documents lend additional support to Ancel’s account. These documents show, first, that France had the airpower necessary for an attack of the kind Ancel described, with four Jaguar fighter jets and four Mirage-F1CT fighter jets positioned at the French air base in Kisangani, a city in northeastern Zaire.450 Those planes arrived in Kisangani on 28 and 29 June 1994—just a few days before the aborted air strike.451 Documents also show that, on the morning of 1 July 1994—the morning of the alleged aborted attack—the RPF’s representative to the United Nations complained to UN officials and diplomats in New York that French planes were frequently overflying RPF-held territory and failing to respond to RPF air traffic controllers.452 The representative told diplomats the RPF “had intercepted French communications” indicating that the planes intended to bomb RPF military installations.453 To date, the French government has not released documents that describe its flight operations or missions at the time.

General Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander, could see that Turquoise was taking an increasingly assertive tack, noting with some concern on 30 June 1994 that French forces were “advancing toward the center of the country” and had reportedly arrived at Gikongoro, just 12 miles from the RPF front line.454 Dallaire was especially troubled to learn that French troops were en route toward the southern city of Butare, outside of the area where Turquoise forces had, to that point, been patrolling in western Rwanda.455 French officials had suspected for some time that the
RPF forces had designs on Butare, the country’s second largest city, and it was either in spite of this, or because of it, that General Lafourcade, in late June 1994, had ordered Turquoise troops to conduct “discreet reconnaissance” in the region. (Delaye, making note of the general’s decision in a 28 June 1994 memo, warned Mitterrand that the region was “potentially highly sensitive.”) It surely mattered, too, that Cardinal Jean-Marie Lustiger, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Paris, had urged French officials to send troops to rescue about 40 nuns living in the southern Rwandan city. Prime Minister Balladur approved the rescue operation on 30 June 1994.

Dallaire received advance notice about planned French operations in Butare while meeting with Lafourcade in Goma that same morning, 30 June 1994. In his memoir, Dallaire recalled being taken aback by the chatter of the men on Lafourcade’s staff when they broke for lunch. The men were critical of UNAMIR, arguing it “should help prevent the RPF from defeating” the interim government forces. “They refused to accept the reality of the genocide and the fact that the extremists leaders, the perpetrators and some of their old colleagues were all the same people. They showed overt signs of wishing to fight the RPF,” Dallaire wrote.

A French special forces detachment arrived in Butare on 1 July, joined, despite unfavorable weather, by two helicopters. In his memoir, Colonel Tauzin said he was struck by the fact that for the first time since the detachment’s crossing into Rwandan territory on 23 June, no journalists had come along for the ride. Not yet knowing what their mission would be, Tauzin began to speculate:

Assuming that in Paris the eternal struggles for influence have not ceased, I imagine for a moment the improbable. What if we were here, very far ahead of the Turquoise plan, to rush towards Kigali by this road that leads straight to it, less than 150 kilometers away?! Rush towards Kigali, seize the airport to prepare the airlift of the forces needed to retake the city.

The detachment’s actual mission in Butare disappointed Tauzin: to “secure the city” and “stop the abuses,” which anti-Tutsi militias were said to be perpetrating in anticipation of the RPF’s arrival. (“I really hope[d] that Paris [would] give Kagame the lesson he deserves, and that we [would] change our attitude for that, not to save those who have turned into killers, but to attack the evil at its root: the RPF!” Tauzin wrote.)

In General Lafourcade’s account of the special forces’ detachment’s first day in Butare, a group of French soldiers was heading to a Catholic mission a few miles north of the city when RPF forces fired in the direction of the lead vehicle. The vehicle reportedly turned around, sustaining no damage.

The special forces team did, ultimately, evacuate 16 nuns and one Tutsi family by helicopter that night. Dallaire, though, remained distressed. In a phone call with Lafourcade that evening (1 July), he “reproached” the French general “for going too fast to the East,” according to a handwritten note Lafourcade scrawled just before midnight that night. [Dallaire] seemed perfectly aware of the intentions of the RPF and confided to me that [the RPF] was leading an offensive on Butare,” Lafourcade wrote. Lafourcade assured him that the French operation in
Butare would be limited: the troops, after spending the night on site, would conduct evacuations on the morning of 2 July before returning west to Gikongoro. Dallaire, he wrote, “seemed relieved” and said he would “warn the RPF.”

There was more that Lafourcade hoped to accomplish in Butare. The French troops had evacuated only 20 people on 1 July, leaving many more behind, including several hundred children from a Butare orphanage. To Lafourcade’s way of thinking, the RPF was doubly responsible for the threat these people were continuing to face: it was the reason their lives were in danger, and also the reason French troops were struggling to save them. “We still do not have the means to ensure the protection of Butare, and it is likely that the RPF will seize the city before our arrival,” he wrote in a 2 July memo. Anticipating the press coverage the French operation was all but guaranteed to generate, Lafourcade warned: “We therefore risk being accused of doing nothing for these refugees by the media.”

The RPF, at that time, was advancing on multiple fronts. By the morning of 2 July, its troops had Kigali completely surrounded. A French Ministry of Defense memo reported that the 10 remaining FAR battalions in the capital were boxed in and running low on supplies.

Admiral Lanxade, assessing the situation in a 2 July note, took it as a given that the RPF would not stop fighting until its troops had reached the Burundian and Zairean borders. In the face of these ambitions, he argued, France had two options. The first option, which, he made clear, he did not favor, was to retreat. Although a retreat, in theory, would have reduced the risk of an armed confrontation with the RPF, he wrote: “As soon as this is known, the RPF will be encouraged to continue. Our units will then have to gradually abandon the protection of the refugee camps, while trying to prevent any massacre before the RPF takes control of the areas.” The end result, he warned, would be “a complete withdrawal of our forces to Zaire.”

The alternative—“Option 2,” in Lanxade’s note—was to establish a “protected humanitarian zone” in Rwanda. Under this plan, which echoed a concept Ambassador Marlaud had floated in various memos over the previous week, the Turquoise forces would mark off a large portion of Rwanda as off-limits to RPF forces. “It would be clearly indicated to the RPF that its military units shall not penetrate [the zone], so that the security of the various populations can be maintained,” Lanxade wrote.

Marlaud, in his own writings on this subject, had argued the creation of one or more such zones would serve two goals: first, it would limit the flow of refugees into neighboring countries, and, second, it would “deter the RPF from going too far.” Marlaud acknowledged, though, that the French government could expect some complications. One issue was the FAR, whose troops, he noted in a 1 July memo, would either take sanctuary in the French-controlled zones or would continue to wage war against the RPF outside of the zones, with no way to retreat. Marlaud also cautioned that the French government would have to contend with “the risks of infiltration” by the RPF.

Lanxade did not touch on these issues in his memo. The one risk that he acknowledged was the possibility that RPF forces would continue to advance in full disregard of the zone’s
boundaries, triggering a clash with French troops.498 “However,” he wrote, “we can believe that the display of our determination should reasonably limit this risk.”499

President Mitterrand quickly let it be known that he supported option two: establishing a safe humanitarian zone.500 A handwritten postscript on Laxande’s 2 July memo indicated that Prime Minister Balladur, Foreign Minister Juppé, and Defense Minister Léotard also favored this proposal, provided that, as Laxande recommended, France present the plan to the UN Security Council for its approval.501 In a matter of hours, Ambassador Mérimée, France’s permanent representative to the United Nations, dispatched a letter to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali.502 The letter stated that the French government believed it already had the authority, under previous UN Security Council resolutions, to establish the safe humanitarian zone (SHZ).503 “Nevertheless,” it said, “it is the wish of France that, through you, the United Nations should indicate its support for the establishment of such a zone.”504 Mérimée warned, in closing, that “if France is unable to organize a safe humanitarian zone with the support of the international community, it will have no other choice than to withdraw very rapidly from Rwandan territory.”505

The initial plan for the SHZ, as conceived by General Lafourcade, would have “cut the country in two.”506 It was a radical proposal, in that it threatened to carve out a buffer zone between the two sides’ Armed Forces. The IRG and FAR would be safely ensconced on the western side of the country, while French troops barred the RPF forces from proceeding any farther. Lafourcade would later say his hope was that the French-imposed détente would pressure the RPF to agree to a cease-fire.507

The Mitterrand administration settled on a less aggressive course of action, in the end. Even so, the boundaries that the French government ultimately chose for the SHZ were telling. In his letter to Boutros-Ghali, Mérimée said “the zone should comprise the districts of Cyangugu and Gikongoro and the southern half of the district of Kibuye, including the Kibuye-Gitarama road as far as the N’Daba pass.”508 It was a large area, covering roughly one-third of the interim government-held territory and about one-fifth of the whole of Rwanda.509 One could not help but note, though, that all of the localities the Quai d’Orsay, through Mérimée’s letter, had expressly sought to place under French protection—Cyangugu, Gikongoro, and Kibuye510—were places French officials had identified as likely targets for a coming RPF offensive.511 It was likely not coincidental, either, that the French government wanted the protected zone to extend “as far as the N’Daba pass,” given that French officials had previously voiced concerns that an RPF takeover of that area would sever the interim government-held territory in two.512 Ultimately, the lines left little doubt about what the French government was trying to do: it was trying, as it had so many times before, to stop the RPF.

The RPF needed no further evidence of the French government’s unstated aims. The proof, in its view, was already on display in Butare, where French forces had resolved to resume their planned evacuations, even as RPF troops were closing in on their goal of seizing control of the city.513 “This coincidence is all the more suspect in their eyes because Butare is far from French bases and because such in-depth operations were not initially planned,” the DGSE reported on 4 July.514 “The RPF thus considers that the French authorities are revealing their true intentions as operation ‘Turquoise’ progresses: to protect the self-proclaimed government and give the FAR a second wind.”515
The RPF captured Butare on the afternoon of 3 July 1994. That day, as shelling continued, a convoy of French jeeps mounted with machine guns escorted half a dozen buses into the city to evacuate several hundred orphans and religious workers. When the rescue operation was complete, Col. Tauzin led the French trucks back toward Gikongoro via a road that had come under RPF control. At the Butare city limits, their path was blocked by RPF soldiers. “The moment was delicate,” Tauzin recalled in his memoir. “Of course we were very seriously armed, but we were only 58 [men] and accompanied by 600 refugees!”

The RPF soldiers allowed the French convoy to pass. “[W]e continued on our way,” Tauzin wrote, “when suddenly I heard Kalashnikov fire coming from the second RPF line, up there on the hill to the north.” The French troops did not hesitate. According to Tauzin: “The patrol just behind me reacted ‘with panache’ with ‘a fireball,’ that is, by retaliating with all available weapons.”

The French troops suffered no injuries; according to Tauzin, damage on the French side was limited to a single bullet found in the glove compartment of a French jeep. (A Le Monde reporter wrote that Tauzin “could not really clarify if the incident resulted in casualties among the Rwandans [i.e., the RPF], but he ha[d] every reason to believe it.”) For the French government, though, the clash proved harmful in another way, as news of the incident broke at the same time that French officials were announcing, on 4 July 1994, the decision to establish the SHZ. The story fed a media narrative that tensions between France and the RPF were rising and that further confrontations were, as one reporter put it, “inevitable.” Admiral Lanxade quickly sought to push back on that narrative, advising the Turquoise force commanders to clarify that French forces had conducted an evacuation operation with the RPF’s consent, and that “the shots were provoked by uncontrolled units.” (This last assertion was consistent with RPF Commander Kagame’s assurance that he had not directed his troops to fire on the French forces; his explanation, as reported in a French cable on 4 July 1994, was that an RPF soldier had either ignored orders or had responded to “provocation from the government side.”)

The French government opted, in the end, to announce the establishment of the SHZ without the benefit of a UN Security Council vote approving the initiative. “It may be that France has concluded that it would be unlikely to secure Council support for the proposal and is therefore not seeking it,” a New Zealand Foreign Ministry official wrote in a 4 July 1994 cable. For its own part, the New Zealand delegation had several concerns about the initiative, not the least of which was that the zone’s borders were “close to, if not contiguous with, the current confrontation between RPF and [FAR] forces.” In other words,” the official wrote, “by securing such a zone, the French would inevitably be caught doing what they said they wouldn’t—i.e., that their forces would avoid conflicting with the RPF and would not get caught in fighting between the Rwanda parties or be interpositioned.” Other Security Council member states had concerns too. None, however, ever went so far as to raise a formal objection to France’s plan, allowing French officials to assert that the Council had effectively consented to the proposal, through the silence of its members.

Early press reports about the establishment of the SHZ indicated that the RPF was either firmly opposed to the idea, or that its tolerance of the French initiative was, at best, begrudging.
Such reports, though, were quickly overtaken by events. Not long after dawn broke on 4 July 1994, reports began to come in that the battle for control of Kigali was over.\textsuperscript{539} The FAR had abandoned the city, with the last remaining units reportedly fleeing northwest to join their comrades about 30 kilometers outside of the capital.\textsuperscript{540} Based on what the troops left behind, it appeared to General Dallaire, the UNAMIR force commander, that the interim government forces had finally run out of ammunition.\textsuperscript{541}

That morning, the French ambassador to Uganda received an invitation to speak with President Museveni in the president’s office in Kampala.\textsuperscript{542} When he arrived, he was greeted not only by Museveni, but by RPF Commander Kagame.\textsuperscript{543} The French ambassador found Kagame to be “courteous,” if a little “reserved.”\textsuperscript{544} In the course of their conversation, Kagame said that the RPF did not oppose the creation of humanitarian zones, and that now that Kigali had been won, it could consider agreeing to a cease-fire.\textsuperscript{545} Kagame explained that, in the view of RPF leaders, the launch of Operation Turquoise had threatened to give the Rwandan interim government forces “a false sense of confidence.”\textsuperscript{546} “But,” the French ambassador wrote in a 4 July 1994 cable to Paris, “the RPF was now convinced of our good faith.”\textsuperscript{547} When the ambassador suggested opening a direct line of communication with Kagame, rather than continuing to rely on General Dallaire to serve as an intermediary, the RPF commander gave him his satellite phone number.\textsuperscript{548}

Whatever preconceptions the French ambassador might have had about Kagame, he appears to have come away from this meeting persuaded of his sincerity. “[H]is openness to us,” the ambassador wrote, “confirms that he is preparing to move from the military approach to politics.”\textsuperscript{549}

\textbf{I. Leveraging the Establishment of the SHZ, French Officials Redoubled Their Efforts to Catalyze a Cease-fire and Salvage the IRG.}

While France’s envoy in Kampala was taking the first tentative steps toward rapprochement with the RPF, French troops on the ground in Rwanda remained committed to a strategy of military deterrence. “No one will go any further,” Col. Tauzin told an assembly of journalists on 4 July in Gikongoro, where French special forces had begun to stake out the eastern border of the SHZ.\textsuperscript{550} Tauzin said his troops were under orders to stay in Gikongoro,\textsuperscript{551} where, according to his memoir, their task was to “set[] up battle stations [and] properly prepar[e] heavy weapons ranges around our position . . . for the unlikely event that the RPF would attack.”\textsuperscript{552} He told the reporters that more French troops would be joining them soon.\textsuperscript{553} “We will not allow anyone to bother the population—whether they are militias, the Rwandan Army, or the RPF,” he said.\textsuperscript{554} He directed his bluntest warning to one of those entities in particular: “If the RPF comes here and threatens the population, we will fire on them without hesitation. We have the means, and more are on their way.”\textsuperscript{555}

One of the French journalists who heard Tauzin speak that day recalled asking the colonel how French troops could possibly hold back the RPF forces who had just seized Butare and vastly outnumbered the Turquoise troops in Gikongoro.\textsuperscript{556} “Ah yeah,” he remembered Tauzin responding, “but then, let them move a foot, and I’ll smash in their faces.”\textsuperscript{557}
Chapter X

22 June 1994 – 21 August 1994

Tauzin was not speaking entirely out of turn. That same day, aboard a helicopter flight to Gikongoro, his superior officer, Col. Rosier, told photographers that the RPF was “going to be very surprised.” Rosier spoke in metaphor, invoking some of the highs and lows of French military history as reference points for its latest operation. “We won’t call this Dien Bien Phu,” he said, referring to France’s 1954 defeat in Vietnam. Reaching further back in history, to the scene of one of Napoleon’s most famous victories, he declared: “we’ll call it Austerlitz.”

It was not surprising that Tauzin and Rosier—two officers who, before the Genocide, had labored to help the FAR fight RPF forces—framed their mission in these terms, as though French troops were boldly standing their ground against the oncoming rebel forces. In fact, there were officials in Paris who similarly characterized the SHZ as an effort to establish a buffer zone between the advancing RPF forces and the “retreating Hutus” and former regime elements. One US embassy official in Paris at the time recalled that a Quai d’Orsay staffer framed the SHZ as a “stop line” that would supposedly prevent the RPF from engaging in reprisal killings and provoking an even greater humanitarian catastrophe. Such talk, though, was out of step with the message officials in the Élysée were hoping to convey. At a joint press conference with Nelson Mandela in South Africa on 5 July 1994, Mitterrand said: “France does not intend to carry out military operations in Rwanda against anyone. . . . The Rwandan Patriotic Front is not our adversary. We do not seek to hold back its potential success.”

According to the Duclert report, an “order was issued to remove Colonel Tauzin from Rwanda, who had made aggressive remarks to journalists about the RPF.”

The softening of French rhetoric had more to do with messaging than with policy, as Mitterrand remained committed to the same French strategy in Rwanda that had prevailed since the early days of Operation Noroit. Mitterrand continued to combine French military “determination,” as Lanxade had put it, with diplomatic pressure to forge a cease-fire and a negotiated peace. Only now, instead of holding the northern line against the RPF, as Noroit had done, French troops were holding the SHZ.

Whatever the French government’s intentions for the SHZ were, once the French forces stood up the SHZ, its presence deterred the RPF from sending military missions into western Rwanda for the purpose of saving Tutsi lives. “Many Tutsi were in Bisesero, in Kibuye, in Nyarushishi, in Kibeho, and in former Gikongoro, and the French presence in those places was obstructive in terms of getting information on where the Tutsi had sought refuge and our advancing to those places,” said Charles Karamba, who commanded the RPA at the CND (Centre Nationale de Développement) during the Genocide. “That gave more time to the killers to kill as many Tutsi as possible.”

Meanwhile, the diplomatic approach that had helped produce the failed Arusha Accords was now being employed by French officials in pursuit of a cease-fire that might save the IRG from total defeat. The strategy, always problematic, had curdled into grotesquerie, its goal being to salvage some power for the perpetrators of a genocide.

Diplomatic outreach to the IRG fell in large part to Yannick Gérard, the Quai d’Orsay’s deputy director of African and Malagasy affairs and a former French ambassador to Uganda. Gérard had arrived in Goma on 30 June with plans to open a dialogue with the Gisenyi authorities.
and deliver what essentially boiled down to three key requests: first, that they cooperate in any way necessary “to ensure that [Operation Turquoise] goes smoothly”; second, that they “exert their influence, in the right direction, on the militia”; and third, that they “put a stop to the propaganda” on the hate-media radio station RTLM.568

The question of what to do about RTLM had taken on some urgency in the days preceding Gérard’s arrival. UN Secretariat officials and Security Council representatives had grown increasingly frustrated with the IRG’s failure to stop the torrent of bilious rhetoric the station continued to spew.569 The principal target for the station’s venom was, of course, the Tutsi; a 28 June 1994 report by a UN special rapporteur observed that RTLM, widely known as “the killer radio station,” “does not hesitate to call for the extermination of the Tutsi and is notorious for the decisive role that it appears to have played in the massacres.”570 What most galvanized UN officials, though, was a recent trend among RTLM broadcasters of claiming, falsely, that UNAMIR and General Dallaire were secretly backing the RPF.571 (An RTLM broadcast on 25 June, to cite just one example, alleged that Dallaire “advises the Inyenzi Inkotanyi [i.e., RPF cockroaches]” and “teaches them how to handle these large-caliber bombs that they continuously drop on this town of Kigali.”572)

French officials contemplated what it would take to jam Rwandan radio transmissions, but decided, according to a 30 June Foreign Ministry cable, that the Turquoise forces were not close enough to the transmission sites and lacked the equipment they would need.573 The Ministry also ruled out the idea of forcibly stopping the broadcasts, on the grounds that this would not fall within Turquoise’s UN mandate and would represent “an act of force against one of the parties,” after which Turquoise “could no longer be seen as impartial.”574 A remaining option, one French officials chose to pursue, was to “intervene,” verbally, “with Rwandan officials who may have an influence on the content of the programs.” The cable called for a French envoy to reach out to RTLM founder Ferdinand Nahimana, who had returned to Rwanda through the Bukavu/Cyangugu crossing in late April,575 and “insist that all calls for massacres or murder as well as attacks against UNAMIR and its commander be stopped on this radio station.”576

Gérard, in the days that followed, would twice admonish IRG officials to halt the station’s violent rhetoric—first in a 2 July 1994 meeting with Nahimana, and then in a meeting the following day with IRG President Théodore Sindikubwabo.577 His words, though, had little impact.578 After a couple of days of silence, RTLM reportedly returned to the air, its broadcasters’ tone as coarse as ever.579

Based on the way the Gisenyi officials approached their meetings with Gérard, it seemed that nothing the French government had done in the opening phase of Operation Turquoise had disabused them of their assumption that France remained their ally. The officials were apparently confident enough of the French government’s ongoing support that they felt comfortable asking for various favors or special privileges.580 It was not merely that they pressed for France to expand the SHZ to cover northwestern Rwanda and even “certain areas of Kigali.”581 One official, MRND Chairman Mathieu Ngorumpatse (later sentenced to life in the ICTR for genocide and other crimes),582 even went so far during the 3 July meeting with President Sindikubwabo and other IRG officials as to “express[] his wish that France help the FAR in their fight against the RPF.”583 It was not as though Ngorumpatse had no reason to believe Gérard might agree to the request; Gérard,
after all, had just finished detailing the French government’s plans to shield a large swath of IRG-controlled territory (i.e., the SHZ) from RPF forces. (Gérard said he told Ngirumpatse, in response to his request for military assistance, “that this was out of the question.”)

Gérard would later write that he left these meetings convinced that the IRG authorities “were preparing . . . to complicate our task and deliberately worsen the situation.” Though he soon decided to distance himself from the IRG and its associates (without cutting off direct contact entirely), he let General Lafourcade know that he remained available “to have any contact with the local authorities in the SHZ that he deemed might be useful for [Operation] Turquoise to proceed smoothly.” (Indeed, the instructions he received from Paris were that he should maintain contact with local authorities, as this “will be necessary for the smooth execution of Operation Turquoise.”) Gérard apparently became acquainted with several of the most prominent local authorities within the SHZ. In an 8 July cable, he noted that the prefect of Gikongoro had proven “very cooperative,” while the prefect in Cyangugu “sometimes create[d] difficulties.” Gérard’s lone comment about their counterpart in Kibuye was that he “has his hands all covered with blood, like most of the bourgemestres of the area.” All of them, he remarked, were criminals who would have to be arrested in due course and brought to justice as soon as possible. (Notably, Gérard—in line with other French officials at the time—viewed arresting génocidaires as something that UNAMIR should do, rather than Turquoise forces.)

As for the IRG itself, its fortunes were fading more and more rapidly, with the RPF establishing its authority over Butare and Kigali on 3 and 4 July, respectively. Before long, according to Gérard, French Foreign Ministry officials “no longer saw the usefulness” of continuing to meet with IRG contacts. “They are totally discredited,” Gérard wrote in a 7 July cable, explaining that he and General Lafourcade were in complete agreement on this issue. “Any contact with them is now useless or even harmful . . . . We have nothing more to say to them except to step aside as quickly as possible.”

French officials, continuing to harbor hopes for a cease-fire, and recognizing they would need to find a replacement for the IRG to sit across the table from the RPF in prospective peace talks, settled on one of the country’s most prominent génocidaires: the FAR’s chief of staff, General Augustin Bizimungu. General Bizimungu, who, in late June 1994, had pressed General Lafourcade to supply the interim government’s Army with much-needed ammunition to continue its fight against the RPF, committed many crimes during the Genocide—not only at the outset, but as late as 7 June 1994, when soldiers under his command murdered about 100 Tutsi civilians who had sought refuge at a religious order’s compound in Nyamirambo, Kigali. (The ICTR would later convict Bizimungu of genocide, among other crimes.) Lafourcade and Gérard were aware that Bizimungu “retain[ed] some authority over the militias” slaughtering Tutsi. Nevertheless, they and other French officials hoped Bizimungu “could . . . play a role in a possible settlement with the RPF,” if only they could persuade him to break ranks with the IRG.

The French government attempted to gauge Bizimungu’s willingness to play such a role on 6 July 1994, in a series of meetings French officials arranged with the general in Goma. Bizimungu’s responses were not encouraging. In a meeting with Admiral Lanxade’s deputy, General Raymond Germanos, Bizimungu asked, yet again, whether France would agree to supply the interim government’s Army with more ammunition (“This was refused,” a French cable
Bizimungu, according to the cable, “seemed to understand” that a cease-fire with the RPF “was the only possible solution.” He let on, though, that he suspected the RPF would try to delay any negotiations to “gain time to regroup its forces in the north in order to attack the Ruhengeri-Gisenyi region.” Germanos told him not to worry: “UNAMIR and possibly elements of Turquoise could control the northern area to prevent this from happening.”

Bizimungu did not, ultimately, break off from the IRG. In a matter of days, as the RPF forces were bearing down on Gisenyi in mid-July 1994, he would flee to Zaire. There, he would continue to command the ex-FAR, preparing his reconstituted troops for a reconquest of Rwanda.

In his attempts to induce someone else from the ex-FAR to step forward, Gérard met several times with Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, who, from June 1993 to June 1994, had served as the FAR’s commander in Gisenyi. Nsengiyumva stepped down from that post in June 1994, when the FAR designated him as its liaison to Operation Turquoise. As this report has previously noted, he later served a 15-year sentence following his convictions in the ICTR for genocide, crimes against humanity, and other offenses. Nsengiyumva, to Gérard’s disappointment, “remained very close to the [interim] government.”

J. The Safe Humanitarian Zone Offered Refuge to the Interim Government’s Army and Other Perpetrators of Massacres, as French Officials Did Not Order Their Troops to Arrest or Systematically Disarm Génocidaires.

As they began to assert control over the country, RPF leaders sought to assure the international community that they were prepared to take necessary measures to restore law and order throughout the parts of Rwanda already under their authority. They let it be known, too, that while they did not object “in principle” to the French government’s decision to seal off much of southwestern Rwanda, they viewed this decision as “absolutely unnecessary.” The advance of the Rwandese Patriotic Front does not in any way threaten the security of innocent civilians, as millions living in other parts of the country would testify,” a representative of the RPF political bureau wrote in a 6 July 1994 letter to the UN Security Council President.

The representative did not dwell on the point. It was, however, an important one. One of the core French government rationales for the creation of the SHZ was the notion that the RPF forces’ advance threatened Rwanda’s stability. Over and over, throughout late June and early July 1994, French officials predicted that the RPF troops’ progress would drive people from their homes and precipitate more killings. The assumption was that, by stopping the RPF in its tracks, the SHZ would keep the crisis in check.

RPF leaders chafed at this idea. The crisis, they kept having to remind the French government, was not of their making. The other side—the IRG, its Army, and the militias—was the one waging a genocide; the RPF was the one trying to stop it. “We are not fighting to drive out
the civilians, who are our compatriots and for whom we are concerned, but to chase down and capture the assassins who have dismantled this country,” Commander Kagame told Le Monde in an interview published on 6 July 1994. Kagame did not deny that the fighting between the RPF and the interim government’s Army had spurred people to flee their homes. If, however, some of those people were afraid of what RPF troops might do, it was not because of the troops’ own actions; rather, as Kagame explained in a 10 July 1994 letter to General Lafourcade, it was the natural result of “the propaganda from extremist circles.” In either case,” Kagame told Lafourcade, “we do not see why the RPF should be held responsible for this flow of refugees of which it is not the cause.”

The conquest of Kigali offered Kagame and other RPF leaders an opportunity to show that many of the French government’s assumptions about the organization had been wrong from the start. Among its first steps was to announce the formation of a national unity government, in which members of moderate Hutu political parties would play a significant role. “This new Government would be broad-based, encompassing the broad spectrum of Rwandese political opinion,” the RPF’s special envoy in New York wrote in his 6 July 1994 letter to the Security Council President. “It would be formed in the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement to which the Rwandese Patriotic Front reaffirms its commitment, but will exclude the perpetrators of genocide.” Following words with action, the RPF soon announced that Faustin Twagiramungu, the MDR party leader, would take his place as prime minister of the new government—just as he had been slated to do in the transitional government provided for in the August 1993 Arusha Accords. RPF leaders also signaled they would soon announce a unilateral cease-fire.

At least one French official—General Huchon, the head of the French Military Cooperation Mission—was not primed to credit the RPF for any of this. “The RPF will still be our adversary (enemy?) because [it is] Marxist and totalitarian, thus irredeemably opposed to our democratic and humanist culture,” he wrote in a 5 July 1994 note. Written on the day after RPF forces seized Kigali, the note laid bare Huchon’s evident frustration with Turquoise and its pretense of neutrality. He complained that “concessions” to the RPF had only made it stronger and more ambitious. At the same time, he said, the decision to situate Turquoise’s bases on the Rwandan-Zairean border “has blocked all supplies to the FAR who are running out of ammunition while the RPF is burning through large quantities of artillery ammunition.” Though Huchon appears to have recognized that a new government was about to take its place in Kigali, he insisted that France must continue to denounce the RPF and must reflect on the future of its relationship with Rwanda. “[O]ur political objective for the future Rwanda is of immediate interest to African leaders,” he wrote. “They are waiting, watching, and judging. What is our plan?”

A contemporaneous DGSE analysis was less hostile to the new authorities in Kigali, if still distrustful. “The RPF’s strategy is undoubtedly not devoid of ulterior motives with regard to the French presence,” the French intelligence agency assessed in a 7 July memo. The agency suspected the RPF’s attempts to court international goodwill were driven, at least in part, by a desire “to embarrass France and provoke its departure from Rwanda.”

Kagame’s public position on the SHZ was no different than what he told the French ambassador in Kampala on the day Kigali fell: he did not oppose it. He did, however, want assurances that France would administer the zone responsibly, and he let it be known that he was
prepared to sit at the table with French officials to discuss the ways in which France could do so.

What was most important, he indicated, was “that the militiamen and the perpetrators of abuses do not take refuge there.”

It was an eminently foreseeable concern. French officials were certainly aware that militias were present in the SHZ. Rwandan refugees in Tanzania, for example, noted in conversations with the DGSE that the SHZ included the Nyungwe Forest, “which had long served as a training base for Hutu Interahamwe militia, and that there was therefore a real risk of the formation of a protected maquis [i.e., resistance fighters].” It was not difficult to imagine that the militias would take advantage of French protection, using the SHZ as a safe space in which to regroup and prepare new attacks. Nor was it difficult to imagine that their compatriots in areas outside of the SHZ would seek to join them.

What Twagiramungu, the incoming prime minister, found just as concerning, if not more so, was the likelihood that the interim government’s army would use the SHZ to its advantage, knowing that RPF forces could not reach its troops there. Twagiramungu told an interviewer that when he raised this concern with Ambassador Marlaud in Brussels on 6 July, the French ambassador “assured me that the Rwandan Armed Forces were not in the security zone.” “I can only record the promises of the French government,” Twagiramungu told the interviewer, “but the reality on the ground seems very different to me.”

Twagiramungu’s intuition was correct. FAR units were indeed active in the SHZ, and French officials knew it. The DRM, in fact, on the same day that Twagiramungu met with Ambassador Marlaud, reported that the FAR’s new commander in the province of Cyangugu had positioned a battalion west of the Nyungwe forest—which is to say, inside the SHZ. Gérard, France’s liaison to the IRG, estimated a few days later (10 July) that roughly 1,600 Rwandan soldiers—about one-tenth of the FAR’s total strength—were inside the SHZ. He cautioned that more might soon be on the way, writing in a 9 July cable: “The possible temptation of the FAR to take refuge in the humanitarian zone with their weapons is very worrying.”

French defense officials were not blind to these concerns. What was unclear was whether they had the means—or, for that matter, the will—to do something about it.

In a 7 July 1994 memorandum, General Lafourcade identified two goals for French forces in the SHZ: first, to clamp down on any activity that threatened the security of people in the zone; and, second, to prepare to hand over control of the zone to UNAMIR upon the completion of Operation Turquoise. The memorandum went on to list a number of activities the Turquoise forces would consider threatening, including the following: roadblocks preventing the free movement of people and goods; destruction of property, herds, and crops; weapon fire on either side of the zone’s borders; movement of armed troops; unauthorized flights over the zone; hostile acts toward Turquoise or UNAMIR; and, finally, the introduction or circulation of weapons, ammunition, or explosives in the zone. What remained vague was how, precisely, the Turquoise forces were supposed to respond to these threats. The key provision in this regard said only that, in the event of a violation of these terms, it would be up to Lafourcade to decide, as a matter of discretion, whether the troops may respond with force.
The French government, ultimately, proved far more adept at keeping RPF troops out of the zone than at policing the threats already within it. Chris McGreal, a reporter for the *Guardian*, noted in a 7 July 1994 dispatch from Gikongoro, within the SHZ, that French troops were continuing to dig in mortars and roll out cannons in an effort to reinforce their positions in the city, about 10 miles from the RPF front line. “The French say the city is virtually impregnable if defended properly,” McGreal reported. These efforts, though, presented no impediment to FAR soldiers already in Gikongoro, who, according to McGreal, were “leaving the front in droves, packed into lorries or marching with bands of refugees” deeper into the French-controlled zone.

McGreal noted that French troops continued to stage rescue missions; one operation by French special forces shortly after the establishment of the SHZ reportedly saved a family of 21 who had been hiding for two months. The zone, however, remained unsafe for many Rwandans, in McGreal’s estimation. “Militia roadblocks remain in place, supposedly as a security measure, but Tutsi victims are still sought,” he reported.

Turquoise officers were disinclined to eliminate all roadblocks in the SHZ, believing, as one situation report put it, that even “unauthorized” roadblocks could, at times, be “useful.” Meeting, on 8 July, with the subprefect of Kibuye, French officers recommended that they “harmonize this system and control it,” by permitting only authorized checkpoints and placing them in “strategic locations.” They suggested that the checkpoints be controlled by mayors and gendarmes and “be entrusted to Rwandans of good moral character known for their integrity and old enough (youths should no longer be found on the roadblocks).” It is not at all clear whether the French officers considered the possibility that the mayors and gendarmes they would be empowering to control the checkpoints were themselves génocidaires, or whether any thought was given to who, exactly, would be rendering judgments about the checkpoint operators’ “moral character.”

French defense officials lamented that the area under their ostensible control lacked both “a functioning police force and a national judicial system,” describing the absence of these critical institutions as “a significant problem.” But it was a problem as foreseeable in early July 1994, when Mitterrand decided to create the SHZ, as it was a few weeks earlier, when he chose to launch Operation Turquoise. Having failed to commit the resources necessary to govern and police the SHZ, the French government would have to placate and collaborate with local authorities and génocidal forces fleeing the RPF advance. Support and collaboration were baked into Mitterrand’s plan. French officials knew, though, that many of the local authorities in the zone were implicated in unspeakable crimes. As Admiral Lanxade, the chief of defense staff, would later write in his memoir:

Little by little, a system [was] being set up, despite the extreme difficulty of determining which local administrative structure to rely on. Most of the former leaders were compromised in the killings. We need[ed] all our officers’ know-how to find the right representatives as well as the right solutions.

Lanxade did not go so far as to say that French troops did not collaborate with “compromised” officials. Given that, as Lanxade conceded, the majority of them had blood on their hands, it is difficult to see how French officials could have steered clear of them. Indeed, Lt. Col. James
Babbitt, an American defense attaché who was temporarily embedded with the Turquoise troops in Cyangugu in July 1994, said they did not. Babbitt said the French troops appeared to confer authority on former municipal leaders, permitting them to reassume control regardless of their likely participation in the Genocide.666

Attempts to identify reliable partners to enforce security in the SHZ proved futile. For instance, Rwandan gendarmes could not be trusted to detain suspected génocidaires, even if French troops delivered them directly to the Gendarmerie.667 That would have posed a problem if the Turquoise officers had, indeed, been serious about bringing the perpetrators of the massacres to justice. Often, though, they were not. A handwritten French sitrep recounts, for example, an episode at the Murambi refugee camp in Gikongoro, where, on 6 July, six génocidaires tried to pass themselves off as refugees.668 French officers, speaking with Tutsi refugees at the camp, confirmed that the six interlopers had participated in massacres in Butare in April 1994.669 The officers held the six of them prisoner for the night, but were conflicted about what to do with them after that.670 “[I]f we release them, they may turn the population against us,” the sitrep stated. “If we hand them over to the Gendarmerie, they will probably be [set] free and [the end result] will be the same.”671

The RPF had tried to set clear expectations for French activity in the zone, explaining to French and UN officials that its tolerance of the SHZ was subject to certain “conditions.”672 One of those conditions, as stated in its special envoy’s 6 July 1994 letter to the Security Council President, was that “[a]ny troops or members of the militia entering the zone[] should be promptly disarmed.”673 Another was that “[p]erpetrators of acts of genocide and other human rights violations living in the security zone[] should be apprehended as information of their complicity in atrocities becomes available.”674

The French government did not fully comply with either of these terms. To be sure, officials in the Quai d’Orsay anticipated, from the moment of the SHZ’s creation, that there would be calls for French troops to systematically disarm the FAR and militias within the zone.675 Their view, though, was that this was both “impossible and hardly desirable.”676 To do so, they contended, “would in fact require more means than those we currently have at our disposal.”677 They argued, at first, that it would be enough to simply appeal to soldiers and militia members to voluntarily surrender their arms.678 (It is hard, though, to believe that anyone at the Quai d’Orsay actually thought an appeal to surrender weapons voluntarily would work. Indeed, Foreign Minister Juppé would later scoff at the idea, telling an interviewer in 2018, “I do not imagine that the génocidaires would have let themselves suddenly be disarmed by throwing down their weapons, it would have been necessary to go find them, and stop them, and fight them.”679)

All available evidence suggests that decisionmakers in Paris never seriously entertained any arguments to systematically disarm the FAR and militias.680 “Many are asking us to take care of it, but it is not within our mandate, and we do not have the means,” key Mitterrand advisors Bruno Delaye and General Quesnot wrote in a 7 July memo.681 Defense officials, including General Lafourcade, were of the same view.682 As General Dallaire would later recount, Lafourcade sent him a memo in early July stating
that Turquoise was not going to disarm the militias and the [FAR] in the [SHZ] unless they posed a threat to the people his force was protecting. As a result, the extremists would be able to move about freely in the zone, safe from any interference from the French, and also safe from retribution from or clashes with the RPF.683

That armed elements, both FAR and militia, would take refuge in the safety the SHZ provided was predictable. French politicians’ decision to erect the SHZ without the means or intention of disarming those elements offered those responsible for the Genocide an opportunity to regroup.

To be clear, Turquoise troops did confiscate some weapons in the SHZ.684 On 7 July, for instance, a Rwandan prefect asked Turquoise forces to do something about a group of militiamen who had threatened residents in Gikongoro and, as General Lafourcade subsequently recounted in an interview, had “entrenched themselves like madmen in a house.”685 Lafourcade said a team of French special forces, equipped with night vision goggles, “showed these thugs that they knew everything they were doing.”686 The French soldiers disarmed the group of nine.687 Incredibly, the general noted, without any evident misgivings, that French special forces turned the men over to the interim government’s Army.688 (Lafourcade’s explanation was the French troops knew that if they instead handed the men over to the Gendarmerie, the men would likely be released.689)

There remains some question about what the Turquoise troops did with the weapons they did confiscate over the course of their work in the SHZ. US and UN documents confirm that Turquoise forces supplied at least some of these weapons to gendarmes in the SHZ.690 These documents indicate that, after creating the SHZ, the French government established and armed an ad hoc Gendarmerie in Cyangugu.691 A draft cable from the US embassy in Kigali in mid-August 1994, just before the end of Operation Turquoise, said embassy officials believed the arms given to the newly deputized gendarmes were weapons French troops had previously confiscated from FAR soldiers and militia members.692 The Kigali authorities, following the conclusion of the war and the establishment of a national unity government in the latter half of July 1994, would later deem these gendarmes illegitimate and would demand their disarmament.693

The US embassy’s assessment differed from the conclusion that General Dallaire’s successor as UNAMIR force commander, General Guy Tousignant, reportedly drew following his first visit to Cyangugu on 18 August 1994, where he spoke with departing French officers in the waning days of Operation Turquoise.694 Tousignant, according to the US draft cable, “said that while the French may have confiscated weapons earlier from ex-FAR soldiers and militia members, they have subsequently given them back.”695

As for whether Turquoise troops would arrest and detain suspected génocidaires, there appears to have been little or no debate over this question either. The French government’s position, officially, was that, as a general matter, the operation’s mandate did not authorize the troops to take such measures.696 The exception to this rule, French Foreign Ministry officials suggested in a 7 July 1994 memo, was that arrests and detentions may be permissible in cases of “flagrants délits”—essentially only if soldiers witnessed a massacre taking place before their own eyes.697
Quai d’Orsay officials said France was willing to offer its assistance to “those who are responsible” for bringing génocidaires to justice. That did not mean Turquoise soldiers would help identify suspects; General Lafourcade told a UN official on 6 July 1994 they would not. All that French officials were promising to do was to provide information in their possession to UNAMIR and to the newly created, but not yet operational, UN Commission of Experts, a body whose charge was to collect information “with a view to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda, including the evidence of possible acts of genocide.”

The French government certainly had information to share. “Arrests are not our role. But people are getting more talkative,” General Lafourcade told Le Monde in an interview published on 9 July. “There are even people who admitted in front of us that they had killed civilians, and some are starting to think that things are turning sour for them. It will be up to the international commission of the UN to sort it out.” It was a striking thing to say, upon reflection. It meant that French troops had, in some instances, heard Rwandans confess to killing other Rwandans, and had simply allowed the killers to go free.

If French officials feared the repercussions of their troops making arrests, there was no reason to believe UNAMIR would be in a better position to bring the killers to justice. If anything, UNAMIR’s fraught relationship with the former Rwandan government would raise the level of danger for its troops. French officials sacrificed the possibility of efficient and effective criminal justice when Mitterrand decided to create the SHZ, the administration of which required collaborating with genocidal forces. Further, the idea that UN authorities would make arrests at some later date assumed, among other things, that the killers would still be in Rwanda when UNAMIR troops were finally ready to track them down. This was wishful thinking, at best. With every passing day, more and more Rwandans crossed the border into neighboring countries, and it was no secret that génocidaires were among them. A 7 July 1994 US cable reported: “[S]everal camps in the south Kivu region of Zaire serve as training bases for militias. Cases of assassinations, torture and disappearances have been reported in these camps. At the Banako camp in Tanzania, the refugees include individuals accused of having organized or participated in massacres in Rwanda.”

Years after the fact, French officials have continued to claim that their hands were tied. In 2019, Hubert Védrine, the secretary-general of the Élysée during Mitterrand’s presidency, asserted in a television interview:

I don’t see how France at the time could have done something, because there was no clear mandate from the Security Council. It would have been different if the Security Council’s mandate had said that there will be both a humanitarian operation, and also one to arrest those who we are certain were responsible for what happened. The United Nations mandate was a humanitarian one, not a judicial one.

Foreign Minister Juppé echoed Védrine’s point in an interview with Laurent Larcher in December 2018, when asked why Turquoise troops did not disarm the “killers.” Larcher had just challenged Juppé’s assertion that France “did not have a policing mission.” If, as Juppé said,
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French troops were truly there to protect people, how could they do that without disarming and arresting the murderers who had massacred so many of their countrymen? “No, no,” Juppé said. “[It would be] a mission change. I’m sorry. Maybe we were wrong, I don’t know. It’s possible. That the mission should have been more ambitious. But it’s not the same mission.”

There is some reason to wonder whether French officials’ claims about the limitations on Turquoise’s mandate were entirely sincere. At least one Quai d’Orsay official, its secretary general, acknowledged behind closed doors, in a 20 July 1994 meeting with a US official in Paris, that the mandate was not the issue. A US cable following the meeting reported that the secretary general said that “France had only 1,500 troops in the safe zone and 1,000 further north, and they were in no position to investigate or detain suspects. It wasn’t a question of lacking a mandate, but rather of limited manpower and other priorities.”

It bears noting, in any event, that it was France that drafted Security Council resolution establishing Operation Turquoise’s mandate. Had French officials believed it necessary to expand the mandate to empower Turquoise troops to make arrests, they could have returned to the Council to press for its authorization. They never did. In fact, when American diplomats suggested that the United States might support an effort to broaden Turquoise’s mandate to allow French forces to arrest génocidaires, France balked, with one French Foreign Ministry official writing that this suggestion “does not seem to us to be worth exploring.” The French government’s reluctance to affirm or expand Turquoise’s authority in the zone would end up benefitting the leaders of the Genocide, who, in mid-July, would escape to Zaire with the French government’s assistance.

K. While Slowing the RPF Forces’ Progress, the French Government Struggled to Adequately Care for Refugees in the SHZ and Allowed Génocidaires’ Safe Passage to Zaire.

The Turquoise intervention, it needs to be said, created more problems than it solved.


Following the RPF victories in Butare and Kigali in early July, French officials had expected the RPF forces to continue marching west toward Gikongoro. Thanks to the SHZ, that was now an impossibility. “The establishment of the safe zone in the south has slowed the RPF’s progress,” the DGSE wrote in an 11 July 1994 memo. “Its command, wanting to avoid any clashes with the men of Operation Turquoise, has had to adjust its strategy.” The new strategy surprised no one. After capturing Rushashi (a community northwest of Kigali) on 10 July, the RPF troops continued their northwest progression toward Ruhengeri, one of the largest of the IRG’s last remaining holdings outside of the SHZ. From there, the RPF army would have a more or less clear path to the IRG’s home base of Gisenyi.

French officials could see that the interim government’s Army, short on both ammunition and vehicles, was in no shape to repel the opposing forces’ advance. Some Rwandan Army officers, they noted, had simply abandoned their men on the front. Fearing more desertions, the
Army’s leadership ordered special protections for the Gisenyi brewery, ensuring it would continue to produce enough beer for the rank and file.\(^{724}\)

The French government saw worsening refugee crisis on the horizon. French officials anticipated that many more Rwandans would join the estimated one million displaced persons already in the SHZ.\(^{725}\) In Paris, French officials characterized the situation in the SHZ as a “human disaster in the making.”\(^{726}\) An Élysée official complained to US diplomats on 7 July that, without help from the rest of the international community, France was “being overwhelmed” by the hordes of refugees streaming into the zone.\(^{727}\) Many among them were hungry, sick, or injured.\(^{728}\) The Quai d’Orsay secretary general, in a separate meeting with US embassy officials in Paris that same day, said “some of the scenes were so appalling that it was necessary to frequently change personnel convoying refugees and wounded.”\(^{729}\)

French officials acknowledged, privately, that they were not equipped to care for the number of people they had now assumed a responsibility to protect.\(^{730}\) The military doctors were overwhelmed, and more people were needed to distribute aid packages to those in need.\(^{731}\) French officials never presented this as France’s failing. Always, in their accounts, it was the fault of the international community, and particularly of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who, in their view, were unjustifiably reluctant to cooperate with French forces in the SHZ.\(^{732}\)

The Mitterrand administration, however, had put NGOs in a difficult situation when it decided, despite its checkered history in Rwanda, to redeploy troops there. “NGOs cannot appear to be at the French intervention’s service. By doing so, they would strip themselves of all credibility in the eyes of any and all populations,” the president of one international NGO, Médecins sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders), told a French newspaper on 12 July 1994.\(^{733}\) MSF, he noted, had been helping people in Rwanda since the start of the Genocide, long before the French government decided to send soldiers there.\(^{734}\) He said the launch of Operation Turquoise had presented his organization with a difficult choice, given the risk that the public might view its activities as “a backing of the French operation.”\(^{735}\) “The Turquoise intervention, it needs to be said, created more problems than it solved,” he added.\(^{736}\)

It was mid-July when French journalists, after weeks of covering Operation Turquoise, spotted a familiar face on their televisions, during the coverage of the annual Bastille Day military parade in Paris.\(^{737}\) Leading a formation of paratroopers from the 1\(^{st}\) RPIMa was a man they had known, and regularly quoted, as “Colonel Didier Thibaut”—the French special forces commander who had paraded over the bridge from Bukavu to Cynagugu during Turquoise’s inaugural operation on 23 June 1994, and who later threatened to fire on RPF troops if they dared set foot in the SHZ. Only now, squinting at the nameplate on his chest, the reporters could see that his name was not actually “Thibault.” It was Tauzin.\(^{738}\) A bit of research soon revealed that at least one other French special forces officer they had come to know during Turquoise had used an alias as well.\(^{739}\)

“Why play hide-and-seek with identities in the context of an operation that, according to the government, is ‘purely humanitarian’?” the reporters wondered.\(^{740}\) The deception, which struck them as “amusing in its clumsiness,”\(^{741}\) could be read as evidence of an attitude among some French officers that their efforts to hold themselves out as humanitarian workers were mere performance, not to be taken too seriously. “What politicians ask us to do changes all the time,”
the reporters quoted one French officer as saying. “[B]esides,” the officer said, “we don’t know how to do humanitarian work.”\footnote{742}

As the crisis along Rwanda’s western border deepened, French officials were forced to reckon with the realization that they had once again committed French troops to a mission that proved far more complicated than initially anticipated. While Prime Minister Balladur had insisted, at first, that Operation Turquoise would conclude at the end of July 1994,\footnote{743} it was evident that UNAMIR would be nowhere near ready to take its place by then.\footnote{744} With the international community still reluctant to commit troops to the UN force, Balladur was forced to adjust his plans, announcing at a special meeting of the UN Security Council on 11 July that France’s withdrawal would only just begin on 31 July, and that it would be gradual.\footnote{745} He pleaded for other countries to pledge their support to “enable the strengthened UNAMIR to be deployed quickly.”\footnote{746}

President Mitterrand, too, admitted to having concerns about the crisis that French forces might soon leave behind.\footnote{747} As much as anything, though, the focus of his fears appears to have been the RPF and what it would do with the power it now wielded in Kigali. “If we leave on 31 July,” he said at the G7 Summit in Naples on 10 July, “and if the United Nations is not there, we will have a genocide in the opposite direction.”\footnote{748} So profound was his distrust of the RPF that he assumed its forces, having just spent the last three months fighting to stop a genocide against the Tutsi, would mark their victory by launching a second genocide against Hutu.

While reconciling themselves to the emergence of a new power base in Kigali, French Foreign Ministry officials asked their envoy to the RPF to deliver the message that the new national unity government must include members of the MRND, President Habyarimana’s old party.\footnote{749} Faustin Twagiramungu, the incoming prime minister, agreed that the new government must be broad-based,\footnote{750} but found it significant to note that the MRND had never issued any statements denouncing the massacres against the Tutsi and had never disassociated itself from the militias responsible for the killings.\footnote{751} On 10 July, an RPF official announced that the MRND and the extremist CDR party would be excluded from the new government, as would members of any other parties “considered as bearing, individually, a responsibility in the massacres perpetrated against the Tutsis.”\footnote{752} This decision, the DGSE wrote the following day, “puts the ministers of the [IRG] in a desperate situation. They thus have only two options: take flight or, despite the near certainty of a military rout, continue fighting.”\footnote{753}

If IRG ministers were not already planning their escapes, they soon had a reason to start doing so: In an 11 July press conference in Goma, General Lafourcade told journalists that if IRG ministers flee into the SHZ, French soldiers would welcome them “as mere refugees.”\footnote{754} The general reiterated that he did not see it as Turquoise’s role to assess the culpability of Rwandans in the protected zone—that would be a task for the UN commission, once it was up and running.\footnote{755} (The ministers would hardly be the only génocidaires in the zone. As a US cable noted, Defense Minister Léotard “admitted” in a 12 July interview on French TV “that many of those responsible for the massacres probably were in the French protected zone.”\footnote{756} Léotard, the cable reported, “emphasized that it was not up to France to punish them. The [French government] would cooperate fully, however, with the UN and other ‘responsible authorities.’”\footnote{757})
Officials in Paris would soon contradict Lafourcade, insisting that “the fleeing Hutu officials would not be welcome in the safe haven.” They suggested, though, that there was little the French government could do to enforce this stance, as it “did not have the means to keep [IRG officials] out.” It was already too late. On 13 July, RPF troops seized Ruhengeri. The next morning, at 5 a.m., the IRG ordered the Hutu population in northwestern Rwanda to “leave the country and take refuge in Zaire.” Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans did as they were told, crowding the dirt road that led to Goma. Reporting to Paris, Lafourcade said he expected many FAR and militiamen would do the same. He also reported that some IRG officials, including President Sindikubwabo, had apparently fled south to Cyangugu, in the SHZ. “It is regrettable that this sensitive situation . . . was not taken into account in time by our diplomacy,” Lafourcade wrote in a 14 July sitrep. “I am now awaiting orders, but the Turquoise force will have one more problem to solve.”

French officials would confirm over the next few days that President Sindikubwabo and several of his ministers had, in fact, absconded to Cyangugu and were attempting to reconstitute the IRG there. This news, when it inevitably became public, would not look good for the French government, which could hardly claim to be running a purely humanitarian operation while knowingly sheltering the remnants of a genocidal regime. In New York, French diplomats insisted they did not want the Rwandan Army or its leaders in the zone and urged the Security Council to issue a statement “warning them off.” It seemed telling, though, that when one of the other delegations to the Security Council suggested that France advise IRG officials that they could enter the zone only as individuals—indicating, in short, that their government was at an end—the French diplomats dismissed the idea on the ground that it “would have no practical effect.” “[I]t became clear,” a New Zealand diplomat wrote in a 14 July cable, “that what [France] really wanted was cover from the Security Council in case things started to go badly wrong.” What actually troubled France, the diplomat wrote, was not the prospect of harboring a genocidal interim government and its Army, but the possibility that RPF forces might pursue that Army into the SHZ, “leaving France with some very difficult choices.”

At that moment, General Lafourcade was contemplating precisely that scenario. “Continued FAR movements, in the long term, in the SHZ could serve as a pretext for the RPF to enter the area,” he cautioned in a 14 July memo. Lafourcade’s solution was to reason with the interim government’s Army—to explain to its troops that they must “remain at their current combat locations or in their garrisons,” as this was the only way “to guarantee the integrity of the SHZ.” Lafourcade took a decidedly stricter line, by contrast, with the RPF. Should RPF forces infiltrate the zone, he wrote, “it is a question of being vigilant and demonstrating our determination to fulfill our mission in the SHZ. If an infiltrating RPF element is identified with certainty, it would have to be destroyed or neutralized by possibly calling in the force’s air support.” (There is, to be sure, no evidence that French officials ever contemplated using fighter jets against their former pupils in the FAR, no matter their role in the Genocide.)

Gérard, who, as France’s liaison to the IRG, had met personally with several of its highest-ranking officials, argued the French government needed to do more to bring those officials to justice. “[W]e know that the authorities bear significant responsibility in the Genocide,” he wrote in a 15 July cable. (A few days earlier, Gérard had reported to Paris that President Sindikubwabo was “said to have called for the total ‘elimination’ of the Tutsis during numerous
public meetings and demanded that the Gendarmerie not obstruct the executions.” 776) Gérard concluded: “[W]e have no other choice, regardless of the challenges, but to arrest [the IRG authorities] or to put them immediately under house arrest while waiting for the competent international judicial bodies to rule on their case. 777

His argument fell on deaf ears. Instead of directing Turquoise troops to arrest the IRG authorities when they had the chance, Paris pressed Gérard to quietly send word to the authorities that France would like them to leave the SHZ. 778 The Quai d’Orsay advised Gérard to remain discreet, suggesting he may “use all indirect channels and especially your African contacts” to deliver the message “without exposing yourself directly.” 779 The Quai, of course, made no mention of these back-channel communications in its public messaging on the subject, which instead warned that France “will not tolerate any political or military activity in the safe zone, which was strictly humanitarian in purpose. If members of the ‘interim government’ engage in such activities, France will take every measure to enforce respect for the applicable rules in the safe zone.” 780

RPF leaders demanded that France do more. “If the French arrest them and hand them over, there is no need for us to move in,” an RPF military spokesman said, alluding to the possibility that RPF forces might muscle their way into the SHZ to arrest the IRG officials themselves. “But we have a duty to follow up these criminals, a safe zone notwithstanding. It is our right to bring the criminals to justice.” 781 French authorities, having erected the SHZ as a barrier to the RPF forces, did not take kindly to the threat. “They won’t get through, we’ll stop them,” a “military source in Paris” told the French newspaper Libération. “We have 12 fighter bombers in the area. We are not especially keen to fight, but we will not let these people be massacred.” 782

Some French officials maintained that Turquoise troops lacked authority to arrest the IRG authorities. This interpretation of the operation’s UN mandate (which, as previously noted, the French government was responsible for drafting) suited officials in Paris, who showed no interest in expanding the mandate to explicitly authorize French troops to arrest and detain criminals, and who found it inconvenient when US diplomats suggested they might favor such an amendment. 783 “We cannot [. . .] turn ourselves into police officers in our zone,” one French official reportedly said at a crisis cell meeting at the Quai d’Orsay on 16 July. “We are not in favor of extending our mandate to [authorize] the arrest of those responsible for the massacres.” 784

The French government, it bears noting, was effectively protecting the IRG ministers at the very moment that other western powers were turning their backs, once and for all, on the interim government. Most prominently, on 14 July 1994, the US Department of State ordered the IRG ambassador and his staff in Washington to shut down the Rwandan embassy there and leave the United States. 785

General Lafourcade would later say that the “problem” of the IRG officials’ presence in the French-protected zone “solved itself” because the officials ultimately chose to flee to Zaire. 786 This phrasing seems calibrated to absolve the French government of any responsibility for their escape. The truth, though, is that the French government not only encouraged IRG officials to flee the country, but actively facilitated their safe passage to Zaire. 787 In his memoir, Lt. Col. Hogard, the south group commander, acknowledged that he and a team of French paratroopers paid a visit to the IRG authorities in Cyangugu on 16 July. 788 “I summarized our conditions to the president
and his minister: they had twenty-four hours to leave, them and their families,” Hogard wrote. To make things easy for them, Hogard reached out to a Zairean military officer “to arrange with him the passage to Zaire.” The IRG officials left the next day, 17 July, but, according to Hogard, “not without having launched over the airwaves of Radio Rwanda an appeal in Kinyarwanda to the Hutu populations, encouraging them to flee the country en masse. This was the signal for a truly unreal exodus!”

The French government’s assistance enabled the IRG authorities to reestablish themselves in exile, where they prepared their remaining forces for a return to war. It would be years before any of the officials who fled the SHZ would be brought to justice—and, in fact, some never would. President Sindikubwabo and Defense Minister Bizimana both died in exile. Prime Minister Jean Kambanda was finally found, and arrested, in Kenya in July 1997, three years after the Genocide. Kambanda pleaded guilty to genocide and crimes against humanity, among other offenses, and is currently serving a life sentence.

L. As the War Ended, French Officers Crossed the Border to Meet with Ex-FAR Leaders in Exile and Express Their Support.

The object of these negotiations was to see how the defeated FAR could reconstitute itself as soon as possible and reconquer the country.

– Paul Rwarakabije, Gendarmerie Operational Commander (1994)

French officials were quick to blame the exodus on the RPF, finding it sufficient to note that displacements often preceded, or coincided with, the RPF troops’ progress on the battle front. These assessments, though, overlooked the role that IRG authorities and other extremists played in spurring, or even ordering, people to leave their homes. The fact is, French officials were aware that both the IRG and its Army (now, for all intents and purposes, the former Rwandan Armed Forces, or ex-FAR) had prodded civilians to flee to Zaire. One French document even noted on 18 July that Rwandan soldiers, while making their own escapes over the border, had threatened civilians in an attempt to “bring as many people as possible with them,” and that some local Rwandan authorities had done likewise.

Charles Karamba, who commanded the RPA at the CND (Centre Nationale de Développement) during the Genocide, said the extremists’ task was made easier because of the SHZ. “The government that was being defeated got a sense of protection from the SHZ,” Karamba said. “It gave them time to mobilize the population to move to Zaire with them, and they did.” Emmanuel Karenzi Karake, head of RPA operations, said local officials loyal to the previous Rwandan government “used to herd people away” to Zaire. “Not all who fled wanted to flee,”
he explained. “To the extent it would have been risky for them to go, they would not have fled,” were it not for the SHZ and the local Rwandan officials within it.807

The French government’s position on the causes of the exodus—its reflexive blaming of the RPF—also tended to disregard the impact of the extremists’ relentless campaign to demonize the RPF. For months, RTLM and Radio Rwanda had been drumming up fears that RPF forces would mercilessly slaughter any Hutu in their path, fueling what one NGO official described as a “psychosis.”808 A US cable on 18 July noted that RTLM “exhorts the Hutus to flee the RPF advance, telling its listeners that the RPF will kill them if they stay in their home areas.”809 (Pro-IRG radio broadcasts also targeted Hutu in the SHZ, specifically, warning them that “the RPF are arriving and France will not guarantee your safety.”810 Lt. Col. Hogard, the commander of Turquoise’s southern group, told a reporter that those broadcasts “created a movement of panic.”811)

The anti-RPF propaganda had served the extremists’ purpose, uniting the country’s Hutu majority in opposition to the RPF. The evidence, though, did not back the extremists’ claims.812 UNAMIR officers, after months of observing the RPF military operation, described Commander Kagame’s force as “remarkably disciplined,” crediting the RPF’s explanations that the misconduct of some soldiers was generally attributable to “battle fatigue” and “stress.”813 Kagame told UN officials the RPF had taken measures to curb such abuses—for example, court-martialing some soldiers and, in one instance, executing a soldier who, following a trial in a military court, had been convicted of rape.814

The French government could have blocked the incendiary radio broadcasts that were so instrumental in rallying ordinary Rwandans to the extremists’ cause. In fact, French defense officials contemplated doing so.815 Chiding the IRG, as Yannick Gérard had attempted to do in early July, had not worked,816 and soon afterward, following the establishment of the SHZ, French defense officials were increasingly concerned that the IRG might “launch appeals for rioting and murder against Tutsis and possibly Turquoise.”817 By 11 July, the Ministry of Defense was able to verify that it had the equipment necessary to scramble the extremist radio stations’ signals.818 “[B]e quick,” a colonel in the Army état-major in Paris wrote that day, urging the Ministry to decide whether to take action.819 It was, to be sure, much too late to prevent the worst of what RTLM had wrought—the months of hate-mongering that incited listeners to hunt down and kill their Tutsi neighbors. There was, however, still time to deny the extremists their mouthpiece at a critical juncture, when the near certainty of a military defeat spurred them to exhort the public to flee the country and live to fight another day. The French government never jammed the extremist broadcasts, even after shipping the jamming equipment to the region for use by the Turquoise forces.820 “[W]e considered it and decided not to do it,” Lanxade explained in a 2018 interview. “Moreover, it was too late and it no longer made sense, and we didn’t have any real means at that time.”821

As RPF forces closed in on Gisenyi, on 17 July, the ex-FAR mounted little resistance.822 “Most [ex-FAR troops] spend their days drunk, harassing refugees and looting,” a reporter for the Guardian observed. “Sometimes soldiers shoot other looters, sometimes anyone they choose. To refuse to hand over property is deemed sufficient reason to be killed.”823 When, on 18 July, the RPF captured the city, Lafourcade reported to Paris that the RPF forces had managed to encircle
the city “almost without a fight, since the FAR and the population had [already] crossed the border.”

The significance of the moment was seemingly unmistakable. “What is new in the situation is that the Rwandan Patriotic Front seems to have actually won the war,” Foreign Minister Juppé said in a 19 July interview on Europe 1. It was hardly a controversial concession on the foreign minister’s part; indeed, the French military intelligence agency, the DRM, reported that same day, “The RPF has practically become the master of the entire country, except the safe humanitarian zone.” Still, Juppé’s remark irked General Lafourcade, who scribbled at the bottom of a sitrep that evening: “Comforce did not appreciate the minister of foreign affairs’ statement evoking the ‘victory’ of the RPF.”

Juppé had indeed used the word “victory,” but only in the course of expressing his hope that the RPF would now demonstrate self-restraint in its moment of military triumph:

[I]f the RPF has really won, and if it is preparing to govern this country, it must reassure the people. It will not be able to govern against 80% of the population of Rwanda, which you know is made up of the Hutu ethnic group. And to reassure the people, it must allow them to return home.

RPF leaders had, in fact, been encouraging Rwandans to make their way back home (with the lone caveat that those who had committed atrocities would not be welcome). Already, in Kigali and other RPF-controlled areas, displaced people were returning home, while refugee camps in the area were beginning to empty out. Meanwhile, on 19 July, a crowd that included UN officials and several foreign dignitaries gathered at the CND complex in Kigali to watch the swearing in of Rwanda’s new president, Pasteur Bizimungu, along with other leaders of the national unity government: Kagame as Vice President, Faustin Twagiramungu as prime minister, and Alexis Kanyarengwe as deputy prime minister. Soon afterward, the RPF announced a unilateral cease-fire.

The interim government’s Army was broken, but not yet finished. Though its soldiers, by and large, had slunk off to Zaire, many took their weapons with them. A French Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo reported on 19 July that roughly 10,000 ex-FAR soldiers had escaped to Zaire with their arms. In Goma, the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported, “Both [Rwandan] Presidential Guard and FAR troops have intermingled with the refugees. These forces possess automatic weapons, grenades and hand-held [a]nti-tank rocket launchers.” Paul Rwarakabije, a high-ranking ex-FAR officer at the time, said the ex-FAR used civilian trucks to sneak some of these weapons past the Zairean troops standing guard at the border. In some cases, though, no deception was necessary. While, according to US defense officials in Kinshasa, the Zairean forces did disarm most of the ex-FAR soldiers they encountered, it seemed “that some quantities of arms [were] still getting through . . . as the Zairean soldiers appear[ed] more content with shake-downs and personal gain, versus the task at hand.”

French journalist Patrick de Saint Exupéry reported in 2017 that he had learned of the existence of a document, stashed in the Élysée archives, indicating that Turquoise officers received an order at some point in July 1994 to rearm génocidaires in Zaire. The date of the order is
unknown, since it was only described to Saint Exupéry by an unnamed “high-ranking official” reportedly tasked with reviewing secret files in the wake of French President François Hollande’s 2014 pledge to release them—the official advised against making the files public, and Hollande’s pledge went unfulfilled.839 However, Saint Exupéry’s article said the weapons were destined for Hutu who “were crossing the border,” which suggests a date in late July.840 According to Saint Exupéry, Turquoise soldiers objected to the order, but Hubert Védrine, Mitterrand’s advisor, wrote in the margin of a document noting one of these objections that the forces should “stick to the fixed directives, [and] therefore to rearm the Hutu.”841

While Védrine has denied the story (as Saint Exupéry predicted in his article),842 Captain Guillaume Ancel, an outspoken veteran of Operation Turquoise, has also reported that France secretly funneled weapons to the ex-FAR troops in Zaire.843 In his 2018 memoir, Ancel recounted a day in late July 1994 when a superior asked him to distract a group of reporters who had stayed on base longer than anticipated.844 Ancel held an impromptu press conference, fielding reporters’ questions to divert their attention away from a convoy of trucks leaving the base with confiscated weapons to be delivered to ex-FAR in Zaire.845 That evening, during a debrief with a dozen officers, Ancel raised the arms convoy with the head of the Turquoise detachment in Cyangugu, Lieutenant Colonel Jacques Hogard. Hogard explained that France was delivering weapons to the ex-FAR in Zaire as a “gesture[+] of conciliation,” hoping it would ease their frustrations “and also prevent them from turning against us.”846 The Turquoise force, the lieutenant colonel said, was too small to defend itself both from the RPF on one side and the ex-FAR on the other.847

Ancel said he found this logic “indefensible”:

How to buy that delivering weapons to these soldiers, we improve our own security? I remind them that we did not really have any doubts about the involvement of the FAR in large-scale massacres that none of us was yet calling genocide. But the lieutenant colonel stopped the debate there, even if he seemed unsettled by this situation.848

As with Védrine denying Saint Exupéry’s reporting, Lt. Col. Hogard has vehemently denied Ancel’s account.849 However, Lt. Col. Babbitt, the American defense attaché temporarily embedded with French troops in Cyangugu, recently recalled events quite similar to those recounted by Ancel.850 Babbitt recalled seeing six to eight shipping containers (which he described as “Conex boxes”) filled with confiscated small arms.851 While French soldiers took great pains to inventory the weapons (he even helped copy serial numbers himself), Babbitt said he eventually saw the arms being loaded onto trucks and hauled away.852

Babbit recalls reporting the arms movements to Lt. Col. Jean-Luc Nash, a fellow US military attaché embedded in the French base in Goma, and requested that Nash relay the information to the State Department desk officer in Washington, DC.853 Babbit placed the date as one day after French Foreign Minister Leotard’s visit to Cyangugu on 31 July, a timing consistent with Ancel’s account.854 Without access to an encrypted means of communication, Babbitt spoke on an open line.855 Apparently French officers listened in on his conversation, because that evening a senior French official in Cyangugu accused him of spying and presented him with what he described as a “PNG” (persona non grata) order, demanding that he leave Rwanda immediately.856
The next morning, Babbit left Cyangugu for Goma, where the French command ordered that he never return.\(^{857}\)

Another US military attaché, Thomas Odom, received Babbit in Goma. Odom discussed the incident in a 2005 book, confirming that Babbit had indeed been accused of spying and dismissed from Rwanda.\(^{858}\) According to Odom, Babbit handed Odom the PNG order, which Odom described as “a remarkable left-handed defense against sending the American out,” continuing, “The author went into great detail about how intrusive and arrogant their American guest had been around French headquarters. He stated that it was his inept social skills that had led several French officers to conclude he was there to spy.”\(^{859}\) Consistent with Babbit’s account, however, Odom offered another possible explanation for Babbit’s expulsion: “Once the French pulled out and U.N. soldiers entered the area, it became clear the French had allowed the former military and the Interahamwe to continue the genocide in the zone. [Babbit] may have been exposed to evidence of French complicity whether he knew it or not.”\(^{860}\) Odom also identified the author of the PNG order as Lt. Col. Jacques Hogard, the same commander who Ancel alleged had overseen and rationalized the rearming of gènocideaires.\(^{861}\)

Babbit’s account differed from Ancel’s in one important respect: Babbit’s suspicion was that the Turquoise troops redistributed arms in the SHZ, whereas Ancel said the weapons were bound for forces just across the border in Zaire.\(^{862}\) Babbit recalled reporting to his American colleague in Goma that French forces were re-arming a limited number of Rwandan gendarmes and former political leaders, some of whom were responsible for genocidal massacres.\(^{863}\) As noted above, documents confirm that the French government supplied some of the arms confiscated in the SHZ to a gendarme force charged with patrolling the zone.\(^{864}\)

Babbit, Ancel, and Saint Exupéry’s accounts raise questions that remain unanswered. Amongst the documents requested from the French government during this investigation were those “regarding alleged French orders to rearm FAR combatants and gènocideaires in 1994.”\(^{865}\) The French government did not respond to this request.

Paul Rwarakabije, who was among the ex-FAR officers in Zaire after the RPF takeover of Gisenyi, was not aware of the French government providing weapons or ammunition to the ex-FAR while its troops were in exile (although he suggested that this would have been the province of intelligence officers, which he was not),\(^{866}\) but confirmed that communications between French and ex-FAR officers continued after exodus to Zaire.\(^{867}\) He recalled that General Augustin Bizimungu, who had quickly become the leader of the reconstituted ex-FAR in Zaire, met with French officers several times in late July 1994, both in Goma and in Keshero, a town outside Goma and close to the Mugunga refugee camp where Rwarakabije said he lived along with many of the regrouping ex-FAR soldiers.\(^{868}\) Although Rwarakabije did not attend the meetings, he recognized one French officer who met with Bizimungu in Keshero: Colonel Gilbert Canovas, the former advisor to the Rwandan Army’s état-major who, since the launch of Operation Turquoise, had headed the operation’s liaison detachments.\(^{869}\) “The object of these negotiations was to see how the defeated FAR could reconstitute itself as soon as possible and reconquer the country,” Rwarakabije told the Mucyo Commission,\(^{870}\) a process on which Lafourcade also provided advice, according to Rwarakabije.\(^{871}\)
Evariste Murenzi, who was serving with Rwarakabije among the ex-FAR as a battalion commander, also recalled French officers coming to Keshero for meetings with ex-FAR leaders. He, too, recalled seeing Canovas arrive for a meeting with Bizimungu. He also recalled a visit from Commander Grégoire de Saint Quentin, who served under Canovas in the liaison detachments and had previously worked as a technical advisor to the commander of the FAR’s para-commando battalion before the Genocide. Though Murenzi did not attend the meeting with de Saint Quentin, he was told that the French officers in attendance said they were not happy about the IRG’s defeat and offered their condolences. According to Murenzi, de Saint Quentin, who had led the MAM assistance to Rwandan para-commandos, said he never expected the FAR to lose.

According to both Rwarakabije and Murenzi, the ex-FAR did not pause to lick its wounds. As soon as its troops arrived in Zaire, the ex-FAR pursued what it called “Operation Insecticide.” The operation’s goals, Murenzi said, were to infiltrate Rwanda, destroy infrastructure (such as electrical cables and bridges), and “kill people.” Operation Insecticide, Murenzi confirmed, could be traced back to training delivered in May or June 1994 at Camp Bigogwe—which has been linked to Paul Barril (see discussion Chapter 9). The operation would continue for years under the rebel groups that, eventually, Rwarakabije and Murenzi would both help command.

It was not hard to discern the ex-FAR’s intentions at the time. “The flow of weapons now circulating throughout Kivu [the region west of Lake Kivu] will equip the Hutu extremist militias of Zaire and Burundi that are ready to continue the fight against the Tutsi” the DGSE wrote on 19 July. According to a French military intelligence report, issued that same day, the Zairean Army planned to help the ex-FAR regroup in Rutshuru, a town about 40 miles northeast of Goma. There, the ex-FAR could rebuild its strength, readying itself to do what the RPF forces had done four years earlier. “It took the RPF four years to come back with 200,000 people,” a Radio Rwanda broadcaster reportedly said, just after the ex-FAR’s withdrawal to Zaire. “We’ll take a month with 5 million.”

M. When French Officials Withdrew French Forces from Rwanda, They Proclaimed Operation Turquoise a Success Despite the Humanitarian Crisis Enveloping the Region.

Today, we can say that Operation “Turquoise” has succeeded.


General Tousignant [the new UNAMIR commander] believes the departure of the French from the southwest is in the best interests of Rwanda.

–Cable from US Embassy in Kigali to US Secretary of State

“The war is over in Rwanda, as the Rwandan Patriotic Front says,” the French newspaper Les Echos observed in a 20 July 1994 editorial, “but the humanitarian disaster is only starting.” In the area around Goma, where as many as 1.2 million refugees crowded in unsanitary conditions and with limited access to clean water, a cholera outbreak was claiming hundreds of lives per
day. French media reported that the disease was spreading at a “frightening” speed, prompting one international NGO president to fret, “It could be the largest epidemic of modern times. Our efforts are doomed to fail.” By 22 July, “the road from the Goma airport to nearby refugee camps” was reportedly “littered with corpses wrapped in blankets or matting.”

French troops, who, along with aid workers from the Catholic relief organization Caritas, took on the burden of burying the dead, were said to have been “transformed from soldiers into grave-diggers.”

Lafourcade, recognizing that the NGOs in Goma were “completely overwhelmed” by the rapidly expanding humanitarian disaster, accepted that the Turquoise forces were “necessarily involved in this tragedy,” and acceded to the NGOs’ requests for emergency assistance. With more than half of his troops, though, committed to stabilizing the SHZ, it seemed that all he had to offer was the services of the 700 logistical support troops working out of the Turquoise base in Goma. “Most of them had never been in combat, never been confronted with death,” he wrote in his memoir. Lafourcade knew that their assistance would not be enough. As he wrote in a 20 July situation report:

[A]ll this is insufficient, and we will be confronted in the near future with an apocalyptic situation: thousands of deaths, in the streets, along roads, in refugee camps, epidemics including cholera, serious disorders because of lack of food and drink. I fear that the Turquoise force will bear the impact of the effects. But I don’t see what more we can do than what we’re already doing with the means we have on site.

The outbreak was just one more emergency in a series of crises unfolding on both sides of the Rwandan-Zairean border, including in the SHZ. In Paris, French officials told a visiting US envoy on 20 July that there was an “overwhelming need” for food in the French-controlled zone, as France was able to feed only half of the estimated 1.2 million refugees there. Security, too, remained a pressing issue. In Cyangugu, interim government Army deserters could be found roaming the streets, intimidating people and looting property. A French intelligence report noted, similarly, that a gang of about 12 gendarmes in Gikongoro “continues to terrorize the population.”

This, in brief, was the state of affairs Turquoise troops were confronting when, on 20 July 1994, Prime Minister Balladur stood before the Council of Ministers in Paris and declared, “Today, we can say that Operation Turquoise has succeeded.” Balladur reflected on the “skepticism, indeed hostility” that had greeted France in mid-June 1994, when its leaders decided to launch the operation. That decision, he said, had been made in response to an “already very serious humanitarian situation in [a] French-speaking African state.” Now, one crisis had evolved into another. Balladur, however, asserted the time had come to prepare for France’s exit. “It is now necessary that the withdrawal of our forces happen in good circumstances,” he said, “that is to say in such a way that disturbances do not follow our departure and that France thus preserves the moral and political capital which the success of Operation Turquoise has earned it.”

Whether or not the people in the SHZ would be safe following France’s departure was, to some extent, up to the UN, which at that moment was still trying to coax member countries to supply the troops needed to reach its target of 5,500 troops by the time of France’s scheduled
withdrawal on 21 August 1994—a goal the UN was highly unlikely to reach. It was also, in Balladur’s view, and in Foreign Minister Juppe’s, up to the new government in Kigali. “[F]irst and foremost,” Juppé said at the Council of Ministers meeting, “it’s a matter of pointing out clearly its responsibilities to the new government and of obtaining guarantees from it for the moment when our troops will withdraw so as to guarantee people’s safety and so refugees can return home.” Juppé, accordingly, announced that the Quai d’Orsay would immediately dispatch delegations both to the UN headquarters in New York and to Kigali.

Upon arriving in the Rwandan capital, the French Foreign Ministry’s secretary general, accompanied by Admiral Lanxade’s deputy, General Germanos, spoke with Prime Minister Twagiramungu in a 21 July meeting that Germanos found “constructive.” Twagiramungu assured his French guests that the Kigali government would respect France’s right to continue its operation in the SHZ. He also offered a “formal assurance that there will be no reprisals against the Hutu populations,” and that the government would support international efforts to bring the perpetrators of the Genocide to justice. The Quai d’Orsay secretary general, briefing Balladur at Matignon the next morning, admitted he was skeptical of this last claim, believing the RPF authorities would prefer to deliver justice on their own terms (with violence, presumably).

Twagiramungu, in turn, wished to make a request of the French government: the Rwandan government, he said, would like to send ministers to the SHZ to address the public, and was hoping the French government would agree to ensure the Rwandan ministers’ security. Hearing about this at Matignon the next morning, Balladur and Juppé balked. While acknowledging that France could not “oppose” the government’s request to address its own citizens, they suggested they would prefer to leave it to the United Nations to guarantee the ministers’ protection.

The Kigali authorities recognized that one of their most pressing challenges now was to persuade Rwandans, regardless of ethnicity, that it was safe to return home. The radio offered one means of relaying this message to the public, but the authorities did not content themselves with electronic communications alone. French military officials soon took note of small groups of RPF members making “shallow infiltrations” into the SHZ to meet with locals. “These incursions,” the DRM noted, “do not seem to have as their aim the harassment of the Turquoise forces, but are part of a propaganda campaign . . . to encourage [locals] to return to their homes.” The effort appeared to bear fruit. French defense officials would report in the days that followed that large numbers of displaced people in the western regions of Kibuye and Musange had started to flow back into the “RPF zone” (the term French officials were still using to refer to the approximately 80 percent of Rwandan territory outside of the SHZ).

Rwanda, plainly, had entered a new phase. “[T]he problem is no longer military but only humanitarian and political,” Delaye and Quesnot, the French president’s primary advisors on Rwanda issues, wrote in a 22 July note to Mitterrand. Just across the border, in Goma, 500 people were dying each day, and with cholera cases spreading wildly, that figure was expected to jump to 2,000 per day. The crisis had captured the world’s attention, spurring a number of countries and international organizations that had sat on their hands during the Genocide to announce aid packages for the refugees. The United States, in particular, soon seized a leadership role, with the White House announcing on 22 July that President Clinton had ordered an “immediate and massive increase” in US assistance to the refugees. Juppé, in his comments...
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at Matignon on 22 July, said he expected the Americans would “try to take our place in Goma and ask us to stay in the SHZ.”

Since the launch of Operation Turquoise, French officials had often made a show of lamenting the rest of the world’s seeming indifference to the plight of the Rwandan people. Early on in the operation, they had noted a positive trend in the international perception of the operation, when journalists in France and around the globe wrote of the rapturous greeting Hutu villagers extended to the French troops upon their arrival in Rwanda in late June 1994. Now, the number of journalists in the region was ballooning again, but their attention, by and large, was fixed on Goma. This media attention frustrated French defense officials, who called it “regrettable . . . that the situation in the SHZ is fading into the background.”

Ever obsessed with its media coverage, the French Ministry of Defense remained attentive to how Turquoise was being portrayed in the press. (One senior French officer, Lt. Col. Hogard, would later note in his end-of-mission report that press relations took up “a non-negligible part” of his time as commander of Turquoise’s southern group, responsible for securing a large portion of the SHZ. With tactful understatement, he suggested that, in retrospect, it might have been helpful—“in a context where military problems, political problems, human problems, [and] administrative problems come one after the other”—if the Ministry had sent a public affairs specialist “so that the sector commander [could] devote all the necessary time to substantive problems.”) A Ministry memo on 22 July called for a media strategy that would “focus on the humanitarian aspect of our efforts” and “highlight the usefulness of the SHZ.” A directive that same day from Admiral Lanxade to the Turquoise commanders in Goma urged them to take note of Defense Minister Léotard’s recent op-ed in the French newspaper Libération, which asserted that French forces would leave Rwanda with their “head[s] held high.” An effort, Lanxade said, would have to be made to shape the narrative concerning Turquoise’s eventual withdrawal, “so that France is not accused of leaving a humanitarian situation that is unquestionably different, but more disastrous than upon its arrival.”

Having raced back into Rwanda, in June, in response to humiliating press coverage in the first place, France was now preparing to leave altogether, in the face of a crisis that was claiming thousands of Rwandan lives each day. While declaring itself the savior of Rwandans, the French government had not prevented the crisis on the Rwandan-Zairean border, and it was not equipped to respond to it, belying the humanitarian purpose of Turquoise’s mission. “On the humanitarian level, . . . the Turquoise presence is not designed to cope with the massive influx of refugees, both in [the] SHZ and in Zairian territory,” a French Ministry of Defense document assessed on 26 July 1994. The resulting situation—which the document blamed not on Turquoise, but on “the reaction time of international organizations and NGOs”—was, by the Ministry’s own admission, nothing short of “catastrophic.”

In the meantime, Delaye and Quesnot were pleased to note that the tenor of the press coverage had changed since the war ended, and the refugee crisis exploded. “The scale of the tragedy provoked by the continued RPF offensive toward Gisenyi, after France warned the international community in vain, silenced the critics of our intervention,” they wrote in a 27 July note to President Mitterrand. It was a dubious interpretation—the press had not suddenly come around to the French government’s view that the RPF was responsible for the crises gripping the
region, and that France had been right to try and stop it. Delaye and Quesnot, though, had spun the wreckage on Turquoise’s doorstep as vindication.

French officials took what a *New York Times* reporter, on 26 July, referred to as “undisguised satisfaction from the fact that both the United Nations and the United States had appealed to Paris not to pull out its troops until they are replaced by United Nations soldiers.” Balladur, who was embarking on a three-day trip to Africa at the end of the month, maintained, in spite of these pleas, that Operation Turquoise would end on 21 August, in strict compliance with its UN mandate. In Côte d’Ivoire, on 29 July, the prime minister announced that the French withdrawal was already beginning, with the first 180 troops due to return to France that night, followed by another 120 or so before the end of July.

The French special forces troops led by Colonel Rosier were among the first to depart. In his end of mission report, Rosier credited his detachment with halting an exodus of refugees in Gikongoro, at the eastern edge of the SHZ. More than one million refugees remained in that area, but could yet take flight, he noted, if the food and medical care they needed failed to materialize. It was a precarious situation, but one that Rosier apparently felt would be better addressed by others. “The transfer is now strictly humanitarian. It’s outside our skillset,” he wrote.

While in Côte d’Ivoire, Balladur said the French forces in the SHZ would, over time, be replaced by Turquoise’s African troops, who, upon France’s departure, would be placed under UN authority. Were that to happen, he said, some French soldiers could stay behind, on the Zairean side of the border, to provide logistical support.

Balladur concluded his African tour with a brief stop in Goma on 31 July—a late-breaking addition to his itinerary. With no more than a few hours to spare before his return flight to France, the prime minister had just enough time to visit two hospitals in the SHZ. Prime Minister Twagiramungu complained, afterward, that Balladur had failed to consult the Kigali authorities before his visit. “Had he done it, he would have been welcome,” Twagiramungu said. Instead, Twagiramungu said, “[h]is visit to the security zone is a message to the whole world to say that France occupies part of our territory.” Even more aggravating, from President Pasteur Bizimungu’s perspective, was that the French government was continuing to refuse to facilitate the Kigali government’s request to send ministers to the SHZ to encourage displaced people to return home. He responded with a warning. “If by August 22 they don’t let our civil servants in there, then the French will have violated our sovereignty,” Bizimungu declared to reporters on 2 August. “If to regain our sovereignty means going to war, we will have to go to war.”

The French government, from the Kigali authorities’ perspective, had spent the last four years blocking the RPF’s efforts to unify the country under new leadership. Even now, as the new Rwandan government confronted the challenge of restoring peace and security to the nation, the French government was impeding its progress by trying to bar the new Rwandan government from gaining access to a vast swath of Rwandan territory and the people living on it. The authorities left no doubt that they were ready to see France go, and, as General Lafourcade noted in a 4 August situation report, they let Turquoise officers know it; the situation report said Vice President
Kagame’s staff advised the liaison detachment that French soldiers must leave the country by 22 August.953 “Otherwise, there would be problems (threats thinly veiled),” the report recounted.954

The French government had not, to this point, put in the work to mend relations with the new leaders of Rwanda. The Élysée’s hostility toward the RPF was now aimed at the new government. “Do we have any interest in establishing an ongoing, special relationship with this new regime, whose true face even its staunchest supporters are beginning to see?” Quesnot and Pin wrote in a 2 August memo to Mitterrand. “In the short term, we have nothing to ask of this government, which is keen to see us leave Rwanda in circumstances that reflect the least positively on us.”955 Even if it were possible, later down the line, to thaw relations between the two governments, Mitterrand’s advisors had difficulty seeing the value in a rapprochement. They remained mired in the same ethnicist tropes that had guided their failed policy for the prior three and a half years:

In the medium term, if [the RPF] does not find a way to work with the Hutu majority, it will be drawn to a dictatorship relying on a Tutsi minority group stretching from Uganda to Burundi. The instability of the Great Lakes region will be guaranteed for many years. Here again, it seems it is urgent to wait and judge this new government on the basis of the evidence.956

The Quai d’Orsay was decidedly more pragmatic. “Generally speaking, it is essential to make the political gestures toward the Kigali authorities that will allow us to optimize the withdrawal of French Turquoise forces from the safe humanitarian zone,” a Quai d’Orsay official wrote in a memo a few days later. “It should not be possible to hold against us the fact that we did not do everything possible to ensure that this withdrawal take place in the best possible circumstances.”957

Mitterrand’s advisors seemed irritated by the news, a few days later, that Balladur had decided on his own to send an envoy to Kigali to “discuss the circumstances” of Turquoise’s withdrawal.958 The president’s staff sent word to the prime minister on 5 August that Mitterrand did not agree with Balladur’s initiative.959 The decision, though, was made. The next day, France’s ambassador to Uganda met in Kigali with President Bizimungu and Rwanda’s new foreign minister to discuss the waning days of Operation Turquoise and the future of Franco-Rwandan diplomatic relations.960 There, Bizimungu consented to the Quai d’Orsay’s proposal to send diplomats to Rwanda to liaise with his government and to explore the possibility of reopening the French embassy in Kigali.961

President Pasteur Bizimungu and the Rwandan foreign minister used the occasion of the 6 August meeting with the French ambassador to voice, again, their frustration with France for “denying them access to the SHZ.”962 The Quai d’Orsay, hoping to put the issue to rest, decided in response to direct France’s permanent representative in New York to send a letter to the UN Security Council president affirming “that the Rwandan Government’s authority extends throughout Rwanda, including the safe humanitarian zone.”963 Briefing Mitterrand about the Quai d’Orsay’s decision, Quesnot and Pin said the letter would explain—with some disingenuousness—“that the authorities have, of course and as we have always said, free access to the SHZ.”964 The
French government would not, however, budge in its insistence that Kigali officials should look to UNAMIR, not Turquoise, to ensure their personal protection in the SHZ.965

The populations in the Zairean refugee camps continued to thin over the course of the first week of August 1994, as refugees trekked back home to Rwanda.966 Observers, though, noticed the rate was beginning to slow,967 despite the Kigali authorities’ efforts to persuade people to come back.968 The refugee population in the SHZ was declining as well, but slowly. Some refugees in the zone—between 300 and 400 per day, according to General Lafourcade—were choosing not to go home, but to try their luck among the refugees in Zaire.969

The Turquoise commanders’ read on the situation was that many of the refugees in the SHZ were hesitant to leave the protection France was providing, with rumors circulating about violence in the east.970 In Kibuye, local officials and residents aired their concerns in a meeting in early August with Colonel Patrice Sartre, the commander of Turquoise’s north group, discussing with him the rumors they had heard of violent reprisals against Hutus outside of the zone.971 Sartre, a reporter wrote, “stressed there was no evidence of ‘systematic massacres’ and denounced ‘often false, sometimes true but rarely verified’ rumours put about by Hutu hardliners to dissuade refugees from returning home.”972 When asked whether refugees should leave the SHZ, he advised “intellectuals and members of the former administration” to stay put in Kibuye, but suggested “peasants and the ordinary people” had little to fear.973

General Lafourcade worried that the refugees in the zone were growing anxious as Turquoise’s departure date approached.974 What concerned him was not just what the refugees might do—i.e., stage another mass exodus to Zaire, which could only worsen the humanitarian crisis there—but when they would do it. “We must . . . prevent this exodus from occurring while we are still in charge of part of the SHZ,” he wrote in a 9 August situation report. “The image of columns of refugees heading for Zaire and crossing the French presence in Cyangugu would be a disaster.”975 A disaster, that is, for France.

There was no chance that UNAMIR would achieve its target of 5,500 troops before 21 August. The French government could, however, push for available UNAMIR troops to gradually move into the SHZ, specifically, to take the place of the departing French soldiers. Lafourcade’s plan was to hand operational control of the Gikongoro area over to UN troops from Ghana by 17 August.976 If, as it turned out, the handoff spurred large numbers of Rwandans to flee westward, the remaining Turquoise troops would have to find a way to stop them in Cyangugu before they reached the Zairean border.977 The margin for error, though, was exceedingly thin.978 Indeed, all it would take for the plan to fall apart was for Ethiopia, which had promised to contribute troops to UNAMIR, to fail to dispatch those troops quickly enough for them to take Turquoise’s place in Cyangugu as the French troops moved out of the SHZ.979

In committing to this course of action, French officials either assumed the Hutu in the SHZ would welcome the presence of UNAMIR troops, or simply disregarded the possibility that they might not. French officials knew, though, that the IRG and its mouthpieces—primarily RTLM—had poisoned public sentiment against UNAMIR, insisting for months that General Dallaire and his troops were secretly in league with the RPF.980 “We have no confidence in UNAMIR,” one worker for the Rwandan Red Cross told the New York Times.981
As days passed, the much-feared second Hutu exodus to Zaire began to seem more and more likely. On 13 August, a US cable reported that 5,000 people had crossed the border from the SHZ to Bukavu in a span of just 24 hours. "This movement could eclipse the crisis in Goma," the cable warned. A Los Angeles Times reporter found that in Cyangugu, a city under French protection, fleeing Hutus were " pillaging everything that can be carried—doors, beams, toilet seats, pipes, electric wire, their neighbors' laundry, stray chickens." US officials were not only worried the outflow might overwhelm aid workers in Zaire, but feared a recurrence of ethnic violence as the Hutus, on their way to Bukavu, filed past the Nyarushishi refugee camp, where Turquoise forces were ostensibly protecting an estimated 10,000 Tutsi refugees. "Reports have indicated the presence of 15-20 French troops around the Tutsi camp. Their numbers are not enough to prevent a significant disaster from occurring," the 13 August US cable reported.

Colonel Sartre, the Turquoise north group commander, continued meeting with locals in the SHZ, attempting to dissuade them from fleeing to Zaire (if not necessarily to return to their homes in parts of Rwanda outside of the SHZ, as the Kigali authorities would have liked). "There are more people being murdered in Bukavu by the Zairian soldiers, the old Rwandan Army and the militia than in the humanitarian zone," he told a group of 200 refugees on 12 August. A reporter noted: "His words brought gasps of shock from the anxious crowd, who thought they had more to fear from Front soldiers only a few miles away."

If Hutu in the SHZ were laboring under misimpressions about the dangers in their midst, their confusion had not come about by accident. According to a handwritten note on a draft US cable, dated 19 August 1994, France had, earlier that week, allowed former Rwandan ministers "to hold three rallies in Cyangugu urging people to flee." Press, meanwhile, reported that former IRG officials and their supporters had been gathering villagers in secret to spread anti-RPF propaganda, telling them that "when the French leave the Front soldiers will move in and massacre them." A Red Cross worker said former IRG officials were sending buses to the zone to pick up frightened Hutu and bring them to Zaire. One local official in the SHZ told a reporter that supporters of the IRG were actively "forcing people to leave" the zone.

The new government could see what it was up against when, on 14 August, a UN helicopter flew three of its ministers to Kibuye, located at the northern part of the SHZ, to address a crowd of about 2,000 people at the local soccer stadium. The ministers stressed that the new administration in Kigali was not an RPF Government, but a National Unity Government," and that it welcomed people of all ethnicities to work with it to rebuild the country. However, when the crowd laughed, the new interior minister, Seth Sendashonga, at one point attempted to reassure the attendees that the Kigali authorities were "not vengeful." "People just don't believe him," the mayor of Kibuye said.

The French government had an "informant" at the event who took note one particular exchange between Sendashonga and a questioner who pressed him about the new Rwandan government's attitude toward France: was it true that the government opposed France, and that it had only reluctantly agreed to allow French-speaking African troops to participate in UNAMIR? A fax from the head of Turquoise, General Lafourcade, reported:
the Minister replied that all of this was true, that the government was against [it], because the French were in Rwanda, they had witnessed the preparation of the massacres, [and] they had fled only to come back after the massacres. He added that he suspected us [France] of having come with other intentions that the establishment of an SHZ had been a way of stopping the RPF and depriving them of a total military victory. 999

From Paris’s perspective, the upside to public recriminations such as these was that they gave the French government a convenient excuse for withdrawing its forces while a humanitarian crisis still raged, and while UNAMIR was still cobbling together the resources it needed to adequately respond to it. French officials could, and did, suggest they might have been inclined to keep their forces in Rwanda, if only the new government had not been so opposed to them. 1000 That was not true, though. Some French officials—Prime Minister Balladur, in particular—had insisted from the beginning that Turquoise ought to be a time-limited operation. 1001 And to the extent that other French decision-makers might at one point have been more receptive to extending Turquoise’s mandate, it would seem that the RPF’s victory in mid-July 1994 had drained some, if not all, of their remaining enthusiasm for the operation—as the French chargé d’affaires in New York had made clear on 18 July, the day Gisenyi fell, when he privately acknowledged to other diplomats that “the French were now very keen to get out of Rwanda as quickly as possible.” 1002

The argument for even trying to extend Turquoise’s mandate lost much of its force when a first contingent of Ethiopian peacekeepers arrived in Rwanda on 15 August, ensuring there would be at least some UN boots in the ground to take France’s place in Cyangugu. 1003 Pressed, one last time, by the UN Secretary-General’s special representative in Rwanda to drop his objection to France’s continued presence in his country, President Pasteur Bizimungu held firm. 1004 “The president told the [special representative] that he knew the UNAMIR forces would not be ‘100 percent’ by the 21 August changeover date, but that at least the UN is a positive force for Rwanda, while the French continue to be a negative influence on stability and security in Rwanda,” a US cable reported after the 16 August 1994 meeting. 1005

French officials, in the face of such disparagements, have long argued that France deserves credit for the simple fact that it did something. “Other countries did nothing,” Édouard Balladur told the MIP in 1998, a few years after his tenure as prime minister had concluded. 1006 The criticism of the international community’s complacency is fair. To acknowledge, though, that the Rwandan people, in 1994, were crying out for the world’s help is not to say that Operation Turquoise was the answer to their cries.

A commonly cited criticism of Turquoise is that it came too late to save many Tutsi. 1007 This is true. It is not, however, the sum total of the operation’s faults. The most critical of all of Turquoise’s defects is that France—the Habyarimana regime’s most loyal ally, and the FAR’s most generous benefactor—was the one to spearhead it. The French government, from October 1990 through the Genocide, had not remained neutral, but rather had engaged in Rwanda as co-belligerents, supporting the FAR and opposing the RPF. The French government used Operation Turquoise as a French-led rescue mission that doubled as a concerted effort to prevent the RPF from overthrowing Rwanda’s interim government. While the operation, ultimately, did not keep the RPF from achieving its military and political aims, it did embolden the génocidaires, who
found refuge in the French-controlled areas and, with French assistance, were able to abscond to Zaire, where they began plotting to avenge their defeat. Turquoise, according to General Daniel Schroeder, who was in charge of the US humanitarian operation in Zaire that commenced on 22 July 1994, was “a sham.”1008 “It was,” Schroeder continued, “an attempt, under the guise of a humanitarian role, to keep the French clients supplied and protected. The French protected génocidaires and the leadership in the country who were responsible for the Genocide, and helped get them out of the country.”1009

The French government marked the final days of Operation Turquoise with outpourings of self-congratulation, on the one hand, and blame-shifting, on the other. In the SHZ, the departing troops joined their UNAMIR successors for passing-of-the-torch ceremonies in Gikongoro and, later, Cyangugu.1010 Gen. Lafourcade described the Gikongoro ceremony as “a tribute paid to the Turquoise forces.”1011 French officials in Paris, meanwhile, downplayed the pandemonium that, at that very moment, was driving thousands of refugees to flee the zone.1012 In the Élysée, Pin and Quesnot spun a wild, and entirely unsubstantiated, theory that NGOs, in league with the United States and United Nations, were dramatizing the situation along the Rwandan-Zairean border in order to pressure France to stay longer.1013 “The Americans, in particular, seem to want to blame us in advance for the responsibility of an exodus that might occur after our departure,” they wrote in an 18 August note to President Mitterrand. Turquoise’s Bureau of Civil Affairs asserted, similarly, that the NGOs were trying to pin their own failings onto France.1014

By 18 August, UNAMIR forces from Africa had assumed control of much of the SHZ, with remaining French troops mostly confined to Cyangugu.1015 It was General Dallaire’s last full day in Rwanda,1016 and his successor, General Guy Tousignant, accompanied a group of Kigali officials on a visit to Cyangugu.1017 Briefing US embassy officials afterward, Tousignant made clear that he was not impressed with what he saw of the French troops there:

The General said that ex-FAR soldiers were looting and maliciously dismantling buildings in and around Cyangugu in full view of the French, who claim their mandate does not cover such activities and do nothing to stop it. As long as there is no violence, he said the French are apparently taking an ‘anything goes’ attitude, because their numbers are so small when compared to the population in the [SHZ].1018

Tousignant, according to US diplomats, felt UNAMIR was up to the task of securing southwest Rwanda.1019 “[H]e wants the French out,” the diplomats wrote in a 19 August 1994 draft cable.1020

France was not abandoning the region entirely; roughly 450 French troops would remain in Goma temporarily to provide logistical support for the African UNAMIR troops, to control the local airport, and to continue their humanitarian work in Zaire.1021 Already, though, there was a sense in Paris that French officials no longer viewed Rwanda as their concern. When, just a few days before the end of Operation Turquoise, a US diplomat there urged a senior French Foreign Ministry official to consider issuing a statement “telling Rwandans there [was] no justification for leaving the zone for Bukavu,” the official “reacted coolly,” replying that “France could not with honesty say the zone will remain safe.”1022 “In any case, he added, such statements are the responsibility of the Rwandan government to make.”1023
French troops left Rwanda with none of the triumphalism that marked their arrival two months earlier. The Zairean government, fearing another mass exodus, had temporarily shut down the border on 20 August 1994, reportedly stranding tens of thousands of people who were waiting in Cyangugu to cross one of the bridges over the Ruzizi River.\textsuperscript{1024} The next morning, Zairean troops fired warning shots into the air as a horde of refugees tried to force its way over the border.\textsuperscript{1025} With chaos still reigning that morning, a convoy of French military vehicles left Rwanda, exiting via one of the bridges that, to that point, was still closed to civilians.\textsuperscript{1026} A small number of French officers and soldiers stayed behind for a brief “farewell ceremony,” during which the French troops reportedly lowered the French tricolor flag at their base in Cyangugu “and watched as it was replaced by the colours of Ethiopia and the United Nations.”\textsuperscript{1027} Soon afterward, Lafourcade boarded one last helicopter flight for Goma.\textsuperscript{1028} His mission in Rwanda was over.
Notes to Chapter X

1 Telephone Interview by LFM with Charles Petrie.


3 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 53 (2010); see generally JOHN W. LELAND & KATHRYN A. WILCOXSON, THE CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF THE C-5 GALAXY (May 2003); Cable from Kevin Aiston (June 28, 1994) (Subject: “Meeting with French Amb. Andreani”) (“The French have withdrawn their request for airlift of equipment from Bangui to Goma due to limitations on absorbing a large amount of equipment in Goma in a short time. The French desk thinks they might also have dropped the request in part because they thought the U.S. would decline it. We have not yet received any formal request for support for the Senegalese contingent.”).


5 Memorandum from Dirk Dijkerman to Arlene Render (13 June 1994) (Subject: “Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Issues in the Rwanda-Burundi Sub-Region”); see also Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Paris (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aid Administrator Atwood’s Meetings with GOF Officials”) (reporting that France had twice asked the United States “on short notice for airlift support” but that US officials “were unable to respond in time”). The United States had already been looking to limit its cost for humanitarian efforts and believed that the planes might not actually be needed given its view that the number of displaced persons was well below UN reporting. See Memorandum from Dirk Dijkerman to Arlene Render (13 June 1994) (Subject: “Interagency Working Group on Humanitarian Issues in the Rwanda-Burundi Sub-Region”). The United States did provide military aircraft to support for a promotional media event airdrop outside of Goma near the end of July. “The White House wants to see U.S. airdrops on television,” Lt. Col. Thomas Odom, a US military attaché, recalled being told. THOMAS ODOM, JOURNEY INTO DARKNESS 108 (2005).


9 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).

10 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 61 (2010).

11 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 21-22, 24-26 (2010). As chief of defense staff, Lanxade played a lead role in planning Operation Turquoise. See JACQUES LANXADE, QUAND LE MONDE A BASCULÉ [WHEN THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN] 176 (2001). Lanxade has said that, as a general matter, Mitterrand granted him considerable autonomy in carrying out decisions made during high-level meetings in the Élysée: “What you have to see is that there was a very strong, or at least very obvious relationship between Mitterrand and me on these issues. . . . I reported on what we had done, but I didn’t have to ask for permission to do it.” François Graner, Jacques Lanxade: “Le Président suivait généralement mon avis, je dirais même quasiment toujours [Jacques Lanxade: “The President Generally Followed My Advice, I Would Even Say Almost Always”], AGONE, 17 Feb. 2020 (interview occurred on 22 Aug. 2018).


15 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 26 (2010).

16 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 27 (2010).

17 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 27 (2010).
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18 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 28 (2010).
20 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 28 (2010).
21 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 & 60 (2010).
22 RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 204-05 (22 Aug. 1994).
23 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 439 (2003) (“Goma, at the northern end of Lake Kivu, had a modern airport that needed repair but could support the French.”).
29 Cable from the American Embassy in Paris to the US Secretary of State 7 (21 June 1994). (Subject: “Quai Thinking on Eve of UNSC Vote on Rwanda”).
31 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).
32 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).
33 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).
34 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).
35 See, e.g., Graham Brown, Belgium Prepares to Evacuate from Former Colony, AFP, 8 Apr. 1994 (reporting that Belgium had dispatched a DC-10 aircraft to Entebbe in April 1994 “in preparation of an airlift of the 1,500 Belgians in Rwanda”); Cable from US Secretary of State to the American Embassy in Bujumbura (9 June 1994) (Subject: “Official-Informal”) (reporting that UNAMIR had established a second supply base in Entebbe to facilitate the transportation of relief supplies to Rwanda).
36 Memorandum from US Department of State (25 May 1994) (Subject: “Proposed concept for peacekeeping operation in Rwanda”).
37 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 415-16 (2003).
38 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).
40 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).
41 See, e.g., Transcript of Paris Europe No. 1 Radio broadcast 1 (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Armed Forces Chief of Staff Briefs on Rwanda Operation”) (transcribing an interview with Admiral Lanxade, in which he acknowledged that “France supported the Government of Rwanda” during the war before the Genocide but maintained that, once Operation Turquoise was under way, French troops were “demonstrating on the ground that the operation is impartial”); Note from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Entretien à Paris avec des représentants du FPR”) (reporting that a representative of the French Prime Minister’s Office assured RPF representatives that France’s Africa policy had changed since Prime Minister Balladur took office in 1993, and that France’s aims in Rwanda were now strictly humanitarian).
42 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 54 (2010).
43 See Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (24 June 1994); Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”) (noting that, since the start of the Genocide, the RPF had seized two-thirds of Rwandan territory).
The analysis of operational orders demonstrates that the neutral and humanitarian nature of Operation Turquoise is not in doubt. Even so, it does not appear possible to say that Turquoise only pursued a purely humanitarian goal.

See Letter from Hubert Védrine to François Mitterrand (18 April 1994) (discussing the possibility of a territorial partitioning of Rwanda). To be sure, not every French official embraced this concept. Léotard publicly stated in late June 1994 that Rwanda “must remain a multi-ethnic country.” Richard Dowden, *France Rejects Role as Rwanda Buffer Force,* INDEPENDENT, 30 June 1994. In addition, the General Secretariat for Defense and National Security, an arm of the Prime Minister’s Office, warned on 28 June 1994 that a partitioning of Rwanda “could further exacerbate ethnic oppositions or even competition from rival guardians” and “should be avoided.” Memorandum from François Lafargue to Achille Lerche 7 (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Operation humanitaire francaise au Rwanda – engagement et perspectives”); see also Hubert Védrine, *Hutus et Tutsis: à chacun son pays* [Hutu and Tutsi: To Each His Own Country], LE POINT, 23 Nov. 1996.

Put to the test of reality, this analysis has proven in large part utopian, insofar as the RPF, the advances of which France never attempted to thwart, continued to advance militarily against the FAR who were in full disarray and against a government on the run.

See Cable from the American Embassy in Kampala to the US Secretary of State 2, 5 (22 June 1994) (Subject: “Ambassador Rawson’s Meetings with RPF Officials and Rwandan Ambassador in Kampala”).

Jonathan C. Randal, *Saved by French Troops, Rwandans Thank God; Tutsis Celebrate Mass Under Guard,* THE WASHINGTON POST, 27 June 1994 (“With everything from fighter bombers to armored fighting vehicles arriving in growing numbers at nearby airports in Zaire, France is determined to project an image of force amid hope that its troops will not have to employ it to stop the killing.”).
See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 289 (1997) (“[T]he intended firepower of the French forces seemed to be too important for a humanitarian mission.”); LINDA MELVERN, A PEOPLE BETRAYED 184 (2009) (“Dallaire thought it a lot of military power for what was strictly a humanitarian operation.”); see also ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 449, 551 (2003) (“Despite its humanitarian aim, Opération Turquoise had arrived extremely light in trucks, which are essential to relief operations.”).

JEAN-CLAUDE LAFORCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 58 (2010).

See, e.g., Interview by LFM by Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II, 12, 18 (22 Aug. 1994); see Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”) (Mitterrand approves an intervention); see also MIP Tome I 319 (stating that on 16 June Mitterrand agreed to launch a humanitarian operation).

L’affrontement avec le FPR [Confrontation with the RPF], RAIDS MAGAZINE NO. 101, 6 (1 Oct. 1994).


See Interview by LFM with Karel Kovanda; LFM Interview with Colin Keating; The French in Rwanda, THE GUARDIAN, 21 June 1994 (arguing that a “mainly African force” backed by Western technical support should intervene in Rwanda and not France, which had a history of supporting the Habyarimana regime, “whose militias, since his death, have launched the massacres”); Marie-Pierre Subtil, La proposition d’intervention française au Rwanda suscite de plus en plus de critiques [The Prospect of a French Intervention in Rwanda Brings More and More Criticism], LE MONDE, 23 June 1994.

See Interview by LFM with Karel Kovanda; Interview by LFM with Colin Keating; The French in Rwanda, THE GUARDIAN, 21 June 1994 (arguing that a “mainly African force” backed by Western technical support should intervene in Rwanda and not France, which had a history of supporting the Habyarimana regime, “whose militias, since his death, have launched the massacres”); Marie-Pierre Subtil, La proposition d’intervention française au Rwanda suscite de plus en plus de critiques [The Prospect of a French Intervention in Rwanda Brings More and More Criticism], LE MONDE, 23 June 1994.

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (22 June 1994) (Balladur and Mitterrand approving Minister of Cooperation Roussin’s proposal that he “continue to try to convince our African partners to participate in the operation,” following a discussion about France’s media strategy).

See Visite au Sénégal—conférence de presse du Ministre des Affaires étrangères, M. Alain Juppé [Visit to Senegal—Press Conference by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alain Juppé], 19 June 1994 (highlighting Juppé and Roussin’s discussions with Senegalese authorities); Michel Sailhan, Updates with Details of French Operation, Criticism by Humanitarian Group, AFP, 24 June 1994 (reporting on Roussin’s two-day visit to Niger); Restricted Council Meeting Notes 161-63 (29 June 1994).

Charles Lambroschini, Mitterrand-Juppé: les alliés objectifs [Mitterrand-Juppé: Objective Allies], FIGARO, 24 June 1994 (“Another subject of astonishment: if the cause that the French defend is so just, why are they so alone?”).

Letter from the Permanent representative of France to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, S/1994/795 (5 July 1994) (reporting that, as of 5 July 1994, the troop contingent consisted of 2,300 French soldiers and 32 Senegalese soldiers); Memorandum from the Ministry of Defense to the État Major des Armées (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 11 juillet 1994”) (reporting that, as of 11 July 1994, there were a total of 108 foreign troops serving in Operation Turquoise, of which 98 were Senegalese and 10 were Mauritanian). The Mauritanian contingent was a medical team that consisted of four physicians and six nurses. Cable from American Embassy in Nouakchott to the US Secretary of State (5 July 1994) (“It is likely that the [government of Mauritania] decided to send a token contingent to Rwanda in response to pressure from France, Mauritania’s largest aid donor. Given the [Mauritanian government’s] meager resources, we also think it likely that the [government of France] agreed to cover all costs incurred by Mauritania’s team.”).

RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 3, 5 (22 Aug. 1994); see African States Divided over French Rwanda Venture, AFP, 24 June 1994 (“Senegal, a former French colony, is the only African country to
contribute troops—300—to the operation.”). Egypt sent seven military observers. See RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 4 (22 Aug. 1994). French defense officials suspected the RPF had quietly dissuaded one African country, Ghana, from making good on an earlier pledge to send troops to Rwanda, noting that RPF representative Seth Sendashonga had visited the Ghanaian capital on 23 June. See Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 24/06/1994 – 18H00”). An RPF document confirms that Sendashonga and a colleague met with Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings, but says they merely asked him whether it was true that he supported the French operation. Rawlings responded that he did not. See Memorandum from Denis Polisi and Seth Sendashonga to Alexis Kanyarengwe (26 June 1994) (Subject: “Raporo y’ubutumwa Accra (Ghana)”).

78 See GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 289 (1997) (describing two RPF representatives’ incredulity, while meeting with a French general in Paris on 22 June 1994, upon learning that “the complete operational plan of the future Operation Turquoise was written on two sheets of paper”).

79 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”).

80 Cable from the American Embassy in Paris to the US Secretary of State (21 June 1994) (Subject: “Quai Thinking on Eve of UNSC Vote on Rwanda”).


83 Cable from US Secretary State to the American Embassy in Addis Ababa (20 June 1994) (Subject: “Update on French Initiative on Rwanda”).

84 See MIP Tome I 323 (“We must recognize that by having some soldiers participate in Operation Turquoise who were previously engaged in military cooperation operations for the benefit of the FAR, France undeniably created a source of ambiguity and aroused suspicion or skepticism in [people’s] minds.”).


87 Transcript, Interview by Laure de Vulpian with Thierry Prunnaud (22 Apr. 2005).


92 Jacques Isnard, The Ambiguous Mission of Special Operations Commandos: Candy and Guns, LE MONDE, 10 July 1994 (“A not insignificant number of special operations men knew Rwanda before ‘Turquoise.’”).


94 Letter from James Gasana to Juvénal Habyarimana (23 Aug.1992) (Subject: “proposition de decoration”).

95 MIP Tome I 154 & 162.


99 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”).

100 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (20 June 1994).

101 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (20 June 1994).
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103 See MIP Tome I 164-65; DIDIER TAUZIN, RWANDA: JE DEMANDE JUSTICE POUR LA FRANCE ET SES SOLDATS [RWANDA: I DEMAND JUSTICE FOR FRANCE AND ITS SOLDIERS] 64, 70-71 (2011) (“I had to take the indirect command of the FAR”).

104 See DIDIER TAUZIN, RWANDA: JE DEMANDE JUSTICE POUR LA FRANCE ET SES SOLDATS [RWANDA: I DEMAND JUSTICE FOR FRANCE AND ITS SOLDIERS] 59 (2011), (stating that Nsabimana “made a strong impression” on him and struck him as “the man for the job”); id. at 70 (calling Bizimungu “clearly a remarkable man of the field” and stating, “I have always considered it an honor to have known him and to have fought alongside him”); id. at 71 (describing Nsabimana as a “true warrior” who “does not give up”); id. (“Nsabimana, Bizimungu and Kabiligi . . . are among the few Hutu who have almost completely freed themselves from the psychological and intellectual oppression that the Tutsi have been subjecting them to for centuries.”).


108 See RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 154 (22 Aug. 1994); MIP Tome I 355-56.

109 RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 152 (22 Aug. 1994). Report from Rwandan Ministry of Defense 11-12 (5 Mar. 1994). These five officers were Commander Grégoire de Saint Quentin, former technical advisor to the commander of the FAR’s para-commando battalion; Lieutenant Colonel André Marin, former technical advisor to the commander of the reconnaissance battalion; Lieutenant Colonel Marc Vuillemin, who had worked with the FAR’s aviation squadron; Squadron Chief Gérard Forgues, former technical advisor to the état-major of the National Gendarmerie; and Captain Michel Fabries, former course director at the National Gendarmerie school in Rwanda. See Memorandum from French Ministry of Defense to the Armies Etat-Major (21 Aug. 1998) (Subject: “L’assistance militaire au Rwanda de décembre 1993 au 10 avril 1994”) (listing Vuillemin, de Saint Quentin, Forgues, and Fabries among French military personnel in Rwanda between December 1993 and January 1994); Letter from Augustin Ndindiliyimana to Chief of Armies Etat Major (9 Mar. 1992); Letter from James Gasana to Rwandan minister of foreign affairs and cooperation (5 May 1993) (referring to Battalion Chief Marin’s service as technical advisor to the commander of the reconnaissance battalion); Letter from the Rwandan minister of foreign affairs and cooperation to the French Embassy in Kigali (8 Apr. 1993) (approving Squadron Chief Forgues’ assignment as technical advisor to the état-major of the National Gendarmerie); Letter from Augustin Ndindiliyimana to Chief of Armées Etat-Major (3 Ap. 1992) (recommending Captain Fabries as EGENA course director).


112 Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (21 June 1994); see Daily situation report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (21 June 1994).

113 RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 157 (22 Aug. 1994).


115 RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 158 (22 Aug. 1994).

116 See, e.g., Interview by LFM with Charles Petrie; Interview by LFM with Jonathan Randal.

117 LFM Interview with Charles Petrie.

118 LFM Interview with Charles Petrie.
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119 Charles Petrie noted that the narrative changed “within a few days” amongst French special forces, who were “used to operating in small numbers and blending into their environment, and as a result [were] permeable to the realities they [found] themselves in.” Email from Charles Petrie to LFM.

120 LFM Interview with senior French military officer.

121 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (22 June 1994). As the DGSE, France’s external intelligence agency, wrote on 22 June: “The engagement of French troops, for strictly humanitarian purposes, is misunderstood by the two Rwandan belligerents: the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) sees in it an intervention to support the government Armed Forces; the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) believe that there is military support [in it] for them.”


123 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake; see also Interview by LFM with Tito Rutaremara.

124 Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.

125 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (22 June 1994).

126 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (22 June 1994).


131 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (24 June 1994) (“A first detachment of French paratroopers embarked on an incursion into southwestern Rwanda, in order to assist 8,000 Tutsi and Hutu refugees and thus make it clear to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that the French mission has only a humanitarian purpose and is not directed against the rebel movement.”).


133 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (22 June 1994).

134 Stephen Smith, Premiers contacts au camp de Nyarushishi [Initial Contact Made at Camp Nyarushishi], LIBÉRATION, 25 June 1994.

135 Stephen Smith, Premiers contacts au camp de Nyarushishi [Initial Contact Made at Camp Nyarushishi], LIBÉRATION, 25 June 1994.


138 Alison Des Forges, Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994, in THE MEDIA AND THE RWANDA GENOCIDE 52 (Allan Thompson ed. 2007). One survivor of the Genocide recalled hearing an announcement in her home commune of Kamembe, near the southern shore of Lake Kivu, directing Hutu girls to dress up well and go out to welcome French soldiers. Interview by LFM with Alphonsine Mukakarangwa.

139 Stephen Smith, Premiers contacts au camp de Nyarushishi [Initial Contact Made at Camp Nyarushishi], LIBÉRATION, 25 June 1994.

140 Stephen Smith, Premiers contacts au camp de Nyarushishi [Initial Contact Made at Camp Nyarushishi], LIBÉRATION, 25 June 1994.
See Raymond Bonner, *Rwandan Enemies Struggle to Define French Role*, N.Y. TIMES, 27 June 1994; Robert Block, *Rwandans Put Faith in God and Their Trust in Paratroopers*, INDEPENDENT, 27 June 1994. “Refugee” is a term that has been used to describe the Rwandans who fled their homes in search of safety, even though they would not be considered refugees under international law, since they did not cross any national borders.


French Too Late to Save the Tutsis, OBSERVER NEWS, 26 June 1994 (“Of the more than 55,000 Tutsis who once lived in the prefecture of Cyangugu, only 10,000 are left—8,000 of them in the camp of Nyarushishi.”).


French Intelligence Note (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Le 24 – 15:00”).

French Intelligence Note (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Le 24 – 15:00”) (describing a mass grave 300 meters south of Kamarampaka stadium); see François Luizet, *Cris et murmures à Kibuye* [Screams and Whispers in Kibuye], LE FIGARO, 27 June 1994.

French Intelligence Note (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Le 24 – 15:00”).


164 Memorandum from François Regnault to Jacques Rosier (undated) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

165 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (23 June 1994).


168 Memorandum from Anatole Nsengiyumva to Head of the état-major of the Rwandan Army (15 Dec. 1990) (Subject: “Exploitation d’un rapport”) (from the Linda Malvern Rwanda Genocide Archive); Memorandum from Anatole Nsengiyumva to the Head of the état-major of the Rwandan Army (11 Oct. 1990) (Subject: “Campagne médiatique”) (from the Linda Malvern Rwanda Genocide Archive).

169 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (23 June 1994).

170 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (23 June 1994).

171 See RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION , OPÉRATION TURQUOISE TOME II 6, 8-10, 150-215, 157, 159, 161 (22 August 1994) (discussing the liaison detachments’ efforts to gather intelligence, in part from current and former FAR personnel).

172 See, e.g., Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”) (stating that there had been in Rwanda, following the assassination of President Habyarimana, “a genocide perpetrated by some units of the Rwandan military and by Hutu militias against the Tutsi minority”); JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 28 (2010) (“We will have to deal with the IRG, the legal Interim Rwandan Government, which is already suspected of being complicit, if not the instigator, of the massacres of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.”).

173 See JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 27, 120-121 (2010) (from page 27: “[S]ome of them were guilty of participating in this business of death. How could we tell the difference between those who were still fighting loyally and those who were complicit in [perpetrating] the worst?”; from pages 120-121: “I readily believe that not everyone [in the FAR] is guilty and that there was never a consensus, nor among the population for that matter, on the genocide. Most of them were fighting to defend their country against an enemy from the outside. Of course, some were involved in the genocide. But these soldiers belonged to less well-trained, poorly commanded and undisciplined units.”).

174 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade 2, 3 (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”) (emphasis added).

175 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade 2 (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”).

176 Fax to Colonel Vaganay and Colonel Pouly (20 June 1994) (Subject: “CR arrivée et HOUSIN à Goma”).


178 Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 27/06/1994 – 17H00”); Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (24 June 1994). The DGSE, similarly, observed that the arrival of French forces appeared to have brought the government forces and the militias closer. “The militias ... seem to be more controlled by the regular Army, except in the stronghold of Gisenyi, in the northwest,” the DGSE wrote on 24 June.
180 See, e.g., Cable from Yannick Gérard (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda point de situation au matin du 7 juillet”).
182 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994).
184 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994). Whether Rosier believed the ministers’ claims that the IRG had done nothing to orchestrate the killings is unclear. Rosier was aware, though, that Hutu militias were still committing ethnic killings in Rwanda, more than two months into the Genocide. Stephen Smith, Dialogue difficile avec les massacreurs [Difficult Conversation with the Murderers], Libération (27 June 1994); see also Fax to Colonel Vaganay and Colonel Pouly (20 June 1994) (Subject: “CR arrivée et Houssin à Goma”).
185 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994).
186 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994).
187 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994); see also discussion in Chapter 5 concerning the delivery of the artillery in 1992.
188 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994);
189 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994).
190 Memorandum from Jacques Rosier to Maurice Le Page (25 June 1994).
191 Jean-Claude LaFourcade & Guillaume Riffaud, Opération Turquoise 118 (2010).
192 Jean-Claude LaFourcade & Guillaume Riffaud, Opération Turquoise 118 (2010).
194 Jean-Claude LaFourcade & Guillaume Riffaud, Opération Turquoise 119 (2010).
196 Jean-Claude LaFourcade & Guillaume Riffaud, Opération Turquoise 120 (2010).
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204 French Too Late to Save the Tutsis, THE OBSERVER, 26 June 1994.

205 MIP Tome I 319; see Restricted Council Meeting Notes (15 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

206 See discussion in Chapter 9.


208 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

209 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

210 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

211 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).


220 See Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (21 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation hebdomadaire”); ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 434 (2003); See Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 24/06/1994 – 18H00”) (reporting that the RPF was applying heavy pressure on the capital, while, at the same time, fighting was taking place about 9 miles east of Ruhengeri).

221 Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (26 June 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 26 juin 1994”).

222 Interviews by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

223 Interviews by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

224 See, e.g., Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade 2 (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”) (flagging a need for information on “RPF infiltration” in the volcano park, west of Gitarama, Gikongoro, and south of Butare).

225 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade 2 (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”).

226 Interviews by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

227 Interviews by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

228 Cable from Comforce Turquoise to Armées Centops Paris (27 June 1994) (Subject: “appréciation de situation du Dimanche 26 juin 1994”).
229 Benoît Duquesne, Le colonel Rosier estime que les infiltrations du FPR dans la région sont une réalité [Colonel Rosier Believes That RPF Infiltrations in the Region are a Reality], FRANCE 2, 25 June 1994.


232 See Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 25 juin 1994”; French Too Late to Save the Tutsis, THE OBSERVER, 26 June 1994; Raymond Bonner, Rwandan Enemies Struggle to Define French Role, N.Y. TIMES, 27 June 1994 (“Virtually no Tutsi live in Cyangugu any more, since all have been killed or have fled.”)).


234 French Too Late to Save the Tutsis, THE OBSERVER, 26 June 1994.


239 Cable from Comforce Turquoise to Armées Centops Paris (27 June 1994) (Subject: “appréciation de situation du Dimanche 26 juin 1994”) (“The populations encountered are probably those who do not fear being discovered, while there are probably others who hide because they know they are threatened.”).


243 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possible au Rwanda”) (italics added).

244 See Transcript of France 2 broadcast (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Affrontement entre soldats gouvernementaux et Front Patriote Rwandais à quelques kilomètres des positions françaises”).

245 Transcript of France 2 broadcast (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Affrontement entre soldats gouvernementaux et Front Patriote Rwandais à quelques kilomètres des positions françaises”).

246 Transcript of France 2 broadcast (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Affrontements à Kibuye le 27 juin 1994”).

247 Transcript of France 2 broadcast (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Affrontement entre soldats gouvernementaux et Front Patriote Rwandais à quelques kilomètres des positions françaises”).

248 Transcript of France 2 broadcast (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Affrontement entre soldats gouvernementaux et Front Patriote Rwandais à quelques kilomètres des positions françaises”).

249 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”) (stating that the legitimacy of Operation Turquoise relied on “respect[ing] a strict neutrality toward the conflicting parties and . . . avoid[ing] any armed contact with the RPF”).
250 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier ministre et Conseil restreint, Mercredi 29 juin 1994”).

251 See, e.g., Transcript of Paris Europe No. 1 Radio broadcast 1-2 (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Armed Forces Chief of Staff Briefs on Rwanda Operation”) (Jacques Lanxade: “[W]e are demonstrating on the ground that the operation is impartial, because we are at the service of the Tutsi population . . . just as much as we are at the service of the Hutu population . . . . We shall avoid, we mean to avoid, any physical contact with the troops fighting each other.”).

252 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda) (quoting Lanxade as saying, “The front line between the FAR and the RPF is somewhat stable. But Kigali should fall in the coming days”).

253 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”).

254 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”).

255 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”).

256 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”).

257 See, e.g., Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier ministre et Conseil restreint, Mercredi 29 juin 1994”) (asserting that RPF military action “would lead to further significant population displacements”); Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 28/06/1994 à 06h00”) (“The advance toward Kibuye to split the government sector in two would, among other things, result in the westward flight of Hutu refugees from the three camps west of Gitarama.”); Alain Juppé, La responsabilité de tous [Everyone’s Responsibility], LE MONDE, 2 July 1994 (“The absence of a cease-fire and political resolution leads to the constant swelling of the number of displaced people, who are fleeing the zones of combat.”).

258 See, e.g., Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 28/06/1994 à 06h00”) (explaining, with more precision than most French analyses at the time, that an RPF advance into western Rwanda would “risk triggering a massacre of Tutsi refugees in the government zone”).

259 See Raymond Bonner, French Establish a Base in Rwanda to Block Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, 5 July 1994 (“[T]he refugees have been bombarded for months by Government broadcasts saying the rebels will kill all Hutu, and many refugees are certain the rebels will seek revenge.”).

260 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”).

261 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”). Marlaud’s memo did not explain what he meant in suggesting that a French retreat from Rwanda would precipitate a massacre of the people French troops had charged themselves with protecting. While he may have been suggesting that the RPF forces might kill people in their path, it is just as likely, if not more so, that he meant the Hutu militias would slaughter Tutsi (or suspected Tutsi) refugees.

262 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”) (characterizing this option as “without a doubt the most reasonable” of the three choices).

263 Marlise Simons, French Troops Enter Rwanda in Aid Mission, N.Y. TIMES, 24 June 1994 (quoting Gérard Araud, an aide to Léotard, as saying, “Our troops will be making incursions but they will set up no bases in Rwanda”).

264 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”).

265 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”).

266 Interviews by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

267 Interviews by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.
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268 DRM intelligence report (27 June 1994).

269 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

270 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

271 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

272 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

273 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

274 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

275 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”). Quesnot referred to this site as the “N’Gada pass.”

276 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

277 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec M. Léotard le 27 juin à 17 heures. Situation.”).

278 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

279 See DRM intelligence report (28 June 1994); Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”) (estimating the RPF to have 25,000 troops). The DGSE had previously observed, on 24 June 1994, that the RPF was already having difficulty holding onto the territory it had won. DGSE No. 18891/N – Refugee Movements, 24 June 1994.

280 DRM intelligence report (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 28/06/1994 à 18H00”).

281 DRM intelligence report (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 28/06/1994 à 18H00”).


285 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”) (characterizing this option as “without a doubt the most reasonable” of the three choices).

286 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”) (characterizing this option as “without a doubt the most reasonable” of the three choices) (italics added; original in bold).

287 Account taken from interview by LFM with Jason Nshimye.

288 Fax from Jean-Rémy Duval (27 June 1994) (“Fax No. 3”) (Subject: “C/R de situation”).

289 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).

290 Note from unknown author indicating the locations and actions of the COS (24 June 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise situation COS”).

292 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).
293 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).
294 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).
295 French Memorandum from unknown author (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 29 juin 1994”).
296 French Memorandum from unknown author (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 29 juin 1994”).
297 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Police Judiciaire (11 Oct. 2007). In a 2013 deposition, Duval said that he “decided to return to my base camp and return the next day to secure the area.” Deposition of Colonel Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).
298 Compare French Memorandum from unknown author (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 30 juin 1994”) (“500 Tutsi civilians were discovered”) with Report from Captain Marin Gillier (30 July 1994) (Subject: “compte-rendu de mission TURQUOISE”) (“We discover about 800 Tutsi.”).
299 VENUSTE KAYIMAHE & JACQUES MOREL, ENQUÊTE SUR LES VICTIMES TUEES AU RWANDA DURANT L’OPÉRATION TURQUOISE, CAS DE LA RÉGION DE BISESERO [INVESTIGATION INTO THE VICTIMS KILLED IN RWANDA DURING OPERATION TURQUOISE, THE CASE OF THE BISESERO REGION] 1, 3, 7, 34, 36 (25 June 2014); French Memorandum from unknown author (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 30 juin 1994”) (“Tutsi corpses, recently killed, were found (several dozens).”).
300 Report from Christian Lureau to EMA cellule de crise Rwanda (Subject: “Point de situation”) (1 July 1994).
301 The total number of Tutsi killed in those three days is unclear. According to a paper published by in 2014, surveys conducted by Ibuke (1999) and African Rights (1995) of the number of victims killed in Bisesero in the Genocide do not give precise enough information on the date of death to know how many people died between 27 June and 30 June. Kayimahe and Morel identified 381 victims killed in Bisesero on 24 June 1994 and after (the date they believe “French special troops . . . had at their disposal arms, means of transport, observation, and communication to stop massacres.” VENUSTE KAYIMAHE & JACQUES MOREL, ENQUÊTE SUR LES VICTIMES TUEES AU RWANDA DURANT L’OPÉRATION TURQUOISE, CAS DE LA RÉGION DE BISESERO [INVESTIGATION INTO THE VICTIMS KILLED IN RWANDA DURING OPERATION TURQUOISE, THE CASE OF THE BISESERO REGION] 1, 3, 7, 34, 36 (25 June 2014).
302 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).
304 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).
305 See Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013); Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, Rwanda: les assassins racontent leurs massacres [Rwanda: The Killers Recount Their Massacres], LE FIGARO, 29 June 1994; see also Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1, Trial Transcript (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Nov. 1997).
306 Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, Rwanda: les assassins racontent leurs massacres [Rwanda: The Killers Recount Their Massacres], LE FIGARO, 29 June 1994; see also Dominique Garraud, Le Nettoyage ethnique continue dans les montagnes rwandaises [Ethnic Cleansing Continues in the Rwandan Mountains], LIBÈRATION, 29 June 1994 (offering a similar account and many of the same quotes from local Hutu militia).
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324 Jacques Morel, La découverte, l’abandon puis le sauvetage des Tutsi survivants de Bisesero [The Discovery, Abandonment and then Rescue of Tutsi Survivors of Bisesero], RFI, 9 Feb. 2011.

325 Jacques Morel, La découverte, l’abandon puis le sauvetage des Tutsi survivants de Bisesero [The Discovery, Abandonment and then Rescue of Tutsi Survivors of Bisesero], RFI, 9 Feb. 2011.

326 Jacques Morel, La découverte, l’abandon puis le sauvetage des Tutsi survivants de Bisesero [The Discovery, Abandonment and then Rescue of Tutsi Survivors of Bisesero], RFI, 9 Feb. 2011.

327 Jacques Morel, La découverte, l’abandon puis le sauvetage des Tutsi survivants de Bisesero [The Discovery, Abandonment and then Rescue of Tutsi Survivors of Bisesero], RFI, 9 Feb. 2011.


333 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (18 June 2013).

334 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 7 (18 June 2013).
335 Mitterrand Confirms Intervention, RFI, 18 June 1994.
337 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Police Judiciaire (11 Oct. 2007); Memorandum from Patrice Molle (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Voyage de Monsieur le ministre d’État, ministre de la Défense au Zaïre et au Rwanda, le mercredi 29 juin 1994”)
339 Fax from Jean-Rémy Duval (27 June 1994) (“Fax No. 3”) (Subject: “C/R de situation”).
340 Fax from Jean-Rémy Duval (27 June 1994) (“Fax No. 3”) (Subject: “C/R de situation”).
341 Fax from Jean-Rémy Duval (27 June 1994) (“Fax No. 3”) (Subject: “C/R de situation”).
342 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 9 (18 June 2013).
343 Deposition of Jacques Rosier by Police Judiciaire 10 (13 Sept. 2007).
346 Médiapart, Génocide au Rwanda: la vidéo qui accable l’armée française [Genocide in Rwanda: the Video that Condemns the French Army], YOUTUBE (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W1y-9c1lGuY.
349 The video, courtesy of Médiapart, the French investigative journal, can be accessed at https://iciabidjan.com/genocide-des-tutsis-au-rwanda-la-video-qui-accable-larmee-francaise/; see also Letter from Survie to Judge Choquet 14-15 (3 July 2015); Deposition of Eric Meynier by Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (26 June 2013) (noting the capacity in which Meynier served in Rwanda during Operation Turquoise).
354 MIP Tome I 162.
355 Raymond Bonner, Grisly Discovery in Rwanda Leads French to Widen Role, N.Y. TIMES, 1 July 1994.
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361 Catherine Jentile, *Affrontements à Kibuye le 27 juin 1994* [Clashes in Kibuye on 27 June 1994], TF1, 27 June 1994 (“Colonel Rosier, who is in charge of the plan here in the South, has given us, and more precisely it is 15 km [9 miles] from the town of Kibuye that this clash took place, which started this morning at half past eleven and ended in the early afternoon.”); JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, *OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 86-87* (2010) (“To put it plainly, my men heard shots and were told that the RPF was not far away. This was happening in Rwanda, in the vicinity of the Bisesero hill.”).
363 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”) (revealing that Lafourcade had confirmed that armed men were in the area but did not know who the men were).
364 Unsigned report concerning the COS detachment’s discovery of Bisesero massacre (1 July 1994).
366 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).
367 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).
368 Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”) (emphasis added).
380 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by *Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris* (18 June 2013).
381 Deposition of Jean Marie Charpentier by *Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris* 4 (12 Sept. 2013) (“Question: In your notebook, on 29 June, you mention of the visit of the minister of defense at 3:30 p.m., you mention: ‘Briefing on the missions already carried out by the CPA 10 and on the intelligence gathered by the LCL Duval.’ Does this imply debriefing reconnaissance on Bisesero? Answer: Of course.”).
382 Corine Lesnes, *Une semaine après “le feu vert” de l’ONU à l’intervention française au Rwanda* M. Léotard craint de nouvelles difficultés pour le dispositif “Turquoise” [One Week after the U.N. Gives the “Green Light” for French Intervention in Rwanda, Mr. Léotard Fears New Difficulties for the “Turquoise” Contingent], LE MONDE, 1 July 1994.


385 Unsigned report concerning the COS detachment’s discovery of Bisesero massacre (1 July 1994).

386 Memorandum from Marin Gillier (30 June 1998) (Subject: “Turquoise: intervention à Bisesero”) (emphasis added).


388 Deposition of Michel Peyrard by *Police Judiciaire* 5 (1 June 2006).

389 French Memorandum from unknown author (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 30 juin 1994”).


393 See, e.g., Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by *Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris* 5 (18 June 2013) (“We were instructed to avoid contact with any belligerents, that is, the RPF, the FAR, and the militias. Because to clash with one would be interpreted as taking sides with the other. . . . I couldn’t allow myself to even leave a group of six whose lives were at risk.”); Deposition of Jacques Rosier by *Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris* (8 July 2015).

394 See, e.g., Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by *Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris* 5-6 (18 June 2013) (describing his presentation to Minister Léotard on 29 June in a school classroom); see also Deposition of Eric Meynier by *Direction Generale de la Police Nationale* (23 Jan. 2008) (commenting that Minister Léotard’s visit may have contributed to the apparent breakdown in communication).


397 Deposition of Jean-Rémy Duval by *Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris* 10 (18 June 2013).

398 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon”).

399 Letter from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon”).

400 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

401 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

402 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

403 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

404 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

405 Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).

406 See, e.g., *Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement and Sentence*, ¶ 7 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 18 Dec. 2008) (“The Defence has . . . advanced a number of alternative explanations for the events which unfolded. One of them is based on the view that it was the RPF which shot down President Juvénal
Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994, and that this event, together with other factors, triggered spontaneous killings.”).

Decision No. 51/2016 of the Cour d’Assises de la Seine-Saint-Denis siégeant à Bobigny in the appeal of Pascal Senyamuhara Safari alias Pascal Simbikangwa 7 (3 Dec. 2016) (finding that the Genocide was the product of a “concerted plan”).

Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”).


Meeting Notes from Bruno Delaye concerning President François Mitterrand’s meeting with President Yoweri Museveni (1 July 1994) (Subject: “entretien avec Museveni”).

Meeting Notes from Bruno Delaye concerning President François Mitterrand’s meeting with President Yoweri Museveni (1 July 1994) (Subject: “entretien avec Museveni”); see Press Conference, Conférence de presse de Monsieur François Mitterrand (15 Oct. 1990).

Meeting Notes from Bruno Delaye concerning President François Mitterrand’s meeting with President Yoweri Museveni (1 July 1994) (Subject: “entretien avec Museveni”).

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Entretiens avec Museveni”).

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Entretiens avec Museveni”).

Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Entretiens avec Museveni”).

Meeting Notes from Bruno Delaye concerning President François Mitterrand’s meeting with President Yoweri Museveni (1 July 1994) (Subject: “entretien avec Museveni”).

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See Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier ministre et Conseil restreint, Mercredi 29 juin 1994”) (noting that Prime Minister Balladur on 27 June 1994 authorized an extension of the Operation Turquoise detachment’s area of operation); Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon”) (noting that Balladur asked Defense Minister Léotard to authorize operations in Gikongoro and Butare).

Guillaume Ancel: “L’histoire mythique de l’opération Turquoise ne correspond pas à la réalité” [Guillaume Ancel: “The Mythical History of Operation Turquoise Does Not Correspond to Reality”], JEUNE AFRIQUE, 7 Apr. 2014 (discussing the preparatory order, but saying he received it “around June 24”). Memo by Guillaume Ancel (15 Sept. 1994). This is not mentioned in Ancel’s after action report.

Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”) (inferring, on the basis of communications between the RPF and Dallaire, that the RPF intended “to continue its action as far as the borders of Burundi and Zaire”).


438 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to Jacques Lanxade (3 July 1994) (Subject: “zone humanitaire sûre”) (“Here are the new boundaries of the safe humanitarian zone that I will propose to the RPF.”); ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 457-58 (2003) (noting that Dallaire and Kagame each received copies of the French proposal).


444 LFM Interview with Paul Rwarakabije.

445 LFM Interview with Paul Rwarakabije.

446 LFM Interview with Paul Rwarakabije.

447 LFM Interview with Paul Rwarakabije.

448 LFM Interview with Paul Rwarakabije.

449 LFM Interview with Paul Rwarakabije.
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451 See Cable from ARMEES CENTOPS PARIS to COMFOR TURQUOISE (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Communiqué – Rwanda”) (noting the arrival of the Jaguar fighter jets); Report from Raymond Germanos (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Operation Turquoise – Point de situation du 29 juin 1994”) (noting the arrival of the Mirage F1 CT aircraft).

452 See Letter from Claude Dusaidi to President of the United Nations Security Council (1 July 1994); New Zealand diplomatic cable from New York to Wellington (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”).


454 See Fax from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan 2 (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Daily Sitrep 300600B June to 301800B June 94”); Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).

455 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”); ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 448-50 (2003) (Dallaire had told Lafourcade during a visit to Goma the previous day that “Butare was in essence in RPF hands.”).

456 See Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possibles au Rwanda”) (listing Butare among the locales the RPF forces might target after seizing Kigali); Report from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Ordre d’opération No. 1”) (raising the possibility that the RPF might seize Butare).

457 Raymond Bonner, French Establish a Base in Rwanda to Block Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, 5 July 1994.


460 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon”).

461 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon”).

462 Fax from Roméo Dallaire to Kofi Annan (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Special Sitrep”).


466 Report from Aérienne Regnault (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Situation à Butare”).

467 DIDIER TAUZIN, RWANDA: JE DEMANDE JUSTICE POUR LA FRANCE ET SES SOLDATS [RWANDA: I DEMAND JUSTICE FOR FRANCE AND ITS SOLDIERS] 137-138 (2011); see Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (30 June 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 30/06/1994 à 18H00”) (“Tensions are mounting in Butare where the militias could resume their abuses in the event of a pronounced threat from the RPF (20 to 30 assassinations of Tutsis are committed there each night).”); JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 112 (2010) (“The RPF’s infiltration throughout the front line and in particular in the center and south of the country raises
fears that, in the coming hours, there will be an increase in Hutu militia abuses in the Butare region, where many camps and religious communities are particularly at risk.”).


472 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).

473 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”); Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

474 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”); Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade to unknown (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”); Report from Raymond Germanos to EMA COIA (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 02 juillet 1994”).

475 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).

476 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).

477 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).

478 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).

479 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).


481 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (2 July 1994) (“[T]here remains a large number of [refugees] in Butare whose evacuation will be very difficult given the current positions of the RPF.”); JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE 111 (2010) (“[T]he RPF’s advance can only lead to further massacres, especially in Butare.”).

482 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (2 July 1994).

483 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade to EMA COIA CCR (2 July 1994).


485 Memorandum from the French Directorate of Military Intelligence (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Note quotidienne de situation du 2 juillet 1994”).

486 Report from Raymond Germanos to EMA COIA (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 02 juillet 1994”).

487 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

488 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

489 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

490 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

491 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

492 See Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Évolutions possible au Rwanda”); Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Éléments pour une solution politique au Rwanda”).

493 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

494 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

495 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Éléments pour une solution politique au Rwanda”).

496 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Éléments pour une solution politique au Rwanda”).
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497 Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud (1 July 1994) (Subject: “Éléments pour une solution politique au Rwanda”).

498 Memorandum from Admiral Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

499 Memorandum from Admiral Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

500 Note from François Mitterand to Bruno Delaye (2 July 1994).

501 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

502 Letter from Jean-Bertrand Mérimée to the UN Secretary-General (Annex to Letter Dated 2 July 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/798 (6 July 1994)).


504 Letter from Jean-Bertrand Mérimée to the UN Secretary-General (1 July 1994) (Annex to Letter Dated 2 July 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/798 (6 July 1994)).

505 Letter from Jean-Bertrand Mérimée to the UN Secretary-General (1 July 1994) (Annex to Letter Dated 2 July 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/798 (6 July 1994)).


508 Letter from Jean-Bertrand Mérimée to the UN Secretary-General (1 July 1994) (Annex to Letter Dated 2 July 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/798 (6 July 1994)).

509 See La France établit une zone de sécurité contestée par le FPR qu’elle entend défendre par les armes [France Creates a Safe Zone, Disputed by the RPF, which It Plans to Defend by Force of Arms], AFP, 4 July 1994 (reporting that the SHZ would cover roughly one-fifth of Rwanda and one-third of the territory under the IRG’s control); La zone humanitaire sûre “est créée,” selon l’amiral Lanxade [The Safe Humanitarian Zone “Has Been Created,” According to Admiral Lanxade], AFP, 4 July 1994 (reporting that the SHZ would cover roughly one-fifth of Rwandan territory).

510 Letter from Jean-Bertrand Mérimée to the UN Secretary-General (1 July 1994) (Annex to Letter Dated 2 July 1994 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/1994/798 (6 July 1994)).

511 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda–Zaïre–France Éléments de situation militaire”) (reporting that the RPF “was apparently wishing to continue its offensive on Gikongoro” and speculating that its “next objectives . . . would be Kibuye and Cyangugu”).


513 Fiche Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Point de Situation”).

514 Fiche Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Point de Situation”).

515 Fiche Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Point de Situation”).

516 See La France établit une zone de sécurité contestée par le FPR qu’elle entend défendre par les armes [France Creates a Safe Zone, Disputed by the RPF, which It Plans to Defend by Force of Arms], AFP, 4 July 1994 (reporting that the SHZ would cover roughly one-fifth of Rwanda and one-third of the territory under the IRG’s control); La zone humanitaire sûre “est créée,” selon l’amiral Lanxade [The Safe Humanitarian Zone “Has Been Created,” According to Admiral Lanxade], AFP, 4 July 1994 (reporting that the SHZ would cover roughly one-fifth of Rwandan territory).


518 See Alain Frilet, La France a décidé de créer une “Zone humanitaire sûre” dans le sud-ouest du Rwanda [France Decided to Create a “Safe Humanitarian Zone” in the South-West of Rwanda], LIBÉRATION, 4 July 1994; DIDIER


528 See La zone humanitaire sûre “est créée”, selon l’amiral Lanxade [The Safe Humanitarian Zone “Has Been Created,” According to Admiral Lanxade], AFP, 4 July 1994 (reporting that Admiral Lanxade announced the creation of the SHZ at a press briefing on 4 July 1994); Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994 (reporting both on the decision to establish the SHZ and on the exchange of gunfire in Butare).

529 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994.


536 See, e.g., Memorandum from Peter Fromuth and Laurie Shestack to Karl Inderfurth (5 July 1994) (stating that “Paris’ decision to establish a secure humanitarian zone in the contested area of southwestern Rwanda creates a de-facto interpositionary force” and commenting that, while US Department of State officials “understand” the decision, they remain “anxious to assure that this does not lead to conflict with RPF forces”) (memorandum partially redacted).

537 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier ministre, mercredi 6 juillet – Situation”).

538 See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, French Force in Skirmish in Rwanda, N.Y. TIMES, 4 July 1994; La France établit une zone de sécurité contestée par le FPR qu’elle entend défendre par les armes [France Creates a Safe Zone, Disputed by the RPF, which it Plans to Defend by Force of Arms], AFP, 4 July 1994.


541 ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 459 (2003).


543 French diplomatic cable (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Museveni et Paul Kagame (4 juillet)”)(presumably from François Descoueyte, French Ambassador to Uganda).

544 French diplomatic cable (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Museveni et Paul Kagame (4 juillet)”)(presumably from François Descoueyte, French Ambassador to Uganda).

545 French diplomatic cable (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Museveni et Paul Kagame (4 juillet)”)(presumably from François Descoueyte, French Ambassador to Uganda).


547 French diplomatic cable (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Museveni et Paul Kagame (4 juillet)”)(presumably from François Descoueyte, French Ambassador to Uganda).

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549 French diplomatic cable (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Président Museveni et Paul Kagame (4 juillet)”)(presumably from François Descoueyte, French Ambassador to Uganda).

550 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994; see François Luizet, La France décide de s’interposer [France Decides to Intervene], LE FIGARO, 5 July 1994.

551 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994.


553 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994; see François Luizet, La France décide de s’interposer [France Decides to Intervene], LE FIGARO, 5 July 1994.

554 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994.

555 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994.


558 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994.

559 Michela Wrong, France Promises to Halt Rwandan Rebel Advance, REUTERS, 4 July 1994.

560 Telephone interview by LFM with William Bellamy. A 5 July 1994 article in the New York Times reported, along similar lines, that the SHZ’s purpose was “to prevent the rebels’ westward advance,” quoting a French Army captain as saying, “It is a line in the sand.” Raymond Bonner, French Establish a Base in Rwanda to Block Rebels, N.Y. TIMES, 5 July 1994.

561 Telephone interview by LFM with William Bellamy.

562 Memorandum from Christian Quesnot and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Restricted Committee of 4 July 1994”) (“A communication effort must be made so that the media does not interpret our position as being hostile to the RPF.”).

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565 Memorandum from Jacques Lanxade (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise”).

566 Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.

567 Two Emissaries from Paris Are in Charge of Contacts with the RPF and the Interim Government, AFP, 29 June 1994. The Quai d’Orsay had announced its selection of Gérard for the role on 29 June 1994, as part of an initiative in which it also tapped another former French ambassador to serve as an emissary to the RPF. Id. The emissary to the RPF was Ambassador Jacques Warin, a former French permanent representative to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization. See id.; Décret du 2 septembre 1992 portant nomination d’un ambassadeur, représentant permanent de la France auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture à Rome [Decree of 2 September 1992 Appointing an Ambassador, Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization in Rome] (5 Sept. 1992). A Quai d’Orsay spokesman explained at the time that France was “anxious to keep in touch with all parties.” Two Emissaries from Paris Are in Charge of Contacts with the RPF and the Interim Government, AFP, 29 June 1994.


571 See Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Demands End to Hostile Radio Broadcasts against UNAMIR Force Commander (28 June 1994); Fiche Particuliere No 18921/N (30 June 1994); New Zealand Cable from New York to Wellington (27 June 1994).


573 Notes on TD Diplomatie (Subject: “Rwanda – Émission de la radio ‘mille collines’”) (30 June 1994).

574 Notes on TD Diplomatie (Subject: “Rwanda – Émission de la radio ‘mille collines’”) (30 June 1994).

575 Ferdinand Nahimana se défend d’avoir eu un contrôle sur la RTLM [Ferdinand Nahimana Denies Having Had a Control over RTLM], JUSTICEINFO.NET, (26 Aug. 2002).

576 Notes on TD Diplomatie (Subject: “Rwanda – Émission de la radio ‘mille collines’”) (30 June 1994).

577 See Cable from Yannick Gérard (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec MM. Jérôme Bicamumpaka et Ferdinand Nahimana (Fondateur de la Radio des Mille Collines)’’); Cable from Yannick Gérard (3 July 1994) (Subject: “Safe humanitarian zone”)

578 See Cable from Roméo Dallaire to Maurice Baril (3 July 1994) (Subject: “Radio report”) (showing that RTLM attacks on Dallaire continued on 3 July 1994, the day after Gérard’s first meeting with Nahimana).

579 See Cable from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Quelques Commentaires sur les Questions en Cours”); Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Démarche on French humanitarian zone in Rwanda”).

580 See Cable from Yannick Gérard (2 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec MM. Jérôme Bicamumpaka et Ferdinand Nahimana (Fondateur de la Radio des Mille Collines)’’ (reporting that IRG Foreign Minister Jérôme Bicamumpaka, who joined Nahimana at the 2 July meeting, pressed Gérard to agree to set up “working contacts with [French officials] in regard to’’ Operation Turquoise); Cable from Yannick Gérard (3 July 1994) (Subject: “Safe humanitarian zone”) (reporting that on 3 July, during Gérard’s meeting with President Sindikubwabo and other officials, Mathieu Ngorumpatse “expressed his wish that France help the FAR in their fight against the RPF”).

581 Cable from Yannick Gérard (3 July 1994) (Subject: “Safe humanitarian zone”).

583 Cable from Yannick Gérard (3 July 1994) (Subject: “Safe humanitarian zone”) (reporting that on 3 July, during Gérard’s meeting with President Sindikubwabo and other officials, Mathieu Ngirumpate “expressed his wish that France help the FAR in their fight against the RPF”).

584 See Cable from Yannick Gérard (3 July 1994) (Subject: “Safe humanitarian zone”) (reporting that Gérard delivered a presentation about the plan to establish the SHZ).

585 Cable from Yannick Gérard (3 July 1994) (Subject: “Safe humanitarian zone”).


589 Cable from Catherine Boivineau (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Relations avec les Autorités de Gisenyi”).

590 Cable from Yannick Gérard (8 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Relations avec les Autorités de Gisenyi et avec les Autorités Locales”).

591 Cable from Yannick Gérard (8 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Relations avec les Autorités de Gisenyi et avec les Autorités Locales”).

592 Cable from Yannick Gérard (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Relations avec les Autorités de Gisenyi et avec les Autorités Locales”).

593 Cable from Yannick Gérard, French Liaison to IRG (25 July 1994) (Subject: “Report de Mission a Goma: 30 juin au 25 juillet”); see also Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (“Under these conditions, it does not seem desirable to maintain contacts with the Gisenyi personalities.”).

594 Cable from Yannick Gérard (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Point de Situation au Matin du 7 Juillet”).

595 Cable from Yannick Gérard (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Point de Situation au Matin du 7 Juillet”).

596 See, e.g., Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (8 July 1994) (Subject: “GOF More Confident on Rwanda”) (stressing “a need to restart the Arusha process as quickly as possible”).


598 Augustin Bizimungu v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-00-56B-A, Appeals Judgement ¶¶ 175, 186, 194, 201-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 30 June 2014).


601 Cable from Yannick Gérard (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Point de Situation au Matin du 7 Juillet”).

602 Cable from Yannick Gérard (8 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Relations avec les Autorités de Gisenyi et avec les Autorités Locales”).

603 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bismingu” [sic]); Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Général Dallaire du 6 juillet 1994”).

604 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bismingu” [sic]).

605 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bismingu” [sic]).

606 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bismingu” [sic]).
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607 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bisimungu” [sic]).

608 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bisimungu” [sic]).

609 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bisimungu” [sic]).

610 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Rencontre du Général Germanos avec le Général Bisimungu” [sic]). Later that day, in a meeting with UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire, Bizimungu inquired whether, in the event of a cease-fire, both UNAMIR and the Operation Turquoise troops could operate as observers and verify that neither side was violating the cease-fire. When Dallaire and UNAMIR’s political adviser replied that they did not believe cease-fire monitoring and verification was within Turquoise’s mandate, Bizimungu explained “that he had suggested the involvement of Operation Turquoise because the Rwandese population did not have confidence in the impartiality and neutrality of UNAMIR, and in particular General Dallaire.” Memorandum from Sammy Kum Buo (9 July 1994) (Subject: “Force Commander’s Visit to Goma, Zaire, on 6 July 1994”). Evidently, Bizimungu believed Rwandans would feel comfortable entrusting the responsibility to French soldiers.

611 Cable from Yannick Gérard (25 July 1994) (Subject: “Report de Mission a Goma: 30 Juin au 25 Juillet”). Notably, some other FAR generals did dissociate themselves from the IRG in mid-July 1994. See Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion du 11 juillet 1994”). General Dallaire suggested to General Lafourcade on 14 July that it would be better to present some of the dissident generals, rather than Bizimungu, as “valid interlocutors” with the RPF. Lafourcade disagreed, writing in a memo: “I told him my reservations about this scenario, [in] which the dissident generals seem to me to have no authority over the FAR and are considered traitors.” Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Entretien avec le Général Dallaire”).


618 Letter from Gerald Gahima to President of the UN Security Council (6 July 1994).

619 Letter from Gerald Gahima to President of the UN Security Council (6 July 1994).

620 Letter from Gerald Gahima to President of the UN Security Council (6 July 1994).

621 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jean-Michel Marlaud (27 June 1994) (Subject: “Evolutions possible au Rwanda”) (predicting that the RPF’s advance would present a risk of “massacres and the influx of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons”); Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (28 June 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier ministre et Conseil restreint, Mercredi 29 juin 1994”) (asserting that a “massive” RPF attack outside of Kigali “would provoke an uncontrollable flood of refugees”); Restricted Council Meeting Notes (29 June 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”) (quoting Lanxade as saying, “The push of the RPF will cause a Hutu exodus, the flight of populations to the West”).


624 See, e.g., _Half a Million Rwandans Cross Zaire Border in 2 Days_, _LOS ANGELES TIMES_, 16 July 1994 (“No evidence of reprisals has surfaced.”).

625 Letter from Paul Kagame to Jean-Claude Lafourcade (10 July 1994).

626 Letter from Paul Kagame to Jean-Claude Lafourcade (10 July 1994).

627 Raymond Bonner, _France Backs Away from Battle in Rwanda_, _N.Y. TIMES_, 6 July 1994; see Memorandum from Dominique Pin to Anne Lauvergeon (5 July 1994).

628 Letter from Gerald Gahima to President of the UN Security Council (6 July 1994).


632 Duclert Commission Report 881 (quoting ADIPLO, 415COOP/1194, Note « sous couvert de Monsieur le Directeur de Cabinet ». « Réévaluation de notre stratégie »).

633 Duclert Commission Report 880 (quoting ADIPLO, 415COOP/1194, Note « sous couvert de Monsieur le Directeur de Cabinet ». « Réévaluation de notre stratégie »).

634 See Duclert Commission Report 881 (quoting ADIPLO, 415COOP/1194, Note « sous couvert de Monsieur le Directeur de Cabinet ». « Réévaluation de notre stratégie »).

635 Fiche Particulière No. 18997 (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Le FPR Joue la Carte Politique”).

636 Fiche Particulière No. 18997 (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Le FPR Joue la Carte Politique”).


640 See, e.g., Fiche Particulière No. 18972, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Le FPR joue la carte politique”).

641 Fiche Particulière No. 18972, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Le FPR joue la carte politique”).

642 Faustin Twagiramungu: les forces françaises doivent avoir quitté le Rwanda fin juillet [Faustin Twagiramungu: French Forces Must Leave Rwanda by the End of July], _AFP_, 7 July 1994.

643 Faustin Twagiramungu: les forces françaises doivent avoir quitté le Rwanda fin juillet [Faustin Twagiramungu: French Forces Must Leave Rwanda by the End of July], _AFP_, 7 July 1994.

644 See, e.g., Raymond Bonner, _French Establish a Base in Rwanda to Block Rebels_, _N.Y. TIMES_, 5 July 1994 (“Rwandan Government Troops moved freely throughout the area today, and a checkpoint less than a mile from the French base was manned by militiamen with machetes, rifles and grenades.”). A DGSE report in August 1994

645 French intelligence report (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de Situation du 06 juillet 1994”).

646 Cable from Yannick Gérard (10 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Attitude des FAR”).

647 Cable from Yannick Gérard (9 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Point de la Situation au Matin du 9 juillet”).

648 Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Zone humanitaire protégée”) (“The principle laid down by France is that the area must not be used as a rear base for the FAR.”).

649 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Modalités de déploiement de la force Turquoise dans la zone humanitaire sure (ZHS)”).

650 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Modalités de déploiement de la force Turquoise dans la zone humanitaire sure (ZHS)”).

651 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Modalités de déploiement de la force Turquoise dans la zone humanitaire sure (ZHS)”).


661 As noted above, in his end-of-mission report, Colonel Patrice Sartre noted that the mission orders provided no instruction on what to do if French forces apprehended someone who posed a threat to them or civilians. See Report from Patrice Sartre 10, 12 (24 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rapport de fin de mission Turquoise du Chef de corps du GIAR”).

662 See Memorandum from French Ministry of Defense (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 07 juillet 1994”) (reporting that, as of 7 July 1994, France had just 1,500 troops in Rwanda and 1,055 in Zaire); Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Démarche sur French humanitarian zone in Rwanda”) (“[France] does not administer the territory, which it considers to be the responsibility of local Rwandan authorities.”).

663 As noted above, Yannick Gérard and local leaders in the SHZ acknowledged the need to have contact with local authorities in the SHZ in order “to ensure that Operation Turquoise runs smoothly,” but also observed that all of them were criminals who would have to be arrested in due course and brought to justice as soon as possible. Cable from Yannick Gérard (25 July 1994) (Subject: “Report de Mission a Goma: 30 Juin au 25 Juillet”); Cable from Yannick Gérard (8 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Relations avec les Autorités de Gisenyi et avec les Autorités Locales”).


665 Interview by LFM with James Babbitt. Babbitt was on a temporary assignment. He had flown in from Brazzaville, Republic of the Congo, where he was serving as the US defense attaché, to embed himself for roughly two weeks with the Turquoise forces and report his observations about the refugee crisis back to Washington.

666 French Situation Report (6 July 1994) (Subject: “CRQ du 6/7/94”) (predicting that if Turquoise troops delivered suspected killers to the Gendarmerie “they will probably be [set] free”); Corine Lesnes, Rwanda: un entretien avec le général Lafourcade: Le chef de l’opération “Turquoise” prévoit que le FPR va progresser jusqu’à la limite de la zone
humanitaire [Rwanda: An Interview with General Lafourcade: the Head of Operation “Turquoise” Predicts That the RPF is Going to Advance to the Edge of the Humanitarian Zone], LE MONDE, 9 July 1994 (stating the French troops handed militia members over to the FAR, rather than to the Gendarmerie, “to be sure they were not released”).


Letter from Gerald Gahima to the President of the UN Security Council (6 July 1994).

Letter from Gerald Gahima to the President of the UN Security Council (6 July 1994).

Letter from Gerald Gahima to the President of the UN Security Council (6 July 1994).

Memo from the French Ministry of Defense (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda; concept de zone humanitaire protégée; contenu, évolution”).

Memo from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

Memo from the French Ministry of Defense (4 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda; concept de zone humanitaire protégée; contenu, évolution”).

Memo from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).


See Memo from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand and Hubert Védrine (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (asserting that disarming the FAR and militias inside the SHZ “is not within our mandate and we do not have the means”); Chris McGreal, Rwandan Troops Pack French Safe Haven, GUARDIAN, 7 July 1994.

See Memo from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand and Hubert Védrine (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).


ROMÉO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL 457 (2003); see also Cable from Yannick Gérard (10 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Point de Situation (Matin 10 juillet)”) (“[T]he disarmament of militias cannot be arranged without stirring up widespread reactions against Operation Turquoise.”).

Cable from Yannick Gérard (10 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Point de Situation (Matin 10 juillet)”) (“Unless it were to provoke generalized reactions against Operation Turquoise, the disarming of militias cannot be made systematic. It is currently done on a sporadic basis on occasions where militia threaten population groups.”).

Corine Lesnes, Rwanda: un entretien avec le général Lafourcade: Le chef de l’opération “Turquoise” prévoit que le FPR va progresser jusqu’à la limite de la zone humanitaire [Rwanda: An Interview with General Lafourcade: the Head of Operation “Turquoise” Predicts That the RPF is Going to Advance to the Edge of the Humanitarian Zone], LE MONDE, 9 July 1994; see French Situation Report (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Comte General Lafourcade 7 Juillet – 08:15 Point de situation”).

Corine Lesnes, Rwanda: un entretien avec le général Lafourcade: Le chef de l’opération “Turquoise” prévoit que le FPR va progresser jusqu’à la limite de la zone humanitaire [Rwanda: An Interview with General Lafourcade: the Head of Operation “Turquoise” Predicts That the RPF is Going to Advance to the Edge of the Humanitarian Zone], LE MONDE, 9 July 1994.

Corine Lesnes, Rwanda: un entretien avec le général Lafourcade: Le chef de l’opération “Turquoise” prévoit que le FPR va progresser jusqu’à la limite de la zone humanitaire [Rwanda: An Interview with General Lafourcade: the Head of Operation “Turquoise” Predicts That the RPF is Going to Advance to the Edge of the Humanitarian Zone], LE MONDE, 9 July 1994.

Corine Lesnes, Rwanda: un entretien avec le général Lafourcade: Le chef de l’opération “Turquoise” prévoit que le FPR va progresser jusqu’à la limite de la zone humanitaire [Rwanda: An Interview with General Lafourcade: the
Head of Operation “Turquoise” Predicts That the RPF is Going to Advance to the Edge of the Humanitarian Zone],

689 Corine Lesnes, Rwanda: un entretien avec le général Lafourcade: Le chef de l’opération “Turquoise” prévoit que le FPR va progresser jusqu’à la limite de la zone humanitaire [Rwanda: An Interview with General Lafourcade: the
Head of Operation “Turquoise” Predicts That the RPF is Going to Advance to the Edge of the Humanitarian Zone],


693 Cable from Shaharyar Khan to Kofi Annan (6 Sept. 1994) (Subject: “Weekly Sitrep Period Covering 29 Aug to 04 Sep 94”).


696 Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”); see also Duclert Commission Report 629-30 (stating that General Germanos “explained during a crisis cell meeting on 7 July, ‘we can provide information and [illegible] take note of the killers, but not arrest people” (quoting ADIPLO, 643COOP/18, carton 1, Verbatim de Jean-Marc Simon sur la réunion de la cellule de crise, 7 juillet 1994)).

697 Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

698 Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

699 Memorandum from Sammy Kum Buo (8 July 1994) (Subject: “SRSG’s Meeting with Foreign Minister of Rwanda”).

700 See Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”); Memorandum from Sammy Kum Buo, (8 July 1994) (Subject: “SRSG’s Meeting with Foreign Minister of Rwanda”); S.C. Res. 935, ¶ 1, S/RES/935 (1 July 1994); see also Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (13 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion du 13 juillet 1994”) (noting that the members of the commission had yet to be appointed as of 13 July 1994).

701 See S.C. Res. 935, ¶ 1, S/RES/935 (1 July 1994).

702 Corine Lesnes, Rwanda: un entretien avec le général Lafourcade: Le chef de l’opération “Turquoise” prévoit que le FPR va progresser jusqu’à la limite de la zone humanitaire [Rwanda: An Interview with General Lafourcade: the
Head of Operation “Turquoise” Predicts That the RPF is Going to Advance to the Edge of the Humanitarian Zone],

703 See Slaughter Continues in Rwanda: UNHCR, AFP, 12 July 1994 (reporting that 2,000 Rwandans were arriving in Tanzania daily and that 15,000 arrived in Burundi the previous week); Cable from US Mission in Geneva to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Human Rights Commission: Special Rapporteur Concludes Genocide Has Occurred in Rwanda”) (“The conflict has led to a mass exodus unprecedented in Rwanda.”).

704 See, e.g., Cable from Yannick Gérard (9 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda, Point de la Situation au Matin du 9 juillet”) (“‘ Authorities’ of Ruhengeri and Gisenyi have reportedly already fled to Zaire.”); RENÉ DEGNI-SÉGUI, SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RWANDA ¶ 37-40, E/CN.4/1995/7 (28 June 1994) (reporting on militia activity in refugee camps in Tanzania and Zaire).
Cable from US Mission in Geneva to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Human Rights Commission: Special Rapporteur Concludes Genocide Has Occurred in Rwanda”) (“The conflict has led to a mass exodus unprecedented in Rwanda.”).


Cable from American Embassy in Paris to US Secretary State (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aid Administrator Atwood’s Meetings with GOF Officials”).

Cable from American Embassy in Paris to US Secretary State (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aid Administrator Atwood’s Meetings with GOF Officials”); Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Paris (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aid Administrator Atwood’s Meetings with GOF Officials”) (“The French feel they are being overwhelmed by the situation in Rwanda. They went in to stop the killings but now find themselves faced with a humanitarian disaster of horrendous proportions.”).


Interview by LFM with Colin Keating (4 Sept. 2019). French representatives to the United Nations touched on the issue in mid-July 1994, after notifying the UN Security Council that some IRG leaders were taking shelter in the SHZ (discussed below). According to a 15 July 1994 French diplomatic cable, the French diplomats “indicated that France was prepared to give support to any UN decision concerning these persons.” Duclert Commission Report 630 (quoting ADIPLO, 789SUP/15, Letter from H. Ladsous to Jamsheed Marker, President of the Security Council, 15 July 1994). Nothing in the cable indicates that the French diplomats urged the United Nations to authorize Turquoise troops to arrest the IRG authorities or any other suspected génocidaires. The cable does note that members of the US delegation “informed us at the end of the council [meeting] that they would be ready to support us in the adoption of a resolution extending the mandate of the multinational force to allow for the arrest and detention of criminals.” Id. at 635. It is unclear whether, in referring to “the multinational force,” the cable was alluding to Turquoise or to UNAMIR. In any case, the cable concluded that an effort to secure such a resolution would be sure to fail absent “a specific report from the [human] rights commission or the commission of inquiry.” Notes on TD DFRA New York 3463 (15 July 1994).


Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (5 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de Situation du 5 juillet 1994”) (“It seems they’ve chosen to concentrate efforts in a NE-SW direction, towards Gikongoro and the eastern edges of the Nyungwe forest, the capture of which would represent an impressive gain for the RPF.”).

Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (11 July 1994).

See, e.g., Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (6 July 1994) (“According to the provisional government, the RPF will seek to avoid direct clashes with French forces and will modify its strategy, favoring an offensive toward Gisenyi. By doing so, the RPF should bypass Gikongoro and attack in the northwest, starting with Ruhengeri.”).


See Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Directives concernant la ZHS adressée aux cdts de groupements”) (predicting, following the RPF’s capture of Ruhengeri on 13 July 1994, that Gisenyi would “fall very soon”).


Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (11 July 1994).

Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (11 July 1994).


Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (8 July 1994) (Subject: “GOF More Confident on Rwanda”) (stressing “a need to restart the Arusha process as quickly as possible”); see also Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Démarche on French humanitarian zone in Rwanda”).

Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Démarche on French humanitarian zone in Rwanda”).

Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Démarche on French humanitarian zone in Rwanda”).

Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (8 July 1994) (Subject: “GOF More Confident on Rwanda”) (stressing “a need to restart the Arusha process as quickly as possible”).

See, e.g., Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (13 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 13 juillet 1994”) (“To date, aid delivered (about 140 tons in 15 days) is laughable compared to the estimated 1,000 needed per day.”); Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 11 juillet 1994”) (decrying the “shortcomings in terms of quantity of humanitarian aid” in the area and noting that the Turquoise forces were “experiencing tremendous difficulties, in the absence of NGO’s, to distribute aid to displaced persons”).

See Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand and Hubert Védrine (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”); Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 11 juillet 1994”). The operation’s shortcomings would only become more apparent as more and more displaced persons flooded the SHZ in mid-July 1994. See, e.g., Memorandum from PCIAT (17 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation humanitaire du 17 juillet 1994”) (reporting that aid from the French government and the World Food Program merely represented three days of need in the SHZ).

See, e.g., Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (“The mobilization of the international community is still totally insufficient.”); Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand and Hubert Védrine (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”) (“For political reasons, NGOs are always hesitant to step in alongside us.”); Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise – Point de situation du 11 juillet 1994”) (complaining that NGOs had been tardy and asserting that if they “do not urgently take necessary measures, the lives of several thousand people will be threatened in the very short term”); Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (12 July 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier Minister le mercredi 13 juillet à 09 H 30”) (“Finally, humanitarian organizations’ commitment remains very modest in spite of our repeated calls.”).


743 Memorandum from Ms. Lauvergeon and Mr. Mary to Hubert Védrine (28 June 1994) (reproducing a 27 June 1998 interview of Alain Juppé by Europe 1).

744 See Memorandum from Sammy Kum Buo (9 July 1994) (Subject: “Force Commander’s Visit to Goma, Zaire, on 6 July 1994); Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (8 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Réunion du 8 juillet 1994”).


747 G7 Summit in Naples Meeting Notes (10 July 1994) (Notes by Anne Lawegen).

748 G7 Summit in Naples Meeting Notes (10 July 1994) (Notes by Anne Lawegen).

749 Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

750 Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

751 Cable from American Embassy in Paris to the US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Ambassador Rawson’s June 7 Meeting in Brussels with Faustin Twagiramungu”).

752 Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation le 11 juillet à 7 heures”); see Bulletin Quotidien d’Information (BQI) (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Bulletin Quotidien d’Information (BQI) du lundi 11 juillet à 09 H 00”)

753 Fiche, Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (11 July 1994).

754 Lafourcade: nous accueillerons les ministres hutus [Lafourcade: We Will Welcome the Hutu Ministers], *REUTERS*, 11 July 1994.

755 Lafourcade: nous accueillerons les ministres hutus [Lafourcade: We Will Welcome the Hutu Ministers], *REUTERS*, 11 July 1994; see also Lindsey Hilsum, *France Hides Rwandan Wolf with the Lamb*, *GUARDIAN*, 10 July 1994 (quoting a French colonel as saying, “We are here to save lives, not to judge people”).

756 Cable from American Embassy in Paris to the US Secretary of State (13 July 1994) (Subject: “GOF confirms troops will stay slightly longer in Rwanda”).

757 Cable from American Embassy in Paris to the US Secretary of State (13 July 1994) (Subject: “GOF confirms troops will stay slightly longer in Rwanda”).


762 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 14 juillet soir”); Rwandans Flee in Panic to Zaire, N.Y. TIMES, 14 July 1994.

763 Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Directives concernant la ZHS adressée aux cdts de groupements”).

764 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 14 juillet soir”).

765 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 14 juillet soir”).


767 New Zealand diplomatic cable from New York to Wellington (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”). French diplomats in New York argued that it ought to be up to the United Nations to decide what to do about the IRG authorities in the SHZ, “insofar as France was acting in this zone with a UN mandate.” Notes on TD DFRA New York 3463 (15 July 1994). According to a 15 July 1994 French cable, the diplomats were frustrated to find that other UN Security Council members seemed un eager to take up the issue. The cable noted that US diplomats said “they would be ready to support us in the adoption of a resolution extending the mandate of the multinational force to allow for the arrest and detention of criminals.” Id. The French delegation concluded, though, that such an initiative would have no chance of success unless it were “to rely on a specific report from the [human] rights commission or the commission of inquiry.” Id.


771 Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Directives concernant la ZHS adressée aux cdts de groupements”).

772 Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Directives concernant la ZHS adressée aux cdts de groupements”).

773 Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Directives concernant la ZHS adressée aux cdts de groupements”).

774 Cable from Yannick Gérard (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Refuge du gouvernement intérimaire à Cyangugu”).

775 Cable from Yannick Gérard (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Refuge du gouvernement intérimaire à Cyangugu”).

776 Notes on TD Kigali (Subject: “Témoignage sur les autorités de Gisenyi”) (10 July 1994).

777 Cable from Yannick Gérard (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Refuge du gouvernement intérimaire à Cyangugu”).

778 Ducleret Commission Report 632 (citing AN/PR-BD, AG(5)/BD/62, TD Diplomatie 20698, 15 juillet 1994, Emié). One reason the Quai d’Orsay was in a hurry to shoo the IRG authorities out of the zone is that officials in Paris did not want to get into a confrontation with the new government the RPF was expected to form in Kigali. “We also run the risk, as soon as a new government is formed by the RPF, of being asked to hand [the IRG officials] over to the new authorities,” an unsigned Quai d’Orsay note cautioned. “It is better to prevent this risk by having those involved leave, which will also dissuade others from joining the safe zone.” Id. at 633 (ADIPLO, 3727TOPO/3320, note non signée, 15 juillet 1994).

779 Ducleret Commission Report 632 (quoting AN/PR-BD, AG(5)/BD/62, TD Diplomatie 20698, 15 juillet 1994, Emié). Gérard’s reply was defiant: “For my part, I continue to believe that these members of the interim government are indeed among the main perpetrators of the genocide and that our duty now is not to let them go free. This opinion, of course, is my own, but I would like to see it recorded in the file of this case, given the mission with which the Department has entrusted me.” Id. (quoting ADIPLO, 202000018ACXXX, TD Kigali 471, 16 juillet 1994).
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[780] Cable from Jacques Lapouge (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Présence de membres du ‘Gouvernement intérimaire’ rwandais dans la zone humanitaire sure”).


[785] Cable from US Secretary of State (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Non-Recognition of Interim Government of Rwanda”).

[786] MIP Tome I 344.


[792] See, e.g., PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 262-63 (1998) (documenting an interview with IRG President Sindikubwabo and André Nkurunziza, Sindikubwabo’s press attaché, during his exile in Bukavu).


[797] See Half a Million Rwandans Cross Zaire Border in 2 Days, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 16 July 1994; Raymond Bonner, Rwandan Refugees Flee into Zaire as Rebel Forces Gain Grip, N.Y. TIMES, 15 July 1994 (“Nearly all of the refugees fleeing into Zaire are Hutus.”).


[800] See Cable from the USDAO Kinshasa to the US Secretary of State (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwandan Crisis; Goma, Zaire Sitrep Number One”); US Defense Intelligence Agency (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Goma Threat Assessment”).

[801] See, e.g., Memorandum from PCIAT (17 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation humanitaire du 17 juillet 1994”) (“The RPF push on Gisenyi resulted in a last wave of Rwandan peoples mixed with government forces that were disarmed immediately upon arriving in Goma.”); Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 July 1994) (Subject:
“Directives concernant la ZHS adressée aux cdts de groupements”) (“The RPF took Ruhengeri causing the exodus of
700,000 people to Zaire, in the region of Goma.”).

802 See, e.g., Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Opération Turquoise –
Point de situation du 14 juillet 1994”) (reporting that the IRG on 14 July 1994 ordered Hutus in northwestern Rwanda
to take refuge in Zaire).

803 See Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de
Situation du 15 juillet 1994”) (referring to the Gisenyi authorities’ “directive to leave the country”); French Situation
Report (18 July 1994) (Subject: “CRQ du 18/7/94”); see also New Zealand diplomatic cable from New York to
Wellington (14 July 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”) (discussing “Rwandan Radio’s calls to flee the
‘Tutsi-led massacres’”).

804 French Situation Report (18 July 1994) (Subject: “CRQ du 18/7/94”).

805 Interview by LFM with Charles Karamba.

806 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

807 Interview by LFM with Emmanuel Karenzi Karake.

808 Cable from US Embassy in Nairobi to the US Secretary of State (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Situation –
USAID Administrator Atwood Meeting with ICRC and UN in Nairobi, July 17, 1994”); see New Zealand cable from
New York to Wellington (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Security Council: Rwanda”) (reporting that Radio Rwanda and
[FAR] officials were major contributors to the panic which had led to the massive exodus in recent days”); Raymond
Bonner, Rwandan Refugees Flood Zaire as Rebel Forces Gain, N.Y. TIMES, 15 July 1994 (“For the last several
months, [the Hutu] have been bombarded with propaganda against the Tutsi, and believe that the Tutsi will not only
kill them, but do so in the most gruesome ways.”).

809 Cable from US Embassy in Nairobi to the US Secretary of State (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda Situation –
USAID Administrator Atwood Meeting with ICRC and UN in Nairobi, July 17, 1994”); see also Cable from the
USDAO Kinshasa to the US Secretary of State (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwandan Crisis; Goma, Zaire Sitrep Number
One”) (“The Hutu or Hutu sympathizer-operated radio station ‘Mille Collines’ (Thousand Hills) continues to broadcast
propaganda to the Rwandan population; telling them to leave Rwanda or be slaughtered.”).


812 Half a Million Rwandans Cross Zaire Border in 2 Days, LOS ANGELES TIMES, 16 July 1994 (“No evidence have
reprisals has surfaced.”).


815 See Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Brouillage RTLM”) (exploring
the possibility of jamming RTLM’s broadcasts); Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (July 1994)
(Subject: “Brouillage opération Turquoise”).

816 See French Cable (6 July 1994) (Subject: “Quelques Commentaires sur les Questions en Cours”); Cable from
Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Démarche on French humanitarian zone in
Rwanda”).

817 Memorandum from the French Ministry of Defense (7 July 1994) (Subject: “COMTEL of COMFOR Turquoise 07.09.00 B”); see Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (7 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de Situation”).

818 See Memorandum from [first name unknown] Doireau (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Fiche d’analyses”); Memorandum

819 See Memorandum from [first name unknown] Doireau (11 July 1994) (Subject: “Fiche d’analyses”).

820 See Cable from American Embassy in Paris to US Secretary State (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aid
Administrator Atwood’s Meetings with GOF Officials”) (reporting that France sent to Rwanda equipment to locate
the extremists’ radio transmitter, and that “jamming equipment was on the way”).


Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du dimanche 18 juillet soir”).

Transcript, Interview by Europe 1 with Alain Juppé (19 July 1994).

Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (19 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation le 19 juillet 1994 à 07 h 00”).

Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (19 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 19 juillet soir”).

Transcript, Interview by Europe 1 with Alain Juppé (19 July 1994).

Cable from Madeleine Albright to the US Secretary of State (19 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – 18 Jul 94 Security Council Meeting”).

See Cable from Shaharyar Khan to Kofi Annan (19 July 1994) (Subject: “Weekly Sitrep Period Covering 11 Jul to 17 Jul 94”).


See Chris McGreal, Remnants of Beaten Army Enter Zaire, GUARDIAN, 18 July 1994; DRM intelligence report (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de Situation du 18 juillet 1994”) (“[T]he interim government taking refuge in Cyangugu seems to have chosen to withdraw to Zaire with the rest of the FAR and their weapons.”) (emphasis added).

Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (19 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”). This figure may not have represented the total number of FAR soldiers in Zaire at that time. An 18 July 1994 sitrep by General Lafourcade said the FAR had reportedly exfiltrated 23,000 troops to Zaire, of whom 15,000 were in Goma and 8,000 were in Bukavu. Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du dimanche 18 juillet soir”).

Cable from US Defense Intelligence Agency (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Goma Threat Assessment”).

Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

Cable from the USDAO Kinshasa to the US Secretary of State (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwandan Crisis; Goma, Zaire Sitrep Number One”). Rwarakabije said the Zairean troops kept the weapons they confiscated at a military camp in Goma. He said they returned the weapons to the FAR in 1996. See Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.


Patrick de Saint Exupéry said it came a month after the 17 May UN arms embargo, which would have meant June and not July.


Jacques Hogard, *Le Colonel Hogard met les choses au point après la parution du livre de Guillaume Ancel [In His Turn, Colonel Hogard Takes the Things to Point After the Publication of Guillaume Ancel’s Book]*, *Association France Turquoise* (8 May 2018). Hogard suggested that Ancel may have “confused this imaginary delivery of weapons with the real delivery of humanitarian cargo (plastic sheeting, blankets, food and essential drugs) that I made on Friday afternoon, 22 July (I have all my records!) to the families of General Kabiligi’s soldiers (4300 people) who are refugees at the western exit of Bukavu (Zaire).”

Interview by LFM with James Babbitt.

Interview by LFM with James Babbitt.

Interview by LFM with James Babbitt.

Interview by LFM with James Babbitt.

Interview by LFM with James Babbitt.

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Interview by LFM with James Babbitt.

Interview by LFM with James Babbitt.


Request for documents from the Government of Rwanda to the Government of France (receipt acknowledged 10 July 2020).

Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije. Gen. Rwarakabije did note that two civilian trucks full of weapons crossed the border from Rwanda to Zaire without being searched.

Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije.

See Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije; *Rapport de Fin de Mission, Operation Turquoise Tome II* 150 (22 Aug. 1994); MIP Tome I 355-56.

Mucyo Report Section 4.1.2.1 (2008).
Interview by LFM with Paul Rwarakabije. Rwarakabije said that Bizimungu had advised him of the advice offered to him by Lafourcade.

Interview by LFM with Evariste Murenzi.

Interview by LFM with Evariste Murenzi.

Interview by LFM with Evariste Murenzi; Mucyo Report Section 4.1.2.1 (2008).

See RAPPORT DE FIN DE MISSION, OPERATION TURQUOISE TOME II 3, 9, 154, 161 (22 Aug. 1994); Letter from Colonel BEM Augustin Ndindilyimana, the Rwandan minister of defense, to the Army chief of staff (9 Mar. 1992) (Subject: “Candidature du Capitaine de Saint Quentin Grégoire”).

Interview by LFM with Evariste Murenzi.

Interview by LFM with Evariste Murenzi.


Interview by LFM with Evariste Murenzi.


Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (19 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation le 19 juillet 1994 à 07 h 00”).


Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

Draft cable from the US Embassy in Kigali to Office of Central African Affairs (19 August 1994) (Subject: “Introductory Meeting with New UNAMIR Force”).


Cable from American Embassy in Paris to RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Daily Media Reaction Report”), quoting RWANDA Les réfugiés menacés par le choléra la situation du million de personnes qui ont fui au Zaïre empire et les organisations humanitaires ne sont toujours pas en mesure d’y faire face [RWANDA Refugees Facing Cholera: The Situation of the One Million People Who Have Fled to Zaire is Worsening and Humanitarian Organizations Are Still Unable to Cope], LE MONDE (22 July 1994).


Cable from American Embassy in Paris to US Secretary of State (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aid Administrator Atwood’s Meetings with GOF Officials”) (reporting that France had 1,500 troops in the SHZ and another 1,000 “further north”).

JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPERATION TURQUOISE 147 (2010).


Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 20 Juillet soir”).
896 Cable from American Embassy in Paris to US Secretary of State (20 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: Aid Administrator Atwood’s Meetings with GOF Officials”).


899 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

900 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

901 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

902 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

903 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994) (noting that the UN secretary general was expecting UNAMIR to have 2,000 troops by 15 August 1994; see also Situation Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (17 July 1994) (Subject: “note quotidienne de situation du 17 juillet 1994”) (anticipating that UNAMIR would have, at best, no more than 1,250 troops by the end of July and 2,800 by 21 August).

904 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

905 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

906 Council of Ministers Meeting Notes (20 July 1994).

907 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

908 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

909 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

910 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

911 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

912 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

913 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).


915 Intelligence Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de situation du 22 juillet 1994”); see also Intelligence Report, Direction du Renseingement Militaire (23 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de situation du 23 juillet 1994”).

916 Intelligence Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de situation du 22 juillet 1994”).

917 Intelligence Report, Direction du Renseignement Militaire (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Note Quotidienne de situation du 22 juillet 1994”).


919 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).
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920 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

921 See, e.g., Editorial, Two Million Refugees, N.Y. Times, 20 July 1994 (noting that the United States “approved 80 airlift missions and $31 million in emergency funds for food and medicine”); International Aid Efforts Multiply as Rwanda Crisis Deepens, AFP, 22 July 1994.


923 Memorandum from Bruno Delaye and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Réunion à Matignon le 22 juillet à 10h00”).

924 See, e.g., Alain Juppé, La responsabilité de tous [Everyone’s Responsibility], LE MONDE, 2 July 1994, p. 2 (“I admit to feeling some concern about the international apathy that I still see today, even as the Rwandan tragedy continues. France cannot act alone.”).

925 See, e.g., Cable from Jacques Lanxade to Jean-Claude Lafourcade (25 June 1994) (Subject: “Directive de communication Turquoise N 3”).


932 Cable from Jacques Lanxade to Jean-Claude Lafourcade (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Directive de communication complémentaire Turquoise N 17”); see François Léotard, La France doit garder la tête haute [France Must Keep Its Head High], LIBÉRATION, 22 July 1994.

933 Cable from Jacques Lanxade to Jean-Claude Lafourcade (22 July 1994) (Subject: “Directive de communication complémentaire Turquoise N 17”).


938 Memorandum from Craig Kelly to Anthony Lake (27 July 1994) (Subject: “Your Meeting with French Defense Minister François Léotard, July 29, 1:30 p.m.”).


See *Meeting Notes* (3 August 1994) (Subject: “Dominique Pin entretien avec Françoise Carle”). French officials had evidently thought it sufficient to reach out through the United Nations, as an intermediary; Cable from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (3 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “TD Diplomatie 22364: Entretien téléphonique avec le ministre des affaires étrangères Rwandais”) (stating that PM Twagiramungu had at least expected a telephone call from Balladur); Memorandum from Direction du Renseignement Militaire (5 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Éléments de situation sur les rapports entre les forces Turquoise et le FPR et sur les retours de réfugiés au Rwanda”). The DRM later reported that the UN failed to relay the message in time.


Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (4 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 4 aout soir”).

Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (4 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 4 aout soir”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (2 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier Ministre mercredi 3 août – Rwanda – Cameroun”).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Bruno Delaye to François Mitterrand (2 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Votre entretien avec le Premier Ministre mercredi 3 août – Rwanda – Cameroun”).


Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (5 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”) (reporting that the ambassador would travel to Kigali on 6 August).

Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (5 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”) (reporting that the ambassador would travel to Kigali on 6 August).

See Memorandum from Jean-Marc de La Sablière (8 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: réunion ministérielle du 8 août 1994”); Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (5 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Situation au Rwanda”) (reporting that the ambassador would travel to Kigali on 6 August).

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962 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (8 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).


964 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (8 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

965 Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (8 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

966 Annie Thomas, UN Envoy Downplays Harassment Reports, AFP, 6 Aug. 1994.

967 Annie Thomas, UN Envoy Downplays Harassment Reports, AFP, 6 Aug. 1994.

968 See, e.g., Fiche Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (5 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Collaboration entre anciens officiers des FAR et le FPR”) (showing the Kigali authorities had even gone so far as to reach out to former FAR officers—those who had not participated in the genocidal violence against the Tutsi—to request that they meet with refugees in Goma and urge them to come home).

969 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”).

970 Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”).

971 Hutus Return to French Zone Citing Tutsi Reprisal Attacks, AFP, 6 Aug. 1994.

972 Hutus Return to French Zone Citing Tutsi Reprisal Attacks, AFP, 6 Aug. 1994.

973 Hutus Return to French Zone Citing Tutsi Reprisal Attacks, AFP, 6 Aug. 1994.

974 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”).

975 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”).

976 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”); Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Paris (6 August 1994) (Subject: “French Plans for Withdrawal from Rwanda”).

977 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”).

978 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”).

979 See Memorandum from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (9 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Point de situation du 9 aout soir”).

980 See, e.g., Situation Report from “Gérard” (25 July 1994) (Subject: “TD Kigali 530: Rwanda, Report on the Mission to Goma: 30 June to 25 July”) (“I was astounded by the flood of ethnic hatred that [RTLM] broadcast to its listeners, the confounding of the RPF and UNAMIR and the rabble-rousing against the enemy, the Tutsi, who should be gotten rid of.”); see also Memorandum from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (15 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”); Turquoise situation report (16 July 1994) (“The population is apprehensive about the departure of the French in August, and the prospect of being protected by Africans from UNAMIR is not cause for rejoicing. This could be the source of new mass movements.”).


982 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Paris (13 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Démarche to the French on Rwanda”).

983 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Paris (13 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Démarche to the French on Rwanda”).


985 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Paris (13 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Démarche to the French on Rwanda”).

986 Cable from US Secretary of State to American Embassy in Paris (13 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Démarche to the French on Rwanda”).
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990 Draft cable from the US Embassy in Kigali to Office of Central African Affairs (19 August 1994) (Subject: “Introductory Meeting with New UNAMIR Force”).
995 Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Visite du ministre de l’intérieur Sendashonga Seth (Hutu)”).
998 Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Visite du ministre de l’intérieur Sendashonga Seth (Hutu)”).
999 Fax from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (14 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Visite du ministre de l’intérieur Sendashonga Seth (Hutu)”).
1000 See, e.g., Craig Nelson, Hutus Begin New Exodus as French Troops Pack Their Bags, INDEPENDENT, 16 August 1994, p. 2 (quoting Hogard as saying, “Why should we stay with a government that doesn’t want us?”); Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State ¶ 3 (Subject: “French Pullout from Humanitarian Zone Remains on Track”) (19 Aug. 1994).
1001 See, e.g., Memorandum from Ms. Lauvergeon and Mr. Mary to Hubert Védrine, Secretary General to the President (28 June 1994) (reproducing a 27 June 1998 interview of Alain Juppé by Europe 1).
1002 Cable from US Defense Intelligence Agency (18 July 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda – Security Council”); Notes on Memorandum from Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (19 July 1994) (featuring a handwritten note from Hubert Védrine noting that Prime Minister Balladur “is very concerned to see this operation completed quickly and with dignity for France’s image”).
1003 Cable from US Embassy in Kigali (16 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Meeting of Charge d’Affaires with UN SRSG; No Bend in the GOR”).
1004 Cable from US Embassy in Kigali (16 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Meeting of Charge d’Affaires with UN SRSG; No Bend in the GOR”).
1005 Cable from US Embassy in Kigali (16 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Meeting of Charge d’Affaires with UN SRSG; No Bend in the GOR”).
1006 MIP Tome III 88.
1007 JEAN-CLAUDE LAFOURCADE & GUILLAUME RIFFAUD, OPÉRATION TURQUOISE, 25-26, 34, 85, 105, 109 (2010); LAURE DE VULPIAN & THIERRY PRUNGAUD, SILENCE TURQUOISE [TURQUOISE SILENCE], 11-12, 90-91 (2012); French Too Late to Save the Tutsis, REUTERS, 26 June 1994.
1008 Interview by LFM with General Daniel Schroeder.
1009 Interview by LFM with General Daniel Schroeder.
1011 Cable from Jean-Claude Lafourcade (17 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Compte rendu quotidien du 17 aout 1994”).

See Memorandum from Dominique Pin and Christian Quesnot to François Mitterrand (18 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda. Situation le 18 août 1994”) (“Contrary to NGO claims, population movements are still limited.”) (emphasis added); id. at 2 (“The United States, the organizations (H.C.R. and I.C.R.C.) and the NGOs put pressure on us so that the Turquoise detachment is kept in Rwanda for a few weeks.”).

Situation Report from the Bureau of Civil Affairs at the Turquoise Inter-service Theater Command Post (18 Aug. 1994) (“[A]ll the humanitarian agencies have thus found a clever way to escape criticism for not having anticipated a massive exodus to Bukavu and for not having taken appropriate measures to avoid this exodus that they consider inevitable. With a clear conscience, they will be able to argue . . . that such an exodus [was] not attributable to an absence of NGOs in [the] SHZ but rather [was] caused by the departure of the Turquoise force.”).


See Memorandum from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of African and Malagasy Affairs (23 Aug. 1994); Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (19 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: French Pullout from Humanitarian Zone Remains on Track”). According to a US cable, a French official (the name is redacted) told a US State Department official on 17 August 1994 “that a contingent of French troops would remain in Zaire after [Turquoise’s] withdrawal from Rwanda to monitor the actions of the Hutus and resupply of the francophone African troops participating in UNAMIR.” The French official reportedly explained “that both the French and Zairian President Mobutu were concerned that armed Hutus might stage a break-away movement in the Kivu provinces, in addition to threatening the new Rwandan government.” Cable from US Secretary of State to the American Embassy in Paris (20 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “[Redacted] Says Troops Will Monitor Rwandan Situation from Zaire After Withdrawal”).

Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (19 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: French Pullout from Humanitarian Zone Remains on Track”).

Cable from Pamela Harriman to US Secretary of State (19 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda: French Pullout from Humanitarian Zone Remains on Track”).


See Zaire Agrees to Reopen Border as Refugee Panic Grows, AFP, 21 Aug. 1994; Francois-Xavier Harispe, Zaire Caught in Two Minds on Rwandan Refugees, AFP, 21 Aug. 1994; Michela Wrong, Shots Halt Stampede from Rwanda, INDEPENDENT, 22 Aug. 1994 (reporting that a 60-vehicle French convoy “was waved through by Zairean paratroops despite the closure of the border”).


The departure of the Turquoise troops in late August 1994 marked an end to the French military presence in Rwanda. Throughout the nearly three decades that have followed, however, the French government has continued to impede and undermine Rwanda’s efforts to recover from the Genocide Against the Tutsi by using France’s power to promulgate a false narrative about the Genocide, bury the truth, and silence alternative views. In short, French officials have engaged in a cover-up: circulating false and dangerous narratives about the Genocide; conducting a parliamentary inquiry and then avoiding the inescapable conclusions of the facts it unearthed; coordinating with a supposedly independent judicial inquiry that produced arrest warrants for RPF leaders based on scant and even falsified evidence; harboring and protecting some of the most culpable génocidaires; withholding relevant materials and documents from public scrutiny; and, most importantly, failing to acknowledge the French government’s own role in the Genocide. All the while, generations of Rwandan citizens have continued to endure the toll of the Genocide.

A. After Operation Turquoise Ended, President Mitterrand Refused to Accept Any Responsibility for the Genocide, Instead Issuing False Statements Blaming the RPF and Distorting the History of the Genocide.

France claims to be virtuous and denies any responsibility or even any examination of responsibility. Worse, [France] wants to give advice.1

— Patrick de Saint-Exupéry, journalist

After the French government’s intervention in Rwanda ended in August 1994, President Mitterrand began rewriting history. Nearing the end of his presidency, and suffering from advanced prostate cancer,2 Mitterrand was showing an increasing concern for his legacy.3

That fall, in a book published by a sympathetic biographer, Mitterrand acknowledged long-swirling rumors about a shameful chapter in his life story: his support, as a young man in Nazi-occupied France, for Marshal Philippe Pétain and the collaborationist regime in Vichy.4 Mitterrand entrusted the biographer, Pierre Péan, to tell the story from Mitterrand’s perspective, without sensationalism or disapproval.5 “I feel that he wanted to put things in their place,” Péan said.6 Though he had ample opportunity to do so, Mitterrand never apologized for the Vichy government’s role in the Holocaust.7

Soon after the book’s publication, in September 1994, Mitterrand gave an interview to Le Figaro. When the reporter asked him to comment on criticism from intellectuals about the French government’s role in the Genocide, Mitterrand insisted, “[O]ur responsibility is nil.”8

The truth, as Mitterrand well knew, was that for close to four years, the French government had sent guns, money, and soldiers to help defend a repressive regime that barbarically and publicly massacred the Tutsi minority. French troops, officials, and diplomats had witnessed and learned of the commonplace brutalization and dehumanization of the Tutsi—in the media, at
roadblocks, in arbitrary detentions, in the torture of arrested persons, and in the massacres—with no change in policy from Paris. French leaders had sought to maintain influence in East Africa and demonstrate to vital allies throughout the continent that France could be trusted to defend them against military threats to their power. French presence in Rwanda and its conscious indifference to Tutsi persecution had created a sense of impunity amongst the perpetrators that found its fullness in the Genocide. And yet Mitterrand acknowledged no responsibility for any of this.

The biennial Franco-African Summit, held in November 1994 in Biarritz, a city on France’s southwestern coast, offered yet another look backward—a chance to reexamine Mitterand’s Africa policy and the results it had borne in the 13 years since he assumed the French presidency. It was at this same summit four years earlier, in La Baule, that Mitterrand had famously announced his plan for promoting democratic reforms in francophone Africa. With his presidency now in its twilight, Mitterrand had seemingly hoped to frame the gathering in Biarritz as a “triumphant valediction.” Few outside of his administration appeared to see it that way, though. The press ridiculed the Biarritz summit as a beachside retreat for corrupt African autocrats, such as Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko, whose presence exposed the hollowness of Mitterrand’s promises at La Baule. The French government had welcomed Mobutu to the summit, in spite of his history of corruption and brutality, because of his support for French actions in Rwanda, including his willingness to allow French troops to set up operating bases in Zaire during Operation Turquoise. Tellingly, the French government had not invited the new authorities in Kigali. “They are too controversial, and besides they are going to collapse any minute,” Mitterrand’s Africa advisor, Bruno Delaye, told a journalist before the summit.

The French government’s refusal to invite Rwandan officials was symbolic, indicative of its lingering hostility toward the RPF. Other expressions of the French government’s enmity had more serious consequences. Rwanda emerged from the Genocide in desperate need of international assistance. “We must start practically from zero,” the country’s new finance minister, Marc Rugenera, told US officials in September 1994. Fleeing members of the IRG had raided the treasury on their way out of the country, leaving the new authorities in Kigali with nothing. Taking on the monumental task of rebuilding the country, the new government was forced to confront what Vice President Kagame described as an economy in “total bankruptcy,” a civil service that “has largely been wiped out, an infrastructure that lies in ruins, and a destabilization campaign by some countries both inside and outside Africa.” Rwanda had no functioning police force, and its hospitals and schools were barely operational. Crops were left to rot while millions starved. Surveying the destruction, a writer for the international anti-poverty NGO Oxfam remarked: “It may now take decades before Rwanda returns to the standard of living of the early 1980s.”

To jump-start the rebuilding process, the new government in Rwanda needed to pay off the crushing debts it inherited from the prior administration. The French government, however, resisted pleas for Western countries to help Rwanda clear its arrears. When the US government pressed allies in the fall of 1994 to help Rwanda wipe out its debt to the World Bank, at least two other countries—Belgium and Canada—heed the call.;France, it was noted, “did not offer any assistance.” Its coldness spurred the French legislator Jean-Claude Lefort, a French Communist Party member who would later serve on the MIP, to accuse France of effectively “boycotting the
new government.”27 Lefort condemned the French government for “support[ing], until the very end, the former leaders of this country who have committed and planned an actual Genocide.”28

The French government actively worked to undermine the new Rwandan government by using France’s power within the European Union to temporarily block an EU aid package for Rwanda.29 As reported in La Croix, “everyone within the Union [knew] that France [was] using all the tools at its disposal to delay European aid to the new Rwandan government as long as possible.”30 French officials reportedly argued “that the RPF government must better demonstrate its commitment to human rights in deeds as well as words before international aid coffers are opened,”31 a concern that might have sounded sincere coming from a country that had not knowingly overlooked the systematic human rights abuses of the previous Rwandan regime. The French government ultimately softened its position, allowing the EU financing to proceed.

As a general matter, its views toward the Rwandan government remained hostile in the time immediately following the Genocide.32 President Kagame recalls this hostility as France “defended those who perpetrated the Genocide” and used its influence to “discourage others from giving aid [to Rwanda].”33 “France,” he said, “found a way to mobilize those who sought to fight against Rwanda.”34

Mitterrand, for his part, seemed intent on recasting Rwanda’s new leaders as villains on par with the génocidaires. In Biarritz, the written version of his prepared remarks for the opening of the summit referred not to a single genocide in Rwanda, but to “genocides,”35 the implication being the RPF was engaged in its own form of Genocide, presumably against the Hutus. When a reporter asked him about this, Mitterrand confirmed the script had said “genocides,” but he maintained he had used the singular in his spoken remarks. “These are the mysteries of eloquence,” he said, coyly.36 Mitterrand knew better. “The ‘double genocide gambit’ is a well-known piece of historical sophistry,” historian Gérard Prunier has written, referring to Mitterrand’s remarks in Biarritz.37 “To find President Mitterrand, an elder statesman, a man of taste, a literary author and formerly not without dignity, not embarrassed to be caught passing off such counterfeit intellectual and moral merchandise is another sad confirmation of the validity of de Gaulle’s saying that ‘getting old is a form of human shipwreck.’”38 To the very end, Mitterrand was promulgating false attacks on the RPF and the emerging new government.

There is no credible evidence of a double genocide, but the mere pronouncement of it by the president of France would prove pernicious. Such a false narrative permits the culpable to create a moral equivalency where there is none. It diminishes the historical import of the Genocide Against the Tutsi by suggesting that everyone was involved in killing Rwandans of all ethnicities—and if all are guilty, no one is guilty. And, at its core, it denies the historical truth of the Genocide. Mitterrand, not so deftly, deflected an acknowledgement of the French government’s responsibility by suggesting the guilt of others. His perspective would become a theme echoed at the ICTR trials, with defendants parroting Mitterrand’s false narratives.39

Mitterrand’s speech at Biarritz betrayed no regrets about his government’s actions in Rwanda. The president had carefully pruned his account of the lead-up to the Genocide, trimming out the parts where, for three and a half years, the French government, under his leadership, propped up a murderous regime and its army in Rwanda; where, in April 1994, French forces
exfiltrated génocidaires from the chaos engulfing Rwanda, leaving countless Tutsi behind to perish in the Genocide; and where, two months later, the French government sent troops to shield the genocidal interim government from the RPF forces’ advance. Omitting the foregoing history from his remarks, Mitterrand then revised history by attempting to take undue credit—not for the first time—for the Arusha process.40 “We were close to a solution,” he lamented.41 He spoke as though the French government had been a neutral mediator in that process, when in fact his administration had leveraged the power of the French military to strengthen the Habyarimana government’s position at the negotiating table.

It had, by this time, become a habit for Mitterrand to refer to a letter he received from RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe—a “very warm letter of thanks,” the president called it—in August 1993, just after the conclusion of the Arusha talks.42 “France in this case has consistently maintained a position of balance and wisdom,” Mitterrand said at an August 1994 diplomatic conference at the Élysée, “and I have an extremely warm letter from the chairman of the RPF, Mr. Kangyarame [sic], who thanked France, in a particularly grateful tone, for what [France] had accomplished for the settlement of the war there.”43 This was a mischaracterization. Kanyarengwe’s letter—while containing pleasantries typical of diplomatic correspondence—was not, at bottom, a thank-you note.44 It was a courteously worded request for France to facilitate the Arusha Accords’ implementation by hastening the withdrawal of the 300 Noroît troops still stationed in Rwanda.45

The notion that France had succeeded, ultimately, in winning over some of its detractors and skeptics at the United Nations was a through line in Mitterrand’s speech in Biarritz. He framed Operation Turquoise in precisely the same misleading way, insisting that some members of the international community, after questioning France’s intentions at the outset of the operation in June 1994, had eventually abandoned their reservations and decided they wanted French troops to stay in Rwanda longer.46 This, too, appears to be a selective representation of the facts. US and UN officials had, indeed, lobbied France in August 1994 to agree to a limited extension of its troops’ mission while waiting for the reinforcement of UNAMIR to be completed.47 These requests, though, were not a validation of the French government’s decision two months earlier, in the final days of the Genocide, to send soldiers to “stop the killing” in Rwanda. Circumstances in and around Rwanda had changed considerably from June to August. The genocidal forces were no longer in control of the Rwandan government, and a new, very different humanitarian crisis was taking place. The fear among US and UN officials at that time was that a precipitous departure of French troops would contribute to the panic among Rwanda’s Hutu population (already stoked by false rumors of widespread retribution circulated by RTLM and the IRG), spurring more Hutu to flee to Zaire.48 The question facing the international community was no longer whether Turquoise, as conceived by France, had been advisable. It was when, and how, to end the operation without making the crisis immeasurably worse.

Mitterrand’s declaration of success about Rwanda was repudiated by events on the ground. By declining to arrest génocidaires and facilitating their leaders’ escape to Zaire, Turquoise contributed to the refugee crisis there. In its erection of the Safe Humanitarian Zone as a bulwark against RPF westward movement in Rwanda, Turquoise also protected the genocidal interim government, génocidaires and local Rwandan leaders, who encouraged Rwandans to flee to Zaire with false messages about reprisal attacks from the RPF that never materialized. The génocidaires,
fully armed, were able to control the camps in Zaire and kept many refugees hostage, persuading them and even threatening them if they sought to return.\textsuperscript{49} When refugees in Zaire were presented with the opportunity to go home to Rwanda, “they were soon greeted with riflemen—members of the Hutu Power who had also sought refuge in the camps—knocking on their doors and threatening them not to go back to Rwanda,” according to Ray Wilkinson, a spokesman for the UN High Commissioner for Refugees efforts to coordinate over 200 humanitarian agencies in Zaire at the time.\textsuperscript{50} The \textit{génocidaires} held the refugees hostage as “leverage over the resolution of the conflict” with the new Rwandan government.\textsuperscript{51} At the most basic level, they served as human shields.

When American and French diplomats convened in Rwanda on 23 August 1994, just as the French military was exiting, they shared concerns about the refugee crisis’s “potential for destabilizing the region,” and Jean-Marc de La Sablière, the Quai d’Orsay’s head of African and Malagasy affairs, remarked that “the problem is compounded by the need to disarm the refugees on the border who have to date only been relieved of their heavy weapons, not their light arms.”\textsuperscript{52} The growing presence of armed foreign groups in Zaire became a powder keg lit in two regional wars—Congo I and Congo II—that followed the Genocide and engulfed the region in a state of war and instability. A report issued several years later by the OAU observed how Turquoise contributed to these developments:

The consequences of French policy can hardly be overestimated. The escape of génocidaires leaders into Zaire led, almost inevitably, to a new, more complex stage in the Rwandan tragedy, expanding it into a conflict that soon engulfed all of central Africa. That the entire Great Lakes Region would suffer destabilization was both tragic and, to a significant extent, foreseeable.\textsuperscript{53}

But in Biarritz and elsewhere in the fall of 1994, France’s president told a different story.

Mitterrand died in his sleep on 8 January 1996.\textsuperscript{54} The attempt to cover up his government’s disgraces in Rwanda would, however, long outlive him.

\textbf{B. A 1998 Parliamentary Inquiry Whitewashed the French Government’s Role in the Genocide.}

For years, the architects of France’s intervention in Rwanda were unsullied by the fallout from their policy choices.\textsuperscript{55} As the Genocide faded from the French public’s consciousness, veterans of the Mitterrand administration moved on, evading and escaping accountability for what they had enabled.

Then, in January 1998, a series of articles in the French newspaper \textit{Le Figaro} renewed attention to the French government’s role in Rwanda’s civil war and the ensuing Genocide.\textsuperscript{56} In this series, journalist Patrick de Saint-Exupéry spotlighted the Mitterrand administration’s conviction that the RPF’s invasion of Rwanda in 1990 threatened to erode French influence in East Africa; the Mitterrand administration’s efforts to help the Rwandan government forces defeat the RPF, despite evidence of the Habyarimana government’s complicity in ethnic killings; and the Mitterrand administration’s continued collaboration with Rwandan authorities even after the Genocide began.\textsuperscript{57} The articles pointed out that other countries—the United States and Belgium,
in particular—had shown a willingness in the post-Genocide era to acknowledge at least some of their failures to prevent mass killings in Rwanda. Just one month earlier, after nearly a year of investigatory work, the Belgian Senate finalized a report that faulted the international community generally, and Belgium, in particular, for failing to stop the Genocide in April 1994. In the United States, both President Clinton and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright (who was UN ambassador during the Genocide) expressed regrets for the failure to act.

France, as compared to all other foreign powers, bore far more responsibility for the catastrophic events of 1994, and yet, Saint-Exupéry observed, it had taken no comparable steps. “France claims to be virtuous and denies any responsibility or even any examination of responsibility. Worse, [France] wants to give advice,” he wrote.

French NGOs sought to capitalize on the revived interest in the French government’s exploits in Rwanda and issued a joint statement calling on the French parliament to launch an inquiry along the lines of the one the Belgian Senate had just completed. “Today, the government declares it wants to break the authoritarian and neocolonial tradition of France’s Africa policy[.] By setting up this commission of inquiry, parliamentarians can help to ensure that such declarations are not reduced to a mere announcement,” the group wrote.

In the face of this mounting pressure, on 3 March 1998, Paul Quilès, president of the National Assembly’s defense committee, issued a statement announcing the creation of a “fact-finding mission on Rwanda.” Quilès—a Socialist, as Mitterrand had been—had served as Mitterrand’s defense minister from 1985 to 1986. His statement was instructive in the way it defined the mission’s goal. It was not to examine France’s intervention in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994, but “to shed light on the role that various foreign military forces may have played in the Rwandan crisis.” The phrasing was an early indicator that Quilès did not see France’s role as unique, and it created reason to question whether he had any intention of neutrally assessing—let alone condemning—the conduct of the French government or President Mitterrand, under whom he had once served.

Members of the Communist and Green parties were not satisfied with Quilès’ promise of an “information mission,” and they recognized that such a body would lack the powers necessary for a genuinely robust investigation—for example, the power to subpoena witnesses or, if appropriate, to bring criminal charges. Doctors Without Borders called the limited approach to the inquiry “a diversionary maneuver.”

Despite flaws that were present from its conception, the Parliamentary Information Mission’s (“MIP”) report is a useful repository of testimony and fact, however incomplete. The 1,800-page report, issued in December 1998, was replete with damming revelations, noting, for example, that French officials, during the Rwandan civil war, had assigned officers to advise the FAR’s most senior leaders and to train its troops for combat operations; that, in February 1993, it dispatched officers to supervise and control (albeit “indirectly”) the Rwandan Armed Forces; and that it supplied the Rwandan Army with 105mm howitzers and other weapons. The report acknowledged, if only vaguely, that the steady expansion of French cooperation with the Habyarimana government and the FAR, at a time of “ethnic tensions, massacres and violence,” had “serious consequences” for Rwanda. The significance of such findings, though, was
everywhere diluted by circumlocution and evasion. At seemingly every juncture, the report’s authors were at pains to paint French officials’ policy choices as excusable, characterizing even their most ill-advised decisions as mere “errors in judgments.”72 “The report . . . tried to demonstrate that at each stage of the process, Paris had a good reason to make choices that would later prove to be ill-advised,” a *Le Monde* reporter, Rémy Ourdan, observed just after the report’s release in December 1998. In Ourdan’s opinion, Quilès’ invocation of a “comprehensive strategic mistake” to explain away the French government’s responsibility was “not very convincing.”73

Ultimately, Quilès did not equivocate when it came to the French government’s responsibility for the Genocide itself, insisting that, the French government “is neither responsible nor guilty.”74 Quilès’ conclusion as to the French government’s lack of responsibility ignored facts that, in many instances, could be found in the MIP’s own report.75 The French government, the report itself acknowledged, had spent years arming, training, and even, at one point, commanding the Rwandan military in an effort to protect President Habyarimana and his government, in spite of indications that his government committed and facilitated rampant human rights abuses.76 Its officers advised FAR commanders and trained members of the Presidential Guard, some of whom would go on to commit atrocities in the Genocide.77 Its unwavering support for Habyarimana’s murderous regime disincentivized the Rwandan president to accept a negotiated truce with the RPF and bought the extremists more time to hatch their plans.78 The message to the extremists was, as an OAU investigative panel observed in a report released in 2000, “that they could get away with just about anything.”79

Pierre Brana, one of two rapporteurs appointed to lead the fact-finding mission and the drafting of its report, would later acknowledge that many of the mission’s members were not interested in undertaking a good-faith effort to uncover the truth. Brana said the mission consisted of two blocs—one that earnestly believed it would serve France’s interests to resolve unanswered questions about its actions in Rwanda, and one that “continued to think that national greatness thrives best in the shadow of secret-défense.”80 The process favored the proponents of secrecy. An initial list of interviewees the mission intended to question required the prior approval of the Élysée and Matignon.81 The MIP ultimately interviewed 88 people—a mix of politicians, diplomats, military officers, academics, and NGO staff.82

Ourdan, the *Le Monde* reporter, described the MIP public hearings as “disappointing, even pathetic.”83 “There were hardly any tough questions for four months,” he wrote in July 1998. The only exception to that rule, he said, was in the mission’s comparatively tough questioning of “insolent” academics who, based on their years of research, “presented views that did not conform to the official French line.”84 Other witnesses—those who adhered to the government line—were treated with kid gloves. Detecting “conniving smiles” from certain mission members, Ourdan noted that some witnesses were released after just 30 minutes of questioning, while others—French government officials—were permitted to sit for questioning as a group, minimizing the risk that they might contradict one another.85 “Witnesses used the hearings as a platform to assert their certainties and present their arguments, generally without having to provide tangible evidence,” Ourdan wrote.86 The mission’s accommodating approach came as a relief to some of the witnesses, including one unnamed soldier who admitted, with a smile, that he had been surprised by how incurious the mission members had seemed.87
While testifying before the MIP in May 1998, former Mitterrand advisors Bruno Delaye and General Christian Quesnot each acknowledged that they could not say for certain just who was responsible for shooting down President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994. Both men nevertheless used the occasion of their hearings to advance the theory that the RPF was to blame for the attack—the same narrative that RTLM promoted on its airwaves, inciting the Genocide Against the Tutsi, in April 1994, and the same narrative that génocidaires had peddled in the years afterwards. Delaye was comparatively subtle. Acknowledging that he “had no evidence” to support his suppositions, Delaye “recalled that in the hours that followed [the crash], the rumor was that the RPF was the perpetrator of the attack.” Quesnot, meanwhile, did not hesitate to indulge in speculation about the cause of the crash (stating that “[i]f the extremists had wanted to get rid of President Habyarimana, they could have done so on land at another time without killing one of their own”), even as he conceded that, in pointing the finger at the RPF, he was merely “expressing a personal feeling.”

The MIP’s finished product was, at once, both massive and incomplete. Critics were baffled by the mission’s failure to question Paul Barril, the French mercenary suspected of training IRG-aligned forces during the Genocide and of contracting to supply the IRG with weapons and ammunition in violation of the UN arms embargo. Barril’s connections to the IRG were no secret; they had, in fact, figured into the January 1998 Le Figaro series that precipitated the MIP’s launch. Quilès, though, had no interest in questioning Barril. “Paul Barril? But he’s a clown!” he replied when asked, in November 1998, whether the mission would be questioning him. While this may be true, he appeared to be involved in matters important to the MIP’s inquiry. Quilès would later claim that he did, ultimately, reach out to Barril on 2 December 1998—less than two weeks before the report’s completion—to summon him for an interview, but he let the matter drop when Barril said he was out of the country and could not attend. “They never wanted to see me,” Barril later said.

Quilès incorrectly suggested the mission’s report was the final word on the French government’s exploits in Rwanda. Addressing the press upon the report’s release, he delivered a short and simple verdict: “France is exonerated.” “The sentence was repeated on radio and television,” Saint-Exupéry would later recall. “It was intentional: everything had been done to ensure that the press did not have time to read the report.” Quilès’ summation obscured the inconvenient facts his team had been charged with unearthing, and, most certainly, the report had not “exonerated” the French government.

More recently, following the presentation of a report by the Research commission on the French Archives Related to Rwanda and the Genocide Against the Tutsi (known as the “Duclert Commission” after the Commission’s President, Professor Vincent Duclert) there were misleading media headlines reminiscent of Quilès’ exculpatory pronouncements. This may be due to language in the Duclert Commission’s Conclusion that does not reflect the underlying report. For example, the BBC’s headline pronounced: “France was ‘blind’ to Rwanda genocide, French report says.” The Commission’s ten-page Conclusion may have invited such headlines by suggesting the French government was “blind” to the violence in Rwanda and the coming Genocide, despite what the underlying 1,200-page Duclert report found to the contrary. The French government was not blind. The Commission’s report acknowledges evidence of the French government’s unqualified support of the Rwandan government, despite French officials’ knowledge of massacre upon massacre of
Tutsi, their daily dehumanization, and the hardening of extremism in Rwanda facilitated by French support of the Rwandan government.

In light of the Duclert report’s underlying factual findings, the Commission’s conclusion about the French government’s responsibility is unclear. The Commission’s discussion of responsibility starts with a strong statement pronouncing that responsibility to be “serious” and “overwhelming,” but ultimately equivocates and comes to no fixed conclusion, devolving into a series of abstract discussions of “political,” “institutional,” “intellectual,” “ethical,” “cognitive,” and “moral” responsibilities without any reference to who was responsible for what. It stops short of explaining what the French government was responsible for having done, when that responsibility is clear from the evidence. As our investigation has concluded, the French government bears significant responsibility for enabling a foreseeable genocide. For the last 27 years, the French government has, on a continual basis, trivialized and downplayed that responsibility.

C. A French Judicial Investigation Smeared Rwandan Political Leaders and Gave Credence to the Claims of Genocide Deniers.

Although the MIP did not, in the end, take a position on the lingering question of who brought down President Habyarimana’s plane, France started an inquiry in 1998 into the plane crash that would proceed unprofessionally for years before making headlines across the globe in 2006, parroting the génocidaire narrative that the RPF shot down the plane and resulting in arrest warrants for senior RPF officials. This investigation was formally discredited in 2020 when the Paris Court of Appeals dismissed the case, but not before being used by Genocide deniers as support for their claims and by génocidaires in support of their defenses before the ICTR.

The case’s origins merit suspicion, tracing to a July 1994 complaint filed by Hélène Clamagirand, a French attorney representing President Habyarimana’s widow, Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana. In preparing the case, Clamagirand received an assist from one of her clients: Paul Barril, the same French mercenary who, two months earlier, had struck an agreement to supply the IRG with weapons and ammunition during the Genocide, and whom the Quilès commission refused to interview. Barril had been airing sensational claims that summer, insisting he had obtained physical evidence of the RPF’s involvement in the attack, including both the plane’s “black box” and the two missile launchers used to shoot the plane down. The evidence, however, did not materialize.

French prosecutors rejected Clamagirand’s complaint on technical grounds, noting that the Habyarimanas were not French nationals. Undeterred, Clamagirand effectively revived the claim in 1997, this time on behalf of a woman whose father, a French national, had co-piloted the presidential plane and perished in the crash. (Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana later joined the case, as did family members of the plane’s other passengers and crew.) French magistrate Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière took up the case, launching his investigation in March 1998 and continuing at its helm until his departure from the court in 2007.

Under Bruguière’s direction, the inquiry was unprofessional and careless. Bruguière ignored critical evidence, neglected to call essential witnesses, distorted witness statements, and
disregarded testimony that was contrary to his desired outcome.112 Unlike some of his successors, Bruguière did not travel to Rwanda and collected no material evidence.113 And, quite tellingly, he hired as an interpreter Fabien Singaye, a former intelligence officer in the Rwandan embassy in Switzerland with strong ties to the Habyarimana regime114 and also the son-in-law of the accused financier of the Genocide, Felicien Kabuga.115

In November 2006, Bruguière issued international arrest warrants naming eight senior Rwandan officials (and a ninth person, who did not exist116) in connection with Habyarimana’s assassination.117 Bruguière did not issue a warrant for President Kagame’s arrest (explaining that, as a head of state, he was immune from prosecution in French courts), but was unequivocal in asserting that Kagame was chiefly responsible for the attack.118

The French government took pains to distance itself from Bruguière’s actions and publicly deemed them “a judicial matter.”119 In January 2007, after the Rwandan government announced, in response to the judge’s accusations, that it would cut diplomatic ties with France, a Quai d’Orsay spokesman said, “Judge Bruguière . . . did this on his own authority and in total independence.”120 This was false. A US cable, published by Wikileaks, reveals that a French Foreign Ministry official confided to a US diplomat in January 2007 that the French government “had given Bruguière the green light to issue his report.”121 The Foreign Ministry official “said that France had wanted to reciprocate for Rwanda’s taking steps to investigate France’s alleged involvement in the 1994 Genocide and its aftermath.”122 (The official was referring to the Mucyo Commission.) Within a week of the Foreign Ministry official’s statement to the US diplomat, Judge Bruguière confirmed to a US embassy official in Paris that he had “consulted” with President Jacques Chirac and other French government officials before issuing the arrest warrants “because he was convinced of the need to coordinate timing with the government.”123 A cable documenting the embassy official’s conversation with Bruguière noted that the judge “did not hide his personal desire to see Kagame’s government isolated. He warned that closer US ties with Rwanda would be a mistake.”124

These leaked US cables suggest that Bruguière’s unsubstantiated arrest warrants were not actually the result of an independent inquiry by an impartial judicial body, but rather a coordinated effort with a government that has shown a consistent desire to obscure the truth about the Genocide and its own responsibility for its role. Bruguière appears to have been doing the business of the French government, in the guise of an impartial judicial proceeding. The notion that a sitting judge would be having ex parte conversations with the government is in violation of the most basic ethical tenets governing the role of judges. It is wrong for the judge; it is wrong for the government; and it also shows that the French government has not acknowledged or disclosed communications between Bruguière and the Élysée. Until the French government is more forthcoming about this poorly-conducted investigation—reconciling its public statements with the statements made in private to US diplomats—the Bruguière inquiry will remain yet another shrouded piece of history suggesting French wrongdoing.

The judges who took over the case from Bruguière after he left the bench in 2007 reexamined the evidence and began exposing its weaknesses. In 2012, they determined that the missiles that brought down Habyarimana’s plane were fired from the FAR military barracks at Kanombe.125 The investigation nevertheless dragged on for several more years before the investigating judges finally dropped the probe in 2018.126 A Paris appellate court in July 2020
upheld the decision to close the case,\textsuperscript{127} and that decision is now under consideration by the Cour de Cassation (France’s court of final appeal for civil and criminal matters).

Although the investigation was ultimately discredited, its existence gave ammunition to those seeking to deflect from their responsibility for the Genocide. Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, often described as the “architect” of the Genocide, would try to use the Bruguière investigation to elevate the importance of the plane crash as a defense to the accusation that he and his co-defendants in the “Military I” trial in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had planned the killing spree that began after the presidential plane went down—that, in fact, \textit{no one} had planned it.\textsuperscript{128} It was the defense’s claim, rather, that the mass killings of Tutsi must have happened spontaneously, because the event that triggered them—the downing of the president’s plane—was not the extremists’ doing.\textsuperscript{129} “[I]t is common knowledge today,” Bagosora testified on 24 October 2005, his first day on the witness stand, “that it is General Paul Kagame, current president in Rwanda, who is responsible for that attack.”\textsuperscript{130} The defense was partially successful, because the Court found that the prosecution had not met its burden to prove conspiracy to commit genocide beyond a reasonable doubt. It nonetheless found Bagosora guilty of committing genocide, crimes against humanity, and other war crimes.\textsuperscript{131} Bagosora is currently serving a 35-year sentence based on multiple convictions for his command role in the brutal slayings of UN peacekeepers, Rwandan opposition leaders, and an untold number of civilians in the early days of the Genocide.\textsuperscript{132} But when Bruguière’s arrest warrants were issued, counsel for the Military I co-defendants celebrated his order by declaring at a press conference just a few days later that it confirmed what they had been trying to prove at trial.\textsuperscript{133}

The collapse of Bruguière’s investigation did not erase the damage it had already wrought. By 2006, fourteen years before the investigation closed for a lack of evidence, it had already tarred the RPF as villains and, in so doing, worked to retroactively justify the Mitterrand administration’s use of the French military between 1990 and 1994 to block the RPF from seizing power in Kigali. Judge Bruguière—a member of the French judiciary, with the power and financing of the French state behind his requests for interviews and issuance of arrest warrants—acted for and on behalf of the French government as he conducted an unprofessional investigation that lent credibility to Genocide deniers. His investigation helped legitimize revisionist history and helped credit \textit{génocidaires} mythology that what happened in Rwanda was simply an unpremeditated, uncoordinated eruption of violence, and not what history demands it be called: a genocide.

\textbf{D. Génocidaires Have Enjoyed Decades of Sanctuary and Freedom in France, Despite Concerted Efforts by Private Citizens and the Rwandan Government to Bring Them to Justice.}

In addition to giving voice to the false narratives of \textit{génocidaires}, the French government, even now, provides safe haven to suspected \textit{génocidaires}. There may be more than 100 suspected \textit{génocidaires} living freely in France.\textsuperscript{134} The French office responsible for asylum, l’Office français de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRRA), has too often granted them asylum without taking seriously into account information about their connection to the Genocide, effectively leaving the suspected \textit{génocidaires} free to live and work in France.\textsuperscript{135} In parallel, the French government has failed to prosecute all but a handful of the suspected \textit{génocidaires} known to be hiding within its borders. The claims filed against those \textit{génocidaires} by the families of the victims and many human
rights NGOs have languished on the desks of French judges, sometimes for as many as twenty years. The pattern of these outcomes is clear: the French government does not care, close to three decades after the Genocide, to bring accountability to those responsible for the massacres of Tutsi.

The Collectif des parties civiles pour le Rwanda (CPCR), a nonprofit founded by Alain and Dafroza Gauthier, works to bring “before French justice those suspected of having participated in the Genocide Against the Tutsi and who have found an often too accommodating reception on French soil.” The Gauthiers have devoted their lives and, for the first few years after founding the CPCR in 2001, their personal finances, to ferreting out génocidaires—speaking with witnesses, consulting archives and proceedings from the Rwandan Gacaca courts (local Rwandan tribunals that tried, convicted and sentenced Rwandans accused of committing crimes during the Genocide), and presenting evidence to prosecutors. Thirty complaints, emanating from their work, have led to the opening of judicial inquiries. However, out of those inquiries, the judges have pronounced a decision of “non-lieu” (decided to abandon judicial action under procedure) in four cases and have only brought seven cases to the Cour d’Assise (French criminal trial court). Of the cases that the CPCR is currently pursuing within French courts, more than two-thirds are over a decade old. In Alain Gauthier’s words, “French justice can be characterized by delays that are incomprehensible and unacceptable for the victims.”

The CPCR’s experience in their fight for justice illuminates the French judiciary’s systematic inability or unwillingness to prosecute accused génocidaires in a timely fashion. Before the creation of the crimes against humanity division in 2012 in the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris (merged into the Tribunal Judiciaire de Paris in 2020) cases of alleged génocidaires were assigned to judges without the means to pursue them, causing one judge to say, “There is no need for instructions [to freeze a case]: it’s only a matter of not providing the means to conduct the investigation.” As Clemence Bectarte, a lawyer for one civil society organization involved in the ongoing cases against génocidaires, told Mediapart in 2019, “The simple cases were never followed up on: the prosecutors either did not follow up or opened preliminary inquiries that were not taken seriously at all.”

For example, the case against Father Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, a Catholic priest accused of “complicity in torture and inhumane or degrading treatment” of Tutsi seeking refuge in his church during the Genocide, began in 1995, when a group of Genocide survivors, their families, and civil society organizations filed a complaint in French court against him. Nine years later, the judicial process against Munyeshyaka had not moved forward, prompting the European Court of Human Rights to condemn France for violating the victims’ rights to have their case heard “within a reasonable amount of time.” The European court’s decision did not speed up the investigation of the case. It was not until October 2019 that France’s highest court ended the proceedings, accepting the prosecutor’s advice to dismiss the charges against Munyeshyaka. Ultimately, after 18 years, Munyeshyaka never faced his day in court, despite the fact that the ICTR, in 2005, indicted Munyeshyaka and, in 2007, referred his case to France with the understanding that he would be tried. This has engendered great pain for the survivors. “It is to the great loss of the families of the victims and the associations that have fought for justice that it seems he will never be judged in France,” concludes Alain Gauthier.
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Bectarte said the French government’s delays in genocide prosecutions were, for many years, attributable to a “lack of political will.” This view is endorsed by others, who have pressed the Ministry of Justice for more resources to be allotted to the cases, including the creation of a unit dedicated to Rwanda within the crimes against humanity division. A Mediapart article reported that, prior to 2009, there were just two investigative magistrates in all of France charged with managing the entire docket of cases relating to the Genocide. “You are on duty, you are already drowning in [cases of] robberies, police violence, domestic violence, drug traffickers, and then you are told: ‘Here are the Rwandan files.’ And there, in front of you, there is literally a wall of paper,” one of the magistrates recalled.

The 2012 creation of the new division within the Paris district court did not resolve the problem; just three Genocide suspects have been tried in France since then. (All three were convicted.) No other defendants have yet gone to trial. French leaders, past and present, have vowed in recent years to clear the blockages. In April 2019, as the 25th anniversary of the Genocide approached, President Emmanuel Macron announced his administration would provide more resources for genocide prosecutions, so that suspects “could be tried in a reasonable amount of time.” “It is inappropriate to speak about ‘reasonable’ delay, when you know that the delays have been unreasonable for so long,” says Alain Gauthier. Even with the latest effort shown by the judges, who opened twelve new cases against suspected génocidaires in 2019 without external prompting, resources remain poor, cases brought by the CPCR remain unresolved, and yet more suspected génocidaires still have not had cases brought against them.

Among those génocidaires who are the subject of complaints, Laurent Serubuga, member of the Akazu, head of the état-major of the FAR until 1992, and known for his positions on the extermination of the Tutsi, is still remembered by his French advisor, Col. René Galinié, as an anti-Tutsi extremist who, as early as 1990, was contemplating genocide. He arrived in France in 1998. In 2001, the Strasbourg Public Prosecutor’s Office dismissed a complaint against Serubuga brought by organizations representing Rwandan victims. The next year, the National Court for Asylum (Cour Nationale du Droit d’Asile, known as the French Refugee Appeals Board until 2007) denied him asylum, because he was suspected of international human rights crimes. It was only in 2013 that French authorities arrested him, after Rwanda issued an international arrest warrant for Serubuga alleging genocide and crimes against humanity. On 26 February 2014, the Cour de Cassation decided that he could not be extradited to face genocide charges, because genocide was not a crime specifically recognized in the Rwandan penal code until after the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi.

By contrast, courts in Denmark and the Netherlands have explicitly rejected this rationale. These courts approved the extradition of genocide suspects to Rwanda, noting that Rwanda became a signatory to the Convention on Genocide in 1975 and that genocide was punishable under customary international law prior to 1994. However, the French government has denied all extraditions of accused génocidaires to Rwanda.

In some instances, the reasoning of the French Court for denying extradition was not even made public—for example, in the case of Vénuste Nyombayire, who was “indicted for the massacre of Tutsi orphans in Gikongoro, in southwestern Rwanda” and for whom Rwanda issued an international arrest warrant for in 2011. Nyombayire remains at liberty in France. To date,
French Courts have not approved any Rwandan extradition requests. France is in a distinct minority, even in Europe, where Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have all approved such requests.172 (The European Court of Human Rights upheld the Swedish decision to extradite.)173 “We have sent 42 indictments to France, for people we want to see either extradited or tried on the spot,” said Rwandan Minister of Justice Johnston Busingye in January 2019174) “Paris’ efforts to ensure that people who played a role in the genocide are brought to justice are weak compared to countries that were not close to Rwanda at the time, such as the Netherlands or Germany, which have done their best.”175

Because of its horrific, menacing, and destructive nature, genocide is referred to as the “crime of crimes.”176 France is a signatory to the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Articles I and II of the Convention stipulate that genocide requires an “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” and that the signatories commit to undertake to prevent and punish it.177 Courts around the world, including those in Rwanda and the ICTR, have done so with respect to the Genocide Against the Tutsi. Despite France’s public commitment as a signatory, it has chosen to protect and not prosecute génocidaires.

Others with ties to the Genocide appear to have been able to live their lives in France for years, or even decades, without attracting any notice from the French government—a situation recently brought to light in a series of pieces by the investigative journalist Théo Englebert. In July 2020, Englebert reported that he, personally, had located Major General Aloys Ntiwiragabo, the FAR’s head of military intelligence during the Genocide, living in the suburbs of Orleans.178 ICTR prosecutors had, in the past, named Ntiwiragabo among the suspected planners and perpetrators of the Genocide but it abandoned its investigation in 2004 after the United Nations decided to wind down the ICTR’s operation.179 Prior to that decision, however, in 2001, the ICTR actively sought his whereabouts, but he remained out of reach despite attempting to apply for a visa twice at French consulates.180 That same year, in Kinshasa, Ntiwiragabo provided testimony as a witness in Judge Bruguière’s investigation,181 and, after having done so, appears to have resettled in France, published a book there, and filed an application for asylum with the French government.182 Following Englebert’s exposure of Ntiwiragabo’s whereabouts, Rwanda issued a warrant for his arrest.183

Ntiwiragabo is not the only suspected génocidaire to evade justice while exploiting the French immigration system. Many with links to the Genocide have apparently enjoyed “strange . . . delays” within OFPRA.184 These individuals include:

- Sosthène Munyemana, who was sentenced in absentia in a Rwandan Gacaca proceeding to life imprisonment and is the subject of a complaint in France by FIDH, Survie, CPCR, and others alleging genocide, complicity in genocide, and crimes against humanity. It took 14 years until the National Court for Asylum rejected his application as a result of suspicion of international human rights crimes;185
- Thaddée Maniragaba, a “former member of the Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR, the most radical Hutu Power party), right-hand man of one of the main génocidaires,
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Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, and minority shareholder of RTLM since 1992.” A decision on his application, which was ultimately denied, was delayed for six years; and

- Stanislas Mbonampeka, who was “ex-minister of justice,” and Faustin Semasaka, “former deputy prefect in Kabaya, a hotspot for arms trafficking,” both of whom had six-year waits while OFPRA finished its investigation.

By contrast, the average processing time for other asylum seekers in 2018 and the first half of 2019 was around five months. The distinction was not accidental. As Michel Raimbaud, former director of OFPRA from 2000 to 2003, described, “There was a filing cabinet in the OFPRA director’s office with sensitive cases, some of which were confidential and about which it was deemed preferable not to make a decision.” Placing these applicants in legal limbo avoided the need to make decisions on people with ties to the Genocide while still providing them safe harbor. After three or five years, depending on the case, it is possible for applicants to obtain a worker’s residence permit. For those whose children attend school, it is also possible to obtain a “private and family life” residence permit after five years of residence in France. Indeed, even when, as in Thadée Maniragaba’s case, OFPRA denies an application for asylum because of suspected crimes against humanity, little occurs. Until recently, OFPRA did not apprise judicial authorities of their refusals to grant asylum, so it was difficult for prosecutors to investigate applicants denied asylum for suspected international human rights crimes. Thus, in the years since his application was rejected, a span of more than a decade, Maniragaba reportedly continued to live in France.

Perhaps the most notorious Rwandan “refugee” in France is Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, the former first lady of Rwanda, who sat at the center of the Akazu. That Agathe and other Habyarimana family members were whisked out of Kigali on 9 April 1994 by French soldiers on the orders of President Mitterrand himself may have been understandable in the fog of war—she was the widow of the recently assassinated head of state (although, as discussed above, the circumstances of her rescue and its prioritization as innocent civilians perished merit criticism). When President Mitterrand gave these instructions, he could not have known that, on the morning of 7 April, just hours after President Habyarimana’s plane had been shot down, the daughters of Habyarimana’s physician, Emmanuel Akingeneye (who was also killed aboard the plane) had, according to one source, heard Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana dictate over the telephone the names of people to be killed, including that of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, assassinated a few hours later by the Presidential Guard.

Within two months, though, Mitterrand had a good sense of the woman whom he had saved and flown to Paris and who had received 200,000 French francs from the French Ministry of Cooperation in relocation expenses. “She is possessed by the devil,” President Mitterrand told a delegation from Médecins Sans Frontières in June 1994 (as noted in Chapter 9). “If she could, she would continue to call out for massacres from French radios. She is very difficult to control.” Agathe left France in September 1994 and returned illegally—but without repercussions for her—a few years later. She still lives in her family villa in Courcouronnes, a southern suburb of Paris.

In 2004, Agathe applied to OFPRA and then to the National Court for Asylum, and finally to the Council of State (Conseil d’État), the highest court in France, to obtain asylum. She presented herself as a simple housewife, explaining that “she prepared meals for the whole family,
took care of gardening and animal husbandry; that she did not listen to the radio or read newspapers; that she never spoke about politics with her late husband; that everything that has been said about her is a pure lie.”

Agathe’s plea must have been too much even for French authorities, as her application was rejected at every stage. The National Court for Asylum found that she was “at the heart of the regime” that was responsible for “planning of massacres of Tutsis from October 1990 onwards, and therefore among those responsible for planning the Rwandan genocide.” She “exercised de facto authority between 1973 and 1994,” and then, according to the court, “maintain[ed] special links with the interim government and then with the Rwandan government-in-exile.” The court also found that Agathe played a central role in the “first circle of power” of the regime, the Akazu, also described as “Madame’s clan,” which coordinated “various political, economic, military and media circles” and was the “centerpiece of this system of repression,” “organized as an entity adept at state terror.” And she played a “predominant role” in the “launch and then control” of the extremist newspaper Kangura and the hate station RTLM.

Despite the denial of her applications for asylum, the French government has not taken action to remove or deport Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana from France. While in France, she has also withstood legal action initiated against her. In February 2007, the Gauthiers’ organization, CPCR, filed a complaint against Agathe in the Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI) of Evry for the crimes of genocide and complicity in crimes against humanity. The complaint is still under “investigation” more than 13 years later. In September 2020, Agathe urged the investigating magistrate to close the probe, arguing the investigation has been unreasonably prolonged. The judge refused.

There was a fleeting moment, in 2010, when, just five days after then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy returned from a visit to Kigali, French authorities placed Agathe under arrest on an international warrant issued in 2009 by Rwanda. The authorities released her the same day. A French court rejected her extradition to Rwanda in 2011 (for reasons that, again, remain unknown, as the decision has not been made public). In 2013, Agathe appealed to the European Court of Human Rights to declare that France’s refusal to grant her a residency permit violated the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court quickly denied her petition.

Agathe has yet to face prosecution in any court. She remains outspoken and defiant, telling a Belgian reporter as recently as 2017 that she knew nothing about the “so-called genocide” and insisting that the killing of Tutsi had been justified because of their (supposed) clandestine support for the RPF. In a promising development, Professor Ducler, in an interview soon after the issuance of his Commission’s report, noted that he believed President Macron would reopen the file of Agathe Habyarimana, saying, “It is true that I think that the President of the Republic, Emmanuel Macron, will reopen the case of Mrs. Habyarimana. For thirty years she has had an extremely ambiguous status in France, protected . . . [J]ustice must be done. At least the documentation on her should be established.”

Another positive sign that French authorities may be more committed to devoting attention and resources to fighting impunity was the May 2020 arrest of Félicien Kabuga by French authorities. Félicien Kabuga, once one of Rwanda’s wealthiest men, had been at large for years,
having been indicted in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on allegations that he financed the Interahamwe militia, founded and exercised control over RTLM hate radio, and transported and distributed a large number of machetes right before to the Genocide began.\textsuperscript{216} The Cour de cassation approved his extradition to international custody, and Kabuga is now in custody in The Hague awaiting trial.\textsuperscript{217} In the meantime, Agathe Habyarimana and many other accused génocidaires continue to live in tranquility in France.

\textbf{E. The French Government Continues to Withhold Critical Documents Relating to its Role in the Genocide.}

We may also hypothesize that a certain political mindset that was prevalent at the highest level of State may have hindered the production of substantive reports on the internal organization of the presidential party in Rwanda, which would have documented the preparation of the genocide.

– Conclusion of the Duclert Commission\textsuperscript{218}

The announcement of new resources for genocide prosecutions was part of a package of initiatives President Macron unveiled in April 2019, in the days leading up to the 25\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Genocide.\textsuperscript{219} President Macron declared his intention to mark 7 April as a “national day of remembrance.”\textsuperscript{220} And, more substantively, he announced plans to appoint a commission of researchers to examine “the role that France played in Rwanda from 1990 to 1994,” vowing to provide the commission with “access to presidential, diplomatic, military and intelligence archives.”\textsuperscript{221} At the time, President Macron stated that the Duclert Commission will be able to “consult \textit{all} the French archives relating to the pre-genocide period and the genocide itself.”\textsuperscript{222}

Regrettably, despite efforts by the Commission to gain access to documents it deemed important, the French government has continued to conceal information about the Genocide and France’s role, just as it has done for nearly thirty years. Given that context, it is not surprising that the Commission was denied full access to the French government’s archives.

In the Conclusion to its report, released on 27 March 2021, the Commission found that it “was impossible to access several sets of documents which are nonetheless preserved in archival collections,” and then made the more pointed observation: “We may also hypothesize that a certain political mindset that was prevalent at the highest level of State may have hindered the production of substantive reports on the internal organization of the presidential party in Rwanda, which would have documented the preparation of the genocide.”\textsuperscript{223}

This last statement is fraught with possibilities. It suggests that the French government may be holding onto documents that not only shed light on its role, but also documents showing that the Rwandan government and other extremists were planning and preparing for the Genocide. For too long, génocidaires have tried to hide behind the myth that the Genocide was not premeditated, but rather was a spontaneous mass reaction to the chaos created by the shootdown of President Habyarimana’s plane. The Commission’s hypothesis suggests there are “substantive reports” being withheld.\textsuperscript{224} These reports may detail the “preparation of the genocide”\textsuperscript{225} and establish when the Habyarimana government was engaged in planning that apocalyptic event. They may speak to
the French government’s knowledge about this central matter, including when and how it may have learned of the “preparation of the genocide.” Such documentation would allow for a studied review of who in France had this information and when. It may also establish why it was not made public, including any decisions that may have been made to withhold “the reports” as a response to discovery requests from the ICTR. The Commission’s hypothesis speaks to real documents that are central to this inquiry, but, as best we can tell, the French government continues to withhold them.

The “substantive reports,” noted in the Commission’s hypothesis, are but one example of critical documents being withheld. At another point in its conclusion, the Duclert Commission acknowledges the “limits” imposed on its inquiry. While the Commission appears to have made significant efforts to locate documents, it also appears that the French government, contrary to President Macron’s directive, has withheld important information. The Duclert Commission noted that “the Bureau of the National Assembly refused to allow [the Commission] to consult the archives of the 1998 Parliamentary Information Mission (MIP),” and that “the slowness of the investigation into certain requests from the Commission also prevented it from accessing sensitive files” within the archives of the prime minister’s military cabinet.

Still other archives were either missing or never collected at all. President Mitterrand’s military advisors in the état-major particulier (“EMP”)—Lanxade, Quesnot, and Huchon, among them—left few traces of their work. This is unsurprising, because amongst the few EMP directives the Commission found in the archives of the recipients are some that were required to be “destroyed after reading.” No doubt, other relevant and material documentation continues to be withheld by elements within the French government.

The French government has failed, previously, to deliver on promises of transparency. In 2015, President Macron’s predecessor, President François Hollande, vowed to inaugurate a new era of openness, announcing that France had declassified Élysée records relating to Rwanda and the Genocide. “Nothing prohibits the consultation of these archives,” the president’s office declared at the time of the decision. Activists and academics called the decision long overdue. “It’s a good step, but if this had been done 10 years ago we would have said it was courageous,” author and sociologist André Guichaoua remarked.

President Hollande’s announcement did not have the impact some hoped it would. Just 83 documents were, in fact, declassified, and most of those documents had already been disclosed through other means. “I have already seen, a long time ago, some of the documents that the Élysée today announces triumphantly as declassified,” the author Jean-François Dupaquier said shortly after the announcement. “Let’s just say they are of little interest, which is perhaps why they have been ‘declassified.’”

Researchers soon found that even those documents that had been newly declassified were still, in many cases, inaccessible, because the keeper of Mitterrand’s presidential archives retained authority to deny requests for access to those documents for almost any reason. Within a year of the declassification, one researcher found that all but two of the 83 documents were not viewable. “There is obviously a lot of arbitrariness and certainly a major willingness by those
close to François Mitterrand to close off this topic. That seems to suggest that there is a lot to hide,”
author François Graner commented in 2016.238

Graner waged a five-year battle for access to the declassified files. After some early
setbacks, France’s top administrative court ruled in June 2020 that the government could not deny
him access to the files. “Protection of state secrets must be balanced against the interests of
informing the public about historic events,” the court, known as the Council of State, ruled.239

Graner’s fight concerned only a small tranche of Rwandan files. Researchers suspected
that many more documents remain classified and undisclosed.240 The archives where such files
might be housed are diffuse, and the barriers to access vary widely.241 By law, some documents
could remain classified for decades.242 Graner has found, in the course of his research, that the
ostensible reasons for marking documents as classified are not always so convincing. In a 2016
blog post, he reproduced a document, a one-paragraph summary of a 1993 Restricted Council
meeting, which an archivist had mistakenly made available, but which was officially “classified.”
“The . . . lesson of this paragraph,” Graner wrote, “is that it does not contain anything that justifies
secrecy. [Its public release] is only opposed here to protect government officials from the curiosity
of their citizens, eager to know how [the government] decides [matters] on their behalf.”243

Graner’s words apply to this investigation, as well. The Government of Rwanda, in
furtherance of this investigation, filed three detailed and specific requests with the Government of
France, which are attached to this report, seeking relevant and material evidence that speaks to the
role of French in connection with the Genocide.244 Other than to acknowledge receipt of the
requests on 20 December 2019, 10 July 2020, and 27 January 2021, the French government has
provided no response.245

The French government’s silence in the face of Rwanda’s document requests is consistent
with a decades-long effort to prevent a full accounting of the French government’s role in
Rwanda’s history. For example, during the course of this investigation, eyewitnesses and victims
spoke of French soldiers participating in the denigration and dehumanization of Tutsi women,
including allegations of rape. Accordingly, the Rwandan government specifically requested “all
documents reporting French soldiers involved in rape or prostitution or allegations of such
conduct.”246 The French government ignored this request although, presumably, it has reports,
witness statements, and investigative data that speak to the issue, in light of an ongoing French
judicial inquiry into similar accusations. There is no reasonable national defense concern now, a
quarter of a century later, that would justify concealment of such records. The same can be said
about numerous other investigative matters, each detailed with specificity. For example:

- documents regarding communications between France or French companies, including
  but not limited to Télédiffusion de France, and RTLM or Eclipse-Rwanda regarding the
  creation of a Rwandan television station [from document request number one, receipt
  acknowledged 20 December 2019];

- documents regarding France’s knowledge and training of the Interahamwe and/or the
  Impuzamugambi [from document request number two, receipt acknowledged 10 July
  2020];
documents related to French presence at checkpoints manned by the FAR and Rwandan Gendarmerie [from document request number three, receipt acknowledged 27 January 2021];

documents related to France’s failure to intervene to end genocidal broadcasts from RTLM [from document request number two, receipt acknowledged 10 July 2020]; and

documents regarding alleged French orders to rearm FAR combatants and génocidaires in 1994 [from document request number two, receipt acknowledged 10 July 2020].

If no unreleased documents exist concerning these issues and others in the Rwandan government’s document requests—unlikely, but perhaps possible—then the French government should state as such. If there are such documents, then the French government should release them. The continuing failure to release information appropriately allows the invocation of the well-established judicial rule that withholding such evidence rightly permits the inference that the information would be harmful to the party withholding. The continuing history of hiding information, relying on bureaucratic obstacles, and testing the resolve of those who seek the truth, while hoping the controversy will pass, is fundamentally unfair to victims of the Genocide and an affront to history.247

F. For Rwandans, the Toll of the Genocide Continues.

Don’t pretend any more that you aren’t involved.

– Emmanuel Gasana, Genocide survivor248

Why does a full accounting of the French government’s responsibility remain pressing, even more than a quarter century after the Genocide? “What happened in the early ‘90s and even before, in the lead-up to the genocide, is something France will have to come to terms with,” Louise Mushikiwabo, then Rwanda’s foreign minister, said in 2017. “Rwanda is not going away. We’re not going anywhere.”249

One of the reasons Rwanda has commissioned this inquiry is that the Genocide, perhaps faint in the memory of many of the French officials who made the most consequential decisions affecting its outcome, remains a visceral, daily reality for most Rwandans. Their ordeals defy language and demonstrate, yet again, that a genocide has no half-life. It will impair its survivors and their descendants for generations. That is the ultimate cost of what happened in Rwanda. Any assessment of the role and responsibility of the French government must acknowledge not only French actions, but the suffering enabled by those actions.

During the Genocide, sons and daughters watched as their mothers were raped. Helpless parents witnessed their children being hacked to pieces and thrown alive into pits dug by earlier victims. Entire extended families were obliterated. Innocent human beings, from infants to elders, were dismembered in charnel houses whose walls were covered with blood. Three out of four Rwandans lost a close family member in the Genocide.250 This horror resulted directly from the policies, programs, and practices that dehumanized the Tutsi.
This dehumanization was on full display for the four years leading to the 100 days of the Genocide. French soldiers and officials were aware of what was happening to the Tutsi. That awareness must be part of any evaluation of the French government’s responsibility and guilt. Any inquiry regarding responsibility, of necessity, must ask and answer: what was the dehumanization of Tutsi that was allowed to grow and fester, and what finally happened because of this dehumanization?

Before the war, Emmanuel Gasana did not know his ethnicity: “My family never used to discuss ethnic groups. . . . I only came to realize about my ethnic group when I was in Primary Three, when the teacher called pupils of one ethnic group to stand up. Hutu pupils would stand proudly, but when it was the Tutsis’ turn, other kids would yell at you and humiliate you.” On the second day of Primary Three, he tried to avoid this feeling by standing up with the Hutu children in class. “But then the teacher shouted at me and ordered me to sit down at once,” Gasana recalled. “I felt so ashamed.”

The morning after Habyarimana’s assassination, Gasana’s mother came home and told him and his siblings that “we, the Tutsis, are soon going to be killed.” In the chaos that followed, they were separated. Gasana, who was 15, hid under a neighbor’s bed. The mayor encouraged hiding Tutsi to seek shelter at a local church, “but once they were all in the church, he called the police and soldiers,” who “started shooting people and throwing grenades.”

“That day, I saw a girl from my school. She was covered in blood, her legs had been blown off by a grenade, and she couldn't walk, so she just pulled her body along the ground till she reached” the house where Gasana was hiding. “I saw her and I heard her crying out for help, but as soon as the Interahamwe saw her, they just put her in a blanket and threw her into a deep pit nearby. She was still alive.”

A 2015 study of orphaned children found that 98% had seen people massacred, killed, or attacked. Another found that one out of six had had to hide under dead bodies to survive. Nine out of 10 believed they would die themselves. Gasana at one point survived by pretending to be one of the assailants—he and a friend got across a roadway by carrying a corpse: “All the way, I saw the most horrible scenes of my life. . . . When we got to the other side, I saw a man who was originally from my Grandma’s sector. He was standing on a pile of corpses, holding a big, nailed club. He was searching the victims’ pockets, stripping them of anything he thought was valuable. . . . In the time we crossed the street, he had clubbed three people to death.”

At some point, Gasana’s mother, who had survived by hiding with a part-Hutu family, “got terribly ill. Towards the end of May, her health was getting worse.” Soon after, the people sheltering her fled the RPF advance, leaving her behind: “My Mum couldn’t walk by then; she was very weak. So they took her and put her in the banana plantation. She stayed there in the cold, in the rain; she was starving and ill and had no treatment. . . . She got weaker and weaker until dogs started coming around her, pulling her clothes till they ate her. . . . That’s how she died.”
After the Genocide, Gasana became the head of his household, responsible for his siblings. “It was hard, but I struggled on. . . . Later on, I tried to focus on my future by doing further studies at university, but I couldn’t make it with all the responsibilities I had on my shoulders.”

In 2001, some 250,000 Rwandans were living in households headed by orphans. For an entire generation, school had to become an afterthought. “Children lost their parents, some had to stop school due to financial problems, others dropped out of school due to lack of parental guidance,” a survivor named Viateur Karamage said in an interview. Often, there was nowhere to go: more than half of all Rwandan schools and colleges were destroyed or pillaged, leaving only one third of the country’s schools operational in October 1994, not to mention the teachers who were killed.

Emmanuel Gasana, who gave up school to take care of his siblings, eventually became a guide at the Kigali Memorial Center, which freed him to speak about his experiences. “Before . . . genocide was a taboo subject for me. I wasn’t able to stand where people were discussing it.” His hopes were “with God and all those who have it within their power—the Government and teachers—to promote unity and reconciliation.” He also had hopes, not to say an admonition, for the international community: “Don’t pretend any more that you aren’t involved.”

Throughout Rwanda, survivors still struggle with the decades of trauma inflicted by the Genocide. “The most difficult aspect of being a survivor is remembering what happened to you,” a survivor named Yves Kamuronsi told an interviewer. “Sometimes you remember so many bad things that it could destroy your life and stop you from doing anything. You could become a very wicked person because of the things you saw or went through. . . . It may change the way you look at people and can even stop you from loving anyone . . . You may be woken by nightmares about people with machetes . . . or you may remember a child you saw being killed . . . It affects [survivors] for the rest of their lives.”

A 2018 study commissioned by this firm speaks to the continuing impact endured by survivors and their children. Since 2001, Dr. Yael Danieli has sought to help Rwandan survivors and their children. Her 2018 report identified the continuing impact and effects of the Genocide on the survivors, based on her studies and findings. Her report is attached. A few extracts make the point:

[T]o this day, many victim/survivors are (still) reeling from the multidimensional effects of their victimization traumata, their immeasurable losses, their sense of living shattered lives—including their own and their children’s sense of identity and continuity. Many continue to suffer from and to seek treatment for the injuries and persistent physical problems they sustained and their impact on their functioning (“machete,” broken back, severe unhealable head injuries, ‘permanent’ headache and eye problem, severed chest and psychosomatic pains (headaches and muscular pains, high blood pressure)). Additionally, they suffer trouble sleeping, nightmares, waking up awash with fear, feeling wounded, “getting scared over nothing, [unable to] explain the cause,” inability to concentrate and maintain social attention, among other psychosocial sequelae—with their detrimental effects on their schooling, work, economic status and social relationships.
Many find it too difficult to speak of their experiences and ponder their unimaginable, immense losses. Their minds recoil against accepting their losses. “Whole families were wiped out. . . . There is no one left on our hill, all were killed.” Incomplete mourning, and resulting depression, prevail.275

“Up to now some survivors still say, ‘I wish I had died,’” a survivor named Pierre Kavubi explained, “because those who did wrong are better off than those they hurt. Sometimes they ask us to convict them in Gacaca courts . . . but when you go there and point out someone who attacked you with a machete, they say you are a liar. . . . And on your way back home, you might be ambushed and beaten. For survivors, the genocide still seems to go on—in our hurt and injuries.”276

And yet, Kavubi expressed the same sentiments as Emmanuel Gasana and Yves Kamuronsi: “I think we should all ask ourselves these questions: When I was born, did I choose to be in this ethnic group? . . . No ethnic group is above another . . . no group should be hated. If people were free of this ignorance, nobody could convince them to kill someone just because he's short or tall! Or hurt a kid just because he was born in that family. Instead, people should focus on the future and help one another to build a united country.”277

For Rwandans who survived, the loss is just as raw nearly three decades later. Chantal Ingabire was a young college student in Kigali from 1990 to the Genocide. Her recollections are profiled in an earlier chapter where she speaks of how French soldiers would mistreat her and her friends at roadblocks and throughout the city. She talks powerfully about how she lost family and friends. Additionally, she reflected: “If I were to speak to the French government today, I would say ‘shame on you, you knew how the Habyarimana government was mistreating and abusing Tutsi every day, you allowed your soldiers to treat us as second-class citizens, and you supported the Habyarimana government even as they were massacring us. Shame on you.’”278

The consequences of the French government’s Rwanda policy for more than a quarter century are, for the Genocide’s victims and survivors, unequivocal: lifelong pain and suffering. Remembrance of their unspeakable loss and tragedy, while necessary, is not enough. It is much more important to confront and acknowledge responsibility in relation to one of the darkest events of the twentieth century. The government of France bears responsibility for enabling a foreseeable genocide. The world is still waiting for the French government’s full acceptance of responsibility.
5 Alan Riding, Paris Journal: Mitterrand’s “Mistakes”: Vichy Past Is Unveiled, N.Y. TIMES, 9 Sept. 1994; see also RONALD TIERSKY, FRANÇOIS MITTERRAND: A VERY FRENCH PRESIDENT 343 (2000) (“Mitterrand surely wanted to cut his losses and influence Péan’s interpretations. And since there were in fact no treasonous skeletons in Mitterrand’s World War II closet, better to get the whole story out while he could still fight for his own version of events rather than rely on historians when he was gone.”); PHILIP SHORT, A TASTE FOR INTRIGUE 554-55 (2013). Mitterrand did not use any of his remaining days to apologize for Vichy France. The following year, French President Jacques Chirac would do so.
7 PHILIP SHORT, A TASTE FOR INTRIGUE 110 (2013) (“For the rest of his life, like de Gaulle, [Mitterrand] rejected any suggestion that France should be held responsible for the misdeeds of the Vichy regime.”).
8 Transcript of interview of President François Mitterrand, LE FIGARO, 9 Sept. 1994
10 François Mitterrand, Opening Speech to the 16th Conference of Heads of States of France and Africa in La Baule, France (June 1990).
15 GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 316-17 (1997); Note from Bruno Delaye to President François Mitterrand (24 Oct. 1994). General Christian Quesnot, the president’s top military advisor, was especially hostile to the idea of inviting President Pasteur Bizimungu to the summit. Ultimately, the decision rested with Mitterrand, who delivered his judgment, as he so often did, with a single handwritten word: “No.”
16 Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy Kigali (26 Oct. 1994) (Subject: “Official – Informal”) (“The economic situation is as difficult as the political one. . . . For the foreseeable future, Rwanda’s economy will depend heavily on foreign humanitarian, economic, and technical assistance.”). US Department of State officials estimated in September 1994 that a “basic restoration” of Rwanda’s government operations would cost more than $2 billion.
17 Cable from Warren Christopher to US Embassy Kigali (6 Sept. 1994) (Subject: “A/S Moose Meets with Rwandan Finance Minister”).
18 Cable from Warren Christopher to US Embassy Kigali (6 Sept. 1994) (Subject: “A/S Moose Meets with Rwandan Finance Minister”). Prime Minister Faustin Twagiramungu told reporters that officials from the ousted interim government absconded with all of the country’s reserves in banknotes—about 15 billion Rwandan francs (roughly $117.8 million). “For us, there is nothing left,” he said. Rwanda: Kigali envisage de frapper une nouvelle monnaie [Kigali Plans to Mint a New Currency], LE MONDE, 7 Sept. 1994.
19 Speech by H.E. Major General Paul Kagame, Vice President and Minister of Defence, the Republic of Rwanda, 1 Sept. 1994.
20 See Richard Dowden, Walking Back to Catastrophe?, INDEPENDENT, 12 Sept. 1994; Memorandum from Carol Lancaster and George E. Moose to the US National Security Adviser, 12 Sept. 1994 (Subject: “Rwanda: An Action
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Plan for Recovery’’); Children Scheduled to Return to Primary School in Late September, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 8 Sept. 1994.

21 See Cable from US Embassy Paris to US Secretary of State (12 Sept. 1994) (Subject: “Africa in the French Press – September 3-9, 1994”) (referring to a World Food Programme report indicating “that half the population, or about 5 million people, are starving”); Memorandum from Timothy E. Wirth to US Secretary of State, Sept. 1994 (Subject: “Rwanda and Burundi”) (“Vast sections of this intensely cultivated country, with huts every few yards, are eerily empty, because so many people have left. Crops sit in so many fields, and the rainy season is underway.”).


23 See Memorandum from George E. Moose, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to Dr. Davis (7 Oct. 1994) (Subject: “FY 95 Africa Regional ESF Request”).

24 See Cable from US Department of State (28 Oct. 1994), Subject: “Rwanda Weekly Report”; Memorandum from George E. Moose, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to Dr. Davis (7 Oct. 1994) (“There remains a reluctance among donors to commit funds to Rwandan arrears before seeing what tangible steps the new government will take to support its rhetoric.”).

25 See US Department of State memorandum (undated) (Subject: “Assistance to the Rwandan Government: Multilateral and Bilateral Aid Efforts”). Rwanda owed $4 million to the World Bank, and the debt was projected to grow to $7.5 million by early 1995. See Memorandum from Arlene Render to George E. Moose, through Prudence Bushnell (3 Oct. 1994) (Subject: “Your Meeting with Rwandan President Bizimungu”). This debt was of particular importance to Rwanda. It needed to be paid off before the World Bank would release $250 million to Rwanda in project assistance and economic recovery credits. See Cable from US Secretary of State to US Embassy Brussels et al. (18 Oct. 1994) (Subject: “Demarche: International Assistance to Clear Rwandan World Bank Arrears”); Memorandum from George E. Moose, US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to Dr. Davis (7 Oct. 1994) (Subject: “FY 95 Africa Regional ESF Request”).

26 Cable from US Department of State (28 Oct. 1994), Subject: “Rwanda Weekly Report”.


31 US Department of State memorandum (28 Nov. 1994) (Subject: “Rwanda”).

32 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

33 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

34 Interview by LFM with Paul Kagame.

35 Speech from François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic, 4 (8 Nov. 1994) (emphasis added).

36 Joint Press Conference by Mr. François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, and Mr. Omar Bongo, President of the Republic of Gabon (9 Nov. 1994).


39 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Transcript of trial proceedings 2-4 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 25 Sept. 2006) (testimony of Major Aloys Ntabakuze, in which he declined to acknowledge the existence of a genocide against the Tutsi and asserted: “[T]here were Tutsis who killed also Hutus, and Hutus who killed Tutsis. And there were Tutsis who killed other Tutsis as well. . . . Tutsis killed Hutus in large numbers”).
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40 Speech from François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic, 4 (8 Nov. 1994); see also Transcript of interview of President François Mitterrand, LE FIGARO, 9 Sept. 1994, 4 (“It was France, on the contrary, that facilitated negotiations between the two ethnic groups.”).

41 Speech from François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic 4 (8 Nov. 1994).

42 Transcript of interview of President François Mitterrand, LE FIGARO, 9 Sept. 1994, 4; see also Speech from François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic 4 (8 Nov. 1994); François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic, Ambassadors’ Conference: Statement by the President of the Republic, 4 (31 Aug. 1994).


44 Letter from Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, President of the RPF, to François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic (28 Aug. 1993). The letter did open with an expression of “most sincere” thanks, but not, as Mitterrand claimed, for “what [France] had accomplished for the settlement of the war.” It merely thanked Mitterrand “for the role France played as an observer at our negotiations” (emphasis added).

45 Letter from Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, President of the RPF, to François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic (28 Aug. 1993). Specifically, the letter stated: “[W]e believe in the necessity of the quick deployment of a neutral international force and the departure of French troops, as planned for in the [Arusha] accord, to allow the establishment of the broad-based transitional government which will lead the country until the elections. Excellency, France and the Rwandan Patriotic Front have not always shared the same point of view about the French government’s position in this conflict. However, we remain convinced that France’s total support for the implementation of the Arusha Accord will allow the Rwandan people to actualize its hopes for a state of law, for democracy, and for development.”

46 Transcript of speech from François Mitterrand, French President of the Republic, 5 (8 Nov. 1994).

47 Report from Pol-Mil A. Marley (cleared by Joyce Leader) (16 Aug. 1994) (Subject: “Meeting of Charge d’Affaires with UN SRSG; No Bend in the GoR”).

48 Cable from Warren Christopher to US Embassy in Paris (13 Aug. 1994).


50 Interview by LFM with Ray Wilkinson.

51 Interview by LFM with Ray Wilkinson.

52 Cable from the US Embassy in Paris to the Secretary of State DC (25 Aug. 1994).


55 Michel Sitbon, Un génocide sur la conscience [A Genocide on the Conscience], L’ESPRIT FRAPPEUR 1 (Nov. 1998) (“It is clear that, for the last four years, journalists and politicians have done everything to avoid this guilt that is difficult to understand.”).


87 Rémy Ourdan, *Le parlement peine à éclaircir le rôle de la France au Rwanda* [Parliament Barely Clarified the Role of France in Rwanda], LE MONDE, 10 July 1998.

88 MIP Audition of Bruno Delaye, Tome III, Vol. 1 334-335 (19 May 1998) (“Mr. Bruno Delaye indicated he did not have any information enabling him to express an opinion on the matter.”); MIP Audition of Christian Quesnot, Tome III, Vol. 1 343 (19 May 1998) (opining that the assassination stood to benefit the RPF more than it did “the other protagonists,” but acknowledging that, “for lack of an investigation, it was not a question of certainty”).


91 MIP Audition of Christian Quesnot, Tome III, Vol. 1 343 (19 May 1998). Quesnot’s “personal feeling” was that the RPF had more to gain from Habyarimana’s death than Hutu extremists did. He also speculated that the extremists would not have shot down the plane because some of their own partisans were on board the flight along with Habyarimana. “If the extremists had wanted to get rid of President Habyarimana, they could have done so on the ground at another time without killing one of their own,” Quesnot said.


100 MIP Tome I 224-62.


102 *French Court Confirms Dismissal of Habyarimana Plane Shooting Probe*, RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE, 3 July 2020.


105 Assistance Contract between the Prime Minister of Interim Rwandan Government and Captain Barril (28 May 1994).

106 PHILIPPE BREWAEYS, *RWANDA 1994 NOIRS ET BLANCS MENTEURS* [RWANDA 1994, BLACK AND WHITE LIES] 52 (2013) (“[I]n December 1995, during a search of the home of Séraphin Rwabukumba, brother of Agathe Habyarimana, the Belgian judicial police discovered the transcript of an interview with Barril given on Radio Africa No. 1: “I have about 80 kilos of electronic equipment from the plane; all the recordings from the airport control tower; all the airport logbooks; the two missile launchers that were fired: 80 radio and video testimonies. (The person responsible for the genocide is the person responsible for the attack on the presidential plane. . . . According to my investigation, the person responsible for the attack is none other than the RPF.”).”)

107 PHILIPPE BREWAEYS, *RWANDA 1994 NOIRS ET BLANCS MENTEURS* [RWANDA 1994, BLACK AND WHITE LIES] 55 (2013) (“This is the man who entered the Bruguière case in September 1999 after refusing to meet with both the
Belgian judiciary and the ICTR. The judge and the spy were on the same wavelength: the RPF did it. Jean-Louis Bruguière would have had at least one good reason to be wary. He was in charge of the 1982 investigation into the attack on Rue des Rosiers. He can hardly forget the mess of the Irish of Vincennes while he was following the trail of Palestinian terrorism. And what remains of the ‘evidence’ held by Barril? With the exception of the recordings from the control tower, which were only handed over to the courts a year and a half later, nothing. No satellite photos, no black box, no 80 kilos of electronic equipment and, above all, no missile launcher.

See JEAN-FRANÇOIS DUPAQUIER, POLITIQUES, MILITAIRES ET MERCENAIRES FRANÇAIS AU RWANDA [FRENCH POLITICIANS, SOLDIERS AND MERCENARIES IN RWANDA] 428 (2014); Raphaël de Benito, Barril de Poudre [Powderkeg], SURVIE (1 Feb. 2012).

Raphaël de Benito, Barril de Poudre [Powderkeg], SURVIE (1 Feb. 2012).

French Court Confirms Dismissal of Habyarimana Plane Shooting Probe, RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE, 3 July 2020; Jon Boyle, Top French Anti-Terror Judge Seeks Political Career, REUTERS, 7 Jun. 2007.

112 Rwanda Government’s Reaction to Judge Bruguière’s Indictment Saga 18 (26 Jan. 2007).

113 Rwanda Government’s Reaction to Judge Bruguière’s Indictment Saga 4 (26 Jan. 2007).

114 BENOIT COLLOMBAT AND DAVID SEVERNAY, AU NOM DE LA FRANCE: GUERRES SECRETES AU RWANDA [IN THE NAME OF FRANCE: SECRET WARS IN RWANDA] 67 (2014) (“In 1988, Fabien Singaye was appointed (as deputy secretary) to the Rwandan Embassy in Switzerland. He was in constant contact with President Habyarimana’s private secretary, Élie Sagatwa (Agathe Habyarimana’s first cousin). From Switzerland, Fabien Singaye monitored the opponents of the regime and tirelessly alerted Kigali of their actions.”).

Rwanda/France – Newspaper: Kabuga’s Relative Worked for French Judge, JUSTICEINFO.NET, 8 Apr. 2009 (citing article in LE SOIR).

116 Indictment from Jean-Louis Bruguière, First Vice-President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Issuance of International Arrest Warrants, 46-48 (17 Nov. 2006). The indictment named a ninth person, Corporal Eric Hakizamana, who supposedly worked in the RPF’s “Directorate of Military Intelligence” and was a member of “the attack team.” Id. at 17, 48. There is no record of this person’s existence.

117 Indictment from Jean-Louis Bruguière, First Vice-President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Issuance of International Arrest Warrants, 46-48 (17 Nov. 2006). Events in Rwanda may have impacted the timing of these arrest warrants. Two years prior, the Rwandan Parliament had passed a statute authorizing an investigation into the role of the French government in the Genocide Against the Tutsi, chaired by Jean de Dieu Mucyo, the former Rwandan Minister of Justice. It became known as the Mucyo Commission. The work of the Mucyo Commission would not begin, however, until April 2006. When it did commence, the French government did not cooperate. In its report, released two years later, the Mucyo Commission stated, “In France, the Commission’s request for cooperation with the official authorities was turned down.” Mucyo Report 2-3.

118 Indictment from Jean-Louis Bruguière, First Vice-President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, Issuance of International Arrest Warrants, 10 & 46 (17 Nov. 2006).

119 Thierry Lévèque, Rwanda’s Kagame Should Face Court: French Judge, REUTERS, (21 Nov. 2006).


121 Cable from Craig R. Stapleton to US Secretary of State ¶ 5 (18 Jan. 2007) (Subject: “Rwanda: Effect of Bruguière Report on USG, Status of Mrs. Habyarimana”).

122 Cable from Craig R. Stapleton to US Secretary of State ¶ 5 (18 Jan. 2007) (Subject: “Rwanda: Effect of Bruguière Report on USG, Status of Mrs. Habyarimana”).

123 Cable from Craig R. Stapleton to US Secretary of State, ¶ 6 (26 Jan. 2007) (Subject: “C/T Judge on France, Rwanda, Pakistan, and His Political Future”).

124 Cable from Craig R. Stapleton to US Secretary of State, ¶ 6 (26 Jan. 2007) (Subject: “C/T Judge on France, Rwanda, Pakistan, and His Political Future”).

See Pierre Boisselet, Rwanda – Attentant contre Habyarimana: l’expertise française disculpe les proches de Kagamé [Rwanda – Attack against Habyarimana: French Expertise Exonerates Kagame’s Close Relations], JEUNE
AFRIQUE, 10 Jan. 2012; Thierry Lévêque, French Probe Exonerates Rwanda Leader in Genocide, REUTERS, 10 Jan. 2012.

126 Angela Charlton, France Drops Probe of Air Crash that Led to Rwandan Genocide, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 26 Dec. 2018.

127 French Court Confirms Dismissal of Habyarimana Plane Shooting Probe, RADIO FRANCE INTERNATIONALE, 3 July 2020.


130 Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Transcript of trial, 3 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 24 Oct. 2005). Judge Bruguière’s investigatory report had leaked before Bagosora took the witness stand. Bagosora touted the report in his testimony, suggesting it proved that he was not to blame for the attack on the president’s plane—the RPF was. See Prosecutor v. Théoneste Bagosora et al., Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Transcript of trial 42-43 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 2 Nov. 2005).


134 Interview by Maria Malagardis with Alain Gauthier, Rwanda: «Il y aurait une centaine de génocidaires supposés en France» [Rwanda: “There Would Be a Hundred Suspected Génocidaires in France”], LIBÉRATION, 24 July 2020; Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.

135 Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier. See also Théo Englebert, Aloys Ntiwiragabo, pilier presume du genocide des Tutsis, se terre en France [Aloys Ntiwiragabo, Presumed Pillar of the Tutsi Genocide, Hides in France], MEDIAPART, 24 July 2020.


138 Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.

139 Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.

140 Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier. Of the seven cases, three have resulted in convictions, and four are still awaiting trial.


142 Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.

143 Création du tribunal judiciaire au 1er janvier 2020, AVOCATS BARREAU - PARIS http://www.avocatparis.org/creation-tribunal-judiciaire


146 Laurent Larcher, Rwanda, non-lieu validé pour le père Wenceslas Munyeshyaka [Case Dropped against Rwandan Catholic Priest Accused of Genocide], LA CROIX, 17 Nov. 2019.


Laurent Larcher, Rwanda, non-lieu validé pour le père Wenceslas Munyeshyaka [Case Dropped against Rwandan Catholic Priest Accused of Genocide], LA CROIX, 17 Nov. 2019.

Prosecutor v. Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I. Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for The Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France (20 Nov. 2007) (“The Chamber . . . orders the case of The Prosecutor v. Wenceslas Munyeshyaka be referred to the French authorities, so that those authorities may forthwith assign the case to the appropriate French court.”).

Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.


See Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.


See France Upholds Landmark Rwandan Genocide Conviction, AFP, 24 May 2018. In 2014—20 years after the Genocide—Pascal Simbikangwa, the former head of the Rwandan Central Intelligence Service, became the first génocidaire prosecuted in a French court, resulting in a conviction and a sentence of 25 years. Two Rwandan Mayors Jailed for Life Over 1994 Massacre, THE GUARDIAN, 6 July 2016. Two other génocidaires, the former bourgmestres Octavien Ngenzi and Tito Barahira, were sentenced in 2016 to life in prison for Genocide and crimes against humanity. James Karuhanga, Génocidaire Claude Muhayimana’s Trial in France Pushed to February, THE NEW TIMES, 30 Sept. 2020. One other suspect, Claude Muhayimana, was slated to face trial in February 2021 but has had his trial date postponed. See James Karuhanga, Anger as France Delays Trial of Genocide Suspect Muhayimana, NEW TIMES, 19 Jan. 2021.

Macron Seeks to Shine Light on Rwanda Genocide, FRANCE 24, 5 Apr. 2019.

Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.

Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.

MIP Audition of Georges Martres, Tome III, Vol. 1, 119; MIP Tome I, 139. In an 18 November 1990 cable, Col. Galinié wrote, “Thus, the FAR whose cohesion is more asserted today than ever, thanks to the ties created by the offensives carried out against the adversary, see their political and popular influence considerably increased, to the point that their leaders like Colonel Serubuga appear threatening. “; see also JEAN VARRET, GÉNÉRAL, J’EN AI PRIS POUR MON GRADE [MY WAR STORIES] 156 (2018) (“Colonel Serubuga, whom I met at each of my missions in his country, was more diplomatic in his remarks, but I could read between the lines that genocide was one of the solutions being considered.”).

Colonel René Galinié in an interview to Mediapart in reaction to the Duclert report, stated, “Colonel Pierre-Célestin Rwagafilita, at the head of the Gendarmerie, was a bloodthirsty brute who dreamt only of exterminating the Tutsis. His counterpart, Colonel Laurent Serubuga, at the head of the Army, was more intelligent, but just as determined.” Jean-François Dupaqquier and Théo Englebert, Il a alerté sur le génocide des Tutsis et a été sanctionné: le colonel Galinié témoigne [He Warned about the Tutsi Genocide and Was Punished: Colonel Galinié Testifies], MEDIAPART, 1 Apr. 2021.


165 Jacques Morel, *Le rôle de Laurent Serubuga dans le génocide des Tutsi* [The Role of Laurent Serubuga in the Genocide Against the Tutsi] 20-21 (3 Mar. 2019) (citing CNDA, 9 avril 2008, 552782, K. Cf. Cour nationale du droit d’asile, Contentieux des réfugiés, Jurisprudence du Conseil d’Etat et de la Cour nationale du droit d’asile, Année 2008, p. 80.). The National Court for Asylum case cited by Morel regarding “an MDR member from Nyabikenke” referred to the asylum applicant serving as a professor and prefect in a school controlled by Serubuga and Théoneste Bagosora. In denying the application for asylum, the court stated that massacres of Tutsi between October 1990 and June 1994 took place under the authority of Serubuga and Bagosora. It also stated that Serubuga had been denied asylum under Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the article that refuses refugee states to people suspected of crimes against humanity and other international and serious non-political crimes.

166 France 3 Hauts-de-France, *Un Rwandais soupçonné d’avoir participé au génocide des Tutsis arrêté à Cambrai* [A Rwandan Suspected of Having Participated in the Genocide of the Tutsi, Arrested in Cambrai], 16 July 2013.


168 The Director of Public Prosecutions v. T, Case No. 105/2013, Ordre of the Supreme Court of Denmark, 6 Nov. 2013) (“In accordance with generally recognised international standards the principle that no one should be punished with retroactive effect will not prevent punishment of a person for genocide or a crime against humanity according to subsequent legislation if it was a crime according to the recognised general principles of civilised nations already at the time it was committed, see Article 7(2) of the European Human Rights Convention.”); In re Extradition of Jean Baptiste Mugimba, No. UTL-I-2012058615, § 6.6, The Hague District Court, Extradition Section (Netherlands, 11 July 2014) (citing Šimšić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application No. 51552/10, Decision, ¶ 23, (European Court of Human Rights 10 Apr. 2012); Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Application Nos. 2312/08 and 34179/08, Judgement, ¶ 55, (European Court of Human Rights 18 July 2013); International Court of Justice, Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 28 May 1951, 23 (1951); Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-I-T, Judgement, ¶ 88, (Intl’l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda 21 May 1999); Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgement, ¶ 60, (Intl’l Crim. Trib for Former Yugoslavia 14 Dec. 1999).

169 Romain Gras, *Rwanda- Johnstone Busingye: «Juger ou extrader des génocidaires n’est pas une faveur faite au Rwanda mais une obligation»* [Rwanda-Johnston Busingye: “Trying or Extrading Génocidaires Is Not a Favour to Rwanda But an Obligation”], *Jeune Afrique*, 24 Jan. 2019. According to Rwandan Minister of Justice Johnstone Busingye, the Rwandan government has sent 42 indictments to France requesting that accused génocidaires be extradited to Rwanda or prosecuted in France. No extraditions have followed. “France was very close to the Rwandan regime in 1994,” Busingye has said. “But the efforts made by Paris to ensure that the people who had a role during the Genocide are brought to justice are weak, compared to the countries which were not close to Rwanda at the time.” *Id.; see also* Elisée Mpirwa, *Rwanda Slams France over Employment of Genocide Convict in Public Hospital*, *The New Times*, 6 Feb. 2018.


NCIS Norway v. Charles Bandora, No. 11-050224ENE-OTIR/01, Oslo District Court (11 July 2011); The Director of Public Prosecutions v. T, Case No. 105/2013, Ordre of the Supreme Court of Denmark, 6 (Supreme court of Denmark, 6 Nov. 2013); Decision by Hague Court of Appeal, Case No. 200.182.281 (Netherlands, 5 July 2016).

Communication from Rwanda’s Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit.


Théo Englebert, Réfugiés rwandais: le dévoiement du droit d’asile [Rwandan Refugees: The Misuse of the Right of Asylum], MEDIAPART, 22 Aug. 2020; see also Sosthene Munyemana, TRIAL INTERNATIONAL, 25 Apr. 2016 (“In January 2008 the French National Court for Asylum dismissed the asylum application of Munyemana. The French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons (OFPRA) stated that the application was not sincere and aimed at hiding a truth. Furthermore, there were reasonable grounds for considering that the applicant had committed genocide and crimes against humanity. Therefore, pursuant to Art 1(F)(a) of the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugee, he was excluded from such protection.”); Communication from Rwanda’s Genocide Fugitive Tracking Unit (regarding Sosthène Munyemana being convicted at a Gacaca proceeding).


Interview by LFM with Alain Gauthier.


194 Maria Malagardis, Quinze jours dans la vie de “Madame” [Fifteen Days in the Life of “Madame”], XXI (April, May, June 2010).


196 Maria Malagardis, Quinze jours dans la vie de “Madame” [Fifteen Days in the Life of “Madame”], XXI (April, May, June 2010).


198 Decision of the Commission de Recours des Réfugiés 2e division [French Refugee Appeal Board 2nd division, currently known as National Court for Asylum], Mme Agathe Kanziga veuve Habyarimana, Decision 564776, 3 (15 Feb. 2007).

199 Interview by LFM of Alain Gauthier.


206 Collective des Parties Civiles pour le Rwanda, Complaint against Agathe Habyarimana Kanziga (13 Feb. 2007); See Collective des Parties Civiles pour le Rwanda, Table for complaint against Agathe Habyarimana Kanziga (13 Feb. 2007). As noted in the Gauthier’s filing, the complaint came at a significant financial cost of 6,000 euro—a cost that should no doubt be borne by the French State.


208 Rwandan Ex-Leader’s Widow Asks France to Close Case against Her, AFP/YAHOO NEWS, 16 Nov. 2020. Her request was refused. Agathe’s lawyer said she plans to appeal the decision.

209 Supporting document from Alain Gauthier, 1 Apr. 2021.


211 See Collective des Parties Civiles pour le Rwanda, Table for complaint against Agathe Habyarimana Kanziga (13 Feb. 2007).


Using a pneumatic jack to force open the door to his small flat in Asnières, a residential area in Paris less than four miles across the Seine River from the Élysée, French gendarmes on 16 May 2020 rushed in and discovered Kabuga’s eldest son, who reportedly pointed to the bedroom where his father was sleeping. See Florence Morice, Rwandan Genocide: The 25-Year Search for Félicien Kabuga, RFI (6 June 2020). When confronted, Kabuga acted as if he could not understand the Kinyarwanda interpreter accompanying the gendarmes and insisted in Kiswahili (the language spoken more broadly in Africa’s Great Lakes region) that he was Antoine Tounga from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Id. The gendarmes recognized the alias and knew he was lying. Two hours later, a DNA test left no doubt as to Kabuga’s identity. Id.


Duclert Commission Report 981.

Rwanda to Mark 25th Anniversary of Genocide, as France Examines Own Role, FRANCE 24, 7 Apr. 2019.


Marine Pennetier, Macron Appoints Researchers to Evaluate Role of France in Rwandan Genocide, REUTERS, 5 Apr. 2019.

Duclert Commission Report 5 (emphasis added).

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Fabien Jannic-Cherbonnel, French Rwanda Genocide Documents Not Complete, Activists Warn, RFI, 8 Apr. 2015.


Rwanda: La prétendue declassification des archives de l’Élysée n’est qu’une grossière operation de désinformation [Rwanda: The Alleged Declassification of the Élysée Archives Is Only a Crude Disinformation Operation], COURRIER INT’L, 15 Apr. 2015.

See Béatrice Bouniol, Rwanda, à quand l’ouverture réelle des archives? [Rwanda, When Will the Archives Be Truly Opened?], LA CROIX, 24 June 2018; Benoît Collombat, Génocide rwandais: les archives de l’Élysée toujours inaccessibles [Rwandan Genocide: The Élysée Archives Remain Inaccessible], FRANCE INTER, 6 Apr. 2016.

Benoît Collombat, Génocide rwandais: les archives de l’Élysée toujours inaccessibles [Rwandan Genocide: The Élysée Archives Remain Inaccessible], FRANCE INTER, 6 Apr. 2016.

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François Graner, Une déclassification sans réelle portée [A Declassification Without Real Scope], SURVIE, 1 May 2015.

François Graner, Une déclassification sans réelle portée [A Declassification Without Real Scope], SURVIE, 1 May 2015.

François Graner, Une déclassification sans réelle portée [A Declassification Without Real Scope], SURVIE, 1 May 2015.


Request for documents from the Government of Rwanda to the Government of France (receipt acknowledged 20 December 2019); Request for documents from the Government of Rwanda to the Government of France (receipt acknowledged 10 July 2020); Request for documents from the Government of Rwanda to the Government of France (receipt acknowledged 27 January 2021).

Acknowledgement of receipt of request for documents from the Government of Rwanda to the Government of France (20 December 2019); Acknowledgement of receipt of request for documents from the Government of Rwanda to the Government of France (10 July 2020); Acknowledgement of receipt of request for documents from the Government of Rwanda to the Government of France (27 January 2021).


Phuong N Pham, Harvey M Weinstein, Timothy Longman, Trauma and PTSD Symptoms in Rwanda: Implications for Attitudes toward Justice and Reconciliation, JAMA (4 Aug. 2004).


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260 Lauren Ng, Naphtal Ahishakiye, Donald Miller, Beth Meyerowitz, Life after Genocide: Mental Health, Education, and Social Support of Orphaned Survivors, INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGY (4 Apr. 2015).
261 Atle Dyregrov, Leila Gupta, Rolf Gjestad, Eugenie Mukanohehi, Trauma Exposure and Psychological Reactions to Genocide among Rwandan Children, JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS (30 June 2005).
262 Atle Dyregrov, Leila Gupta, Rolf Gjestad, Eugenie Mukanohehi, Trauma Exposure and Psychological Reactions to Genocide among Rwandan Children, JOURNAL OF TRAUMATIC STRESS (30 June 2005).
266 WENDY WHITWORTH, WE SURVIVED: GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 40 (2006).
268 Interview by LFM with Viateur Karamage.
269 ANNA OBURA, NEVER AGAIN: EDUCATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION IN RWANDA 47 (2003).
278 Interview by LFM with Chantal Ingabire.
CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

It is our conclusion that the French government bears significant responsibility for enabling a foreseeable genocide. For many years, the French government supported the corrupt and murderous regime of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana. French officials armed, advised, trained, equipped, and protected the Rwandan government, heedless of the Habyarimana regime’s commitment to the dehumanization and, ultimately, the destruction and death of Tutsi in Rwanda. French officials did so to advance France’s own interests, in particular the reinforcement and expansion of France’s power and influence in Africa. And they did so despite constant and ever-increasing evidence that a genocide was foreseeable.

President François Mitterrand was chiefly responsible for the French government’s reckless enabling of the Rwandan government during the critical period of 1990 to 1994. He and his administration knew that the government in Rwanda was orchestrating, fomenting and exploiting violence against the Tutsi minority for its own ends. As the French government backed the Rwandan government in its war against the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), the Élysée received a drumbeat of information about the Rwandan government’s anti-Tutsi pogroms. More than once, French officials recommended that France distance itself from the Rwandan government. Mitterrand, however, remained committed to his policy to support the Rwandan government diplomatically and to bolster the Rwandan military with an array of weapons and munitions, including mortars, rockets, attack helicopters, and artillery. French military officers advised Rwandan military leaders and trained Rwandan soldiers, while French soldiers shored up the Rwandan army’s defense of Kigali. This support afforded extremists time to plan and ultimately execute a genocide. When, in 1994, the Genocide Against the Tutsi commenced, the French government continued its opposition to the RPF, the one force fighting to end the mass murder.

The French government would not accept an RPF victory, as it risked unraveling the trust that francophone African leaders placed in France to protect them from threats to their own power. As a result, Mitterrand’s support for Habyarimana did not waver even as his government detained, tortured, murdered, and otherwise persecuted innocent people simply because of their ethnic identification. Dependent on—and highly responsive to—France, Habyarimana and his allies rightly understood the French government’s unqualified aid to mean they could continue to terrorize and slaughter Tutsi with impunity without risking France’s military assistance, financial support, and political backing. In short, French geopolitical interests mattered more than Rwandan lives.

When the Genocide arrived, senior French officials, starting with President Mitterrand, claimed that no one could have seen it coming. But the Genocide was amply foreshadowed. French officials on the ground in Rwanda had been reporting to Paris for nearly four years on massacres targeting Tutsi. Some Rwandan extremist military leaders even confided in French officials an intention to exterminate the Tutsi. Years later, high-ranking French officials would acknowledge that the Genocide was foreseeable as early as October 1990, if not in the exact form that it took. Mitterrand himself understood the risk and accepted it.
Days after the Genocide began, French troops arrived in Kigali to evacuate French nationals and others sheltering in the French embassy, including some of the extremists responsible for the massacres. These French troops became instant eyewitnesses to the killing, carried out in part by French-trained units, such as the Presidential Guard and the para-commando battalion. Yet, as bodies littered church pews and piled up along roads, several of Mitterrand’s closest advisors continued to view the advance of the RPF’s military as a greater threat to Rwanda than those committing the Genocide. After years of tolerating the massacre of Tutsi as an acceptable cost of war, the French government responded to the outbreak of genocide by watering down United Nations resolutions intended to shame and bring to justice those responsible; viewing the massacres as casualties of an ongoing civil war between opposing armies rather than a genocide targeting a civilian population based on ethnicity; and advocating for a cease-fire and the resumption of a failed peace process, as if negotiation was a sufficient response to genocide.

After two and a half months of killings and domestic political pressure to act, the French government pushed through a UN Security Council authorization for Operation Turquoise as a strictly humanitarian intervention. The mission was initiated after the annihilation of Tutsi was nearly complete and timed to allow Mitterrand to redeploy French troops to Rwanda as the RPF was about to seize control of Kigali. Particularly at the beginning of Turquoise, there were several French military officers on the ground, who, outside of the Turquoise humanitarian mandate, continued to treat the FAR as their partners and sought to prevent the RPF from consolidating control of the country. Even though some of those French officers were eventually sidelined, Turquoise—while saving some lives—was ultimately unable to fulfill its stated humanitarian mission.

When the RPF took control of Kigali and was poised to wrest control of the rest of Rwanda from the génocidaires, French officials hastily placed one-fifth of the country under France’s protection, a so-called “Safe Humanitarian Zone” where génocidaires would find refuge. The French government decided not to arrest, detain, or systematically disarm the génocidaires in the Safe Humanitarian Zone. Instead, it allowed extremists safe passage to Zaire, where they rearmed to conduct raids across the border in Rwanda; terrorized civilians in refugee camps; and created a second humanitarian disaster. In the end, Turquoise contributed to the destabilization of the region and saved few lives, relative to those lost in the Genocide.

Over the last quarter century, the French government has been engaged in a cover-up, as it seeks to bury its past in Rwanda. After the French media and a Rwandan commission published reports critical of France’s role in Rwandan affairs and, in particular, the Genocide, the French government responded with deeply flawed investigations, one of which relied on génocidaires as witnesses. As international and Rwandan national courts sought to bring génocidaires to justice, the French government has allowed scores of cases to remain unresolved for decades. Since the Genocide, France has been providing safe harbor to numerous individuals suspected of involvement in genocide crimes, including Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana (the former first lady).

The French government’s concealment of its documents, showing what Mitterrand’s government said, knew, and did over 25 years ago, has been a central element of this cover-up. In this investigation alone, the Government of Rwanda has submitted three detailed requests for
documents received by the French government on 20 December 2019, 10 July 2020, and 27 January 2021 respectively. The French government has ignored all three. Its refusal to disclose these and related documents only raises more questions about the extent of the Mitterrand administration’s involvement in the Genocide. Recent disclosures of documents in connection with the Duclert Commission’s report, however, may signal a move toward transparency.

The individuals convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, foreign courts, Rwandan national courts, and traditional Gacaca tribunals bear the ultimate responsibility for committing the Genocide, and we found no evidence that French officials or personnel participated directly in the killing of Tutsi during that period. However, only the French government was unwavering in its support for its Rwandan allies even when their genocidal intentions became clear, and only the French government was an indispensable collaborator in building the institutions that would become instruments of the Genocide. No other foreign government both knew the dangers posed by Rwandan extremists and enabled those extremists as they prepared to bring about the deaths of more than one million victims of the 1994 Genocide Against the Tutsi—persons killed because they were Tutsi, resembled Tutsi, were related to Tutsi, protected Tutsi, or opposed the extremist politics that sought to divide the nation. The French government’s role was singular. And still, it has not yet acknowledged that role or atoned for it.

These conclusions, in addition to the findings below, receive detailed discussion and corroboration in the Report:

A. Pre-1990: France Supported Rwanda Economically and Militarily as the Rwandan Government Engaged in Systemic Discrimination and Violence against the Tutsi.

1. By the end of 1960, France had negotiated independence with 17 of the 20 African countries it had colonized. In order to maintain its post-colonial geopolitical reach, the French government entered into cooperation agreements with its former African colonies. These agreements preserved France’s interests through economic and military aid.

2. Beginning in the early 1960s, the French government honored its military cooperation agreements by dispatching troops to help suppress uprisings in several of its former colonies in Africa.

3. When Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in July 1962, the French government saw an opportunity to expand its reach—viewing Rwanda as a kind of frontier post on the border with “Anglo-Saxon” East Africa (Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania) that could help spread French influence in the region.

4. In December 1962, the French government entered into civil cooperation agreements with the Rwandan government, headed by newly elected President Grégoire Kayibanda.

5. Kayibanda had risen to power in the wake of anti-Tutsi violence that drove thousands of Tutsi into exile in 1959. In the years that followed his 1961 election as Rwanda’s president, he oversaw anti-Tutsi pogroms that forced tens of thousands of Tutsi, as well as Hutu, to settle elsewhere in Rwanda or take refuge outside the country.
6. By the end of 1964, the UN registered over 300,000 Rwandans living in refugee camps on Rwanda’s borders—in Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire.

7. The French government’s civil cooperation with Rwanda continued, despite the French press reports of continued attacks on Tutsi sponsored by the Kayibanda regime.

8. President Juvénal Habyarimana, who took power from Kayibanda in a 1973 coup, presided over a discriminatory regime that forced Tutsi inside Rwanda to live as second-class citizens and denied them equal access to educational, economic, civil service, and military opportunities.

9. In July 1975, France and the Habyarimana government entered into a military cooperation agreement. This agreement authorized the French military to train a new Rwandan Gendarmerie (its national police force). In the following year, the French government began supplying Rwanda with military trainers, weaponry, supplies, and vehicles, as well as military training courses in France.

10. François Mitterrand was elected President of France in 1981 on a Socialist Party platform pledging an end to France’s military support of corrupt and undemocratic African regimes.

11. Rwandan refugees were eager to escape statelessness and mistreatment in other countries (most notably Uganda in 1982). During the 1980s, they urged President Habyarimana to permit their resettlement in Rwanda and sought France’s diplomatic assistance. In response, Habyarimana took an increasingly hard line on the issue, and President Mitterrand was sympathetic to his position.

12. In 1983, France and Rwanda amended their military cooperation agreement to eliminate the restriction on assisting the Rwandan Gendarmerie with “the preparation and execution of operations of war.”

13. In a 1986 public statement, the central committee of the MRND – Rwanda’s sole political party—rejected the refugees’ call for collective repatriation. This pronouncement became a watershed moment, enshrining in the platform of Rwanda’s only political party that the refugees would not be welcomed home.

14. In December 1987, Rwandan refugees, who had spent almost 30 years in various countries around the world without access to their home country, organized under the leadership of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”), which advocated repatriation as well as democratization and liberalization of the Rwandan government.

15. The RPF, which counted Rwandans serving in the Ugandan army amongst its members, raised a clandestine army to prepare for what they referred to as “the Z option”—the use of military force in order to achieve RPF political goals, when diplomacy could not achieve them.
B. **October 1990: The Rwandan Civil War Began, and the French Government Came to the Aid of the Habyarimana Regime, While Ignoring Its Human Rights Abuses.**

16. When the RPF army implemented the Z option and crossed into Rwanda on 1 October 1990, Habyarimana promptly requested and received French military assistance. By 5 October, 300 French troops were on the ground in Rwanda, a deployment known as Operation Noroit.

17. The Noroit troops joined French military cooperants, who were already in Rwanda training the Gendarmerie and three elite units in the FAR: the para-commando battalion, the aviation squadron, and the reconnaissance battalion.

18. During the month of October 1990, French military cooperants advised the Rwandan army at the highest levels, trained elite fighting units, and offered advice on battlefield tactics. The French Noroit forces based in Kigali freed up FAR forces to go to the front. The French government also supplied the FAR with weapons and ammunition.


20. On 15 October 1990, President Mitterrand stated in a press conference that Noroit’s sole mission was the evacuation of French and foreign nationals from Rwanda. Noroit troops would stay for over three years, and French officials would only later publicly acknowledge that those troops were also intended to deter the RPF.

21. French officials also deployed Operation Noroit to pursue geopolitical aims: to shore up French influence in Rwanda and to reassure francophone African partners that the French government would provide military support in the event of external aggression.

22. To project the appearance of honoring a policy not to intervene in African domestic conflicts, the French government encouraged the Rwandan government to mischaracterize the RPF as a group of “foreign aggressors” from Uganda.

23. French officials also mischaracterized the RPF as a Tutsi movement intent on undemocratically dominating the Hutu majority in Rwanda.

24. Reports that the Rwandan government perpetrated serious human rights abuses and anti-Tutsi massacres during the early stages of the conflict did not dissuade the French government from supporting Habyarimana and the FAR.

25. Mitterrand refused recommendations from his military advisors for a partial withdrawal of Noroit forces. As early as 11 October 1990, Mitterrand’s chief military advisor urged a drawdown of troops, so as “not to appear too implicated in supporting Rwandan forces should serious acts of violence against the population be brought to light in current operations.”

26. On 23 January 1991, the RPF military attacked the northwestern Rwandan city of Ruhengeri. Two days later, in retaliation, Habyarimana’s regime slaughtered more than 500 Bagogwe Tutsi civilians in the area.

27. In late March 1991, the French government deployed 30 military personnel in a group called the Détachement d’assistance militaire d’instruction (DAMI). The DAMI worked directly with FAR troops near the combat zone, advised high-ranking officers on tactical matters, helped battalion commanders reorganize their units, and trained soldiers to use heavy weapons and explosives.

28. In a 4 April 1991 report, the head of France’s military cooperation mission in Rwanda unsuccessfully urged Paris to confine the DAMI to a four-month deployment and to end Operation Noroit. He expressed his concern that any additional French military assistance would empower opponents of reform in Rwanda. Both the DAMI trainers and Noroit forces remained in Rwanda.

29. In the summer of 1991, the French government began sponsoring peace negotiations to stop the fighting between the RPF and the Habyarimana government. During these talks, French officials claimed neutrality at the negotiating table, while continuing to support Habyarimana and the FAR.

30. French negotiators excluded the RPF from initial peace negotiations in favor of dealing with Uganda, as the French government continued to incorrectly view the RPF as a proxy for Uganda.

31. French officials encouraged the Habyarimana government to democratize, while accepting continued repression, intimidation, and physical attacks on Tutsi.

32. In March 1992, state-run radio broadcasts incited militias to murder Tutsi civilians and political opponents of Habyarimana’s government in Bugesera, a region just over 40 kilometers south of Kigali. This would later be referred to as the “dress rehearsal” for the Genocide.

33. France’s Ambassador to Rwanda advised Paris that the state-run radio had incited anti-Tutsi violence in Bugesera just five days after it occurred. Multiple foreign governments and civil society groups condemned the violence linked to the false and incendiary broadcasts. Later that month, the French government nevertheless welcomed Ferdinand Nahimana, the director of the state broadcasting agency, to Paris and pledged to increase French investment in Rwandan state media.

34. Following the Bugesera massacres, French military assistance continued, including training the Rwandan Presidential Guard, which would play a leading role in the Genocide. French military assistance to the FAR was so overwhelming that it contributed, at least
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indirectly, to the FAR’s training of the civilian militias that would do much of the killing during the Genocide. There is also evidence that the French DAMI took part in the training of civilian militias.

35. In June 1992, the RPF army launched an offensive in the northern Rwandan city of Byumba. In response, France deployed additional troops to Rwanda and provided munitions, including a battery of 105mm artillery. According to former RPF soldiers and ex-FAR, the French military played a direct role in the use of the 105mm cannons in the field, either directing their use or firing the guns themselves.

36. On 1 August 1992, a ceasefire agreement between the RPF and the Rwandan government went into effect. This agreement produced a powerful anti-Tutsi backlash, including the rise of the extremist political party Coalition pour la défense de la république (CDR) and the expansion of party-controlled militias—particularly, the MRND’s Interahamwe militia.

37. In the fall of 1992, the French government continued to supply the FAR with munitions. France’s support for Habyarimana’s murderous regime disincentivized extremists from accepting a truce with the RPF and bought them more time to plan a genocide.

D. January – March 1993: Ignoring a Devastating Human Rights Report Exposing the Rwandan Government, the French Government Reached the Pinnacle of Its Intervention in the War against the RPF.

38. In January 1993, a consortium of international human rights groups conducted a fact-finding mission in Rwanda and briefed French officials on evidence of government-sponsored violence against Tutsi. French Ambassador Georges Martres informed Paris that the mission’s report would “only add horror to the horror we already know.”

39. The immediate resumption of anti-Tutsi violence following the international investigative team’s departure from Rwanda was widely reported in the French media. France, on 5 February 1993, joined other countries in presenting Habyarimana with a formal démarche urging the Rwandan government to stop the violence.

40. The RPF viewed massacres of Tutsi as a breach of the ceasefire. When, on 8 February 1993, the RPF army attacked government forces in Ruhengeri, the French government did not consider the massacres to be, in the words of the spokesperson for its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “a justification for the resumption of fighting.”

41. In support of the FAR, on 8 February 1993, the French government immediately dispatched to Rwanda additional Noroît soldiers and more munitions.

42. In addition to the Noroit troops and arms, the French government sent special forces to Rwanda on 22 February 1993 for a secret mission dubbed Operation Chimère. The mission’s commander later wrote in his memoir that he effectively controlled the FAR’s war effort during the course of the operation through the beginning of March 1993.

43. At checkpoints, Noroit troops examined identity cards for ethnicity. Per operational orders, the French soldiers were expected to turn over “suspects,” that is, persons suspected of collaboration with the RPF, to the Rwandan Gendarmerie. This process contributed to the discrimination and harassment of Tutsi.

44. As the RPF gained an upper hand on the FAR in early 1993, Mitterrand sought to distance the French military from an increasingly losing cause in Rwanda, while avoiding the appearance of abandoning an ally. He decided that a UN multinational intervention would allow him to do both, and he supported considerations underway at the United Nations to send international forces to Rwanda.

45. In mid-1993, French diplomats worked to convince the United Nations to send observers to the Rwandan-Ugandan border in order to prevent supplies of arms and ammunition from reaching the RPF. Available documents do not reflect any similar suggestion by French officials to monitor munitions to the Rwandan government.

46. In the summer of 1993, French-led training of Rwandan troops increased, in anticipation of France’s approaching departure.

47. On 4 August 1993, President Habyarimana and RPF Chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe signed the Arusha peace agreement. Under the agreement, a UN-led international force was to be deployed, at which time France was expected to withdraw its remaining troops, except for the military cooperants specifically exempted from this provision of the peace agreement.

48. On 13 December 1993, the withdrawal of the Noroit troops concluded. The French government left roughly 25 soldiers in Rwanda who continued to advise and assist the FAR, which was arming and training the Interahamwe, the extremist militia that had already participated in massacres of Tutsi (e.g., Bugesera) and would slaughter Tutsi during the Genocide.

49. Just prior to Noroit’s withdrawal, French officials authorized a French arms company to ship additional munitions to the FAR. The United Nations impounded the munitions when they arrived in Kigali, in January 1994.

50. From the time the Noroit troops arrived in October 1990 until their withdrawal, French officials, on a day-to-day basis, were aware of efforts to dehumanize Tutsi. They watched and observed the rise of political violence, the proliferation of hate speech in extremist media, and the everyday indignities visited upon Tutsi. They witnessed and learned of Tutsi being abused at roadblocks and being arrested and tortured by the Rwandan gendarmerie. They also witnessed and learned of Tutsi women being subjected to sexual harassment and assault. Through its words, actions and indifference, the French government sanctioned and enabled these horrors.
F. 6 April – Mid-June 1994: The French Government Continued to Oppose the RPF, Which Was Fighting to End the Genocide.

51. Extremists had planned and prepared for the Genocide Against the Tutsi. In 2016, a French court would find that a “concerted plan can be inferred from the speed with which the massacres were carried out, as early as the day after the attack on President Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane, the existence of roadblocks throughout Rwanda, including in Kigali, the development of media propaganda calling for inter-ethnic hatred, the distribution of arms and the scale of the massacres, all of which necessarily fall within the competence of a collective organization.”

52. By noon on 7 April, militias and extremist elements within the FAR had massacred Tutsi and non-Tutsi moderate political figures who had been designated to serve in the broad-based transitional government, as called for in the Arusha Accords. These killings occurred both in Kigali and throughout the country.

53. The targeted elimination of politicians and the assassination of Belgian UN peacekeepers paved the way for a coup d’état, ushering in an interim government made up of extremists. French officials were satisfied with the composition of the new government.

54. Within hours of President Habyarimana’s death, French military cooperants living in the nearby FAR base visited the crash site accompanied by Aloys Ntabakuze, head of the elite para-commando unit. (The Presidential Guard denied UN peacekeepers access to the crash site.) Ntabakuze would later be convicted for his command role in the slaughter of over 1,000 (possibly as many as 4,000) Tutsi men, women, and children who had taken shelter at the École Technique Officielle de Kigali.

55. During the first days of the Genocide, French-trained units—particularly the para-commando unit, the reconnaissance battalion, and the Presidential Guard—would play a leading role in assassinating moderate Rwandan politicians and massacring Tutsi civilians.

56. French cooperants who had remained in Rwanda and officials at the French Embassy in Kigali bore witness to the killings, immediately after the Genocide began.

57. The French government responded to the start of the Genocide with Operation Amaryllis, a mission to evacuate French and other foreign nationals. It also evacuated notorious figures in the Genocide, including Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana (the former first lady and the individual at the center of the Akazu, a powerful network of anti-Tutsi extremists) and Ferdinand Nahimana, the director of RTLM.

58. Amaryllis soldiers witnessed the brutal slaughter of Tutsi civilians, but under orders refrained from saving lives.

59. In late April 1994, the French government welcomed senior officials of the genocidal interim Rwandan government to Paris. The officials were in France to request arms and
ammunition. The United States and Belgium refused an audience with the same interim government officials.

60. As the Genocide continued in full view of the international community, France obstructed UN efforts to acknowledge and condemn the complicity of the interim government.

61. President Mitterrand and several senior French officials favored the perpetrators of the Genocide rather than those fighting to stop it—framing the massacres before the international community as the continuation of a war between opposing armies, instead of the Genocide that it was; advocating for a cease-fire and the resumption of a failed peace process, as if negotiation was the antidote to extermination; failing to use France’s influence to stop the hate media broadcasts or otherwise effectively pressure the interim government and the FAR to put an end to the killing; and watering down UN resolutions intended to shame the interim government.

62. As the Genocide took thousands of lives each day in full view of the international community, France obstructed UN efforts to acknowledge and condemn the complicity of the interim government.


63. In June 1994, pressure from the news media, NGOs, and horrified French citizens forced the French government to consider taking action with respect to the Genocide.

64. After operating in Rwanda as a co-belligerent for the preceding three years, the French government sought UN authorization for a humanitarian military intervention in Rwanda.

65. On 22 June 1994, the UN authorized the French government to launch a “humanitarian mission” in Rwanda, despite skepticism that the RPF and various members of the UN Security Council had expressed about the French government’s true intentions and motives.

66. The ensuing operation, known as Operation Turquoise, was not solely humanitarian in nature. Internal communications and actions of Mitterrand and other senior French officials responsible for Turquoise establish that one of the Élysée’s aims was to forestall an RPF victory over the FAR.

67. When the French troops arrived in Rwanda, RTLM broadcast that the French military was coming to save Rwanda from the RPF. The FAR (and other sympathizers) greeted the Turquoise units as would-be saviors.

68. Despite the strictly humanitarian nature of the UN mandate for Operation Turquoise, Mitterrand and some of his advisors continued to seek ways to prevent the RPF from consolidating its control over the country, as did some of the Turquoise officers who had
previously served in Rwanda and still viewed the FAR as partners. Some of those French officers were eventually sidelined.

69. On 27 June 1994, French soldiers confronted evidence of ongoing massacres in Bisesero. There, starved and terrified Tutsi came out of hiding places to beg the French to save them from ongoing killings. Notwithstanding their humanitarian mission, the French soldiers left and reported what they saw up the chain of command. Their superiors did not order them to return for three days. In those three days, more Tutsi were killed.

70. There is evidence that, during Turquoise, French military leaders considered the use of air power against the RPF.

71. On 4 July 1994, the French government established the Safe Humanitarian Zone (“SHZ”), an area in western Rwanda roughly comprising one-fifth of the country. In an effort to impede the westward movement of the RPF army, the French government placed this area under the protection of French forces and declared it off-limits to the RPF military, even to save Tutsi lives.

72. French troops lacked the manpower and resources to provide adequate care for the refugees inside the SHZ.

73. The RPF army secured Kigali on 4 July 1994, and génocidaires were in retreat. The SHZ provided safe harbor to génocidaires fleeing the RPF advance. French officials did not arrest or systematically disarm génocidaires and helped interim government officials move through the SHZ and into Zaire.

74. French officials did not take swift action to shut down or jam RTLM or Radio Rwanda broadcasts. Immediately before they left Rwanda, interim government officials used radio broadcasts to encourage people to flee en masse to Zaire.

75. In Zaire, the ex-FAR began regrouping and planning attacks in Rwanda. French officers stationed in Zaire met with ex-FAR about this effort.

76. Overall, Turquoise was a failed mission. It saved lives but, ultimately, proved incapable of effectively serving its humanitarian purpose. It allowed FAR, militias, and génocidaires to escape, thereby exacerbating a second humanitarian catastrophe in Zaire and contributing to the destabilization of the region.

H. The Genocide Against the Tutsi Was Foreseeable to the French Government.

77. As the RPF military came closer to ending the Genocide, President Mitterrand denied France’s responsibility for the Genocide and claimed that he could not have foreseen it. This was false.

78. In the four years preceding the Genocide, no State worked more closely with the Habyarimana government than did France.
79. Beginning in October 1990, French officials in Rwanda informed Mitterrand and his top aides in Paris that the Rwandan government was massacring Tutsi as reprisals for RPF attacks.

80. Soon after the arrival of French troops, French officials became aware of the dehumanization, vilification, and killing of Tutsi. As former French Ambassador to Rwanda Georges Martres would later reflect, “The genocide was foreseeable as early as then [October 1990], even if we couldn’t imagine its magnitude and atrociousness.”

81. On 24 October 1990, the defense attaché at the French embassy in Rwanda, Colonel René Galinié, warned of “the physical elimination of the Tutsi within the country, 500,000 to 700,000 people.”

82. While the French government continued to support the Habyarimana government during its civil war with the RPF, the French government knew that Habyarimana’s government sponsored massacres as reprisals for RPF attacks and for other political purposes, in Kibilira and Mutara (Oct. 1990), Bigogwe (Jan. 1991), Bugesera (Mar. 1992), Kibuye (Aug. 1992), and Gisenyi-Ruhengeri (Jan. 1993).

83. In January 1993, a consortium of international human rights groups reported to French officials in Rwanda and Paris on its fact-finding mission in Rwanda. It detailed government-run death squads and anti-Tutsi massacres.

84. The French Ministry of Defense disregarded an internal warning from April 1993 to leave Rwanda to avoid being further implicated in the anti-Tutsi massacres and systemic discrimination.

85. Beginning in October 1990, hundreds of French officials—military and civilian—deployed in Rwanda were privy to the hate media outlets (printed and broadcast in French), the use of ethnic IDs, the use of roadblocks to harass Tutsi, the sexual assault of Tutsi women, the torture inflicted on Tutsi by the Gendarmerie, and the growing violence of the militias and the military.

86. The French government knew the CDR and other extremists had designs to murder the Tutsi.

87. In January 1994, three months before the start of the Genocide, the French government received a warning from an informant, relayed through the United Nations, that the Interahamwe planned to slaughter Tutsi en masse.

88. Despite the information available to French officials that foreshadowed the Genocide, the French government did not alter its policy in Rwanda.
Conclusions and Findings

I. Since the Genocide, the French Government Has Covered up Its Role, Distorted the Truth, and Protected Génocidaires.

89. French officials, starting with President Mitterrand, have disclaimed any responsibility for the Genocide. During a September 1994 interview, Mitterrand insisted that “our responsibility is nil.”

90. The 1998 French Parliamentary Mission of inquiry into French actions in Rwanda (“MIP”) had critical flaws. To this day, critical documents and testimony from key MIP witnesses remain secret.

91. In an interview, the head of the MIP, Paul Quilès, cleared France of responsibility despite evidence to the contrary. One of the MIP’s two rapporteurs would later acknowledge that many of the mission’s members were not interested in undertaking a good-faith effort to uncover the truth.

92. French officials have attempted to shift blame for the start of the Genocide to the RPF. They have also promulgated a false narrative that the Genocide Against the Tutsi occurred in parallel to a second genocide allegedly perpetrated against Hutu by the RPF (the “double genocide” theory).

93. In 2006, French Magistrate Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière issued an indictment and arrest warrants for eight senior RPF officials and blamed them for bringing down President Habyarimana’s plane. A French appellate court later found that Bruguière’s investigation was largely based on unverifiable or contradictory statements. While all charges in the case against the RPF officials would ultimately be dismissed, the investigation spanned many years and provided a distraction from the French government’s role in the Genocide.

94. Agathe Kanziga Habyarimana, the former first lady of Rwanda, has been allowed to remain in France despite the National Court of Asylum’s rejection of her asylum application and its finding that she was “at the heart of the regime” and was responsible for “planning of massacres of Tutsis from October 1990 onwards, and therefore among those responsible for planning the [Genocide Against the Tutsi].”

95. French officials have made little effort to bring suspected génocidaires to justice, and many Rwandan génocidaires continue to live freely in France. To date, just three génocidaires have been tried in France (and all three were convicted). The arrest of Félicien Kabuga in May 2020 is a positive sign that French authorities may be more committed to devoting attention and resources to fighting impunity.

96. The French government continues to cover up its role in the Genocide by withholding critical documents. In this investigation, the Rwandan government has made three detailed and specific requests for documents received by the French government on 20 December 2019, 10 July 2020, and 27 January 2021 respectively. Other than acknowledging receipt, the French government has not responded to those requests.
97. Recent disclosures of documents in connection with the Duclert Commission report suggest a move toward transparency.


98. The French government’s responsibility must be measured in the context of the toll on human life that its words and actions enabled in Rwanda.

99. Rwandans, especially survivors of the Genocide, continue to suffer the physical and emotional wounds of violence and loss.
Dramatis Personae

Ancel, Guillaume (Capt.) – French officer of the 68th artillery regiment. He was assigned to the 2nd REI Foreign Infantry Regiment (French Foreign Legion) during Operation Turquoise.


Balladur, Édouard – Prime Minister of France (March 1993 – May 1995).

Barayagwiza, Jean-Bosco – Influential figure in the CDR, an extremist anti-Tutsi political party; Director General of Political Affairs in the Rwandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the Executive Committee for Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) (1993 – 1994); convicted by the ICTR of genocide and crimes against humanity.

Barril, Paul – French mercenary active in Rwanda, including in 1994; former officer in the French National Gendarmerie.

Belliard, Jean-Christophe – First Secretary of the French Embassy in Tanzania; French observer at the Arusha negotiations.


Bicamumpaka, Jérôme – Minister of Foreign Affairs in the interim Rwandan government (1994).

Bizimana, Augustin – Rwandan Minister of Defense (1993 – 1994); IRG Minister of Defense; indicted by the ICTR but never tried. His remains were identified in Congo-Brazzaville in 2020.

Bizimungu, Augustin (Maj. Gen.) – Appointed Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army in April 1994. He was convicted by the ICTR for crimes committed during the Genocide.


Bizimungu, Pasteur – President of Rwanda (1994 – 2000); previously served as RPF Commissioner of Information and Documentation.


Booh-Booh, Jacques-Roger – Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Rwanda and Head of Mission for UNAMIR (1993 – 1994).


Bruguière, Jean-Louis – French magistrate who led an investigation into the 6 April 1994 attack on President Habyarimana’s plane.

Bucyana, Martín – President of the extremist CDR party from its founding in 1992 until his assassination on 22 February 1994.


Carbonare, Jean – President of Survie, a French NGO, from 1988 to 1994; headed a commission of inquiry sent to Rwanda in January 1993 by the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) to investigate human rights violations.


Delort, Dominique (Col.) – Advisor for African Affairs to the Chief of Staff of the French Army (1991); commander of French military operations in Rwanda (1993).

Denard, Bob – French mercenary; previously served in the French navy.


Gasana, Anastase – Member of the MDR opposition party; Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs (July 1993 – Apr. 1994).


Gatabazi, Félicien – President of the PSD opposition political party; served as Rwanda’s Minister of Public Works and Energy from April 1992 until his assassination in February 1994.

Gérard, Yannick – Ambassador of France to Uganda (Aug. 1990 – Aug. 1993); France’s emissary to the IRG during Operation Turquoise.
Germanos, Raymond (Gen.) – Deputy Chief of Operations to Admiral Lanxade, the French Chief of Defense Staff (as of 1 May 1994).

Gillier, Marin (Cdr.) – Head of the French marine commandos during Operation Turquoise (1994).


Habyarimana, Juvénal – President of Rwanda (1973 – 1994).


Huchon, Jean-Pierre (Col., Gen.) – Head of the French Military Cooperation Mission (Apr. 1993 – 1995); deputy to the chief military advisor to the President of France (1989 – 1993);


Kabarebe, James – Private secretary and aide-de-camp to the RPF military’s Chairman of High Command, Paul Kagame.

Kabiligi, Gratien (Brig. Gen.) – Commander of Military Operations in Byumba Sector (1993) and chief of military operations of the FAR during the Genocide.

Kabuga, Félicien – Rwandan businessman; financier of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) and chairman of RTLM’s steering committee; arrested in May 2020 in connection with indictment for genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and other offenses.

Kagame, Paul – Chairman of High Command of the RPF military; Minister of Defense and Vice President of Rwanda (1994 – 2000); President of Rwanda (2000 – present).

Kambanda, Jean – Member of the MDR opposition political party; served as Prime Minister in the interim Rwandan government (Apr. – July 1994); pled guilty at the ICTR to genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and other crimes.

Kanyarengwe, Alexis – Chairman of the RPF (1990 – 1998); previously Rwandan Interior Minister (1973 – 1980).


Kayibanda, Grégoire – President of Rwanda (1962 – 1973); leader of the Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation (“Parmehutu”).


Lafourcade, Jean-Claude (Gen.) – Commander of Operation Turquoise (1994).


Maurin, Jean-Jacques (Lt. Col.) – Deputy to the Defense Attaché at the French embassy in Rwanda; advisor to the Chief of Staff of the FAR; head of the DMAT Terre (Military Department of Technical Assistance).


Mobutu Sese Seko – President of Zaire (1965 – 1997).

Mugenzi, Justin – President of the Parti Libéral opposition political party; Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Crafts in both the 1993-1994 coalition government and the 1994 interim Rwandan government.

Mugeresera, Leon – Vice-President of the MRND for Gisenyi prefecture.

Murenzi, Evariste – FAR officer.

Museveni, Yoweri – President of Uganda (1986 – present).

Musoni, Protais – RPF Vice-Chairperson and General Coordinator (as of 1989); RPF Secretary General (1987 – 1989).


Nahimana, Ferdinand – Director of l’Office Rwandais d’Information (ORINFOR, the broadcasting arm of the Rwandan government) and editorial director of Radio Rwanda (1990 – 1994); founder of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM); convicted by the ICTR on charges of inciting genocide and other genocide-related crimes.

Ngeze, Hassan – Journalist who founded the extremist publication Kangura in 1990; convicted by the ICTR for inciting genocide, among other offenses.


Ngulinzira, Boniface – Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs (1992 – 1993); member of the MDR.

Nsabimana, Déogratias (Col.) – Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army (1992 – 1994); killed in the attack on President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994.


Nsengiyuremye, Dismas – Prime Minister of Rwanda (1992 – 1993); member of the MDR.

Nsengiyumva, Anatole (Col.) – Chief of Military Intelligence of the FAR (1976 – 1981, 1984 – June 1993) and Commander of Gisenyi operational sector (1993 – 1994); found guilty of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other crimes by the ICTR.

Ntabakuze, Aloys (Maj.) – Commander of the FAR para-commando battalion (1992 – 1994); convicted by the ICTR of genocide, crimes against humanity, and other offenses.

Ntahobari, Sébastien (Col.) – Military Attaché to the Rwandan embassy in Paris during the Genocide.

Ntiwiragabo, Aloys (Maj. Gen.) – Head of Military Intelligence of the FAR during the Genocide.


Pinho, José de – Warrant Officer; French technical advisor to the FAR para-commando battalion’s CRAP platoon, an elite intelligence-gathering unit (1993 – Apr. 1994); served in Operation Noroit (1993).

Poncet, Henri (Col.) – Commander of Operation Amaryllis (9 – 14 Apr. 1994).

Prungnaud, Thierry – Chief Warrant Officer of the French Gendarmerie; member of the GIGN deployed to Rwanda between January and May 1992 to train members of the Rwandan Presidential Guard; returned to Rwanda during Operation Turquoise (1994).


Quilès, Paul – President of the French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda in 1998.


Ruhigira, Enoch – President Habyarimana’s Cabinet Director.

Rutaremara, Tito – RPF Secretary General (1987 – 1993); coordinator of the military and political wings of the RPF.

Rwagafilita, Pierre-Célestin (Col.) – Cousin of Agathe Habyarimana; Deputy Chief of Staff of the Rwandan National Gendarmerie and then Chief of Staff of the National Gendarmerie (until June 1992).

Rwarakabije, Paul (Maj.) – Operational commander of the Rwandan Gendarmerie during the Genocide; later served as commander of the rebel FDLR army exiled in the Democratic Republic of Congo before surrendering to the Rwandan Army in 2003 and being reintegrated into the Rwandan Defense Forces in 2004.

Rwigema, Fred (Cdr.) – Founding member and leader of the RPF; killed in action on 2 October 1990.

Sagatwa, Elie (Col.) – Relative of Agathe Habyarimana and head of the military cabinet for the Rwandan presidential office at the time of the attack on President Habyarimana’s plane on 6 April 1994, in which he was killed.

Saint-Exupéry, Patrick de – French journalist.

Saint Quentin, Grégoire de (Cdr.) – Technical Advisor to the commander of the FAR’s paracommando battalion (1992 – 1994).

Sartre, Patrice (Col.) – Commander of the northern group of Operation Turquoise (1994).

Serubuga, Laurent (Col.) – Deputy Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army and then Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army (until June 1992, reinstated in 1994).

Sindikubwabo, Théodore – President of the interim Rwandan government during the Genocide (1994); previously president of the Conseil national de développement (CND, the Rwandan parliament) (1988 – 1994).


Thomann, Jean-Claude (Col.) – Commander of Operation Noroit (1990).

Twagiramungu, Faustin – President of the MDR opposition political party; was designated to be Prime Minister of Rwanda under the Arusha Accords; sworn in as Prime Minister on 19 July 1994.
Uwilingiyimana, Agathe – Member of the MDR opposition political party; served as Rwanda’s Minister of Education (1992 – 1993) and as Prime Minister of Rwanda (1993 – 1994); was assassinated by Rwandan Presidential Guard soldiers at the start of the Genocide.


Zigiranyirazo, Protais – Elder brother of Agathe Habyarimana and member of the Akazu.
GLOSSARY

**AFP**: Agence France-Presse

**Akazu**: “small house;” refers to the close group of corrupt leaders, of which Agathe Habyarimana’s family formed the backbone, who controlled nearly every major aspect of Rwandan society during much of President Habyarimana’s “Second Republic”

**AML**: Automitrailleuse Légère, a type of light armored vehicle

**AMT**: Assistance Militaire Technique [Technical Military Assistance], refers to technical assistants deployed by the French military to professionalize and modernize foreign military units

**AMASASU**: a clandestine organization that purported to speak for Hutu nationalists within the Rwandan military prior to the Genocide

**Arusha Accords**: a series of peace agreements signed by representatives of the government of Rwanda and the RPF, culminating in the August 1993

**BBC**: British Broadcasting Corporation

**Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG)**: the cabinet that was designated to wield power in a new transitional government in Rwanda following the signing of the 1993 Arusha Accords, but that never came into being

**Bourgmestre**: mayor of a commune in Rwanda

**CDR**: Coalition pour la Défense de la République [Coalition for the Defense of the Republic], an anti-Tutsi extremist party allied with President Habyarimana’s MRND party before the Genocide

**CLADHO**: Comité de Liaison des Associations de Défense des Droits de l’Homme [Liaison Committee of Associations for the Defense of Human Rights], a coalition of Rwandan human-rights groups

**CND**: Conseil National de Développement [National Development Council], Rwanda’s parliament

**COS**: Commandement des Opérations Spéciales [Special Operations Command] (France)

**CPCR**: Collectif des Parties Civiles Pour le Rwanda [Civil Parties Collective for Rwanda], a nonprofit based in Reims, France that seeks to bring génocidaires to justice

**CRAP**: Commandos de Recherche et d’Action dans la Profondeur [In-Depth Research and Action Commandos], an elite intelligence-gathering unit within the FAR’s para-commando battalion

**CRCD**: Centre de Recherche Criminelle et de Documentation [Center for Criminal Research and Documentation], a facility in Kigali, formerly known as the Fichier Central [Central File], where criminal investigations and interrogations were conducted

**DAMI**: Détachement d’Assistance Militaire et d’Instruction [military assistance and training detachment], a term referring to a temporary deployment of French military officers to provide training and advice to foreign military units

**DAMI Panda**: a contingent of French military advisors stationed in Rwanda between March 1991 and December 1993 to train Rwandan soldiers

**DGSE**: Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure [General Directorate for External Security], France’s foreign intelligence and counterintelligence agency
DMZ: Demilitarized zone

DPKO: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly known as Zaire

DRM: Direction du Renseignement Militaire [Directorate of Military Intelligence], the French army’s intelligence branch

Duclert Commission: a commission of researchers (known, in French, as la Commission de recherche sur les archives françaises relatives au Rwanda et au Génocide des Tutsi) appointed by French President Emmanuel Macron to examine the French government’s role in the Genocide, which released a report of its findings in March 2021

Élysée: The Palais de l’Élysée is the official residence and office of the president of France

EMP: L’état-major particulier du président de la République [particular staff of the president of the republic], the staff of military advisors in the Élysée

ENA: École Nationale d’Administration, an elite French graduate school

ENI: Enemy

ESCAVI: Escadrille d’Aviation (Rwanda), the Rwandan armed forces’ aviation squadron

FAL: Fusil Automatique Léger [lightweight automatic rifle]

FAR: Forces Armées Rwandaises [Rwandan Armed Forces]


Gendarmerie: national police

GIGN: Groupement d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale [National Gendarmerie Intervention Group], an elite tactical unit in the French Gendarmerie

GOF: Government of France

GOMN: Neutral Group of Military Observers, organized by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to monitor cease-fires between the FAR and RPF forces during the war in Rwanda

GOR: Government of Rwanda

GSIGP: Groupe de Sécurité et d’Intervention de la Garde Présidentielle [Presidential Guard Security and Intervention Group], a tactical unit of the Rwandan Gendarmerie modeled on the French National Gendarmerie’s Security and Intervention Group

HRW: Human Rights Watch, an international non-governmental organization

ICTR: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, an international court established after the Genocide to bring perpetrators of the Genocide to justice

ICTY: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

Impuzamugambi: anti-Tutsi youth militia affiliated with the CDR political party; the name means “Those with a single purpose,” in Kinyarwanda

Interahamwe: anti-Tutsi youth militia affiliated with the MRND political party; the name means “Those who come together,” in Kinyarwanda
**IRG**: Interim Rwandan government, the self-appointed government of Rwanda during the Genocide

**Kangura**: a pro-Hutu extremist publication in Rwanda

**KWSA**: Kigali Weapons Secure Area, administered by UNAMIR prior to the Genocide

**La Baule**: a commune in western France where President Mitterrand delivered a major speech to African leaders in June 1990

**LRAC**: Lance-roquettes anti-chars [Anti-tank rocket launchers]

**MAM**: Mission d’Assistance Militaire [Military Assistance Mission], the authority under which French military cooperants worked with the Rwandan military pursuant to the 1975 Franco-Rwandan military assistance agreement

**Matignon**: a metonym referring to the office of the French prime minister

**MCM**: Mission de Coopération Militaire [Military Cooperation Mission], an office within the French Ministry of Cooperation and Development responsible for supervising France’s military partnerships with African governments

**MDM**: Médecins du Monde [Doctors of the World], an international non-governmental organization

**MDR**: Mouvement Démocratique Républicain [Democratic Republican Movement], a Rwandan political party that was part of the political opposition to President Habyarimana’s MRND party

**MILAN**: Western European anti-tank missile

**MIP**: Mission d’Information Parlementaire [parliamentary information mission], the French National Assembly’s 1998 information mission that conducted hearings on France’s involvement in Rwanda and issued a report on the subject

**MRND**: Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement [National Revolutionary Movement for Development], Rwanda’s governing political party during the era of one-party rule under President Habyarimana

**MSF**: Médecins Sans Frontières [Doctors Without Borders], an international non-governmental organization

**NATO**: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**NGO**: Non-governmental organization

**NIF**: Neutral international force, a term referring to the peacekeeping force (what would later become known as UNAMIR) that the government of Rwanda and the RPF, as parties to the 1993 Arusha Accords, had urged the international community to deploy to Rwanda

**NRA**: National Resistance Army (Uganda)

**OAU**: Organization of African Unity

**OFPRA**: Office Français de Protection des Réfugiés et Apatrides [Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons], the French agency responsible for processing asylum claims

**Operation Amaryllis**: a deployment of French troops to Rwanda at the start of the Genocide in April 1994, during which French forces evacuated French nationals and some Rwandan nationals
Operation Chimère: a secret French military operation launched in February 1993 to help the Rwandan military counter an RPF offensive

Operation Noroît: a contingent of French troops stationed primarily in Kigali between October 1990 and December 1993

Operation Turquoise: a UN-authorized mission, led by France, that deployed to Rwanda between June 1994 and August 1994

Operation Volcan: a deployment of French troops to Rwanda in February 1993 to evacuate French nationals following an RPF offensive in Ruhengeri

ORINFOR: l’Office Rwandais d’Information [Rwandan Information Office], the Rwandan media and propaganda ministry

Parmehutu: Parti du Mouvement et de l’Émancipation Hutu [Party of the Movement and of Hutu Emancipation], the political party led by Grégoire Kayibanda, Rwanda’s first president

PDC: Parti Démocrate Chrétien [Christian Democratic Party], a Rwandan political party

PL: Parti Libéral [Liberal Party], a Rwandan political party

PNG: Persona non grata

Prefect: governor and chief administrator of a Rwandan prefecture (province)

PSD: Parti Social Démocrate [Social Democratic Party], a Rwandan political party

Quai d'Orsay: a metonym referring to the French Foreign Ministry

RANU: Rwandese Alliance for National Unity, an organization of Rwandans in exile which later morphed into the RPF

RAP: Régiment d’Artillerie Parachutiste [Parachute Artillery Regiment], a unit of the French army

Recce: Reconnaissance

RFI: Radio France Internationale

RICM: Régiment d’Infanterie et de Chars de Marine [Marine Infantry Tank Regiment], a regiment of the French Army

RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army, the military wing of the RPF

RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front [known in French as the Front Patriotique Rwandais, or FPR]

RPIMA/RPIMA: Régiment Parachutiste d’Infanterie de Marine [Marine Infantry Paratroopers Regiment], a French special forces unit

RTLM: Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines, a privately-run radio station in Rwanda that became a tool of the génocidaires

SCR: Service Central de Renseignements [Central Intelligence Service], Rwanda’s intelligence service

SHZ: Safe humanitarian zone (Rwanda), an area in western Rwanda placed under the protection of Operation Turquoise forces in July 1994

UN: United Nations

UNAMIR: United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme
**UNOMUR**: United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda, a mission established in June 1993 to monitor the Rwandan-Ugandan border

**UPC**: Uganda People’s Congress, a political party in Uganda

**VIP**: Very important person

**VLRA**: Véhicule Léger de Reconnaissance et d’Appui [light reconnaissance and support vehicle]